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Consumer Power to Change the Food System?
A Critical Reading of Food Labels as Governance Spaces:
The Case of Açaí Berry Superfoods
Christine Parker,* Hope Johnson ** and Janine Curll ***
Abstract:
This article argues that the marketing claims on food labels
are a governance space worthy of critical examination. We use a case
study of superfood açaí berry products to illustrate how marketing
claims on food labels encapsulate dominant neoliberal constructions
of global food systems. These marketing claims implicitly promise
that by making careful choices consumers can resist and redress the
ravages of unbridled global capitalism. Food labels suggest that
consumers can use market signals to simultaneously govern our own
selves and the market to ensure sustainable, fair, and healthy
consumption. In response, this article develops, justifies and applies
a socio-legal approach to researching food chain governance which
uses the food label as its unit of analysis and traces from the micro
level of what the everyday consumer is exposed to on a food label to
the broader governance processes that the food label both symbolizes
and effects. We demonstrate our approach through a “label and chain
governance analysis” of açaí berry marketing claims to deconstruct
both the regulatory governance of the chain behind the food choices
available to the consumer evident from the label and the way in
which labels seek to govern consumer choices. Our analysis unpacks
the nutritionist, primitivist undertones to the health claims made on
these products, the neo-colonial and racist dimensions in their claims
regarding fair trade and rural socio-economic development, and, the
use of green-washing claims about biodiversity conservation and
ecological sustainability. Through our application of this approach to
the case study of açaí berry product labels, we show how food labels
can legitimize the market-based governance of globalized food
chains and misleadingly suggest that capitalist production can be
adequately restrained by self-regulation, market-based governance
and reflexive consumer choices alone. We conclude by suggesting
the need for both greater deconstruction of the governance
assumptions behind food labels and to possibilities for collective,

Professor of Law, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne.
School of Law, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology and the
Institute for Future Environments.
***
PhD candidate, Law Faculty, Monash University.
*

**
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public interest oriented regulatory governance of both labelling and
the food system.
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I. Introduction
To read the marketing claims on the label of an exotic
superfood sold in Western countries like the United States and
Australia, such as the Amazonian açaí berry, is to be promised a
“healthier you,”1 a more sustainable food system and a kinder,
gentler capitalism. One brand of açaí berry product, for example, tells
us that, “for countless centuries, the people of the Amazon have
revered this unique fruit for its nutritional content and prized it as a
source of health and vitality.” 2 Another promises that “now you can
unlock the energy of the Amazon and better health everyday.” 3 A
third assures us that, despite its healthfulness and exoticness, açaí
This emphasis on individual health, and personal control over bodily health, is
consistent with neoliberal approaches to regulating health. See, e.g., Casimir
MacGregor, Alan Petersen & Christine Parker, Hyping the market for ‘anti-ageing’
in the news: From medical failure to success in self-transformation, 13
BIOSOCIETIES 64 (2018).
2
HOPE JOHNSON, ET AL.., Consumer Choice as a Pathway to Food Diversity: A Case
Study of Açaí Berry Product Labeling, in FOOD DIVERSITY BETWEEN RIGHTS, DUTIES
AND AUTONOMIES: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES FOR A S CIENTIFIC, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL
DEBATE ON THE RIGHT TO FOOD AND AGROECOLOGY 307, 315 (Alessandro Isoni, et
al eds., 2018).
3
Id. at 316.
1
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berries taste delicious and familiar like “a fruit sorbet with hints of
dark chocolate and red wine.”4
These claims encapsulate dominant neoliberal constructions
of global food systems as capable of providing ethical, healthy
products through supply chains significantly governed and arranged
by market signals. These marketing claims implicitly task consumers
with sending the “right” market signals to shape food supply chains
and reinforce the positioning of consumers as regulators of our own
consumption and the ultimate determiners of our own bodily health.
Açaí berry marketing suggests that if we consumers govern our
choices “correctly” by eating these “utopian edibles,”5 we can protect
ourselves from cancer, aging and heart disease. 6 Moreover, we can
simultaneously alleviate poverty and related inequalities experienced
by the indigenous inhabitants of the Amazon while preserving
biodiverse ecologies. In short, we are told that by making careful
choices based on the marketing and information on food labels we
can resist and redress the ravages of unbridled global capitalism,
while simultaneously governing our own selves and the market to
ensure sustainable, fair, and healthy consumption.
The second part of this article argues that the food label is
itself a governance space worthy of critical examination. We define
the food “label” broadly, in line with legal definitions, as including
all the tags, brands, marks, statements, representations, designs and
descriptions on food and its packaging and made or displayed to
consumers when it is sold. 7 Collectively, we consider these aspects
Daniela Dunde-Brown, Kiss the Berry Creek Street, CONCRETE PLAYGROUND (June
7, 2016), https://concreteplayground.com/brisbane/restaurants/kiss-the-berry-creekstreet.
5
Jessica Loyer, What Makes a Superfoods “Super”? The Discursive Construction
of Utopian Edibles, 21ST SYMPOSIUM OF AUSTRALIAN GASTRONOMY: UTOPIAN
APPETITES (2017).
6
Jen Miller, 15 Health Benefits of Açaí Berries, According to Science (7 Delicious
Recipes), JENS REVIEWS, https://www.jenreviews.com/açaí-berries/ (last visited
Feb. 23, 2019).
7
This wording is based on the definition of “label” in Standard 1.1.2 of Australia
New Zealand Food Standards Code. Broad definitions of food labels are common
across jurisdictions consistent with the definition provided by the Codex
Alimentarius which is the source for international food standards. Codex
Alimentarius, CODEX STAN 1-1985[2] (Rev. 1-1991) defines a label as “any tag,
brand, mark, pictorial or other descriptive matter, written, printed, stenciled, marked,
embossed or impressed on, or attached to, a container of food.” The US, for instance,
defines “label” as “a display, written, printed or graphic matter upon the immediate
container of any article.” Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C § 321(k)
(2012); while labelling means “all labels and other written, printed or graphic matter
(1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such
an article.” Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C § 321(m) (2012).
4
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of the food label to visibly manifest a series of (contestable)
governance processes that influence both the choices presented to us
as consumers, and also how we understand what we do when we
choose one or another food.
Our approach draws on Dorothy Smith’s “sociology for
people” to unpack the complex social and institutional arrangements
within which everyday experience is embedded. 8 We also draw on
the insights of regulatory studies scholarship for our understanding
of food labels as governance spaces. This scholarship understands
regulation as emerging from the interactions, stories and power
contests between government, industry and civil society
organizations and individuals in any particular domain. 9 Food
labelling is a governance space, we posit, because the information,
stories and images provided (and what they leave out, simplify or
exaggerate) 10 reflect the outcomes of those contests. Practices and
decisions concerning the sourcing, processing and transporting of
produce, and the contractual, legislative and voluntary certification
conditions under which these activities occur, illuminates where
regulatory power lies in food chains and for what purposes it is being
exercised.
Food labelling is also a governance space in the sense that it
is a forward attempt to influence the choices of individual consumers.
People make choices about what to consume based on their selfidentity, and construct consumption as a form of self-expression and
status signaling. 11 Consumer choices are, therefore, performative.
They shape and reinforce our agency, identity, subjectivities, and
intentions, including our conceptions of the responsibilities
See DOROTHY E. SMITH, INSTITUTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY: A SOCIOLOGY FOR PEOPLE
29 (2005).
9
See PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES
FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 17 (1998); see also Burkard Eberlein et al., Transnational
business governance interactions: Conceptualization and framework for analysis, 8
REG. & GOVERNANCE 1 (2014); see also LEIGH HANCHER & MICHAEL MORAN,
ORGANIZING REGULATORY SPACE (1998); see also Colin Scott, Analysing
Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional Design, PUB. L. 283
(2001).
10
See CAROL BACCHI, WOMEN, POLICY AND POLITICS: THE CONSTRUCTION OF
POLICY PROBLEMS (1999).
11
See Pierre Bourdieu, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF
TASTE (1984); see also C. Fischler, Food, Self and Identity, 27 Sᴏᴄ. SCI. INFO. 275
(1988); see also Margaret K. Hogg & Paul C. N. Michell, Identity, self and
consumption: A conceptual framework, 12 J. MKTG. MGMT. 629 (1996); see also
Janet Borgerson, Materiality, Agency, and the Constitution of Consuming Subjects:
Insights For Consumer Research, NA-32 ACR N. AM. ADVANCES (2005),
http://acrwebsite.org/volumes/9116/volumes/v32/NA-32 (last visited Feb. 15,
2019); see also RUSSELL KEAT, THE AUTHORITY OF THE CONSUMER (1994).
8
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consumers have to govern themselves and the market. 12 Neoliberal
governance thus enlists the consumer as a governance agent of
themselves and of broader social change. 13 We, therefore, suggest
the need for a “label and chain governance analysis” for
deconstructing both (a) the regulatory governance of the chain
behind the food choices available to the consumer evident from the
label and, relatedly, (b) the way in which labels seek to govern
consumer choices. 14
The third part of the article introduces our case study of açaí
berry “superfood” product labelling in Australia. The remainder of
the article uses this case study to illustrate how our approach to
deconstructing food labels as governance spaces can draw out the
multiple, varied and complex politics of the global food system
starting from the standpoint of the everyday consumer and
uncovering the institutions and governance arrangements that
support the supply chain as a whole.
We show that misleading claims on labels go beyond simply
attracting customers via meaningless puffery. Rather, these claims
reinforce the neoliberal ideology, and related governance trajectory,
that consumer power and markets are the optimal regulatory
instrument for food systems. Through a close inspection, we unpack
the nutritionist, primitivist undertones to the health claims (Part IV),
the neo-colonial and racist dimensions in the description of the
traditional groups behind açaí production connected to claims
regarding fair trade and rural socio-economic development (Part V),
and, finally, the use of green-washing claims about biodiversity
conservation and ecological sustainability (Part VI). By depicting
açaí as a product that can address a multitude of food system issues
See Josee Johnston, Michelle Szabo & Alexandra Rodney, Good food, good
people: Understanding the cultural repertoire of ethical eating, 11 J. CONSUMER
CULTURE 293 (2011); see also Dr Mara Miele & Adrian Evans, When foods become
animals: Ruminations on Ethics and Responsibility in Care-full practices of
consumption, 13 ETHICS, PLACE & ENV’T 171 (2010).
13
See Jane Dixon & Cathy Banwell, Re-embedding trust: unravelling the
construction of modern diets, 14 CRITICAL PUB. HEALTH 117 (2004).
14
This article furthers the socio-legal analysis of food label first developed by
Parker: see Christine Parker, The Food Label as Governance Space: Free-Range
Eggs and the Fallacy of Consumer Choice, 35 RECHT DER WERKELIJKHEID, 101
(2014); see also Christine Parker & Josephine De Costa, Misleading the Ethical
Consumer: The Regulation of Free-Range Egg Labelling, 39 MELB. U. L. REV. 895
(2015); see also Christine Parker et al., Can the Hidden Hand of the Market be an
Effective and Legitimate Regulator? The Case of Animal Welfare Under a Labeling
for Consumer Choice Policy Approach, 11 REG. & GOVERNANCE 368 (2017); see
also Christine Parker, Rachel Carey & Gyorgy Scrinis, The Meat in the Sandwich:
Welfare Labelling and the Governance of Meat-Chicken Production in Australia, 45
J. L. & SOC’Y 341 (2018). See also further discussion infra at Part II C.
12
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while still being a globally traded commodity, the need for collective,
public-interested responses to global and local issues are obscured
such as public health, social justice, rural development, conservation
and ecological limits. Moreover, claims on food labels can
contribute, as will be seen in the case of açaí, to recreating the types
of food chains the claims purport the product to transform.
The final part of this article (Part VII) turns to the
implications the analysis has for the (de)construction of the chains
binding consumer governance choices. We suggest an urgent need
for scholars and activists to tease out the implications of analyses like
these in terms of what choices consumers do and do not have, and
what possibilities there are for friction and contestation in the
governance chain for an emancipatory politics of the label. Critically
examining the label as a (market) governance space points to the
places where holistic food policy interventions at the national and
international level are urgently needed to both empower citizens and
create healthier, fairer and environmentally regenerative food
systems.
II. Background and Methodological Approach
A. Consumer choice governance and global food chains
As food supply chains expand globally, and food-processing
technologies develop, consumers have more available options than
ever before. Historically, colonial empires organized and controlled
global food supply chains, and later food supply chains were
organized around nation-states. 15 Today, global food supply chains
are arranged largely through networks of actors that operate
somewhere “between arm’s length markets, on the one hand, and
large vertically integrated corporations, on the other.”16 The actors
within food supply chains develop, monitor or comply with varying
regulatory instruments, such as corporate or international
institutional codes of practices, guidelines, and standards, domestic
and international laws, and contractual agreements. Meanwhile, state
interventions in global supply chains are limited and shaped by,
among other constraints, international trade and investment
treaties. 17
Harriet Friedmann & Philip McMichael, Agriculture and the State System: The
rise and decline of national agricultures, 1870 to the present, 29 SOCIOLOGIA
RURALIS 93, 96 (1989).
16
Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey & Timothy Sturgeon, The governance of global
value chains, 12 REV. OF INT’L POL. ECON. 78, 79 (2005).
17
See, e.g., Anne Marie Thow et al., Will the next generation of preferential trade
and investment agreements undermine prevention of noncommunicable diseases? A
15
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With reduced state intervention, and notably high levels of
corporate concentration, global food chains represent a neoliberal
approach to governance in which private regulation and consumer
choice are key organizing principles for food systems. 18
Underpinning these principles is the rationale that consumer choices
send market signals through supply chains to the actors that influence
where and how the supply chain functions, and under what
conditions. When consumer choices are understood as holding the
power to transform food value chains, then it falls heavily on each
individual to make choices that contribute to food systems consistent
with commonly shared values such as fairness and environmental
stewardship. Given this positioning, consumer choice and individual
responsibility can be understood as “a regulatory regime based on
voluntarism, market solutions and the state acting at a distance.” 19
In this context, food labelling takes on a broader and deeper
significance than solely a written descriptor of contents. Rather, food
labels play a central role in framing the implications of food choices
for the individual in terms of their identity, health status and social
relationships, and with regard to signaling that consumer choices
influence decisions made in supply chains. 20
Three separate bodies of work question the framing of
consumer choice as a solution to health, environmental and justice
issues in food systems. The first body of work centers on critically
reviewing the dominant construction of individuals as responsible for
their food choices and diet-related health outcomes. 21 Scholars
prospective policy analysis of the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement, 119
HEALTH POL’Y 88, 89 (2015).
18
David Burch & Geoffrey Lawrence, Towards a third food regime: behind the
transformation, 26 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 267, 268 (2009); Kiah Smith, Geoffrey
Lawrence & Carol Richards, Supermarkets’ Governance of the Agri-food Supply
Chain: Is the “Corporate-Environmental” Food Regime Evident in Australia, 17
INT’L J. SOC. AGRIC. & FOOD 140, 141 (2010).
19
Unni Kjærnes, Ethics and Action: A Relational Perspective on Consumer Choice
in the European Politics of Food, 25 J. AGRIC. ENVTL. ETHICS 145, 147 (2012).
20
BOURDIEU, supra note 11; SIDNEY WILFRED MINTZ, TASTING FOOD, TASTING
FREEDOM: EXCURSIONS INTO EATING, CULTURE, AND THE PAST (1997); Carole A.
Bisogni et al., Who We Are and How We Eat: A Qualitative Study of Identities in
Food Choice, 34 J. OF NUTRITION EDUC. AND BEHAV. 128–139 (2002).
21
See generally, Steven Shapin, Expertise, Common Sense, and the Atkins Diet, in
EXPERTISE, COMMON SENSE, AND THE ATKINS DIET 174 (J Porter & PWB Phillips
eds., 2007), https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/3425897 (finding that people are
inclined to follow government food pyramids or privately researched diet plans);
Robert Crawford, Health as a Meaningful Social Practice, 10 HEALTH 401, 402
(2006) (stating that “personal responsibility for health is widely considered the sine
qua non of individual autonomy and good citizenship.”); see also, JONATHAN M.
METZL & ANNA KIRKLAND, AGAINST HEALTH: HOW HEALTH BECAME THE NEW
MORALITY 9 (2010) (claiming that “individuals striving for health, are in some
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acknowledge that individuals are, to an extent, personally
responsible for their food choices and related health outcomes.
Critically, though, environmental factors are significant determinants
for the overconsumption of unhealthy foods. As Roberto et al.
explains:
A series of environmental factors are exploiting
biological, psychological, social, and economic
vulnerabilities of people in ways that undermine
their ability to act in their long-term self-interest.
The high profits that come from the successful
exploitation of vulnerabilities are often the driving
force behind environmental changes that promote
overconsumption of food. 22
Researchers have examined the various strategies used to
exploit these vulnerabilities. For instance, Scrinis23 and Nestle24
show how the reductive emphasis on individual nutrients suits the
commercial interests of food manufacturers. Similarly, Dixon and
Banwell 25 and Penders and Nellis26 critically investigate how
interactions between food corporations, diet-disease researchers and
other groupings of professionals (e.g. dietitians, chefs, personal
trainers) construct credibility for food marketing claims, which in
turn influences the scientific evidence on which regulators base their
responses to product claims.
The second body of work has focused on public regulation
and private accreditation of particular ethical and political claims on
food labels such as fair trade, organic, higher animal welfare and
various quality and terroir claims. 27 This line of research illuminates
instances, rendered more difficult by the ways in which health are culturally
configured and socially sustained.”) see also, Janne Huovila & Sampsa Saikkonen,
Establishing credibility, constructing understanding: The epistemic struggle over
healthy eating in the Finnish dietetic blogosphere, 20 HEALTH 383–400 (2016).
22
Christina A. Roberto, et al., Patchy Progress on Obesity Prevention: Emerging
Examples, Entrenched Barriers, and New Thinking, 385 LANCET 2400, 2404 (2015).
23
GYORGY SCRINIS, NUTRITIONISM: THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF DIETARY ADVICE
49 (2013).
24
MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES
NUTRITION AND HEALTH 41 (2007).
25
Dixon and Banwell, supra note 13, at 1.
26
Pat Benders & Annemiek P. Nelis, Credibility Engineering in the Food Industry:
Linking Science, Regulation, and Marketing in a Corporate Context, 24 SCIENCE IN
CONTEXT 487, 487 (2011).
27
See generally, Julie Guthman, The Polanyian Way? Voluntary Food Labels as
Neoliberal Governance, 39 ANTIPODE 456, 456 (2007) (stating “[w]e expand upon
the notion of the ‘credibility cycle’ through a study of credibility engineering by the
food industry.”); see also, Brian Ilbery et al., Product, Process and Place: An
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how consumer anxieties about, and distrust of, industrially produced,
processed and distributed foods have created demand for niche
markets and related schemes for verifying ethical claims. Consumer
choices are constructed as performances of moral and political acts
such as ethical or sustainable consumption, 28 political
consumerism29 and developmental consumption. 30 Evan and Miele
observe, “ethical food labels reflect a socio-political environment in
which consumption is deemed to be an appropriate, if not a
preeminent, field through which to exert influence over the ethics of
the entire food system.”31 Yet much of this work shows that
voluntary food label schemes create, at best, incremental and
contingent change, and generally fail to create the space for deeper
transformations of industrial food systems. Indeed, these ethical and
political claims tend to legitimize, green-wash and reinforce
confidence in the ability of market mechanisms to address food
system issues. 32
The final key body of work connects the normative claims
made through advertisements with cultures and societal structures
that not only encourage but also depend on the over-consumption of
Examination of Food Marketing and Labelling Schemes in Europe and North
America, 12 EUR. URBAN & REGIONAL STUD. 116, 117 (2005) (discussing the
importance of proper food labelling); HENRY BULLER & EMMA ROE, FOOD AND
ANIMAL WELFARE (2018) (stating “[t]he central argument of this original book… is
that the concern for the welfare of farm animals… constitutes a significant and vital
linkage between the processes and the acts of consumption and production.”); TIM
BARTLEY ET AL., LOOKING BEHIND THE LABEL: GLOBAL INDUSTRIES AND THE
CONSCIENTIOUS CONSUMER (2015) (exploring the link between consumption and
production processes in global industries).
28
CLIVE BARNETT ET AL., GLOBALIZING RESPONSIBILITY: THE POLITICAL
RATIONALITIES OF ETHICAL CONSUMPTION 15 (2010).
29
MICHELLE MICHELETTI, POLITICAL VIRTUE AND SHOPPING INDIVIDUALS,
CONSUMERISM, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (2003).
30
Michael K. Goodman, The Mirror of Consumption: Celebritization,
Developmental Consumption and the Shifting Cultural Politics of Fair Trade, 41
GEOFORUM 104, 105 (2010).
31
Adrian Evans & Mara Miele, Food Labelling as a Response to Political
Consumption, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON CONSUMPTION 191 (Margit Keller et al.
eds., 2017).
32
Julie Guthman, Neoliberalism and the making of food politics in California, 39
GEOFORUM 1171, 1173 (2008); Angela Tregear, Progressing knowledge in
alternative and local food networks: Critical reflections and a research agenda, 27
J. RURAL STUD. 419 (2011); Alison Hope Alkon & Teresa Marie Mares, Food
sovereignty in US food movements: radical visions and neoliberal constraints, 29
AGRICULTURE AND HUMAN VALUES 347, 347 (2012); Vaughan Higgins, Jacqui
Dibden & Chris Cocklin, Neoliberalism and natural resource management: Agrienvironmental standards and the governing of farming practices, 39 GEOFORUM
1776, 1777 (2008); cf. Edmund Harris, Neoliberal subjectivities or a politics of the
possible? Reading for difference in alternative food networks, 41 AREA 55, 55
(2009).
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food. The term “consumptogenic” environments refer to the varied
factors that encourage individuals to excessively consume unhealthy
products such as a societal emphasis on economic growth, marketing
that fosters personal insecurity, and a culture that values fulfilling
wants. 33 The extreme emphasis on individualism within capitalist
societies, inter alia, encourages individuals to construct their selfidentity and communicate their status to others through their
consumption choices. 34 In the case of food, the global trend away
from consuming traditional foods based on distinct food cultures and
ecosystems towards “Westernised” diets has diluted previously clear
social rules around consumption. 35 Consumers now depend heavily
on food marketing including food labels (broadly defined) to
construct their own value system for making food choices, which in
turn informs their views of self. 36 In our analysis of açaí berry labels
below, we draw particularly on Warde’s argument that four sets of
contradictory advice were commonly used to structure food choice
in advertisements in British women’s magazines.37 These are (1)
novelty and tradition; (2) health and indulgence; (3) convenience and
care; and (4) economy and extravagance. 38 Consistent with
Bourdieu’s conceptualizations of the feedback loops between
consumer choices, social position, and lifestyle, Warde argues that
these “antinomies of taste” are far more than mere marketing
devices. 39 Rather, he suggests they are aimed at allaying consumer
anxieties in relation to “real, contradictory appeals, representing
social pressures that operate on food choice.”40 Similarly, Schneider
and Davis’ content analysis of several decades of the Australian
Women’s Weekly (Australia’s most popular magazine) shows how
food advertisements purposely exploit these “antinomies of taste” to
33
Jane Dixon & Cathy Banwell, Choice Editing for the Environment: Managing
Corporate Risks, in RISK AND SOCIAL THEORY IN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
180 (Thomas Measham & Stewart Lockie eds., 2012) (arguing that, “consumption
moved from simply fulfilling the basic needs of shelter, food, clothing and mobility
and acquired nationalistic, social and moral overtones.”); JOHN COVENEY, FOOD 49–
50 (2014).
34
See SÉBASTIEN CHARLES, PARADOXICAL INDIVIDUALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO
GILLES LIPOVETSKY, HYPERMODERN TIMES 1, 15 (ANDREW BROWN TRANS., 2005).
35
This trend is termed the “nutrition transition” and is associated with the “double
burden of malnutrition” which refers to the converging malnutrition-related issues
within societies and populations, that is, the prominence of diet-related NCDs
associated with obesity and the continuation of undernutrition (i.e. hunger). See
Barry M. Popkin, et al, NOW AND THEN: The Global Nutrition Transition: The
Pandemic of Obesity in Developing Countries, 70 NUTR. REV. 3, 6–7 (2012).
36
Fischler, supra note 11, at 277, 290–291.
37
ALAN WARDE, CONSUMPTION, FOOD AND TASTE 49 (1997).
38
Id. at 3.
39
Id. at 55–56.
40
Id. at 49.
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create or trigger consumer feelings of risk and anxiety, which can
then be immediately resolved by choosing the branded product. 41
Drawing on these three bodies of work, we connect and
extend these analyses to show how a range of claims and
representations (including implicit appeals to the four antinomies) on
food labels reinforce the value of consumption and systematically
undermine institutional resources and capacity to consider other
ways food systems could function.
B. The Food Label as a Governance Space
At the nexus of the various dimensions explored in the
previous section lies our argument that the food label is a governance
space. Recalling the broad definition of food labels outlined in the
introduction, we consider the term “food labels” to encompass all the
packaging, stories, and visual images made or displayed to
consumers when food is sold. 42 Besides their materiality, we
consider food labels to be, firstly, representations of the decisions
made in the value chain that influence its operation. The food label
encapsulates “a particular socio-economic ordering of the food
system.” Indeed, the distance between producers and consumers
requires a narrative about the item’s qualities and value chain that
fosters trust and attracts consumers. 43 The label communicates that
narrative.
Secondly, we consider food labels to be performative or, as
Evans and Miele put it, “devices.” 44 Food labels hold potential to
bring about material consequences by influencing supply chains and
by contouring societal understandings of food system issues and
solutions, thus channeling “our ethics and politics along certain preset paths.”45 The food label is, therefore, a very small piece of
“valuable real estate” 46 on which larger contests over ecologies,
markets and consumer bodies are all played out.
Tanja Schneider & Teresa Davis, Advertising food in Australia: Between
antinomies and gastro‐anomy, 13 CONSUMPTION MARKETS & CULTURE 31, 39
(2010).
42
As mentioned in the introduction we define the food “label” broadly, in line with
legal definitions, as including all the tags, brands, marks, statements,
representations, designs and descriptions made on a food and its packaging and
made or displayed to consumers when it is sold. See note 10.
43
Evans and Miele, supra note 31, at 191.
44
Id. at 192.
45
Id. at 191.
46
Paula O’Brien, Marginalising Health Information: Implications of the TransPacific Partnership Agreement for Alcohol Labelling, 41 MELB. U. L. REV. 341, 341
(2017).
41
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Corresponding with this understanding of food labels, our
analysis specifically focuses on how food labels implicitly and
explicitly represent and act on the governance systems that support
and construct food chains. As mentioned in the introduction, we draw
here on the insight of regulatory studies where scholars show that
regulation is not a top-down state-centric imposition of rules. Rather,
regulation emerges from ongoing interactions (e.g. conflicts,
alliances, modelling and mimicking) among multiple actors
(including government, industry and civil society), with each actor
seeking to exercise power legitimately and effectively at specific or
multiple levels from local and national to regional and global. 47
The significance of these interactions goes beyond setting
rules and monitoring compliance. These interactions determine what
products are available, who produces them, how they are produced,
and under what conditions. They determine the methods and
materials used in processing, packaging and trading and, crucially for
this analysis, how a product is available for sale and marketed.
Finally, these interactions determine the contractual, legislative and
certification conditions that shape how actors carry out supply chain
activities and communicate to consumers.
C. Methodology for Deconstructing Food Labels as
Governance Spaces
The growth of processed and packaged food, supermarket
concentration, and quality claims on food makes human interaction
with food labelling an everyday experience. We suggest, inspired by
Dorothy Smith’s “sociology for people,”48 that it is possible and
important to start a socio-legal analysis of food labels as governance
spaces from the standpoint of a person going about their daily life.
From this standpoint, Smith suggests that scholars can use
“institutional ethnography” to unpack the complex social and
institutional arrangements within which everyday experience is
embedded. Smith shows how this approach can “enlarge the scope
of what becomes visible from that site, mapping the relations that
connect one local site to others” (emphasis added). 49
Smith describes the purpose of this “institutional ethnography” as
twofold:
One is to produce for people what might be called
‘maps’ of the ruling relations and specifically the
EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 9, at 17; Colin Scott, Analysing regulatory space:
fragmented resources and institutional design, PUBLIC LAW 329, 330 (2001).
48
SMITH, supra note 8.
49
Id. at 29.
47
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institutional complexes in which they participate in
whatever fashion. People’s knowledge of their
everyday world is thereby expanded beyond the
scope of what can be learned in the ordinary ways
they go about their everyday activities . . . The
second aim is to build knowledge and methods of
discovering the institutions and, more generally, the
ruling relations of contemporary Western society. 50
In this case, we use what the consumer sees on food labels
as our starting point from which to illuminate the broader regulatory
and institutional complexes that frame consumers’ food choices.
Following Smith, we start with what a consumer sees when they
wander down food aisles of supermarkets, scroll through online food
stores, or peruse a café menu. We then map and evaluate the
relations, institutions and governance processes, mediated through
food labelling, that influence individual consumers and how food
systems function. Besides Smith, our focus is inspired by the
emphasis that new materialism in food studies places on the
importance of geographies, objects and non-human living beings in
understanding the food system. 51
This approach to deconstructing food labels was previously
suggested and applied by Parker. 52 While Parker preliminarily
termed the method “backwards mapping,” in this article we develop
the methodology further and refer to the approach as a “label and
chain governance analysis” for “deconstructing food labels as a
governance space.” We prefer this terminology because it better
encapsulates our understanding of the food label as both
representative and performative in the relationship between the
consumer and the food chain. 53 That is, we suggest the need for
deconstructing both (a) the regulatory governance of the chain
behind the food choices available to the consumer evident from the
Id. at 51.
Ilbery et al., supra note 27; Julian Agyeman et al., Trends and Directions in
Environmental Justice: From Inequity to Everyday Life, Community, and Just
Sustainabilities, 41 ANNUAL REV. ENV’T & RES. 321, 330-331 (2016); David
Goodman, Ontology Matters: The Relational Materiality of Nature and Agro-Food
Studies, 41 SOCIOLOGIA RURALIS 182, 183 (2001).
52
See, e.g., Christine Parker, The food label as a governance space: free-range eggs
and the fallacy of consumer choice, 35 RECHT DER WERKELIJKHEID 101, 101 (2014)
(“Investigating how the choices presented to consumers on [their] labels have been
constructed.”).
53
Evans and Miele adopted a similar framing of the food label as both an icon
(symbolic) and a device (capable of bringing about material change). See, Evans &
Miele, supra note 31.
50
51
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label and, relatedly, (b) the way in which labels govern consumer
choices.
The methodology for deconstructing food labels is based on
visual sociology. It derives from the notion that “valid scientific
insight in society can be acquired by observing, analyzing and
theorizing its visual manifestations: behavior of people and material
products of culture.” 54 In the context of complex, globalized supply
chains, the methodology of visual sociology offers opportunities to
“bridge some of the disconnections in the contemporary food web.”55
The food label can be, literally, seen as a visual embodiment of
supply chain actors interacting with the consumer. In practice,
deconstructing food labels requires the researcher to consider the
food label as an everyday “found” object and engage with the
combined effect of a label’s visuals and text on the claims and stories
it provides. 56
Deconstructing food labels combines visual sociology and
regulatory network analyses with supply chain mapping,
ethnographic and geographic research. Chain mapping entails
mapping the product and information flows as well as relationships
between the actors along the supply chain. This entails identification
of key chain actors, a mapping of the functions of the actors,
consideration of the various actors’ goals, and identification of where
the most value is added to the product. 57 The chain mapping aspect
to the methodology allows the researcher to understand the material
arrangements that connect consumers at the end of the value chain to
the producers and ecologies at the start of the chain without lapsing
into sentimentalism or sensationalism. Additionally, deconstructing
food labels also requires an examination of the regimes developed to
regulate the value chain, the interactions among these regimes (or
lack thereof), and their interactions with state-based regulation. 58
Throughout the analysis, geographic and anthropological research
provides context for the value chain and its drivers and impacts, as
well as relevant empirical evidence for the label’s claims. In sum, the
aim is for a sober assessment of socio-economic governance
LUC PAUWELS, REFRAMING VISUAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: TOWARDS A MORE VISUAL
SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY 3 (2015).
55
Gilbert W. Gillespie, Visual Sociology and Food, 6 J. FOR THE STUDY OF FOOD
AND SOC’Y 7, 7 (2003).
56
Carol Richards, Geoffrey Lawrence & David Burch, Supermarkets and Agroindustrial Foods, 14 FOOD, CULTURE & SOC’Y 29, 38–39 (2011).
57
See, e.g., Simon Bolwig et al., A Methodology for Integrating Developmental
Concerns into Value Chain Analysis and Interventions, in MARKETS AND RURAL
POVERTY: UPGRADING IN VALUE CHAINS 21, 23 (Jonathan Mitchell & Christopher
Coles eds., 2011).
58
Eberlein et al., supra note 9, at 3.
54
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arrangements that create particular value chains to inform
understandings of what these processes mean for the potential to
change the food chain specifically and food systems more generally.
D. Label and Chain Governance Analysis
Following initial observations, the researcher begins
systematically collecting data on each product available for sale. The
core of this stage involves a segment by segment observation and
documentation of the label’s textual content and tone, certification
marks, trademarks and other visuals, as well as a collective look and
feel of the label including branding, color and font choices. At the
end of this stage, the researcher should be able to make quantitative
conclusions about the main messages communicated to the consumer
via the product label and have an idea of the governance practices
and governmentality emerging.
For the second stage, the researcher maps out the value chain
that brings the products to market with an emphasis on the various
formal and informal governance arrangements influencing supply
chain activities. This entails identification of the key stages a product
moves through from production to consumption and of the main
actors involved in the supply chain in terms of their role, information
and resources.
Proceeding to the third step, the researcher delves deeper into
the analysis by critically examining the actors, their interests and
values, interactions between actors, and the form or nature of these
interactions. 59 Here, the researcher uses a variety of data collection
methods to more deeply delineate the governance relations
implicated by the label. This includes empirical research methods
(e.g. interviews, fieldwork, desktop review) and an examination of
secondary scholarly and activist research.
Finally, the researcher returns to what the consumer sees to
make visible the meaning and significance of the inferred governance
relations. At this stage, the researcher interrogates what the label
includes and excludes from its communication with the consumer,
and considers the interests and values served by providing or not
providing information or by portraying an aspect of the value chain
in a particular way. Questions relevant to this aspect include: How
have those who have sought to unsettle and change dominant food
chains used regulation to do so? How have the dominant players used
regulation in their responses? What values and interest (that is, what
rationalities of governance) do the regulatory options chosen
59

Id.
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represent? What alternative regulatory options and associated values
and interests have been sidelined or occluded? Which are still
available or might be available in the future? To what extent have
choices already made constricted or co-opted the potential for further
critique and contestation, or to what extent have they opened up
possibilities for further dialogue and change? What supply chain
actors are mentioned on the label, which actors are not, and how are
they depicted? What activities in the supply chain are communicated
and which activities are not?
III. Case Study: Açai Berries
A. Origins, Practices and Popularity
Açaí berries originate from two types of palms that grow
along the Amazon river from Bolivia to Brazil.60 Originally
consumed largely by rural, floodplain groups called Amazonian
ribeirinhos, açaí became popular throughout Brazil by the early
1990s due to internal migration of these people to provincial cities.61
Western tourists exported the berry to Los Angeles in the later
1990s. 62 The two most common açaí products on the market are
frozen smoothie packs and açaí powders, which are both used in
various beverages or, for the powders, in baking.
When first imported into the US, açaí was a niche product
described as “[a] cult phenomenon, popular mostly among young,
male extreme-sport enthusiasts… skaters, surfers, snowboarders.” 63
It became widely popular after Dr. Nicholas Perricone, a New York
dermatologist and “anti-ageing expert,” presented açaí as a
“superfood” for its “anti-ageing properties” in his book that was
featured on the Oprah Winfrey Show in 2003 and 2004. 64 By 2013,
“açaí-laced products grossed nearly $200 million in the United
States.”65 Açaí followed a highly similar trajectory in Australia when
Jie Kang, et al., Bioactivities of açaí (Euterpe precatoria Mart.) fruit pulp,
superior antioxidant and anti-inflammatory properties to Euterpe oleraca
Mart, 133 FOOD CHEMISTRY 671, 671 (2012).
61
John Colapinto, Strange Fruit: The rise and fall of açaí, NEW YORKER (May 30,
2011), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/30/strange-fruit-john-colapi
nto.
62
Michael Heinrich, Tasleem Dhanji & Ivan Casselman, Açai (Euterpe oleracea
Mart.)—A phytochemical and pharmacological assessment of the species’ health
claims, 4 PHYTOCHEMISTRY LETTERS 10–21 (2011).
63
Colapinto, supra note 61.
64
Susan Donaldson James, “Superfood” Açaí May Not Be Worth Price, ABC NEWS
(DEC. 12, 2018), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Diet/story?id=6434350&page=1.
65
Tom Philpott, Are Quinoa, Chia Seeds, and Other “Superfoods” a Scam?,
MOTHER JONES, http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2013/06/are-superfoods
-quinoa-chia-goji-good-for-you/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2019).
60

2019] CONSUMER POWER TO CHANGE THE FOOD SYSTEM? 17
it was first imported in the early 2000s. Similar to açaí’s original
market in LA, açaí began being distributed in Australia through stalls
and cafes in beachside health conscious areas such as the Gold Coast
and Bondi beach. 66 Freeze-dried açaí powder, capsules and tonics
began to be sold in retail and health stores in the mid to late 2000s. 67
Because açaí berries begin to spoil within 24 hours of being
harvested, export of the berries to a broader consumer base was only
made possible by advances in food processing, preservation and
transportation technologies. They are 1 to 2 cm in diameter and
contain a large seed that makes up about 80 to 90% of the fruit in
both size and weight. 68 The seeds are covered in a thin, oily coat,
which is the edible pulp layer, and tough, fibrous outer layers. 69
Generally, the manufacturing of açaí juice entails the açaí berries
being soaked in (often, hot and/or chlorinated followed by potable)
water, added to a rotation device that separates the seeds, pulped and
sieved in a machine, mixed with citric acid, pasteurized and then
frozen for and throughout transportation. 70 The juice produced is
then subject to further processing to make either smoothie or powder
packs. Both products require costly and complex machinery to create
the right kind of environment, texture and color. 71
The changing role of açaí from mainly traditional diets in the
place of production to a high value Western “superfood” spruiked by
Jacquie Hayes, Berried treasure, AUSTRALIAN (Aug 19, 2011), http://www.the
australian.com.au/business/the-deal-magazine/berried-treasure/news-story/6c03ef1
7df23992527a633b07a3f4f4e; Cornelia Voigt et al., Health tourism in Australia:
supply, demand and opportunities (2011), http://search.ror.unisa.edu.au/record/UN
ISA_ALMA51138625960001831).
67
Emily Crane, Meet the University Dropout who Started Importing Açaí Berries
for a Juice Bar at 22 and Now Makes One Million Dollars a Month, DAILY MAIL
AUSTRL. (May 1, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3063723/Univer
sity-dropout-started-importing-açaí-berries-business-makes-one-million-dollarsmonth-sleeps-tepee.html.
68
Lisbeth A. Pacheco-Palencia, Christopher E. Duncan & Stephen T. Talcott,
Phytochemical composition and thermal stability of two commercial açai species,
Euterpe oleracea and Euterpe precatoria, 115 FOOD CHEMISTRY 1199, 1199 (2009).
69
Id.
70
Rosanna Iris Ayala, Fermentation and Supercritical Extraction Studies of Açaí
Berry 9–10 (Jan. 2012) (unpublished M.S.C.H. thesis, University of South Florida),
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5157&context=etd.
71
Karin Nordström Dyvelkov & Jakob Sloth, Chapter 6 - New Advances in SprayDrying Processes, in MICROENCAPSULATION IN THE FOOD INDUSTRY 57, 57 (2014),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780124045682000066 (last
visited Feb 27, 2018); Mariana A. Pavan, Shelly J. Schmidt & Hao Feng, Water
sorption behavior and thermal analysis of freeze-dried, Refractance Window-dried
and hot-air dried açaí (Euterpe oleracea Martius) juice, 48 LWT - FOOD SCIENCE
& TECH. 75, 75 (2012).
66
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Oprah and sold as far away as Bondi Beach is a good example of the
creation of global food chains and the way they are represented to
consumers. In Australia, like the US, açaí products are sold in a
variety of forms and retail locations (as shown below) and have
become an established niche in the market – thus allowing for
observation of a variety of marketing claims on the labels. Yet, it is
a small enough niche to enable data collection that covers the whole
market thus allowing us to take a snapshot of the whole market for a
relatively new product and the way it tries to establish itself to
consumers.
B. Data
Following the approach described above to critically
examine the food label as governance space, we identified 49 açaí
berry products on sale in Australia as of September 2017, which were
sold through 41 Australian businesses. Most of these products are
either: a) frozen açaí berry pulp and açaí berry powders and capsules
for individual consumption or b) frozen açaí berry pulp sold in cafés
(in ready to eat bowls and smoothies) and health store retailers. These
products were identified through multiple searches over various
public and private databases for companies, trademarks or products
that used the word “açaí.” 72 Following the initial database searches,
the researchers conducted online or physical site visits.
Upon identifying an açaí product advertised for sale in
Australia, all information regarding each product visible to the
consumer was recorded, compiled, and thematically coded. Relevant
sources of information included written online product descriptions,
pictures, signs or symbols in the product description or on the
packaging, other information on labels (e.g. slogans), and pamphlets
at point-of-sale. Five common themes, or product claims, were
identified:73
1. Açaí berries are uniquely nutritious;
2. Açaí berry consumption is rooted in traditional knowledges
and practices;
72
In order of search: all trademarks registered in Australia with the terms ‘açaí’ or
‘amazon’ on IP Australia; all business names with the term ‘açaí’ on ASIC business
and company names database; products with the keyword ‘açaí’ in a product name
search in the Australian Certified Organics (ACO) database; products of Australian
sellers on ebay.com.au. Specialist açaí cafes were only included if they do not source
through a wholesaler or if they do not appear to source through a wholesaler and
were marketed as specialist açaí cafes. A full list of the brands included in our
sample is available from the first author upon request.
73
A table showing the products and types of claim made on each product is available
from the first author upon request.
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3. Purchasing açaí berries contributes to poverty reduction and
facilitates sustainable livelihoods;
4. Açaí berries are organic; and
5. Açaí berry production preserves the Amazon.
These claims are often on the same label and, as we will
show, reinforce each other. Accordingly, we have further grouped
them into three meta-claims: those claims focused on the health
benefits of consumption of the açaí berry (claims 1 and 2), those
claims relating to how purchasing açaí berries contributes to poverty
reduction and facilitates sustainable livelihoods (claim 3), and finally
those claims that açaí berries are produced in an environmentally
sustainable manner (claims 4 and 5). The remainder of the paper
analyzes the results for each of these meta-claims in turn.
IV. Health: Nutritionism and Primitivism
A. Nutritionism
Of the 49 açaí products identified in the Australian market
place, all labels referred to the large concentration of ‘antioxidants’
and other chemical compounds in the açaí berry. About a third of the
products claimed that açaí berries could help with serious diseases
like cancer or heart disease, and a third claimed that açaí berry
products have anti-ageing properties. This is frequently explained in
highly scientific terminology. For example, “Kiss the Berry” cafes in
Brisbane claim that açaí:
…contains high levels of essential fatty acids
(omega 3’s in particular) known for their cardio and
neuro-protective and anti-inflammatory effect. It is
super rich in antioxidants to reduce cholesterol,
contains 19 different amino acids to optimize brain
signaling pathways, and is rich in minerals and
vitamins (especially calcium and vitamin E) for
healthy hair, skin and nails.
At the same time, however, “Kiss the Berry” goes on to
neatly juxtapose the health benefits of açaí with pleasure:
So now you’re probably thinking ‘Surely something
that good for me, can’t possibly taste good.’ Well,
eating your own words has never been so delicious.
When the berries are blended, we describe it as a
fruit sorbet with hints of dark chocolate and red
wine. What’s not to like?
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This common juxtaposition speaks to consumer anxiety
regarding the need to continuously choose between hedonism and
health or, in Warde’s terms, 74 the antinomie of health and
indulgence. The antinomie is resolved in a gendered way. In her
critical discourse analysis of superfood marketing, Sikka 75 notes that
the great majority of superfood advertisements are targeted at women
and marketed as “a solution to the highly confusing message women
are given with respect to the need to maintain a thin body at the same
time as giving in to junk food.” We found that attention is
increasingly being given to youthful, muscular male gendered bodies
in açaí advertising consistent with idealized images of male bodies,
and exemplified by, for instance, a newer brand (“Açaí Brothers”)
focused on health and fitness.
The previous work of Curll et al76 comprehensively
examined the research findings behind these health claims. Curll et
al found no evidence to support the unique health and anti-ageing
claims made for açaí berry products over many other nutrient-dense
foods. Rather, the labelling of these products conflates the wellaccepted health benefits of antioxidants and other nutrients found in
a variety of “normal” fresh, unbranded fruits and vegetables with
claims exaggerating the unproven benefits of particular
phytochemicals apparently found in higher concentrations in açaí
berries. 77 This is a form of “nutritionism”, a reductionist emphasis on
micro-nutrients. 78
B. Primitivism
Açaí is heavily promoted to western consumers as a
“traditional food.” All 49 of the products in our survey directly made
claims regarding the traditional role of açaí in the diets of those on
the Amazonian floodplains. For example, one line of products point
Warde, supra note 37, at 70.
Sikka focused on how the marketing for many sweeter superfoods like açaí centres
on the sweetness and decadence of the food, which is consistent with the traditional
connection drawn in Western societies between the consumption of sweets by
women as related to pleasure, sex, desire and lust, and the cultural expectation that
these wants should be policed. See Contemporary Superfood Cults: Nutritionism,
Neoliberalism and Gender, in FOOD CULTS: HOW FADS, DOGMA, AND DOCTRINE
INFLUENCE DIET 87, 93, 95 (Kima Cargill ed., 2017).
76
Curll et al., Unlocking the Energy of the Amazon: The Need for a Food Fraud
Policy Approach to the Regulation of Anti-Ageing Health Claims on Superfood
Labelling, 44 FED. L. REV. 419, 448 (2016). This study was based on an earlier
version of the same product survey as the research in the current article – but focused
only on the health claims on the products.
77
Id. at 435.
78
Dana Sturtevant & Hilary Kinavey, Nutritionism, BE NOURISHED (OCT. 10, 2016),
https://benourished.org/nutritionism/.
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out that açaí was a “staple of Amazon natives for hundreds of
years.” 79 Another assures the consumer that açaí, and the other
superfoods in the range, “have been fueling indigenous people
around the world for thousands of years.”80
These exotic superfoods are thus marketed at the intersection
of scientific nutritionism and nutritional primitivism.81 They tell the
consumer that the product is verified by both Western science and
indigenous tradition. This is appealing because it transcends the
antinomie between novelty and traditional foods. 82 Nutritional
primitivism “privileges ancient or indigenous knowledge and
‘natural’ production practices in a nostalgic search for authenticity in
the diet and its related health outcomes, in contrast to those food and
health cultures and regimes seen as ‘tainted’ by complex modern
technologies.” 83 The marketing of açaí berries invokes novel
nutritionist discourse while still appealing to those who might
eschew non-traditional foods based on novel technologies (such as
fortification and genetic manipulation) that produce functional foods
with higher nutrients. 84
Nevertheless, the way açaí is processed and consumed today
is far removed from traditional practices. Indigenous Amazonians
domesticated the palm for use in construction over 8000 years ago. 85
They did consume, but did not rely on, açaí berries before
colonization. During European colonization (roughly 1494 to 1815)
açaí became a staple for Amazonian peasants in riverine areas (i.e.
Amazonian ribeirinhos). 86 Since this time, açaí has been consumed
after being soaked in water, pulped, strained and then drunk, added
to grains or served with fish or meats. Brazil’s dietary guidelines

JOHNSON, ET AL., supra note 2, at 316.
About Us, Lᴀ Kᴜʟᴛ, https://www.la-kult.com.au/pages/about-us (last visited Mar.
13, 2019).
81
Loyer, supra note 5, at 1, 4.
82
WARDE, supra note 37 at 55.
83
Loyer, supra note 5, at 3.
84
See Jessica Loyer, Communicating Superfoods: A Case Study of Maca Packaging,
in FOOD AND COMMUNICATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE OXFORD SYMPOSIUM ON FOOD
AND COOKERY 236, 241 (Mark McWilliams ed. 2015).
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The Myth of the Pristine Amazon Rainforest, MAX-PLANCK-GESELLSCHAFT
(March 08, 2017),https://www.mpg.de/11147178/amazon-rainforest-pre-columbian
(last visited Feb 15, 2019).
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Eduardo S. Brondizio, Agriculture Intensification, Economic Identity, and Shared
Invisibility in Amazonian Peasantry: Caboclos and Colonists in Comparative
Perspective, 26 CULTURE & AGRIC. 1, 6 (2004).
79
80

22

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.15

continue to recommend eating açaí with cassava flour or grits and
fish. 87
By contrast, Western consumers eat frozen açaí as a dessert,
smoothie or breakfast item, combined with fruits. Contrary to some
products’ claims to be “teaching Australians how to eat and prepare
Açaí as the locals do in the streets of Brazil,” 88 Fajan observed that
the Western way of eating açaí is commonly viewed within the key
açaí production region as disrespectful and inappropriate. 89
According to traditional beliefs, açaí has a reputation for being “a
heavy food that weighs you down and makes you lethargic.”90
Traditional beliefs in Brazil also associate the inter-mixing of açaí
with other vegetables and fruits with indigestion. 91 Yet, western
marketing claims that açaí is a “natural energy boost,” an “energizing
superfood,” a “sustained energy boost.” This representation is what
MacCannell 92 refers to as “staged authenticity,” that is, a product is
presented as authentic, but the representation of the product for
western consumers displaces the cultural meaning of the product for
those who traditionally produce and consume it.
This cultural displacement in the western market place
reflects a more literal displacement of açaí in diets in the Amazon.
For Amazon ribeirinhos today, while açaí is still an accompaniment
to the staple foods of fish and manioc, there have recently been
significant declines in açaí consumption. Açaí is increasingly
replaced by the global commodities of soy oil, meat 93 and sugar.94
This is the neocolonial flip side of the globalization of the food
supply that has brought açaí to western consumers. While western
consumers are sold açaí as a disease-preventing solution to unhealthy
western lifestyles, 95 the Amazonian ribeirinhos are joining the global
nutrition transition and the associated rise in the prevalence of dietDietary Guidelines for the Brazilian Population, MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF BRAZIL,
1, 71 (2014), http://bvsms.saude.gov.br/bvs/publicacoes/dietary_guidelines_brazil
ian_population.pdf.
88
About Amazon Power, Aᴍᴀᴢᴏɴ Pᴏᴡᴇʀ, https://www.amazonpower.com.au/aboutus.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2019).
89
JANE FAJANS, BRAZILIAN FOOD: RACE, CLASS AND IDENTITY IN REGIONAL
CUISINES 64 (2013).
90
Id. at 65.
91
Id. at 64.
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Dean MacCannell, Staged Authenticity: Arrangements of Social Space in Tourist
Settings, 79 AMERICAN J. SOCIOLOGY 589, 602 (1973).
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Rui Sérgio Sereni Murrieta et al., Food consumption and ecology of riparian
populations in two Amazonian ecosystems: a comparative study, 21 REVISTA DE
NUTRIÇÃO 123, 128 (2008).
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Curll et al., supra note 76, at 420; MacGregor, Petersen, and Parker, supra note
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related non-communicable diseases. We return to the neocolonial
implications of açaí marketing in Part V.
C. Market-based Governance of Health Claims
As Frohlich has shown in the US context, health claims and
nutritional labelling were largely prohibited on food items
throughout the western world prior to the 1970s on the basis that such
information would confuse consumers by conflating the properties
of pharmaceuticals and foods. 96 Nutrition labelling emerged in the
1970s as a form of consumer empowerment and now reflects the
“belief that it is better to manage markets indirectly through
information than directly through product bans and standards.”97
This approach reinforces the market by suggesting that consumers
can govern the market via businesses’ self-regulatory responses to
consumer choices.
The regulation of health claims on food in Australia is
broadly similar to the US and likewise tends to reinforce this
neoliberal approach. Food Standards Australia and New Zealand
(FSANZ) take an equivalent role to that of the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). Both FSANZ and the FDA set standards for
food labelling, 98 and prohibit health claims that cannot be
substantiated by evidence. 99 In the US, the FDA is guided by the
principle of “significant scientific agreement” 100 among qualified
experts when deciding whether to allow a proposed health claim on
a food product. The FDA applies this standard as part of a systematic
review of evidence regarding the causal link between a food and a
health effect. FSANZ also requires “systematic scientific reviews of
the evidence to establish causal links between a food and health

Xaq Frohlich, The Informational Turn in Food Politics: The US FDA’s Nutrition
Label as Information Infrastructure, 47 Sᴏᴄ. STUD. SCI. 145, (2017).
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Id. at 147.
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Australia New Zealand Food Standards Regulations 1994 (FSANZ Code); see
Standards 1.2.1 and 1.2.7. (reflecting internationally agreed principles for food
regulation set out in Codex Alimentarius 1991: principle 1.2, Codex General
Guidelines on Claims); see Curll et al., supra note 76, at 445 (“In the US, ‘health
claims’ on food that expressly, or by implication, characterise a relationship between
any substance and a disease, or health related-condition, must be approved by the
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before market”).
99
Nutrition Labelling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 101 Stat.
2353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301).
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Guidance for Industry: Evidence-Based Review System for the Scientific
Evaluation of Health Claims—Final, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda
.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/Labeli
ngNutrition/ucm073332.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2019).
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effect before a health claim can be made” on food. 101 Neither the
FDA nor FSANZ requires particular kinds of scientific evidence, and
both institutions can authorize the full version of a health claim or a
qualified version of the health claim. 102
Many general level health claims, such as those health claims
on açaí product labels that do not mention a specific disease or claim
a specific health effect, can be made in the US, Australia and New
Zealand without pre-market approval. Rather, Australia and New
Zealand use a self-substantiated procedure that allows the food
business to determine whether a general health claim is supported by
manufacturer evidence. 103 Similarly, the US adopts a lower threshold
for general health claims that requires only notification from the food
manufacturer with an authoritative statement of support from a list
of legislatively approved scientific bodies. 104 In practice, then, the
monitoring and compliance of health claims in Australia and New
Zealand, similar to the US, is left largely to business self-regulation.
Even where the regulator has to pre-approve claims, it generally
relies largely on evidence provided by the food business. There is
little or no proactive monitoring of what claims are actually made on
products, whether they have been pre-approved or self-substantiated,
or what overall message is being provided in the market place.105
This means that exaggerated health claims flourish, as do
representations that reinforce highly gendered understandings of
desirable body types and attitudes as well as inaccurate claims about
traditional uses of the food. The EU, in contrast to the US, Australia
and New Zealand, demands a higher level of scientific evidence
(randomized control trials) and requires regulatory pre-approval of
all health claims. 106 This means that superfood health claims such as
Curll et al., supra note 76, at 426; see Food Standards Australia New Zealand,
Food Standards Code Standard 1.2.7, s 18(3)(b) (prescribing the elements of a
systematic review).
102
See Curll et al., supra note 76, at 426; Richard Nowak, DSHEA’S Failure: Why
a Proactive Approach to Dietary Supplement Regulation Is Needed to Effectively
Protect Consumers, 3 U. ILL. L. REV. 1045, 1056–57 (2010).
103
Curll et al., supra note 76, at 426.
104
Food & Drug Admin. Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 105 Stat.
1677 (1997) (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. § 379).
105
Curll et al., supra note 76, at 426–27 (discussing the general lack of oversight
and pre-approval requirements under the regulatory system).
106
Only European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)-approved food-health
relationships and their authorized health and nutrition claims determined by the
European Commission (EC) are permitted for use in the sale of food. Regulation
(EC) No 1924/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December
2006 on Nutrition and Health Claims Made on Foods [2006] OJ L 404/9, art 1(3)
(‘Health Claims Regulation (EC) 1924/2006’). The EU register on nutrition and
health claims permitted for use in the sale of foods can be
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those found on açaí products in Australia and the US are absent from
the European marketplace. 107
In Australia, the monitoring and enforcement of misleading
health and other marketing claims are left to the consumer regulator,
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC).
The ACCC, like the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the US,
enforces the general legal prohibition on false, misleading or
deceptive conduct in trade and commerce. US law also grants
specific powers to the FDA to take enforcement action in relation to
deceptive food labels and labelling (broadly defined). This creates
some overlap between the powers of the FDA and the FTC but the
FTC tends to hold the primary enforcement role. 108 In relation to açaí
berry non-food products, the FTC has taken enforcement action by
seeking and receiving injunctions over the websites of particular açaí
berry products marketed as dietary supplements. 109 Yet, as scholars
observed the “deceptive practices on the part of companies not party
to the FTC action have continued.”110
Enforcement often relies on the ability of consumers and
food system advocates to successfully notice misleading claims,
bring them to the attention of the appropriate regulator, and persuade
the regulator that the issue is significant enough for the regulator to
take enforcement action out of the other thousands of potential
actions available to it. However, misleading representations of açaí
on açaí food labels, as identified later in this article, have not so far
prompted action in either jurisdiction. After all, Western consumers
are unlikely to know and complain about details about Amazonian
accessed: <http://ec.europa.eu/nuhclaims/?event=register.home>.
107
The EFSA Scientific NDA Panel has rejected the vast majority of food business
health claim substantiation dossiers submitted to it. See European Food Safety
Authority Panel on Dietetic Products, Nutrition and Allergies, General Guidance
for Stakeholders on the Evaluation of Article 13.1, 13.5 and 14 Health Claims, 9
EUR. FOOD SAFETY AUTHORITY J. 2135 (2011). Based on the submitted, assessed
evidence, EFSA has since 2010 rejected all 149 attempts to substantiate food health
relationships involving the word ‘antioxidant’, and accepted only one out of 19
industry submissions regarding ‘polyphenols’. See Aalt Bast et al., Scientism,
Legalism and Precaution—Contending with Regulating Nutrition and Health
Claims in Europe, 6 EUR. FOOD & FEED L. REV. 401 (2013) (reviewing the European
approach to health claims on food); see also Curll et al., supra note 76, at 443–44
(providing a more detailed discussion of the European approach in comparison with
the Australian and US approach).
108
Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 378(a), (b) (1938).
109
See, e.g., Complaint at 23, Fed. Trade Comm’n v Cent Coast Neutrecules Inc.,
10 Cv. 04931 (E.D. Ill. 2012).
110
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Recent Developments, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 135, 155 (2011).
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ribeirinhos’ traditional consumption of açaí’. Nor have Amazonian
ribeirinhos complained nor pushed for rules that require tradition and
culture be accurately portrayed at the other end of the value chain.
We argue in the next section that these inaccurate claims are not just
trivial marketing puff. They help reinforce a food system in which
those in the Amazon where the açaí was grown and eaten can be
exploited.
V. Fair Trade: Racism and Neo-colonialism
A. Rural Socio-economic Development Claims
After health claims, the next most common claims on açaí
products concerned the benefits of açaí production and sale in
reducing poverty and facilitating sustainable livelihoods for the rural
communities of the Amazon. Twenty of the açaí products made
claims regarding how the purchases of açaí benefit Amazon
communities through increased incomes. Three products even went
as far as to proclaim that “[t]he manual harvesting of the berries also
provides hundreds of jobs for the indigenous tribes around Brazil and
helps minimize the human trafficking and deforestation that these
tribes would otherwise partake in to make ends meet.” 111
Açaí’s international popularity has created economic
opportunities for those Amazonian ribeirinhos involved in
cultivating the palms, harvesting the berries and/or operating the
boats to transport the berries to processing facilities as well as for
those employed in the associated industries for açaí processing and
export. 112 Indeed, Brondizio, a leading anthropologist on rural
populations in the Amazon, claimed that “[t]here may be no better
example of an economic prospect for overcoming underdevelopment
in rural Amazonia than the case of açaí palm fruit production
system.”113

AMAZON POWER PTY LTD., https://www.amazonpower.com.au/what-is-açaí.asp
(last visited Mar. 16, 2019) (marketing the “Amazon Power Açaí Smoothie Packs”,
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Açaí Capsules” products).
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Leonora Genya Pepper & Livia De Freitas Navegantes Alves, Small-Scale Açaí
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Farmers in the Amazon Estuary, in INTEGRATING LANDSCAPES: AGROFORESTRY FOR
BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AND FOOD SOVEREIGNTY 211, 211–20 (Florencia
Montagnini ed., 12th ed. 2017).
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SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT 399, 339 (Daniel J. Zarin et al. eds., 2004).
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Empirical research shows, to an extent, that the economic
opportunities Brondizio refers to have been leveraged. Pegler
conducted in-depth interviews with over twenty açaí-producing
households and found that since gaining popularity açaí has become
an important source of income. 114 These households collected
around 150 sacks of açaí per year, and earn R$40 per sack, which is
roughly US$11.69 (or AU$15) and equals a monthly income of
between R$4800 and R$6000. Similarly, another study reported that
a ribeirinhos family will make an average of 2300 euros, or
US$2640, during each month of the harvesting season for açaí.115
These figures are significantly higher than the average monthly
income in Brazil over the last two years, which at its highest was
R$2186. 116
Yet, this does not necessarily mean that Amazonian
ribeirinhos have received a fair proportion of the profits generated
from açaí production. Similar dynamics that exist in cocoa and coffee
value chains are evident in açaí supply chains. 117Amazonian
ribeirinhos cultivate the palms and provide the berries, but
significant market value is added through the processing, export and
retail of açaí. Additionally, the reliance of Amazonian ribeirinhos on
a single raw commodity for the majority of their income leaves them
especially vulnerable to fluctuations in market prices. 118 The
existence of a market opportunity due to the popularity of açaí with
some western consumers does not necessarily equate to a sustainable
fair-trade opportunity. Moreover, the racist and neo-colonial
representation of Amazonian people in açaí marketing raises
suspicion that their contribution to global supply chains will be
undervalued.
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B. Racist and Neocolonial Representations
Generally, Amazonian ribeirinhos (also referred to as
caboclo) 119 have mixed ancestry (Latin American, European and
African descent) and live a semi-subsistent life based on fishing,
small-scale farming and agroforestry, 120 and tend to govern their
communities with relative autonomy.121 Lima-Ayres explains that:
Forced cultural transformation and intense
miscegenation with whites resulted in the dilution of
specific tribal identities, and led to the formation of
the caboclo population who considered themselves
as part of the national society. 122
This history has led to native, non-Indigenous populations,
like the Amazonian ribeirinhos, as often being described as a
relatively invisible group in both the Amazon and in the broader
world. 123 Nowadays, ribeirinhos live either in cities or along the river
of the Amazon, but mostly they move periodically between both. 124
A food label cannot convey the history or current
marginalization of Amazonian ribeirinhos nor would such accounts
be an appealing marketing strategy. Yet, the widespread popularity
of açaí presented an opportunity to raise the profile of the significant
disadvantages experienced by and contributions made from
Amazonian ribeirinhos. Given their “invisibility,” it would be

Richard Pace, The Amazon Caboclo: What’s in a Name?, 34 LUSO-BRAZILIAN
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socially beneficial for this group to receive recognition as a distinct
and diverse cultural entity.
Yet, none of the labels examined referred to Amazonian
ribeirinhos. Instead, several labels describe Amazon ribeirinhos as
either indigenous, traditional or native. Such references have the
potential to be true, untrue or half-true given the heterogeneity of
Amazonian ribeirinhos. 125 What is of significance is the decision to
omit referring to Amazonian ribeirinhos as a distinct group with their
own history and culture. Referring to Amazonian ribeirinhos broadly
as indigenous or native sanitizes difficult aspects of history. For
instance, it removes the effects of colonization by making it seem as
if this social category of people were undisturbed by its processes. 126
Consistent with the “nutritional primitivism” of the health claims on
açaí products mentioned above, the food label acts as a constructed
window into the history and identity of Amazonian ribeirinhos.
Like other “superfoods,” açaí labels commonly use warrior
imagery and references to warriors to depict Amazon ribeirinhos.
Warrior imagery is often a component of the “noble savage”
stereotype, which stems from colonial ideology and theology. This
long-standing stereotype casts non-white ethnic groups as pure, wise
stewards of the land that are removed from capitalist processes and
urban societies.127 Likewise, on some online açaí sites, consumers
are invited to “join the tribe,” i.e. sign up to their mailing list or
loyalty program. 128 Other labels feature what appears to be a man
with a dramatically protruding bottom lip, a slanted forehead, and
tribal jewelry as a logo (Amazon Power Açaí Smoothie Packs,
Amazon Power Pure Açaí Pulp and Organic Açaí Capsules, Amazon
Power Pty Ltd.) Protruding lips are a facial feature focused upon in
racist pseudo-science to assign inferiority to certain races. 129 As
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O’Toole observed, “in the language of racism, thick lips speak
volumes.”130
This “noble savage” caricature is at best culturally
insensitive. It can also incidentally serve a racist agenda.131
Stearman 132 has shown how an ecological version of the noble
savage stereotype in the Amazonia has undermined efforts for land
tenure security. She argues that policies that grant land entitlements
on the condition that a native group exhibits conservationist qualities
distracts from the fact that rights to remain on traditional lands is
supported by human rights law. 133 The subsuming of the
contemporary Amazonian ribeirinhos into the identity of primitive
“Amazon natives” ‘casts remote producers as “Others” who exist in
a timeless, imaginary geography, when in reality they are real people
in real places faced with a range of “contemporary challenges.”’ 134
Açaí products claim that açaí berry “naturally grows” and is
“wild-harvested” to ensure that “the delicate environment of the
Amazon is protected and the ancient traditions of indigenous people
from this region are respected and preserved.” 135 These claims
overlook the role of Amazonian ribeirinhos as stewards of the açaí
palm. Amazonian ribeirinhos employ skill and labor to manage the
palm, “including through thinning, weeding, pruning, inter-cropping
techniques and the development of seedlings. 136 Arguably then, the
land and crop management by Amazonian peasants may fit some
definitions of ‘agroforestry,’ and is certainly an example of smallscale production systems which tend to use less intensive harvesting
methods.”137 By not mentioning their role as forest managers, açaí
130
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to Forest Farmers: Changing Concepts of Caboclo Agroforestry in the Amazon
Estuary, 18 Res. in Econ. Anthropology 233, 258 (1997)).
137
Id. (citing Clark L. Erickson, Amazonia: The Historical Ecology of a
Domesticated Landscape, in The Social Lives of Forests: Past, Present, and Future
of Woodland Resurgence (Susanna B. Hecht, Kathleen D. Morrison, & Christine
Padoch eds., 2014)).
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berry claims have perpetuated on a global scale the prejudicial views
in Brazil about Amazonian peasants as “low-skill” and “lazy,” due
to their subsistence, rural lifestyle.138 Yet Amazonian ribeirinhos, in
the initial period of açaí boom, did manage to increase the production
of açaí without leading to deforestation or monoculture farming.
Brondizio and Siqueria explain:
Agroforestry systems that mimic native forests are
‘invisible’ in the analysis of most researchers who
employ conventional measures of [agricultural]
intensification. The result is agroforestry’s
characterization as extensive, partially extractivist
and non-dependent on labor and energy input other
than for ‘gathering.’ [In other words,] conventional
ideas of what farming involves, [which stem from
colonial
processes,]
combined
with
the
marginalization of Amazonian ribeirinhos have fed
into the claims that açaí is passively ‘gathered’ and
undervalue the contribution of Amazonian people to
the production and sustainable management of
acai. 139
The agricultural activities of other colonized peoples around
the world, including Australian Aboriginal groups, have also been
constructed in this way, which has provided a narrative that has
assisted in justifying the taking of their (supposedly unmanaged and
uncared for, yet potentially agriculturally productive) land for
industrial, export-oriented agriculture. 140
C. Voluntary Fair-trade Certification and Other Schemes
for a Just Distribution of Benefits and Burdens
The dominant governance method for addressing the
equitable inclusion of poor producers in developing countries into
global supply chains that serve markets of developed countries 141 is
138

See id. at 313 (citing Mark Harris, Nature Makes them Lazy: Contested
Perceptions of Place and Knowledge in the Lower Amazon Floodplain of Brazil, 3
Conservation and Society 461 (2005)).
139
Id. at 313.
140
CHRISTOPHER MAYES, UNSETTLING FOOD POLITICS: AGRICULTURE,
DISPOSSESSION AND SOVEREIGNTY IN AUSTRALIA 19–48 (2018); see generally
BRUCE PASCOE, DARK EMU: BLACK SEEDS: AGRICULTURE OR ACCIDENT? (2014)
(discussing how the colonizing Europeans mistakenly believed that Australian
Aboriginals did not use agriculture to develop the land).
141
See Laura T. Raynolds, Fair Trade: Social regulation in global food markets, 28
J. RURAL STUD. 276, 279 (2012) (“Fair Trade operates at the intersection of market
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the fair trade movement. Fair trade aims to create supply chains
based on adequate working and trading conditions to alleviate
poverty and enable sustainable development. 142 From the 1960s
onwards, fair trade spawned various formalized non-governmental
bodies who create and administer, inter alia, third-party certification
schemes. 143
Third-party fair trade certification entails independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or private companies auditing
aspects of a supply chain against specified criteria including, for
instance, that cooperatives in the chain are democratic, that farm
workers are, at least, being paid the minimum wage for their work,
and that small-scale farmers are receiving at least a fair trade floor
price (i.e. profits cover the costs of production, savings and the living
costs for an average family). 144 The results of such audits may be sent
back to a parent company or head NGO for review. If the audit
reveals that fair trade requirements are being met, then the
manufacturer, in the case of açaí, is licensed a certification mark to
feature on the product’s label. The mark alerts consumers that a thirdparty has verified the product’s claims of being from a “fair,”
equitable supply chain, differentiates the product and attracts price
premiums. 145
Only two açaí products in our survey (both from Sambazon,
a US-based wholesaler) displayed a third-party fair trade
certification. The remaining 18 açaí products that made claims
regarding the fairness of the supply chain had not been subject to any
third-party oversight. 146 For instance, one product explained: “[t]he
Açaí berries used in this product have been harvested by local
families, which also means rural community and grower

critique and reregulation, challenging dominant ‘unfair’ trade practices and
promoting alternative ‘fair’ trade norms in global arenas.”).
142
ANNA HUTCHENS, CHANGING BIG BUSINESS: THE GLOBALISATION OF THE FAIR
TRADE MOVEMENT 58 (2009).
143
Matthew Anderson, NGOs and Fair Trade: The Social Movement Behind the
Label, in NGOS IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN 222–41 (Nock Crowson et al., 2009).
144
See, e.g., WORLD FAIR TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTFO FAIR TRADE STANDARD 17
(2017), https://wfto.com/standard-and-guarantee-system/fair-trade-standard (last
visited Mar. 13, 2019) (explaining compliance criteria used by the World Fair Trade
Organization).
145
See Marie-Christine Renard, Quality Certification, Regulation and Power in Fair
Trade, 21 J. RURAL STUD. 419, 423–24 (2005).
146
Because fair trade is a broader concept than third-part certification schemes,
supply chain actors can also assess their own value chains against set social and
environmental standards and make product claims regarding how the supply chain
follows fair trade principles in a broad sense.
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cooperatives are empowered through fair trade pricing.” 147 Another
uncertified claim was that “[e]very step of our supply chain is closely
monitored to ensure sustainable and fair trade practices are
followed.” 148 These claims are difficult, if not impossible, for a
consumer, regulator or another third party to verify.
Even where fair trade certification was obtained, it was the
company, Sambazon, that manufactured the product that was
certified, as opposed to the açaí product themselves or, at the time of
writing, the cooperatives that bought açaí from Amazonian
ribeirinhos. 149 The certifying body was “ECOCERT” a private
company based in France. The certification would have involved a
review of mainly documentary evidence including Sambazon’s
corporate social responsibility policy, the clauses in contracts
between Sambazon and cooperatives and the cooperatives to the
individual producers (e.g. prices paid to producer must be at least
10% higher than standard price determined annually), the fair trade
policies of the cooperatives Sambazon works with, and other
documentary evidence such as delivery notes and invoices. The
auditor would also have carried out a specified number of interviews
between the auditor and individual producers, cooperatives and
Sambazon staff and management to verify the documentary
evidence.
However, the working conditions for açaí harvesting seem
inconsistent with the ECOCERT audit criteria regarding working
conditions. Açaí harvesting involves climbing near the top of a tall
palm while carrying a machete to cut down palm fronds that grow
the berries. Once on the ground, people hand-strip the berries from
their stalks. Raffles describes it as:
[R]ough, dangerous work, hard on hands and feet,
made worse by the relentless insects… The
emphasis is on speed and volume. On a good day –
if it does not rain, if no one gets injured, if there are
big bunches and short trees– two people might
Açaí berry blend powder, NUTRA ORGANICS, https://nutraorganics.com.au/produ
cts/açaí-berry-blend (last visited Mar. 13, 2019).
148
RioLife 100% Organic Free-dried Açaí Powder, RIOLIFE, http://www.riolife.co
m.au/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2019).
149
Amazonian ribeirinhos engaged in forest farming of açaí do not apply for thirdparty fair trade certification. The fees and administrative work involved can be
considerable. Further, processing companies will obtain fair trade certification that
requires them to work with farming cooperatives that in turn meet fair trade
standards such as minimum price requirements. For exported açaí, Amazonian
ribeirinhos tend to engage with cooperatives that on-sell the berries to a processor.
147
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collect four sacks, each holding fruit from seven or
eight bunches. But to do that, collectors have to cut
corners… 150
Yet ECOCERT criterion 3.4.4.2 requires that the
cooperatives Sambazon engages with do not allow the use of
equipment that presents a danger to users and that adequate
protective equipment is provided at the producer level. To safely use
a machete, equipment required includes appropriate gloves,
protective eyewear and a lanyard around the machete to prevent
against slippage. 151 Images of Amazonian ribeirinhos provided by
Sambazon do not appear to be wearing safety equipment, and no
mention is made of the measures Sambazon takes as part of ensuring
the safety of people harvesting açaí.
The evidence is lacking regarding whether açaí producers
involved in fair trade certified supply chains are better placed than
those producers who are not. Generally, case studies investigating
the impact of cooperatives meeting fair trade standards have found
modest benefits accrue to small-scale farmers that are members of
the cooperative. 152 Nevertheless, a range of contextual and
geographical factors significantly determine whether small-scale
farmers and/or farm workers benefit from participation in fair trade
certification schemes, and so it is difficult to make sweeping claims
about the benefits of fair trade beyond particular contexts. 153 Beyond
the household level, a large body of work critiquing fair trade
suggests that the scheme itself is neither novel154 nor a challenge to
HUGH RAFFLES IN AMAZONIA: A NATURAL HISTORY 202 (2002).
See, e.g., R.A. Munoz et al., Sugar Cane Cultivation and Processing, in
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY 64.36 (Jeanne Mager
Stellman ed., 1998) (discussing recommended safety precautions to be taken when
using a machete).
152
See Christopher Bacon, Confronting the Coffee Crisis: Can Fair Trade, Organic,
and Specialty Coffees Reduce Small-Scale Farmer Vulnerability in Northern
Nicaragua?, 33 WORLD DEV. 497, 506 (2005); V. Ernesto Méndez et al., Effects of
Fair Trade and organic certifications on small-scale coffee farmer households in
Central America and Mexico, 25 RENEWABLE AGR. & FOOD SYSTEMS 236, 239
(2010); Erin Smith & William M. Loker, “We Know Our Worth”: Lessons from a
Fair Trade Coffee Cooperative in Honduras, 71 HUMAN ORG. 87, 94 (2012); Eric J
Arnould et al., Does Fair Trade Deliver on Its Core Value Proposition? Effects on
Income, Educational Attainment, and Health in Three Countries, 28 J. PUB. POL. &
MARKETING 186, 198–99 (2009); Ruerd Ruben & Ricardo Fort, The Impact of Fair
Trade Certification for Coffee Farmers in Peru, 40 WORLD DEV. 570 (2012).
153
See, e.g., Joni Valkila & Anja Nygren, Impacts of Fair Trade certification on
coffee farmers, cooperatives, and laborers in Nicaragua, 27 AGR. & HUMAN
VALUES 321, 322 (2010).
154
See, e.g., Frank Trentmann, Before “fair trade”: empire, free Trade, and the
moral economies of food in the modern world, 25 ENV’T & PLANNING SOC. & SPACE
150
151
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neocolonial trade relations typified by human and natural resources
being significantly exploited in less wealthy areas while the benefits
and outputs from this exploitation flow to wealthier countries and
groups. 155
Consistent with the critiques of fair trade as unsuited to
bringing about systematic change, açaí is increasingly being grown
on plantations, i.e. large, privately held, largely corporate-managed
farms that employ economies of scale and specialize in cash crops. 156
The intensified scale of açaí production is, arguably, a natural
trajectory of relatively unregulated market dynamics that seek everincreasing levels of production and consumption enabled via existing
wealth inequalities which provide a cheap labor pool for plantation
agriculture. This trend is not evident on açaí product labels
examined, which are either silent as to its specific production
methods or claim to originate from wild-harvesting. Nevertheless,
the shift to plantations in the case of açaí is threatening the smallscale production of açaí in the estuary, which model of production
has been and generally is the most suited to addressing social and
economic inequalities in rural communities.157
The move towards plantations reflects an inherent
contradiction within the popularity of açaí; that is, its popularity is
facilitated by claims that purchasing açaí benefits the Amazonian
communities, while its increasing popularity beyond a niche
undermines its potential to benefit such communities in the longterm. Fair trade schemes rather than challenging such capitalist
dynamics in the context of açaí reinforces them by allowing
plantations to be incorporated into fair trade certified supply
1079, 1090–92 (2007) (analyzing the changing moral geography of trade and
consumption over time).
155
See generally Suzanne Freidberg, Cleaning Up Down South: Supermarkets,
Ethical Trade and African Horticulture, 4 SOCIAL AND CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 27,
34–35 (2003); Anandi Ramamurthy, Absences and Silences: The Representation of
the Tea Picker in Colonial and Fair Trade Advertising, 13 VISUAL CULTURE IN
BRITAIN 367, 391–92 (2012); Daniel Jaffee & Philip H. Howard, Corporate
cooptation of organic and fair trade standards, 27 AGRICULTURE AND HUMAN
VALUES 387–399 (2010); Ian Hussey & Joe Curnow, Fair Trade, neocolonial
developmentalism, and racialized power relations, 5 INTERFACE 40–68 (2013);
Trentmann, supra note 155; LAURA T. RAYNOLDS & ELIZABETH A. BENNETT,
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON FAIR TRADE (2015).
156
Nathalie Cialdella & Livia Navegantes Alves, La ruée vers l’« açaí » (Euterpe
oleracea Mart.): trajectoires d’un fruit emblématique d’Amazonie [The rush to the
“açaí” (Euterpe oleracea Mart.): Trajectories of an emblematic fruit of the
Amazonia], 4 REVUE TIERS MONDE (THIRD WORLD REVIEW) 119 (2014).
157
Olivier De Schutter, How not to think of land-grabbing: three critiques of largescale investments in farmland, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 249, 258–59 (2011).
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chains. 158 Moreover, açaí product labels, through their
misrepresentation of Amazonian ribeirinhos, are counter to efforts
like fair trade to re-embed social relations in supply chains. Of the
49 products examined, none pictured açaí plantations, instead
preferring romanticized and mystified representations of the
Amazonian river. No labels depicted the reality of the difficult
working environments that Amazonian ribeirinhos operate in to
secure their livelihoods.
A related issue is the role of Amazon ribeirinhos in
cultivating the palms on which açaí grows over the centuries (as well
as Indigenous groups). Generally, two schemes are relevant where a
group in a particular area has been the stewards for a particular plant
variety. The first is geographical indicators, but no geographical
indicators were provided for on the açaí products examined. 159
Perhaps this is because the palms on which açaí grows are across
country borders.
The second schemes are those international agreements,
namely the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Nagoya
Protocol, that establish bilateral access and benefit sharing schemes
ECOCERT, TECHNICAL STANDARDS DEFINING THE REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO
PRODUCTS ORIGINATING FROM FAIR TRADE 4 (2010) (arguing just like the other
predominant fair trade schemes, make plantations eligible for fair trade
certification). Although, ECOCERT explains that products from plantations will
only be fair trade certified under exceptional circumstances, but it is unclear what
those exceptional circumstances may be. ECOCERT does state that, when
considering the eligibility of a plantation, the context of plantation (e.g. size of land,
type of production), as well as the corporate structuring of the plantation (e.g.
shareholding structure) are relevant considerations. Note also the incorporation of
plantations into fair trade is not necessarily counter to progressing social justice, but
much will depend on the political context and state willingness to regulate fair trade
practices on plantations. See, e.g., Sarah Besky, Can a Plantation be Fair?
Paradoxes and Possibilities in Fair Trade Darjeeling Tea Certification, 29
ANTHROPOLOGY WORK REV. 1 (2008) (stating the context-specific factors that
influence whether fair trade certification makes the conditions on plantations just
and favorable to workers.) In the context of açaí, plantations are only now emerging
and competing with small-scale operations and wild-harvesting. Combined with the
current political climate in Brazil following the country’s 2018 presidential election,
it is questionable whether the context is conducive to supporting fair work conditions
on plantations. See PETER FLEMING AND MARC T. JONES, THE END OF CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CRISIS AND CRITIQUE 91, 91 (2013) (commenting on
Nestle’s ability to appropriate the work of fair trade social movements for corporate
branding).
159
Cf. Rosemary J. Coombe & S. Ali Malik, Transforming the Work of
Geographical Indications to Decolonize Racialized Labor and Support
Agroecology, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 363 (2018) (arguing that geographical
indicators combined with fair trade and analogous certification schemes have the
potential to transform unequal relations within and between countries that perpetuate
harms).
158
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regarding genetic materials and related traditional knowledge.
Access and benefit sharing schemes incentivize biodiversity
conservation and recognize the role of traditional communities as
stewards of particular genetic resources. 160 State signatories to these
international instruments then implement these schemes through
domestic legal regimes. However, access and benefits schemes
generally do not apply in the context of açaí production and export.
The schemes are relevant where a company wishes to patent genetic
material from the palms on which açaí grows or the fruit themselves.
In the context of a traditional food item dramatically increasing in
value like açaí, access and benefit sharing schemes are irrelevant, as
a third-party is not taking the açaí plant genetics and related
knowledge to develop, for instance, a new plant variety or
pharmaceutical drug. Thus, no direct avenues exist to reward those
communities that have acted as stewards to the açaí palms that now
provide significant economic benefits to a range of supply chain
actors.
VI. Biodiversity and Ecological Sustainability: GreenWashing
A. Biodiversity Conservation
Nineteen of the 49 products examined made claims about
how the wild harvesting of açaí preserves the biodiversity of the
Amazon rainforest. For instance, one product claimed that:
This Açai is wild harvested from deep in the
Amazon forests. This means the fruit grows in its
native bio-diverse ecosystem maintaining its natural
nutrient profile. Wild harvesting ensures that the
delicate environment of the Amazon is protected”
(Raw Organic Açaí Powder, Loving Earth Pty Ltd).
Another claimed:
Harvested sustainably from a wild and vigorous 25foot Brazilian tropical palm that naturally grows
prolifically across 2.5 million acres of Amazon
River floodplains -- supporting the Açai Berry
industry makes these trees more valuable vertical
than logging them – and how good is that? (Açaí
Powder, Power Super Foods Pty Ltd)

See, e.g., MANUEL RUIZ & RONNIE VERNOOY, THE CUSTODIANS OF BIODIVERSITY:
SHARING ACCESS TO AND BENEFITS OF GENETIC RESOURCES 4–5 (2012).
160
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These claims imply that food can be produced and
consumed on a large and globalized scale while having only a
minimal, or even positive, impact on the natural environment. The
consumer is told that it is possible to use and consume aspects of
Amazonian ecosystems while simultaneously conserving the same
ecosystems. 161
Conventional food production in relation to fruits tends to
be monoculture, mechanized and input intensive. To cast açaí
berries production and consumption as a counter to conventional
food systems, açaí berry labels do not draw attention to the long,
energy-intensive supply chains that employ highly technical food
processing methods. 162 Instead, the food labels place emphasis on
the harvesting process, with descriptors including “wildharvested,” “wild-gathered,” “hand-picked” and “manually
harvested.” These phrases convey the message that açaí berries are
grown in the wild as opposed to on farms and that açaí berries are
harvested by hands and not machinery. As mentioned above, it
also devalues and invisibilizes the Amazonian ribeirinhos’ role as
stewards of the Euterpe oleracea palm on which açaí grows.
As global demand for açaí has continued to increase, market
pressures have incentivized the development of more intensive açaí
farms. Furthermore, Brazilian politicians have sought to attract
private investment into açai plantations and increase the use of
synthetic fertilizers in açaí management.163 This outcome is
predicated on the theory of comparative advantage, which provides
the rationale for international trade and investment law.164
Comparative advantage holds that each country should specialize in
the commodities that they produce best, rather than directing
resources towards commodity production that is more difficult for
them to perform due to, for instance, environmental, geographic and
social conditions. As Brazil, and other Latin American countries, are
particularly well-suited for growing açaí, the theory provides that
they should specialize and intensify the production of açaí berries.
C.f. Robin Canniford & Avi Shankar, Purifying Practices: How Consumers
Assemble Romantic Experiences of Nature, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 1051, 1051 (2013).
162
The supply chain is energy intensive owing to the need for refrigeration for frozen
açaí pulp or juice. The powders do not require the same refrigeration, but the
processing methods used to formulate the powders have the potential to be energy
intensive depending on the context and methods employed.
163
Jennifer A. Lewis, The power of knowledge: information transfer and açaí
intensification in the peri-urban interface of Belém, Brazil, 74 AGROFORESTRY SYS.
293, 297–98 (2008).
164
Carmen G. Gonzalez, Deconstructing the Mythology of Free Trade: Critical
Reflections on Comparative Advantage, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L. J. 65 (2006).
161
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[In the last few years,] production of açaí has
intensified in the floodplains leading to large areas
of diverse forest being converted into açaí
agroforests and [to açai berries] being grown on
monoculture plantations. A recent study by Freitas
et al. examined the impact of the demand for açai on
the biological diversity of Amazonian floodplain
forests. They found a loss of 50% of tree species
diversity and a 63% reduction in pioneer species
(hardy varieties that are the basis for forest
ecosystems). These findings align with empirical
studies that illustrate a negative correlation between
increase[s in intensive agricultural production for
export to meet global demand] and declines in
[dietary diversity] and on- and off-farm
biodiversity. 165
Similarly, Barlow et al. 166 compared the biodiversity loss
from human disturbances within forests in the Amazonian flood
plains (including from açaí agroforestry) to the expected biodiversity
loss from deforestation. They commented that:
At its most stringent, Brazil’s centrepiece
environmental legislation, the Forest Code,
mandates Amazonian landowners to maintain 80%
of their primary forest cover. Our results show that
even where this level of compliance is achieved, the
primary forests of these landscapes may only retain
46%-61% of their potential conservation value and
are likely to have lost many species of high
conservation and functional importance. 167
In the catchments studied then, more biodiversity was lost
due to human disturbances than would be expected by deforestation
to the extent allowed under Brazilian laws. Barlow et al. 168 framed
their research as evidence for urgent regulatory interventions that go
beyond preventing deforestation and center on preserving the
diversity of these ecosystems. While market dynamics stemming
from the popularity of açaí may prevent land use change in the

Johnson, Parker & Maguire, supra note 136, at 314.
Jos Barlow et al., Anthropogenic disturbance in tropical forests can double
biodiversity loss from deforestation, 535 NATURE 144, 144 (2016).
167
Id. at 147.
168
Id. at 144.
165
166
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Amazonian floodplains, the market as it currently functions does not
conserve biodiversity and instead facilitates simplified agroforests.
Despite the common marketing claims regarding “wildharvested” açaí berries, the rapid development of açaí plantations in
upland areas of the Amazon river delta suggests that açaí is
increasingly sourced from plantations. 169 Alternatively, it may
indicate that domestic markets are now relying on plantation-grown
açaí, while wealthier Western markets have maintained access to açaí
that is wild-harvested and organic.
More broadly, trends in the intensification of açaí production
for export show how the successful marketing of açaí products, with
its emphasis on the multiple benefits of açaí consumption for health
and the environment and rural development, contribute to
undermining these very claims. The popularity of açaí, partly fueled
by such claims, creates market incentives to intensively produce açaí
berries on monoculture farms, which in turn undermines the claims
about how the consumer choice to buy açaí contributes to the
preservation of pristine Amazonian environments.
B. Organic
The main way in which environmental claims are regulated
in global supply chains is through voluntary organic certification.170
Organic claims are common on açaí products with 29 of the
identified labels describing the açaí contents as organic. 171 Of these,
17 claims were supported by third-party certification marks, and 12
claims were unsupported by a certification scheme.
169
Alistair John Campbell et al., Anthropogenic disturbance of tropical forests
threatens pollination services to açaí palm in the Amazon river delta, 55 J. APPL.
ECOL. 1, 1 (2018).
170
See Hui-Shung Chang & Lydia Zepeda, Consumer perceptions and demand for
organic food in Australia: Focus group discussions, 20 RENEWABLE AGRIC. & FOOD
SYS. 155, 159 (2004) (containing empirical research that finds that Australian
consumers generally interpret organic claims as communicating that a product is
“free of chemicals, pesticides and residues,” “healthiness,” and “wholesomeness”);
see generally STEWART LOCKIE, Capturing the Sustainability Agenda: Organic
Foods and Media Discourses on Food Scares, Environment, Genetic Engineering,
and Health, 23 Agric. & Human Values 313 (2006) (discussing, amongst other
topics, the viewpoints surrounding organic foods); Lydia Zepeda & Jinghan Li,
Characteristics of Organic Food Shoppers, 39 J. AGRIC. & APP. ECON. 17 (2007)
(investigating the characteristics of organic food shoppers compared to nonorganic
food shoppers).
171
Generally, organic agriculture refers to a set of ecologically-based land use
practices that do not use synthetic in-puts (fertilizers, herbicides, insecticides,
genetically modified seeds, etc.). Underlying the concept of organic agriculture is,
inter alia, resistance to industrial agriculture, characterised by intensive practices,
low biodiversity and a high dependence on external in-puts.

2019] CONSUMER POWER TO CHANGE THE FOOD SYSTEM? 41
For highly processed foods like açaí berries, these organic
claims give the message that the consumer can purchase a product
that is simultaneously clean, green, and super convenient. Warde 172
suggests that processed foods are often marketed, especially towards
working people with caring responsibilities, as quick and easy yet
also showing care to the family – overcoming the antinomie of
convenience and care. Acaí superfood products also emphasize their
convenience (e.g. ready to blend smoothie packets or freeze-dried
powers) that synchronously allow the consumer to care for the
environment and their own body:
The açaí in our [product name] is natural and organic
and is harvested from the Brazilian rainforest. For
your convenience, our product range includes
RioLife 100% certified organic and wild harvested
freeze-dried açaí powder….. The only açaí in
Australia with absolutely nothing added to it! . . .
since RioLife Açaí berries are wild harvested and
organic, there are no pesticides involved. 173
Yet the claim that these products care for the environment is
not easy to verify and may be greenwashing. No legally binding
standards exist in Australia in relation to “organic” claims nor does
any required pre-market verification process exist. Thus, the
manufacturer of the açaí product broadly determines: firstly, whether
they will make an organic claim, and secondly, whether they will
seek certification of their claim by a NGO or make the claim without
third-party certification.
The only way in which an Australian government regulator
would examine the substantiation of an organic claim on a product
for domestic consumption would be if a consumer, NGO or
competing business made a complaint to one of the state consumer
protection regulators or the ACCC (discussed above). Under s18 of
the Australian Consumer Law, 174 the complaint would have to allege
that a product’s claim is ‘misleading and deceptive.’ When
investigating whether an organic claim is misleading or deceptive,
the ACCC refers to the Australian Standard for Organic and
biodynamic product (AS 6000-2015) as a guideline. 175 Sellers
Warde, supra note 37, at 152.
RioLife, supra note 149.
174
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (Austl.) (being a model law that
applies at both Commonwealth and State levels).
175
See Organic Claims, AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N.
https://www.accc.gov.au/consumers/groceries/organic-claims (last visited Mar. 13,
172
173
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wishing to comply with consumer and imported food law in Australia
would, therefore, follow the minimum standards set out in AS 60002015 to mitigate their potential liability.176 This approach, thus,
informally enrolls the manufacturer to self-regulate their use of
organic claims (which they may do by obtaining organic certification
in accord with the standard), and enrolls the consumer, and other
market actors, in information-gathering to trigger an ACCC
investigation. 177 However, it would be difficult for a consumer to
detect whether an organic claim was actually misleading since açaí
is harvested in lands not subject to secure land tenure rules, and
moves through globalized supply chains. 178 For example in relation
to wild-harvested plants, an açaí product would be consistent with
2.9.2 of the AS 6000-2015, if the açaí berries it contains were sourced
from a clearly defined collection area and the collection area was not
subject to synthetic farming inputs in the last three years.179
Additionally, the operator must carry out collections in a way that
does not “disturb the stability of the natural habitat or the
2019) (stating that “there is a voluntary Australian standard for growers and
manufacturers wishing to label their products ‘organic’ and ‘biodynamic’ (AS 60002009)” and that “this standard is a useful reference point when determining whether
a product is organic”); see generally Memorandum, Memorandum of Understanding
Between the Commonwealth of Australia and Standards Australia International
Limited 2003 (Austl.) (Standards Australia, which is analogous to the American
National Standards Institute, is a long-established NGO and not-for-profit in
Australia. This organization develops standards in a range of sectors, participates in
the creation of international standards and accredits other organizations to develop
standards. It works closely with the Australian Government pursuant to the
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Commonwealth of Australia and
Standards Australia Limited.).
176
See generally Imported Food Control Act 1992 (Cth) (Austl.) Because açaí is an
imported product, it is also regulated under the Imported Food Control Act 1992
(Cth), which contains a “labelling offence” in s 8A. The offence is made out where
a person does not meet “applicable standards” relating to information on food
packaging labels and carries a penalty of imprisonment for 10 years. The burden of
proof falls on the defendant to prove that they did not commit a labeling offence,
which places the onus on the party with the most information about a food package’s
contents. “Applicable standards” is defined as ‘the national standard in force in
relation to that food or matter’, and so would likely encompass the AS 6000-2015.
177
See generally Curll et al., supra note 76, at 425 (discussing further the pathway
of enforcement) The ACCC usually only takes action where there is a complaint and
the issue is of significance; see also Julia Black, Enrolling actors in regulatory
systems: examples from UK financial services regulation, 2003 PUB. L. 63 (2003)
(discussing the concept of enrollment).
178
See Fábio de Castro, Local politics of floodplain tenure in the Amazon, 10 INT’L.
J. COMMONS 1 (2016) (finding that forests are community-based management
systems, which are not subject to land tenure rules).
179
Organic and Biodynamic Products 2015 (Austl.) Farming inputs must meet the
requirements in Appendix B of the AS 6000-2015 if the product is to be labelled as
“organic” in a manner complying with the standard. Generally, farming inputs
should be naturally occurring materials (e.g. compost).
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maintenance of species in the collection area” (art 2.9.2(b)). Thus,
consumers would generally need to rely on third-party organic
certification, consistent with AS 6000-2015.
Even though certification is not a precondition to marketers
making organic claims in Australia, organic claims on açaí products
certified by a third-party were more common than uncertified claims.
Third-party certification involves non-state actors setting
management standards which meet, and perhaps go beyond, AS
6000-2015. No requirements, on-going monitoring or approval
processes exist in relation to certification bodies. Thus, their ability
to create and implement standards generally occurs without any
regulatory intervention from governments.
Meanwhile, certification trademarks are available for an
entity setting itself up as a certification body, provided their
trademark application includes the standards that the goods must
meet before the certification trademark can be employed. 180 The
rights to use and license the certification trademark are limited to the
rules governing the use of the mark, as submitted in the trademark
application. In sum, certification bodies are not regulated by a
government body in terms of their activities or standards; but they
are able to obtain private property rights in their certification mark,
which incidentally provides a small level of regulatory oversight
through the requirement that a trademark application includes the
scheme’s rules.
The Australian and New Zealand approach to regulating
organic claims significantly differs to the US where the term
“organic” can only be used on a food label if the product has been
produced according to the Organic Food Production Act and the US
Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) organic regulations. 181 The US
approach enables significantly more public oversight and critique of
organic standards. However, the USDA’s Organic Standards are
routinely critiqued for representing the interests of large-scale,
industrial organic operations owned by corporations rather than
requiring genuinely sustainable farming practices. 182
TRADE MARKS ACT 1995 (Cth) pt 16 (Austl.).
Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3935
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 6501–6524 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L.
No. 115–281)).
182
See Jaffee and Howard, supra note 156; Alessandra Arcuri, The Transformation
of Organic Regulation: The Ambiguous Effects of Publicization, 9 REG. & GOV. 144
(2014); Leslie King & Julianne Busa, When Corporate Actors Take Over the Game:
The Corporatization of Organic, Recycling and Breast Cancer Activism, 16 SOCIAL
MOVEMENT STUD. 549 (2017); MICHAEL A. HAEDICKE, ORGANIZING ORGANIC:
180
181
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Of the 17 açaí products that claimed to be certified, over half
were accredited through the not-for-profit entity Australian Certified
Organic (ACO). This is consistent with the ACO being the most
common certification mark applied to organic products sold in
Australia. 183ACO’s Standard 7.5 relates to “wild harvesting.” Given
that most açaí does not grow on farms subject to private property
rights, standard 7.5 is likely to be the standard used by açaí product
manufacturers to obtain certification.184 The USDA’s Organic
Regulation “5022: Wild Crop Harvesting” is highly similar to
Standard 7.5, which indicates that analogous standards and
evidentiary requirements apply to açaí certified as organic and
imported into the US.185
To be certified organic under standard 7.5, açai product
manufacturers must periodically verify that the açaí harvesting is not
“degenerating to the natural systems” of the Amazonian estuary or
other natural habitats in which the palm grows. 186 Essentially, the
açaí manufacturer must check on, and verify that, the harvested areas
regenerate post-harvest, and that the harvesting of açaí does not
involve felling of the palms or impacts to other flora to the extent that
harvesting has compromised surrounding ecosystems. 187 The
standard states that the harvesting area should “encourage comingling of species of wild-harvest products and native species so as
to mimic as much as is feasibly possible the natural ecosystems
within which these species have evolved.”188 In other words, the wild
harvesting of açaí should be conducted in smaller-scale ways that
make use of an abundant species without resulting in the loss of
ecosystems functions or the biodiversity that supports ecosystems.
The açaí manufacturer must identify on a map a clear area
for the harvesting of açaí that are “a satisfactory distance” from
conventional farming or related contamination risks. 189 The açaí
manufacturer must keep a record of all “collectors” and any local
CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE IN AN EMERGING MARKET (2016); JULIE GUTHMAN,
AGRARIAN DREAMS: THE PARADOX OF ORGANIC FARMING IN CALIFORNIA (2004).
183
Organic Certification, ORGANIC FOOD AU, http://www.organicfood.com.au/con
tent_common/pg-organic-certification.seo (last visited Mar. 13, 2019).
184
AUSTRALIAN CERTIFIED ORGANIC STANDARD PTY. LTD., AUSTRALIAN CERTIFIED
ORGANIC STANDARD § 7.5, at 54 (2017).
185
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., AGRIC. MKTG. SERV. NOP 5022, WILD CROP HARVESTING
(2011), https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/5022.pdf. (last visited
Mar. 14, 2019); see also 7 CFR § 205.207.
186
AUSTRALIAN CERTIFIED ORGANIC STANDARD PTY. LTD., AUSTRALIAN CERTIFIED
ORGANIC STANDARD § 7.5.1, at 54 (2017).
187
Id. at § 7.5.1–7.5.2, at 54.
188
Id. at § 7.5.3, at 54.
189
Id. at § 7.5.5–7.5.6, at 54.
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agents, as well as the respective quantities of açaí berries they
provided. 190 Açaí manufactures must further provide instructions to
collectors or other local agents that defines the area of collection and
informs them about the standard. 191 To evidence that these
instructions were provided, the collectors or relevant agents must
“sign statements to say that they have followed the instructions,”
which are kept on file by the açaí manufacturer. 192
Documents formulated and provided by the açaí processor
provide the evidentiary base for certification in the context of açaí.
This evidence is provided by the açaí processor to a Brazilian
certification body that is recognized by the ACO. The ACO assesses
the evidence gathered by the approved Brazilian certification body,
along with import documentation and documented proof that the
product was not fumigated or irradiated at the Australian border. The
ACO may then confer its certification mark to the açaí processor or
importer as a wholesaler. The on-going use of the mark is subject to
annual review by the ACO, and the ACO performs random checks
on imported products to test for contaminants.
Overall, an açaí processing company does not know for
certain whether the instructions were followed nor is it required to
perform periodic checks. Financial and time pressures may lower
incentives to examine whether their instructions to forest farmers
have been followed. It is also conceivable that these standards are not
practical, given that they were not developed with the bottom-up
involvement of Amazonian ribeirinhos and apply broadly to all wildharvested products. In the case of açaí products, the organic
certification does not represent, as consumers would assume, a
product that is free from synthetic chemicals. Rather, it represents
that açaí processors and forest farmers have self-substantiated their
efforts to avoid harvesting too close to, for instance, conventional
farms. No objective scientific evidence, or evidence verified firsthand by the ACO itself, is used in the process of certification.
Moreover, the biodiversity loss in the Amazonian
floodplains suggests that the organic certification requirements,
especially those regarding the preservation of ecosystems during
harvest, are not being followed or that not enough actors have
voluntarily agreed to such standards. In the context of açaí then,
organic certification is not confirmation that the product is
sustainably harvested. Consumers think they are buying a product
that is “clean and green” even though the veracity of these claims
Id. at § 7.5.13–7.5.14, at 55.
Id. at § 7.5.12, at 54.
192
Id.
190
191
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requires much more evidence and oversight than the supply chains
of a globally-traded, durable commodity allows. Moreover,
consumers cannot know what proportion of land is being preserved
as organic or biodiverse due to açaí production, but it is not likely to
be large as long as it remains a market niche. At the same time, the
more popular the product becomes, the more likely it is to create
pressure for unsustainable production practices.
VII. Conclusion
Through our preliminary development of a label chain
governance analysis, we demonstrate how to connect, and the value
of connecting, the micro world of the consumer and their everyday
choices with the macro world of cultural, social, political and
governance institutions. 193 In Part II we suggested that this approach
can help scholars, activists and engaged consumers to not only
critically evaluate particular products but also identify patterns in
markets and supply chains that should be addressed by collective
action and governance strategies beyond consumer choice. We
operationalized our approach through a case study of the marketing
for açaí berry products, introduced in Part III. These marketing
claims suggest that choosing these products enable consumers to
govern their own health while also contributing to market signals, as
a form of regulation, which supports a fairer more sustainable food
system.
Our analysis of health claims in Part IV shows the factors
that have influenced the generally lax regulatory standards around
health claims and suggests the need to reconsider whether certain
health and nutritional claims should be legally allowed to be made
on foods at all. In the European Union, for example, many claims
about diseases and disease markers that can be allowed in the US and
Australia are legally prohibited. The result is that many of the
misleading and overreaching claims seen on US and Australian
superfood products are not seen in the market in the EU. Addressing
the claims themselves will be important. Stricter regulation of the
claims and more active monitoring and enforcement of the
requirements to back up claims in the US and Australia would help
prevent misleading claims and quieten the noisy landscape of selfinterested commercial health messages provided to consumers.194

See Schneider & Davis, supra note 41, at 32 (discussing the intersection between
food production, industry, regulation, and consumer choice).
194
See Curll et al., supra note 76, at 443–45 (discussing the failure of Australian and
American regulatory measures in preventing fraudulent food label health claims).
193
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Public messaging and guidance regarding food choices
should adopt a more holistic understanding of the connections
between human bodily health and food. One example of this
approach is the development of sustainable dietary guidelines by
various nations. Brazil’s dietary advice, for instance, tells citizens
that “[d]iet is more than the intake of nutrients.” 195 Such guidance
needs to be combined with restrictions on food advertising itself and
in particular on commercially conflicted health messaging.196 This
would help create space for public health professionals to provide
fairer and more precise messages about healthy diets and healthy
lives and may go some of the way to mitigating the cultural factors
that promote over-consumption. Finally, public regulatory
interventions, such as fiscal measures, could be taken that make
ultra-processed, unhealthy food products less economically and
physically accessible, while improving the availability and
accessibility of a diverse range of unprocessed, unbranded plant
food. 197
Our analysis of fair trade representations in Part V showed
how product labels leave out the limitations inherent in market-based
responses to social inequalities and highlight a simple understanding
of social issues and social change. They tend to provide some
technically true information (e.g. demand for açaí has created more
employment opportunities) that are undermined by the omission of
other aspects (e.g. the working conditions, the lack of land tenure
security, the problems with dependence on raw agricultural
commodities for livelihoods). Rather, açaí product labels tended to
reinforce social inequalities by omitting the distinct culture and
position of Amazonian ribeirinhos, including in particular, the
significance of their agroforestry skills and knowledge in enabling
the mass supplies of açaí while preserving biodiversity.
Part VI exposed how food labels can depict technically true
environmental claims but avoid contextualizing these temporary
benefits within the broader dynamics of capitalist, globalizing food
supply chains that necessarily incentivize monoculture, intensive
See Christine Parker & Hope Johnson, Sustainable Healthy Food Choices: The
Promise of ‘Holistic’ Dietary Guidelines as a National and International
Springboard, 18 QUT L. Rᴇᴠ. 1, 32–34 (2018) (citing Carlos Augusto Monteiro et
al., Dietary Guidelines to Nourish Humanity and the Planet in the Twenty-First
Century: A Blueprint from Brazil, 18 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 2311 (2015)).
196
See id. at 38–40 (summarizing relevant regulatory policy measures and
supporting literature); see also Walter Willett et al., Food in the Anthropocene: The
EAT-Lancet Commission on Healthy Diets from Sustainable Food Systems, 393
LANCET 447, 478–84 (2019) (summarizing regulatory policy measures necessary for
healthy sustainable diets).
197
See Willett et al, supra note 199, at 484.
195
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farming. Moreover, this part illustrated how the depiction of thirdparty certification marks is designed, and empirical evidence showed
how it has created, consumer trust in environmental claims. Going
beyond the marks to critically examine the evidence and standards
being imposed undermines the trust created when it comes to wildharvested, imported products. The difficulties of verifying claims in
this context stem from the distances over which global food chains
operate and the way in which these claims rely largely on
documentary evidence provided by parties with an interest in being
certified.
As Dorothy Smith observed the “work of inquiry” as to how
local sites of people’s experience “are connected into the extended
social relations of ruling and economy” must be “technical,” yet “its
product should be ordinarily accessible and usable, just as a wellmade map is, to those on whose terrain it maps.” 198 Similarly, our
deconstruction of the label as governance space is technical and
scholarly in part. Yet, we also propose it as an emancipatory study
that can be communicated for reflexive consumers199 who wish to
identify and exercise agency in relation to social systems and
structures. We do not mean to imply that every individual consumer
must be aware of everything in the supply chain and its governance
behind every product. Democratic control and accountability of the
market and the food system, however, requires that there be enough
individuals and groups, consumers, activists, policy-makers,
business people, artists, and so on, who look behind the label and
identify governance practices that recreate injustice and inequality
and act to change them. Therefore, we see our study as a resource to
further critical examinations of the food label as a governance space
while positioning such analyses as a starting off point from which to
think through, detail and advocate for new possibilities for the
regulatory governance of food systems.

198
DOROTHY SMITH, INSTITUTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY: A SOCIOLOGY FOR PEOPLE 29
(2005).
199
See generally Antony Beckett & Ajit Nayak, The Reflexive Consumer, 8
MARKETING THEORY, 299 (2008) (introducing the concept of the “reflexive
consumer” and discussing how marketing practices affect consumer choice and
identity).

The Clash of Agricultural Exceptionalism and the First
Amendment: A Discussion of Kansas’ Ag-Gag Law
Meredith Kaufman*
I. Introduction
A. Overview
Since the Nation’s founding, agricultural production has
been treated differently than other industries. This concept, known
as “agricultural exceptionalism,” has manifested in many different
ways throughout U.S. history. 1 Since the 1990s, one manifestation
of agricultural exceptionalism has been the enactment of “Ag-gag
laws,” state laws that limit information gathering activities at
animal production facilities.2 Ag-gag laws are frequently criticized
by animal welfare advocates and legal scholars for seeking to shield

* Author received her J.D. from the University of Colorado Law School in 2018
and received her LL.M in Agriculture and Food Law from the University of
Arkansas School of Law in May 2019. She is grateful for Professor Susan
Schneider's assistance editing this article.
1
For example, the agriculture industry is exempted from federal labor laws,
environmental regulations, and antitrust restrictions. See Susan Schneider, A
reconsideration of Agricultural Law: A Call for the Law of Food, Farming, and
Sustainability, 34 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 935, 935–36 (2010)
(discussing the history of agriculture law in the U.S. and arguing for a new
paradigm for the special treatment afforded agriculture under the law).
2
It should be noted that Ag-gag laws generally apply to “processing activities” and
“farming activities.” Traditionally, agricultural exceptionalism applies to the
latter, but not the former, and the distinction is not trivial. For example, the
exemptions afforded to agriculture under the Fair Labor Standards Act is a form of
agricultural exceptionalism, and the exemptions do not extend to workers in
processing. The Supreme Court has held that chicken catchers are not agricultural
workers and therefore not exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act overtime pay
provisions. See Herman v. Tyson Foods, Inc. 82 F. Supp. 2d 631 (2000). By
contrast, Ag-gag statutes attempt to expand the umbrella of agricultural
exceptionalism to also include processing activities.
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animal production facilities 3 from public scrutiny, a statesanctioned protection not afforded to other industries. 4
Early Ag-gag laws were enacted to protect agriculture
facilities from trespass and property damage, known as “agriculture
interference laws.” 5 After 2011, a second wave of Ag-gag laws
were enacted, focusing solely on information gathering activities. 6
Six states currently have Ag-gag laws which have not been
challenged in court; one state (Kansas) currently has Ag-gag
litigation pending; and in four states, Ag-gag laws have been ruled
unconstitutional. 78

3
By “animal production facility” I refer to feedlots, slaughterhouses, and livestock
processing facilities, although the term might also include animal research
facilities. For example, the Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research
Facilities Protection Act defines “animal facility” as including “any vehicle,
building, structure, research facility or premises where an animal is kept, handled,
housed, exhibited, bred or offered for sale.” KY. STAT. ANN. § 47-1826(b) (2018).
In this paper, I use the terms “animal production facility,” “animal facility,” and
“agriculture facility” to mean the same thing.
4
See generally Matthew Shea, Punishing Animal Rights Activists for Animal
Abuse: Rapid Reporting and the New Wave of Ag-Gag Laws, 48 COLUM. J. L. &
SOC. PROBS. 337 (2015) (discussing the arguments made against Ag-gag laws,
particularly the most recent generation of Ag-gag laws requiring rapid reporting to
local authorities and the damaging effects these laws have for promotion of animal
welfare).
5
Alicia Prygoski, Detailed Discussion of Ag-gag Laws, MICH. ST. U. ANIMAL
LEGAL & HIST. CTR., https://www.animallaw.info/article/detailed-discussion-aggag-laws (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
6
Id.
7
The states with Ag-gag laws in the books include Montana, North Dakota,
Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, Alabama and North Carolina. Ag-gag laws in Idaho,
Utah, Wyoming, and Iowa have been ruled unconstitutional. What is Ag-Gag
Legislation?, AM. SOC. FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS,
https://www.aspca.org/animal-protection/public-policy/what-ag-gaglegislation#Ag-Gag%20by%20State (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
8
This paper does not discuss the Wyoming Ag-gag law because it does not solely
target speech activities pertaining to animal facilities. WYO. STAT. ANN. . § 6-3-414
(2016) and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40- 27-101 (2016) were nearly identical statutes
which imposed civil and criminal penalties, respectively, for entering private land
for the purpose of collecting resource data or crossing private land to collect
resource data. WYO. STAT. ANN. §
6-3-414 (2016), invalidated by W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, No. 15-CV-169SWS, 2018 WL 5318261 (D. Wyo. Oct. 29, 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-27-101
(2016), invalidated by W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, No. 15-CV-169-SWS,
2018 WL 5318261 (D. Wyo. Oct. 29, 2018). In Western Watershed Project v.
Michael, the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming held that the
statutes were content-based restrictions on speech because they only penalized data
“relating to land or land use.” W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, No. 15-CV-169SWS, 2018 WL 5318261, at *8 (D. Wyo. Oct. 29, 2018) (finding that the laws
failed to meet strict scrutiny, the court deemed the laws unconstitutional).
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As recent litigation demonstrates, a state’s desire to protect
animal facilities from public scrutiny through Ag-gag legislation
frequently clashes with the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.
Despite the prominence of agricultural
exceptionalism in federal and state laws and in U.S. history, where
agricultural exceptionalism clashes with the U.S. Constitution, the
former must yield.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the constitutionality
of the Kansas Ag-gag law, “The Farm Animal and Field Crop and
Research Facilities Protection Act,” focusing on the First
Amendment. It explores the law in light of Supreme Court
jurisprudence and three recent Ag-gag cases, Animal Legal Defense
Fund v. Herbert, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden, and
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds. The courts in each
respective case held the states’ Ag-gag laws unconstitutional in part
or in whole. 9
A consideration of the Kansas Ag-gag law’s
constitutionality is timely because on December 4, 2018, a coalition
of public interest groups filed suit against the state, arguing the
Kansas Ag-gag law violates the First Amendment. This article
argues that the public interest groups should succeed in its lawsuit
in part and adds additional perspective on the Kansas Ag-gag law
by addressing additional First Amendment issues with the law not
raised by the public interest group’s complaint.
Section One of this paper looks at the Kansas statute and
the complaint filed by the public interest groups. Section Two
discusses the holdings in ALDF v. Herbert, ALDF v. Wasden, and
ALDF v. Reynolds. Section Three discusses the First Amendment
problems with the Kansas law. As this article discusses below, the
Kansas law is different from the laws in Idaho, Utah, and Iowa.
Nevertheless, the two sections of the law which implicate speech
are unconstitutional and should be struck by the U.S. District Court
for the District of Kansas. 10

See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018)
(upholding and striking aspects of Idaho’s Ag-gag law); Animal Legal Def. Fund
v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1198 (D. Utah 2017) (striking Utah’s Ag-gag
law in its entirety); and Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, No.
417CV00362JEGHCA, 2019 WL 140069 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 9, 2019)(striking Iowa
Ag-gag on summary judgement).
10
See KAN. STAT. ANN. §47-1825(a) (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4)
(2018).
9
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B. Undercover Activities at Animal Facilities: Why They
Matter
The term “Ag-gag” was coined by food writer Mark
Bittman in 2011, though the history of animal activism and
undercover activity goes farther back. 11 The first animal cruelty
indictment occurred in 1999 after People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals (PETA) released footage from a three-month
investigation of animal abuse at Belcross Farm in North Carolina.12
Today, a YouTube search of “animal production undercover
investigation” yields countless undercover videos revealing horrific
animal abuse at farms, slaughterhouses, and processing facilities for
all types of animals.
These investigations matter foremost because no animal
should endure abuse. Moreover, a consumer has a right to know
how her meat arrived on her plate, and undercover investigations
can help consumers make informed decisions when purchasing
food. Also, given the expanding disconnect between consumers
and food production in our society, and the tight security at animal
facilities, these investigations may be the only source of
information disseminated to the public.
These investigations can also have serious consequences
for exposed facilities. For example, footage of graphic chicken
abuse at an egg production facility, Sparboe Farms, released by
Mercy for Animals in 2013 led McDonald’s and Target to drop the
egg supplier. 13 In a dramatic example, in 2007, the Humane
Society released footage of workers torturing cattle at Hallmark
Meat Packing Co., which raised concerns about mad cow disease
and led to a massive recall. 14 As a result, the slaughterhouse went
bankrupt.

Mark Bittman, Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011)
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals/?_r=0.
12
Ted Genoways, Gagged by Big Ag: How Exposing Abuse Became a Crime,
EARTH FIRST! NEWSWIRE (June 17, 2013), http://earthfirstjournal.org/newswire/201
3/06/17/gagged-by-big-ag-how-exposing-abuse-became-a-crime/.
13
Dana Ford, McDonald’s, Target drops egg supplier after animal cruelty report,
CNN BUSINESS (Nov. 19, 2011), https://www.cnn.com/2011/11/19/business/sparbo
e-farms-animal-cruelty/index.html.
14
Wayne Pacelle, Torture on Tape, HUMANE SOC. OF THE U.S. (Jan. 3, 2008)
https://blog.humanesociety.org/2008/01/calif-cow-abuse.html?credit=blog_post_0
92509_id5103.
11
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C. State’s Fight Back: From Property Destruction to Free
Speech
As discussed above, the focus of Ag-gag laws has shifted
over time. Laws adopted in the 1990s—such as the Kansas law—
were enacted in response to groups like the Animal Liberation
Front, which engage in illegal tactics, such as fence cutting, animal
theft, and arson, to liberate animals. 15 The second wave of Ag-gag
laws, which includes the laws in Idaho, Utah, and Iowa, were
enacted in response to undercover investigations and do not
implicate physical conduct. 16
This article argues that the term “Ag-gag” applies to any
law that implicates speech activities at agriculture facilities,
including laws that mainly target trespass and physical damage. 17 A
full discussion of the evolution of these laws and the semantics of
what constitutes “Ag-gag” is beyond the scope of this article, but
merits attention in its own right.18

See Marshall Tuttle, Finally A Solution? How Animal Legal Defense Fund v.
Otter Could Affect the Constitutionality of Iowa’s Ag-Gag Law, 21 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 237, 244 (2016) (discussing the history of Ag-gag legislation in the
United States).
16
Prygoski, supra note 5.
17
See Rita-Marie Cain Reid & Amber Kingery, Putting a Gag on Farm
Whistleblowers: The Right to Lie and the Right to Remain Silent Confront
Agricultural Protectionism, 11 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 31, 35–38 (2015) (“The first
generation of ‘ag-gag’ laws . . . generally concerned trespass and harm to property
at animal facilities and properties with field crops. Additionally, however, they
criminalized unauthorized photographing or recording at the
agriculture facility…. The second wave of ag-gag enactments emphasized new
ways to chill whistleblowing and
undercover reporting.”).
18
For example, whether Ag-gag encompasses “eco-terrorism” laws is open to
discussion. See
Will Potter, Sentinel Species: the Criminalization of Animal Rights Activists as
“Terrorists,” and What It Means For Civil Liberties in Trump’s America, 95
DENV. L. REV. 887, 882–83 (2018) (discussing the history of eco-terrorism laws
and arguing that the term ‘eco-terrorism’ was created by corporate interest groups
to shift public perception regarding animal activists). See also Kevin Adam,
Shooting the Messenger: A Common-Sense Analysis of State “Ag-Gag”
Legislation Under the First Amendment, 45 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1129, 1166–67
(2012) (“The AETA has been the subject of extreme criticism, primarily because
of its disproportionately harsh penalties for conduct that falls outside of what most
would consider ‘terrorism.’ For example, six animal-rights activists—known
collectively as the ‘SHAC 7’—were convicted of conspiring to violate the AETA
and sentenced to four to six years in federal prison for operating a website that was
used to organize undercover animal-rights investigations.”).
15
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II. Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research
Facilities Protection Act
A. The Nation’s First Ag-Gag Law: Constitutionally
Suspect Sections
There are many ways for a state to draft Ag-gag legislation.
As this paper demonstrates, there are major differences in the
Idaho, Utah, Iowa, and Kansas laws, to varying degrees of
constitutionality.
The Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research
Facilities Protection Act, enacted in 1990, was the nation’s first Aggag law. 19 “Animal facility” is defined as “any vehicle, building,
structure, research facility or premises where an animal is kept,
handled, housed, exhibited, bred or offered for sale.”20
The Act broadly criminalizes four types of conduct: (1)
damaging or destroying an animal facility; (2) exercising control
over an animal facility; (3) entering an animal facility to take
pictures or recordings of the facility; and (4) remaining at an animal
facility against the owner’s wishes.21 Each prohibited act requires
that the actor have “the intent to damage or destroy” the enterprise
or the enterprise’s property. 22 Violation of the Act varies from
misdemeanor to felony depending on the amount of damage caused
to the facility. 23
Not all sections of the Kansas law are constitutionally
suspect. The sections of the law which this article argues violate
the First Amendment are the focus of this paper. First, Section (a)
“Prohibited acts; criminal penalties” is void for vagueness and
chills protected speech because it is overbroad. Section (a) states:
“No person shall, without the effective consent of the owner and
with the intent to damage the enterprise conducted at the animal
facility, damage or destroy an animal facility or any animal or
property in or on an animal facility.”24 However, the terms “intent
to damage” and “damage” are not defined in the statute.

KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-1825–47-1828 (2018).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1826(b) (2018).
21
See KAN. STAT. ANN. §47-1827(a)–(d) (2018) (providing a more detailed
description of the prohibited conduct).
22
Id.
23
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(g) (2018).
24
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(a) (2018).
19
20
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Second, Section (c) “Prohibited acts; criminal penalties” of
the statute states: “No person shall, without the effective consent of
the owner and with the intent to damage the enterprise conducted at
the facility: . . . (4) enter an animal facility to take pictures by
photograph, video camera or by any other means.”25 As this article
discusses in detail below, this section violates the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment. Before addressing these sections
and comparing them with the constitutional issues addressed by the
Ninth Circuit, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, and
the U.S. District Court for the District of Iowa, this article discusses
the recent complaint filed against the State of Kansas.
B. Animal Legal Defense Fund Files Suit
i. The Complaint
On December 5, 2018, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Center
for Food Safety, Shy 38 Inc., and Hope Sanctuary filed suit against
the Kansas Governor and State Attorney General, alleging that the
Kansas Farm and Field Crop and Research Facilities Protection Act
violates the First Amendment. 26 The complaint alleges (1) that the
law is an impermissible content and viewpoint-based restriction on
protected speech; 27 and (2) that the law is overbroad. 28
First, Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) alleges that the
Act violates the First Amendment because it regulates speech based
on the speaker’s message, which is a content-based restriction on
protected speech. 29 When the Farm Animal and Field Crop and
Research Facilities Protection Act was enacted, the state already
had content-neutral statutes prohibiting fraud, trespass, adulteration
of food products, theft, theft of trade secrets, and destruction of
property. 30 Because the state has created a separate law to prosecute
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c) (2018).
Complaint at 1, 6, ALDF v. Colyer, No. 2:18-cv-02657-KHV-JPO (D. Kan.
Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/KSAg-Gag.pdf.
27
Id. at 28–30.
28
Id. at 30–31.
29
See id. at 28–29 (citing Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96
(1972), holding that “laws which
target certain messages or speech because of their ‘ideas, subject matter, or
content’” violate the First Amendment,
and arguing that this designation of content-based restrictions applies to the Kansas
Ag-Gag law).
30
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5808 (2018) (creating and describing the state crime
of criminal trespass); KAN. STAT. ANN. 65-664 (2018) (describing the conditions
25
26
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certain conduct and speech at animal production facilities, ALDF
argues the law distinguishes favored speech from disfavored speech
on the basis of ideas or viewpoints. 31 The complaint alleges that
“the law applies only to speech that involves the subject matter of
the animal industry and its practices and is therefore content-based
on its face.” 32
As the complaint notes, content-based restrictions regarding
speech are subject to strict scrutiny. 33 ALDF argues the law is
neither justified by a compelling interest, nor narrowly tailored to
protecting privacy, trespass, and biosecurity because the state can
do so through less restrictive means. 34
ALDF’s second cause of action is that the law’s
overbreadth amounts to a restriction on protected speech. 35 ALDF
also argues that the law has a chilling effect on speech because the
text is vague, and violations carry a heavy criminal penalty.36
Specifically, because the law does not define the meaning of “intent
to damage,” it is unclear what type of conduct is prohibited.37
Moreover, the “almost limitless” definition of animal facility 38 and
research facility 39 chills speech because the statute covers an
expansive number of forums: the complaint notes, “these broad
definitions would include not just factory farms . . . but also . . .
under which a food will be deemed adulterated); KAN. STAT. ANN. 21-5801 (2018
(describing the crime of theft)); KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-3320 (2018); KAN. STAT.
ANN. 21-5813 (2018) (describing the crime of criminal damage to property).
31
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) (explaining that
regulations which differentiate speech on the basis of content are subject to
exacting scrutiny, while regulations unrelated to the content of speech are subject
to intermediate scrutiny).
32
Complaint, supra note 26, at 28–29.
33
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 643 (holding content-based restrictions
are subject to strict scrutiny).
34
Complaint, supra note 26, at 29.
35
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (holding that a law
prohibiting substantially more speech than necessary is unconstitutional even
though some of the conduct targeted by the law does not offend the First
Amendment).
36
Complaint, supra note 26, at 17–19.
37
Complaint, supra note 26, at 13–14.
38
Defined as “any vehicle, building, structure, research facility or premises where
an animal is kept, handled, housed, exhibited, bred or offered for sale. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 47-1826(b) (2012).
39
Defined as “any place, laboratory, institution, medical care facility, elementary
school, secondary school, college or university, at which any scientific test,
experiment or investigation involving the use of any living animal or field crop
product is carried out, conducted or attempted.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47‒1826(i)
(2012).
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restaurants with lobster or fish tanks, pet stores, circuses, petting
zoos, and elementary school classrooms with an ant farm . . . ”40
The chilling effect of the law’s vagueness and broad sweep
is compounded by the potential for criminal prosecution at the
felony level. ALDF indicates that “the criminal penalties are the
same for a person who intends to take a picture in an animal facility
without the consent of the owner as for a person who knowingly
kills or injures an animal.” 41
ii. Assessment of Complaint
This article agrees with ALDF’s claims for relief—that the
law violates the First Amendment as a content and viewpoint-based
discrimination, and second, that the law’s overbreadth violates the
First Amendment—while diverging from the argument that the
entire statute is unconstitutional.
As a content and view-point based discrimination, this
article relies heavily on Reed v. Town of Gilbert, discussed in detail
below. 42 While ALDF’s complaint does not cite Reed, reference to
this important case regarding facially content-neutral laws would
strengthen its case.
Regarding the statute’s overbreadth, ALDF focuses on the
wide range of conduct prohibited by the law, alleging that the entire
law is unconstitutional because “the law as a whole restricts
substantially more speech than the First Amendment permits.”43
This article diverges from ALDF in this allegation, because certain
prohibited activities in the statute do not implicate speech.
For example, K.S.A. § 47-1827(b) prohibits “acquir[ing] or
otherwise exercis[ing] control over an animal facility . . .” and
K.S.A. §§ 47-1827(e) and (f) prohibit “dama[ing] or [destroy]ing . .
. field crops” at a private research facility or a government agency.
The conduct prohibited in these sections does not implicate
the First Amendment, and, despite the statute’s overbreadth and
vagueness, there is a significant difference between causing
Complaint, supra note 26, at 20.
Id. at 18 (comparing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(g)(3) (2006) with KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21- 6412(b)(2)(A) (2017)).
42
See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2227 (2015).
43
Complaint, supra note 26, at 30–31 (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.
460, 473 (2010)).
40
41
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physical damage to a facility versus making an undercover
recording. While the statute amounts to an unreasonable restraint
on protected speech, damaging or destroying another’s property is
not protected speech. Thus, the Kansas District Court could find
the sections of the statute which implicate speech unconstitutional
while upholding the sections of the statute targeting conduct. 44
iii. Comparison to Idaho, Utah, and Iowa Ag-Gag Laws
This section discusses the opinions in the Idaho, Utah, and
Iowa cases. Notably, these three Ag-gag statutes all targeted some
form of false speech used to obtain entry, access, or employment at
an agriculture facility. By contrast, the Kansas statute does not
address false speech. Thus, while the courts in these respective
cases all apply the Supreme Court’s test for laws regulating false
speech, this inquiry is not relevant in the Kansas case. 45
The Idaho statute was deemed unconstitutional in part,
while the Utah and Iowa statutes were deemed unconstitutional
entirely. While the Kansas statute does not address false speech, it
is still at least in-part unconstitutional.
C. ALDF v. Wasden: Idaho Ag-Gag Held Partially
Unconstitutional
The Idaho Interference with Agricultural Production law
was passed in 2014 after an undercover video of abuse at an Idaho
dairy was released. 46 Shortly after the law was enacted, ALDF
filed suit. The case was eventually appealed to the Ninth Circuit,
and a decision was released in January 2018.

A discussion of conduct under the First Amendment is beyond the scope of this
paper, though it should be noted that damaging or destroying an animal facility
would be not considered expressive conduct. See United States v. O’Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968) (discussing the limits and considerations involved when
considering restrictions on symbolic speech).
45
See U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (holding that false speech which
neither causes a legally cognizable harm nor inures a material gain to the speaker
is a form of protected speech).
46
Arin Greenwood, Court Says No to Gagging Those Who Reveal Farm Animal
Abuse, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/id
aho-ag-gag-law_us_55c0b399e4b06363d5a35543; Mercy for Animals, Burger
King Cruelty—Video Exposes Horrific Animal Abuse at a Burger King Dairy
Supplier, YOUTUBE (Oct. 9, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lNYcWOu
Vqk& oref=https% 3A% 2F% 2Fwww.youtube.com% 2Fwatch% 3Fv% 3DlN
YcWOuVqk& has verified1.
44
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In ALDF v. Wasden, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held two sections of Idaho’s Interference with Agricultural
Production law unconstitutional.
First, Section (1)(a), the
“Misrepresentation Clause,” stated: “a person commits the crime of
interference with agricultural production if the person knowingly:
(a) is not employed by an agricultural production facility and enters
an agricultural facility by force, threat, misrepresentation or
trespass.” 47
Second, Section (1)(d), the “Recording Clause,” prohibited
“enter[ing] an agricultural production facility that is not open to the
public and, without the facility owner’s express consent . . .
mak[ing] an audio or video recording of the conduct of an
agricultural production facility’s operation.” 48 The remainder of
Section A focuses on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.
i. Misrepresentation Clause
1. Gaining Entry Through Misrepresentation is Protected
Speech
Assessing the constitutionality of the Misrepresentation
Clause, the Ninth Circuit looked to U.S. v. Alvarez, in which the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Stolen Valor Act, which
criminalized false claims that the speaker had received the
Congressional Medal of Honor. 49 In Alvarez, the Court held that
false speech is neither categorically protected nor unprotected; false
speech made for the purpose of material gain, material advantage,
or that inflicts a legally cognizable harm can be criminalized.50
Other forms of false speech, which do not fall into any of the
unprotected categories, receive constitutional protection. 51
The Ninth Circuit held that criminalizing entering an
agricultural production facility by misrepresentation violated
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(c) (2018).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(d) (2018).
49
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 709.
50
Id. at 712.
51
Cf. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1195 (2018). It
should be noted that Alvarez was a plurality decision, and there has been
discussion in lower courts as to whether the plurality’s opinion applies, or the
concurrence’s (Breyer, J. concurring, applying a form of intermediate scrutiny to
protected false speech). While considering the narrow grounds of the Alvarez
majority, the Ninth Circuit and the District Courts for Utah and Iowa all applied
strict scrutiny.
47
48
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Alvarez. The court reasoned that “lying to gain entry merely allows
the speaker to cross the threshold of another’s property, including
public property.” 52 Lying for this purpose does not necessarily
result in material gain or advantage for the speaker, nor does it
inflict a legally cognizable harm on the property owner. 53
Because lying to gain entry is protected speech under
Alvarez, the court assessed Section(1)(a) under strict scrutiny. The
court held that the state might have a compelling interest in
regulating property rights and protecting its farm industry, but
“criminalizing access to property by misrepresentation is not
actually necessary to protect those rights . . . If . . . [the state’s] real
concern is trespass, then Idaho already has a prohibition against
trespass that does not implicate speech in any way.”54
2. Obtaining Records Through Misrepresentation is
Unprotected Speech
Conversely, Section (1)(b), which prohibits “obtain[ing]
records of an agricultural production facility by force, threat,
misrepresentation or trespass” 55 and Section (1)(c), which prohibits
“obtain[ing] employment with an agricultural facility by force,
threat, or misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or
other injury to the facility’s operations, livestock, crops, owners,
personnel, equipment, buildings, premises, business interests or
customers” 56 were upheld.
The court held that making false statements to obtain
records inflicts a property harm upon the owner and could result in
material gain to the speaker and is thus unprotected speech under
Alvarez. 57 For example, a property owner suffers a legally
cognizable harm from records obtained through false speech and

Id. at 1195.
See id. at 1194–95 (exemplifying this point, the court makes the following
analogy: “Take, for example, a teenager who wants to impress his friends by
obtaining a highly sought-after reservation at an exclusive pop-up restaurant that is
open to the public. If he were to call the restaurant and finagle a reservation in the
name of his mother, a well-known journalist, that would be a misrepresentation. If
the restaurant offers up a reservation on the basis of the mother’s notoriety,
granting a “license” to enter the premises…the teenager would be subject to
punishment of up to one year in prison, a fine not to exceed $5,000 or both.”).
54
Id. at 1196.
55
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(b) (2018).
56
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(c) (2018).
57
Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1199.
52
53
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the speaker may learn trade secrets. Because such speech is
unprotected, it is only subject to rational review.
Regarding the Equal Protection Clause, the Ninth Circuit
did acknowledge that the law was partially motivated by animus
towards animal welfare groups. 58 However, because animal
welfare groups are not a traditionally suspect class, a court may
only strike the statute “if [it] serves no legitimate government
purpose and if impermissible animus towards an unpopular group
prompted the statute’s enactment.”59 The court acknowledged that
animus towards reporters and activists was a factor in passing the
statute, but that it also serves the legitimate purpose of protecting
agricultural production facilities from interference. 60
3. Obtaining Employment Through Misrepresentation is
Unprotected Speech
The Ninth Circuit also held that Section (1)(c), which
prohibits obtaining employment through misrepresentation with the
intent to cause economic or other injury to the facility, does not
offend Alvarez. In Alvarez, the Supreme Court stated, “[w]here
false claims are made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or valuable
considerations, say offers of employment, it is well established that
the Government may restrict speech without affronting the First
Amendment.”61 Moreover, this section is limited to those seeking
employment with intent to cause economic or other injury to the
facility, which further narrows its scope.
While this speech is unprotected, in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, the Supreme Court held that the government may offend the
First Amendment if it makes a viewpoint distinction in regulating
unprotected speech. 62 ALDF argued that the statute’s Restitution
Clause, which permits victims to recover twice the amount of the
damage resulting from the statute’s violation, violated R.A.V.
See id. at 1200–01 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 448 (1985), holding “a bare…desire to harm a politically unpopular group
[or] negative attitude[s] or fears about that group [do not constitute] a legitimate
government interest for the purpose of this review.”).
59
Id. at 1200 (citing Mountain Water Co. v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation,
919 F.2d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 1990)).
60
Id. at 1201.
61
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723.
62
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) (distinguishing which
types of features of speech can be prohibited without violating the First
Amendment).
58
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because it was enacted solely to punish whistleblowers and
journalists, and thus suppress a specific viewpoint. 63 The Ninth
Circuit held that because the Restitution Clause is limited to
economic loss, rather than “less tangible damage” such as
emotional distress, the statute does not punish animal activists any
more so than other regulations in the Idaho Penal code. 64
ii. Recording Clause
The Recording Clause created the crime of interference
with agricultural production if a person knowingly “[e]nters an
agricultural production facility that is not open to the public and,
without the facility owner’s express consent or pursuant to judicial
process or statutory authorization, makes audio or video recordings
of the conduct of an agricultural production facility’s operation.” 65
The Ninth Circuit held that the Recording Clause violated
the First Amendment. As a preliminary matter, the court indicated
that making an audio or video recording is speech protected by the
First Amendment. 66 The court then determined the Recording
Clause was a content-based restriction because law enforcement
would be required to view the content of the recording to determine
before bringing charges. Because the Recording Clause was
deemed to be a content-based restriction, the court assessed it under
strict scrutiny. The court held that the clause was not narrowly
tailored to protect agriculture production facilities because it was
both over and under-inclusive. The clause was held to be underinclusive because it did not regulate photographs and over-inclusive
because it suppressed more speech than necessary to protect
property and privacy. 67
D. ALDF v. Herbert: Utah Ag-Gag Held Unconstitutional
In 2012, the State of Utah enacted the Agricultural
Operation Interference law, which created the crime of agricultural
interference for certain recording activities; seeking access to an
agriculture operation under false pretenses; and seeking
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(4) (2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5304 (2018);
Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1202.
64
Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1202
65
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1), (2) (2018).
66
Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1203 (stating “[N]either the Supreme Court nor [the Ninth
Circuit] has ever drawn a distinction between the process of creating a form of
pure speech (such as writing or painting) and the product of these processes (the
essay or artwork) in terms of First Amendment protection afforded…” 1203.
67
Id. at 1204.
63
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employment with the intent to record activities at an agriculture
production facility. The United States District Court for the District
of Utah held the entire statute unconstitutional, and the State of
Utah did not file an appeal.
i. Lying Provision: Unconstitutional Restriction on
Protected Speech
Section (2)(b) created the crime of agricultural operation
interference if a person “obtains access to an agricultural operation
under false pretenses.” 68 The court assessed this section under the
Alvarez standard discussed above. The Utah District Court, like the
Ninth Circuit in Wasden, held that Section (2)(b) infringed on
protected speech, noting “[l]ying to gain entry, without more, does
not itself constitute trespass.”69 Thus, because obtaining access
through false pretenses does not necessarily result in a legally
cognizable harm, it does not fall into a category of unprotected false
speech under Alvarez. The court cited numerous examples of
speech which could be criminalized under this provision, such as a
restaurant critic who hides her identity, a dinner guest who lies to
his host, and a job applicant who fabricates his hobbies. 70
Because Section (2)(b) infringed on protected speech, it
was assessed under strict scrutiny. The state cited four interests
before the court: 1) protecting animals from injury resulting from
unqualified workers; 2) protecting animals from disease brought
into the facility by workers; 3) protecting workers from exposure to
disease; and 4) protecting workers from injury resulting from
unqualified workers. 71
The court held that even if these were compelling interests,
the statute was not narrowly tailored to address these problems.
The lying provision was over-inclusive in that it criminalized
conduct unrelated to protecting these interests, and under-inclusive
in that it did nothing to target harmful conduct resulting from
“anyone other than an undercover investigator.” 72

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76–6–112.
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1203 (D. Utah 2017).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 1211.
72
Id. at 1213.
68
69
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ii. Recording Provision: Unconstitutional Restriction on
Protected Speech
Section (2)(a), (c), and (d) created the crime of agricultural
operation interference for various recording activities at an
agricultural production facility.73 As a preliminary matter, the court
held that recordings were a form of speech for First Amendment
purposes. 74 The state argued that because the Act only applied to
speech on private property, First Amendment protections did not
apply. The court rejected this argument, stating “a landowner’s
ability to exclude from her property someone who wishes to speak,
and the government’s ability to jail the person for that speech” are
two different concepts which the state incorrectly conflated. 75
The court then determined that the recording provisions
were a content restriction because they required viewing the content
of the recordings to determine if they were recordings of an
agriculture operation. Had the statute supplanted the term “of” with
“at” the court indicated it might have assessed the provisions as
content-neutral restrictions.”76
As a content-based restriction, the court assessed the
recording provision under strict scrutiny. The court held that the
state offered no clear evidence of how its interests in enacting the
statute, discussed above, were furthered by recording restrictions.
The recording provisions, like the lying provisions, were deemed
unconstitutional.
E. ALDF v. Reynolds: Iowa Ag-Gag Held Unconstitutional
Most recently, in January 2019, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Iowa held the state’s “Agricultural production
facility fraud” statute unconstitutional in a summary judgement
motion. 77 The Iowa law, enacted in 2012, created the crime of
agricultural production facility fraud for “(a). obtain[ing] access to
an agricultural production facility by false pretenses” and “(b).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 76–6–112(2)(a), (c), (d).
Herbert, 263 F. Supp. at 1208 (stating that, “[b]ecause recordings themselves are
protected by the First Amendment, so too must the making of those recordings be
protected. This is not to say that the State cannot regulate the act of recording; it is
merely to say that if it wishes to do so, the State must justify and narrowly tailor
the restriction, as with any other constraint on speech.”).
75
Id.
76
Id. at 1211.
77
IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A; Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 2019 WL
140069 (S.D. Iowa 2019).
73
74
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mak[ing] a false statement or representation as part of an
application or agreement to be employed at an agricultural
production facility, if the person knows the statement to be false,
and mak[ing] the statement with the intent to commit an act not
authorized by the owner . . . ” 78 For a first conviction, the crime
constituted a serious misdemeanor and for a subsequent conviction,
the crime constituted an aggravated misdemeanor.79
i. False Speech and Employment: A Different Outcome
Than Wasden
As a preliminary matter, the Iowa District Court determined
that the false speech at issue—both making false statements to
access an agriculture facility and making false statements to seek
employment at an agriculture facility—are protected forms of
speech under Alvarez because neither instance causes a legally
cognizable harm nor provides a material gain to the speaker. 80
Interestingly, the Iowa District Court came to a different conclusion
regarding false speech and employment than the Ninth Circuit,
which upheld Idaho’s restriction on obtaining employment at an
agriculture facility through false speech.
Unlike the Idaho statute, which prohibited obtaining
“employment . . . by force, threat, or misrepresentation with the
intent to cause economic or other injury,”81 the Iowa statute
prohibits obtaining employment by false speech “with the intent to
commit an act not authorized by the owner.”82 In a previous
decision addressing the state’s motion to dismiss, the Iowa court
held that the Ninth Circuit’s holding regarding Idaho’s employment
clause was inapplicable because the court “placed great emphasis
on the intent prong of the Idaho statute.”83
The Iowa court reasoned that “[t]his intent provision
cabined the application of the Idaho statute so that it only
criminalized the sort of false statements that the plurality in
[Alvarez] recognized the government may target . . . : those likely
to cause material harm to others.”84 Conversely, the Iowa code
IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(1)(a),(b) (2012).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(2)(a),(b) (2012).
80
Reynolds, 2019 WL at 10.
81
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(c) (2018).
82
IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(b) (2012).
83
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 297 F. Supp. 3d 901, 924 (S.D. Iowa
2018).
84
Id.
78
79
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prohibits all false speech in a job application if the speaker intends
to commit an unauthorized act—a much broader prohibition that
the Idaho code. Determining section § 717A.3A(b) to be broader
than the type of false speech the Court deemed unprotected in
Alvarez, the Iowa court assessed section (b) under strict scrutiny.
ii. Iowa Statute Does Not Survive Strict Scrutiny
In the court’s summary judgment opinion, it deemed §
717A.3A unconstitutional. First, the court determined the entire
statute was a content-based restriction because the content of the
speech—whether it was true or false—would need to be assessed to
find an individual guilty of agriculture production facility fraud. 85
As a content-based restriction, the court applied strict
scrutiny in assessing the law. 86 Though dubious of the state’s
justifications for the law (property interests and biosecurity) it still
held that these interests were important, but not compelling. 87 The
law was also deemed unnecessary to protect these interests because
the state made no argument explaining how false speech used to
access or gain employment at an agriculture facility would
compromise biosecurity. 88 Finally, the court determined that
because Iowa already has other content-neutral statutes regarding
trespass and biosecurity, the state’s interests could be achieved by
means which do not affront protected speech. 89 As of February 14,
2019, the Iowa Attorney General’s Office is set to file an appeal
brief by March 20, 2019. 90
III. Kansas Ag-Gag: ‘Better’ Drafted, But Partially
Unconstitutional
As the nation’s first Ag-gag law, perhaps there is a reason
the Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research Facilities

85
Reynolds, 2019 WL at 11 (citing See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal.,
468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984) (holding law that prohibits broadcasting stations which
receive federal funds from editorializing is content-based.)).
86
Id. at 6.
87
Id. at 7.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 8.
90
Rox Laird, Federal Judge Strikes Down Iowa ‘Ag-Gag’ Law, https://www.court
housenews.com/federal-judge-strikes-down-iowa-ag-gag-law/, (last visited Jan. 21,
2019); see also Challenging Iowa’s Ag-Gag Law, Animal Legal Defense Fund
(Feb. 14, 2019), https://aldf.org/case/challenging-iowas-ag-gag-law/ (last visited
March 4, 2019).
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Protection Act was not challenged until 2018; it is ‘better’ drafted
than the Idaho and Utah laws. 91
Notably, there is no section in the Kansas statute which
criminalizes false speech used to enter or seek employment at an
animal facility, so Alvarez is not relevant. However, like the Idaho
and Utah statutes, the Kansas statute does criminalize conduct
involving recording and photography.
Despite its tactful drafting, certain sections are still
constitutionally suspect. 92 This section assesses these problematic
sections of the law in light of the holdings in Reynolds, Wasden,
and Herbert.
A. Unconstitutional Aspects of Kansas Law
i.

Because Key Terms are Not Defined, the Statute is
Overbroad and Vague

1. The Meddling Student Example 93
The word ‘damage’ and the clause ‘intent to damage’ are
not defined in the statute’s definition section. However, each
prohibited act under § 47-1827 requires the actor have the ‘intent to
damage’ the enterprise. 94 Because the term ‘damage’ and the
clause ‘intent to damage’ are not defined in statute’s definitions
section, the statute chills speech and restricts more speech than
necessary to serve its purpose. If the term ‘damage’ were defined
to only include activities resulting in physical damage, the
remainder of the statute (excluding § 47-1827(c)(4)) might be
constitutional.
The Supreme Court has stated, “a law may be invalidated
as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are
It should also be noted that no one has ever been prosecuted under this law.
See Complaint, supra note 26, at 31 (alleging that the entire statute is
unconstitutional on its face or, in the alternative, that Kan. Stat. § 47-1827(c)(4),
(c)(1), (c)(3), Kan. Stat. § 47-1827(a), (b), (c)(2), and (d)(1) are unconstitutional as
applied to Plaintiff.) For purposes of this paper, I only argue that Sections Kan.
Stat. § 47-1827(a) and (c)(4) are unconstitutional.
93
This example was inspired by the Ninth Circuit’s factious teenager who lies
about his identity in order to secure a reservation at an exclusive restaurant, thus
implicating Idaho Code § 18–7042(1)(a). See Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1195.
94
§ 47-1827(b) is the only prohibited act with a different standard, requiring the
actor have the “intent to deprive the owner of such facility.”
91
92
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unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly
legitimate sweep.” 95 Even if aspects of the law are constitutional,
under the overbreadth doctrine, the court considers that “the threat
of enforcement of an overbroad law [will] dete[r] people from
engaging in constitutionally protected speech.” 96
In this instance, the word ‘damage’ and the term ‘intent to
damage’ could mean many things and runs the risk of criminalizing
perfectly legitimate forms of speech. For example, does the statute
criminalize economic, emotional, or physical damage, or all three?
There is also a timing issue: must the speaker have the
intent to damage the enterprise before she engages in her speech
activity, or can she be charged if her intent changes from the time
she made a recording or photograph to the time of disseminating
the information?
To exemplify the statute’s overbreadth, consider the
following hypothetical activity which could be criminalized under
the statute. A school group offers a tour to a local animal
production facility as part of a field trip for a science class. Though
the students are told in advance not to take any photos inside, a
student nonetheless hides his phone in his pocket before the field
trip because he plans to take a photo, just for fun. The student has
signed up for the field trip because his friends dared him to take a
photo inside.
Once inside, he takes a particularly gruesome photo of an
animal carcass being processed. The student entered the facility an
omnivore, but, when he returns home and views the photo, he
realizes he is disgusted by the facility and becomes a vegetarian.
Wanting to share his news and hoping to persuade others in his
network to stop eating meat, he posts the photo to his Facebook
page, and in the caption, he names the animal production facility
and tells his friends that they should stop eating meat because of the
atrocities he witnessed at the facility. A few of his friends view the
photo, are also disgusted by it, and decide to stop eating meat.
Under Section (c)(4), the student could be criminally
prosecuted. By captioning the facility’s name in his photo and
hoping to convert his friends to vegetarianism, the student had the
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442,
449 n.6 (2008) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615).
96
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2018).
95
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“intent to damage the enterprise.” Because he planned to take the
photo in advance of entering the facility, he entered “to take
pictures.” For his actions, the student could be fined and charged
with a misdemeanor or felony, depending on the extent of his
damage. Whether the facility owner might have recourse in a
private tort action (which is beyond the scope of this paper), the
State cannot lawfully criminalize such conduct without infringing
on First Amendment rights.97
2. Kansas Attorney General Opinion Letter Does Not
Ameliorate Statute’s Issues
Following the statute’s enactment, the Kansas Attorney
General released Opinion Letter No. 90-72 on the issue of the
meaning of “intent to damage.” 98 The letter does little to clarify
any confusion surrounding the statue’s vagueness and overbreadth,
and moreover, the letter is not binding law. 99
The letter states that the specific intent to damage the
enterprise conducted at the facility is a required element of the
crime, and such intent is determined by a judge or jury based on the
totality of circumstances surrounding the event.
Responding to the question of what “damages” means, the
Opinion Letter essentially ‘punts’ on the issue. The most definitive
statement in the letter says, “[u]pon conviction, restitution may be
ordered in an amount sufficient to compensate the victim for the
loss suffered. In a civil action compensatory damages may include
out-of-pocket loss as well as consequential damages.” 100 So, if
damages constitute any form of quantifiable harm, perhaps any
intent is sufficient to implicate charges so long as the victim’s
losses are quantifiable. This logic is purely speculative and does
little to clarify the meaning of ‘intent to damage.’
Note that the State of Utah argued that the First Amendment was inapplicable to
its Ag-gag statute because the law only regulated speech on private property. The
Utah District Court was quick to reject this argument, noting that the state had
conflated the difference between “a landowner’s ability to exclude from her
property someone who wishes to speak, and the government’s ability to jail the
person for that speech.” The former does not affront the First Amendment, while
the latter does. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. at 1208.
98
See Livestock and Domestic Animals -- Farm Animal and Research Facilities
Protection Act -- 1990 Senate Bill No. 776 Op. Kan. Att’y Gen. No. 90-72 (1990),
http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/1990/1990-072.pdf (last visited Ma. 10,
2019).
99
Id.
100
Id. at 10.
97
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i. The Pictures Clause Fails First Amendment Scrutiny as
Either Content-Based or Content-Neutral Restriction
Section (c) of Prohibited acts; criminal penalties states:
“[n]o person shall, without the effective consent of the owner and
with the intent to damage the enterprise conducted at the animal
facility . . . (4) enter an animal facility to take pictures by
photograph, video camera or by other means.”101 This section
infringes on protected speech in violation of the First Amendment
as either a content-based or content-neutral restriction on speech. 102
The first step in assessing this section under the First
Amendment is to determine if it infringes on protected speech. The
Supreme Court has held movies to be protected by the First
Amendment. 103 And in United States v. Stevens, the Court stated
“visual [and] auditory depiction[s], such as photographs, videos, or
sound recordings” are subject to the First Amendment. 104 It
logically follows that the act of creating a film, photo, or recording
must receive some level of protection as well, and neither the Ninth
Circuit, the Utah District Court, nor the Iowa District Court
considered otherwise. Thus, protected speech is at issue.
1. Assessed as Content-Neutral Restriction
Section (c)(4) prohibits entering an animal facility “to take
pictures by photograph, video camera, or by other means.” 105 This
section is notably different from both the Idaho and Utah statutes in
that it does not prohibit taking pictures or recordings of an
agriculture production facility, but rather at an animal production
facility. 106
Because this section limits where a photo or recording can
be made, rather than regulating the photo or videos content, it might
be deemed a content-neutral regulation. In Herbert, responding to
the state’s argument that the recording provision was a contentneutral restriction, the Utah District Court stated, “[t]hat might be
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (2018).
There is also a timing issue here, as discussed above in the meddling student
example. Must the actor have the intent to damage the enterprise before she enters?
This uncertainty contributes to the statute’s overbreadth and vagueness.
103
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
104
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010).
105
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (2018).
106
Id.
101
102
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so if the Act criminalized recording an imagine at an agricultural
operation. But the Act criminalizes recording an image of an
agricultural operation. The distinction is not trivial . . . the use of
“of” rather than “at” means the Act does not bar all filming at an
agricultural operation, so it is not location based.”107
Following the rationale of the Utah District Court, the
Kansas recording provision should be assessed as a content-neutral
restriction. Though there are different variations of the contentneutral test, the Supreme Court commonly asks if the law “is
designed to serve a substantial government interest and [does] not
unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.” 108
Even assuming the Kansas legislature has a substantial
interest in protecting its farmers and ranchers, it is dubious that the
law does not ‘unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication.’
Individuals and groups who wish to disseminate
information and exposés of animal production facilities essentially
have no other avenue of communication under this law. The
hypothetical “alternative avenues of communication” do not
measure up to the prohibited conduct. For example, an individual
could seek the owner’s consent to film or photograph, but clearly
what the individual would see while undercover at a facility would
be different than what the individual would see during a planned
visit.
And given the tight security at animal production facilities,
there is essentially no way to take photos or recordings from the
outside. Alternatively, an entity or individual wishing to expose
abuses at an animal production facility could interview a willing
employee, but the differences between reading an interview versus
viewing images or audio recordings is significant. A business can
prohibit individuals from recording or taking photos on its property,
but the state cannot lawfully criminalize such conduct. Because the
Herbert, 263 F. Supp. at 1211.
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 41 (1986). See also
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984); United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453
U.S. 114, 132 (1981); Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consc., 452 U.S. 640, 64748 (1981) (illustrating that the Court commonly asks whether a law regarding
speech is designed to serve a substantial government interest and does not limit
alternate avenues of communication).
107
108
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law limits the only legitimate avenue for this speech to occur, it
infringes on protected speech if it is deemed content-neutral.
2. Assessed as Content-Based Restriction
Despite the text of Section (c)(4), and the distinction drawn
by the Utah District Court between the term “at” and “of,” it is not
clear if the Kansas recording provision is actually content-neutral.
Arguably, Section (c)(4) is content-based.
In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Supreme Court stated, “our
precedents have . . . recognized a separate and additional category
of laws that, though facially content-neutral, will be considered
content-based regulations of speech: laws that cannot be justified
without reference to the content of the regulation of speech or that
were adopted by the government because of disagreement with the
message [the speech] conveys. Those laws, like those that are
content-based on their face, must also satisfy strict scrutiny.”109
The Kansas statute is content-based under the Gilbert logic.
First, the law cannot be justified without reference to its content.
For example, although the law prohibits recordings and taking
photos at an animal production facility, it only singles out those
made with the intent to damage the enterprise. Viewing the
contents of the photo or recording is important, if not necessary, to
determine the actor’s intent. For example, a photograph of a sunset
taken at an animal production facility is probably not taken with the
intent to damage the enterprise. But a photograph of animal abuse
is likely taken to expose the conduct and cause the enterprise
economic damage. Thus, Section (c)(4) cannot be justified without
viewing the content of the photo or recording.
Second, the law regulates the content of speech because the
government disagrees with the speaker. In Gilbert, the Court further
stated, “government regulation of speech is content-based if a law
applies to a particular speech because of the topic discussed or the
idea or message expressed.” In this instance, the state already has
other laws on its books which protect privacy, trespass, and
biosecurity. 110 Why the state should need an additional law
singling out speech at an agriculture production facility is unclear

109
110

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).
Complaint, supra note 26, at 29.
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and is only justified by a desire to suppress speech on the topic of
animal welfare. 111
Because Section (c)(4) is content-based under the
“additional category” of laws recognized in Gilbert, it will only be
upheld if it meets strict scrutiny, a standard most laws infringing on
protected speech are unable to meet.
Under strict scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest. While the state may have a
compelling interest in protecting its agriculture production
facilities, the law is not narrowly tailored to this interest because, as
mentioned above, other laws are already on the books in Kansas
that protect these interests and do not infringe on speech. Under
strict scrutiny, this section fails.
IV. Conclusion
The outcome of four prior cases striking Ag-gag legislation
indicates an ominous fate for the Kansas Farm Animal and Field
Crop and Research Facilities Protection Act. While the statute’s
Picture’s Clause uses different language from the Pictures Clauses
in Idaho and Utah respectively, it too fails to meet the demands of
strict scrutiny for the reasons discussed above. Moreover, the
vague meaning of ‘damage’ and ‘intent to damage’ creates an issue
of overbreadth.
While the entire Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research
Facilities Protection Act might not violate the First Amendment,
whether these laws are good public policy is an entirely separate
question. The State of Kansas and the remaining six states with Aggag laws might rationalize these laws with trespass or property
damage concerns, but there is no rational justification to suppress
speech in the process. Ag-gag laws are yet another example of
legislation which affords agriculture special status.
While
agricultural exceptionalism’s pervasiveness in U.S. history and law
is unlikely to shift in the immediate future, it must always yield to
the First Amendment.

Even if the state has a compelling interest in protecting the property of animal
facilities from physical damage—and it is not even clear this was the state’s real
interest in enacting the law—prohibiting recording and photography is not
necessary to further this interest.
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Blockchain Meets Genomics: Governance Considerations
for Promoting Food Safety and Public Health
Walter G. Johnson, M.S.T.P.*
I. Introduction
Foodborne illness remains an ongoing public health
challenge in both the developing and industrialized worlds.1 In the
United States, almost 50 million reported cases of infectious disease
occur every year from a food product, resulting in substantial
morbidity and mortality with economic burdens to health care and
productivity. 2 Despite recognition as a leader in food safety, the U.S.
experiences longstanding and novel issues in food safety. 3 Advances
in whole genome sequencing (WGS) promise to bolster food safety
regulators’ capabilities to identify pathogens and determine their
source. 4 However, inefficiencies in tracing food products through the
supply chain remain. 5
Simultaneously, practical applications are beginning to
emerge for new distributed ledger technologies, including
blockchain. 6 First popularized by the Bitcoin cryptocurrency,
blockchain has been hailed as a transformative technology for any
industry engaged in recordkeeping. 7 Blockchain has attracted
J.D. Candidate, 2020, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law; Master of Science
and Technology Policy, 2017, Arizona State University. With many thanks to Gary
Marchant and David McCarville for helpful comments and suggestions.
1
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S3, S4 (2010).
2
Robert L. Scharff, Economic burden from health losses due to foodborne illness in
the United States, 75 J. FOOD PROT. 123, 123 (2012).
3
RENÉE JOHNSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE FDA FOOD SAFETY
MODERNIZATION ACT (P.L. 111-353) 1 (Feb. 18, 2011).
4
Jennifer L. Gardy & Nicholas J. Loman, Towards A Genomics-Informed, RealTime, Global Pathogen Surveillance System, 19 NATURE REV. GENETICS 9 (2018).
5
Thea King et al., Food Safety for Food Security: Relationship Between Global
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170 (2017).
6
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massive investments for its broad applications in finance. 8
Meanwhile, academic and industry research on blockchain has
exploded since 2012. 9 Though blockchain applications have only
begun to surface, other sectors including healthcare, energy, and
government services stand to benefit from this technological
revolution. 10
New pilot projects suggest blockchain may also serve a
public health function as applied to food safety, 11 potentially
overlapping with WGS advances. Blockchain in the food industry
promises increased traceability of food products through the supply
chain, as well as reduced fraud and counterfeiting of food products.12
In 2017, Walmart and IBM began a collaboration to pilot blockchain
in the food supply chain to hasten responses and reduce waste during
an outbreak of foodborne illness. 13 Federal regulators in the U.S.
have gained interest in exploring this application of blockchain
technologies in the wake of two lettuce E. coli outbreaks during 2018
which suffered from traceability issues.14 Given their complementary
8
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Demystifying the Blockchain, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/business/dealbook/blockchain-technology.ht
ml.
9
Jesse Yli-Huumo et al., Where Is Current Research on Blockchain Technology?—
A Systematic Review, 11 PLOS ONE 10.1371, 9–10 (2016).
10
U.K. GOV’T OFFICE SCI., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK
CHAIN 64–71 (2016), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492972/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-technolog
y.pdf; Katharine Gammon, Experimenting with Blockchain: Can One Technology
Boost Both Data Integrity and Patients’ Pocketbooks?, 24 NATURE MED. 378, 381
(2018); Mike Orcutt, How Blockchain Could Give Us a Smarter Energy Grid, MIT
TECH. REV. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609077/howblockchain-could-give-us-a-smarter-energy-grid/.
11
See generally Frank Yiannas, A New Era of Food Transparency Powered by
Blockchain, 12 INNOVATIONS: TECH., GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 46 (2018).
12
Sylvian Charlebois, How Blockchain Technology Could Transform the Food
Industry, CONVERSATION (Dec. 19, 2017), https://theconversation.com/howblockchain-technology-could-transform-the-food-industry-89348.
13
See IBM Announces Major Blockchain Collaboration with Dole, Driscoll’s,
Golden State Foods, Kroger, McCormick and Company, McLane Company, Nestlé,
Tyson Foods, Unilever and Walmart to Address Food Safety Worldwide, IBM (Aug.
22, 2017), https://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/53013.wss (detailing
IBM’s announcement in 2017 that it would begin a major blockchain collaboration
with various companies, including Walmart as well as blockchain’s suitability to
combat food waste problems) [hereinafter IBM Press Release].
14
Maggie Fox, The FDA Thinks Walmart May Have One Solution to Romaine
Lettuce Recalls, NBC NEWS (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/heal
th-news/fda-thinks-walmart-may-have-one-solution-romaine-lettuce-recallsn940826.
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nature, industry-driven blockchain projects could soon converge
with government-based WGS infrastructure to provide a more
comprehensive approach to responding to foodborne illness.
Accomplishing this goal will require addressing regulatory and
technical hurdles.
This article illustrates opportunities and obstacles arising
from combining blockchain and WGS in food safety. Part I reviews
food safety regulatory infrastructure in the U.S. and recent advances
in WGS. Part II describes the rise of blockchain and its application
in the food supply chain. Part III presents the promise of successfully
combining blockchain and WGS tools alongside governance
challenges and opportunities, pointing to soft law approaches
including voluntary regulatory programs and technical standards as
a potential path forward.
II. Food Safety Oversight and Whole Genome
Sequencing
Ensuring food safety and preventing foodborne illness
represent common, pervasive public health challenges for every
nation and state. 15 Nearly 50 million individuals in the U.S. become
ill after exposure to contaminated food products in a single year.16
Food poisoning may produce more mild symptoms of gastric distress
but can also yield potentially fatal liver, kidney, and neurological
complications. 17 In turn, foodborne illnesses in the U.S. result in
128,000 hospitalizations and 3,000 mortalities annually. 18 Globally,
food poisoning strikes 600 million individuals, resulting in 420,000

See INST. MED., ADDRESSING FOODBORNE THREATS TO HEALTH: POLICIES,
PRACTICES, AND GLOBAL COORDINATION 3 (2006) (“Ensuring the safety of food is a
long-standing and critical objective of public health. The estimate that millions of
Americans—whose food is among the safest on earth—are sickened by tainted food
each year attests to the need to further safeguard our food supply, while the mounting
threat of terrorism lends this mission a particular urgency.”).
16
See L. Hannah Gould et al., Surveillance for Foodborne Disease Outbreaks --United States, 2008, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1197, 1197 (2011)
(“Foodborne agents cause an estimated 48 million illnesses annually in the United
States.”).
17
See Paul S. Mead et al., Food-Related Illness and Death in the United States., 5
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DIS. 607, 607 (1999) (“[S]ymptoms of foodborne illness
range from mild gastroenteritis.”).
18
Foodborne Illness and Germs, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 16,
2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/foodborne-germs.html.
15
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fatalities. 19 Foodborne illness may have disparate impacts on
vulnerable groups, including minorities and people of lower
socioeconomic status, 20 suggesting health justice as a needed lens for
this public health hazard. 21 Consumers consistently rate food
poisoning among top food-related concerns, ahead of pesticides,
antibiotics, or allergens.22 The economic burden of foodborne illness
from common pathogens on the American healthcare system may
approach $78 billion per year. 23
The expansive scope of pathogens and food products
contributing to foodborne illness complicates oversight for
prevention and response. 24 Myriad species of microorganisms and
toxic metabolites lead to illness every year. Prominent pathogens are

Food Safety: Key Facts, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 31, 2017),
http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/food-safety.
20
See Chryssa V. Deliganis, Death by Apple Juice: The Problem of Foodborne
Illness, the Regulatory Response, and Further Suggestions for Reform, 53 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 681, 686 (1998) (“Foodborne illness is particularly dangerous for those
without access to health care, including the homeless, migrant workers, and others
of low socioeconomic status.”); Jennifer J. Quinlan, Foodborne Illness Incidence
Rates and Food Safety Risks for Populations of Low Socioeconomic Status and
Minority Race/Ethnicity: A Review of the Literature, 10 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB.
HEALTH 3634, 3645–46 (2013) (discussing the impact of “greater access to small,
independently operated food markets and fast-food/take-out restaurants” on
minorities’ increased food poisoning rates). Cf. K. L. Newman et al., The Impact of
Socioeconomic Status on Foodborne Illness in High-Income Countries: A
Systematic Review, 143 EPIDEMIOL. & INFECT. 2473, 2473 (2015) (finding that the
effect of socio-economic status, or SES, varies depending on the pathogen, but “the
majority of identified studies for Campylobacter, salmonellosis, and E. coli infection
showed an association between high SES and illness.”).
21
See generally Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J. LAW
& PUB. POL’Y 47 (2014) (arguing that health law should be used as a tool for social
justice).
22
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL FOUNDATION, 2018 FOOD
& HEALTH SURVEY 49 (2018) (finding “[f]oodborne illness from bacteria” was
ranked as the most important food safety issue in 2018 more often than any other
choice); INTERNATIONAL FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL FOUNDATION, 2014 FOOD &
HEALTH SURVEY 75 (2014).
23
See Scharff, supra note 2, at 123 (finding that the aggregated annual cost of
foodborne illness was $77.7 billion under its enhanced model). Cf. Sandra Hoffmann
et al., Annual Cost of Illness and Quality-Adjusted Life Year Losses in the United
States Due to 14 Foodborne Pathogens, 75 J. FOOD PROTECTION 1292, 1292 (2012)
(reporting an average of $14 billion annually as a result of only common pathogens).
24
See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BAD BUG BOOK: HANDBOOK OF
FOODBORNE PATHOGENIC MICROORGANISMS AND NATURAL TOXINS (2d ed. 2012)
(providing information about major food pathogens and discussing the related
oversight challenges) [hereinafter BAD BUG BOOK].
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bacterial or viral, including salmonella, E. coli, and norovirus.25
Parasites, protozoa, prions, and chemical toxins can also contaminate
food and cause illness. 26 Every year, multiple outbreaks in meat,
produce, and other types of consumables are investigated by federal
regulators. 27 Illness arising from all food types can give rise to
infection, hospitalization, and mortality.28 Moreover, contamination
vulnerabilities exist at all stages of the food supply chain, “from farm
to table.”29 Identifying the pathogen responsible and the origin of
contamination is a critical part of the response to an outbreak and
preventing future outbreaks, and thus promoting food safety more
broadly. 30 Difficulties in characterizing pathogens can arise from
food contaminated by multiple microorganisms. 31 Unfortunately,
determining the origin of an outbreak with current tools can require
a substantial amount of time, potentially enabling the outbreak to
propagate. 32
Federal law divides regulatory authority over food safety
between multiple agencies. 33 Recently boosted by the Food Safety
Modernization Act, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
primary responsibility for preventing and responding to food
25
Foodborne Illnesses and Germs, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb.
16, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/foodborne-germs.html.
26
See BAD BUG BOOK, supra note 24 (discussing the impact of each of these
categories of contaminants on food safety).
27
List of Multistate Foodborne Outbreak Investigations, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/outbreaks/multistateoutbreaks/outbreaks-list.html.
28
John A. Painter et al., Attribution of Foodborne Illnesses, Hospitalizations, and
Deaths to Food Commodities by using Outbreak Data, United States, 1998–2008,
19 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DIS. 407, 410–13 (2013).
29
FED. FOOD SAFETY WORKING GROUP, PROGRESS REPORT 1 (2011),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/fswg_report_final.pdf.
30
Steps in a Foodborne Outbreak Investigation, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL &
PREVENTION (June 20, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/outbreaks/investigat
ing-outbreaks/investigations/detection.html. See also Sébastien Pouliot & Daniel A.
Sumner, Traceability, Liability, and Incentives for Food Safety and Quality, 90 AM.
J. AGRIC. ECON. 15, 24–25 (2008).
31
Marion Koopmans, Food-Borne Viruses from a Global Perspective, in INSTITUTE
OF MEDICINE, IMPROVING FOOD SAFETY THROUGH A ONE HEALTH APPROACH:
WORKSHOP SUMMARY 225, 225 (2012).
32
Il-Hoon Cho & Seockmo Ku, Current Technical Approaches for the Early
Detection of Foodborne Pathogens: Challenges and Opportunities, 18 INT’L J.
MOLECULAR SCI. 2078, 2079 (2017); IBM Food Trust: Trust and Transparency in
Our Food, IBM (2018), https://www.ibm.com/blockchain/solutions/food-trust (last
visited Apr. 11, 2019).
33
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOOD SAFETY: A NATIONAL STRATEGY IS
NEEDED TO ADDRESS FRAGMENTATION IN FEDERAL OVERSIGHT 6–7 (2017).
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contamination. 34 FDA wields various tools for ensuring food safety
including inspection, recalls, sampling, and voluntary destruction. 35
Complementing FDA jurisdiction, the Department of Agriculture’s
Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) has similar authority over
meat, poultry, and processed eggs. 36 The Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) conducts food safety surveillance,
investigates multistate outbreaks, and coordinates state and local
public health actions. 37 These three federal agencies established the
Interagency Food Safety Analytics Collaboration (IFSAC) in 2011
to promote coordination and cooperation in identifying culpable
pathogens and contaminated food products. 38
Despite its multi-agency scheme, gaps in U.S. food safety
oversight remain. For example, of the nearly 50 million cases of
foodborne illness in the U.S. each year, the responsible pathogen has
historically only been identified in one fifth of the cases. 39 In 2011,
the FDA launched the “Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS)
Program” to enhance its food safety operations. 40 WGS methods
comprehensively decode the full genome of an organism, identifying
FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011)
(amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399i
(2018)); see Debra M. Strauss, An Analysis of the FDA Food Safety Modernization
Act: Protection for Consumers and Boon for Business, 66 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 353,
354–55 (2011) (analyzing the new duties as well as the enhanced scope of FDA’s
authority created by FSMA).
35
See Deliganis, supra note 20, at 702–05 (considering the many tools available in
FDA’s arsenal); Food: Compliance & Enforcement, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/Food/ComplianceEnforcement/default.htm
(discussing FDA’s authority to take action against “adulterated” or “misbranded”
foods); see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(f), 393(b)(2)(A) (2018).
36
21 U.S.C. §§ 451–72 (2019); 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–26 (2019); 21 U.S.C. §§ 1031–56
(2019).
37
21 U.S.C. § 2224; CDC and Food Safety, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/cdc-and-food-safety.html. See
generally U.S. CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SURVEILLANCE FOR
FOODBORNE DISEASE OUTBREAKS, UNITED STATES: 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2016).
38
INTERAGENCY FOOD SAFETY ANALYTICS COLLABORATION, STRATEGIC PLAN:
CALENDAR YEAR 2017-2021 2–3 (2017).
39
See Elaine Scallan et al., Foodborne Illness Acquired in the United States—Major
Pathogens, 17 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DIS. 7, 7 (2001) (finding 9.4 million cases of
foodborne illness caused by known, common pathogens); see also Elaine Scallan et
al, Foodborne Illness Acquired in the United States—Unspecified Agents, 17
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DIS. 16, 16 (2011) (finding 38.4 million cases of foodborne
illness caused by unknown pathogens).
40
Eric L. Stevens et al., The Public Health Impact of a Publicly Available,
Environmental Database of Microbial Genomes, 8 FRONTIERS MICROBIOLOGY 1, 2
(2017).
34
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the organism by comparing the data produced through sequencing to
reference genomic datasets. 41 With the costs of WGS technology
falling, 42 the FDA program calls on laboratories to characterize the
full genome of microbes obtained from food, environmental, and
clinical samples in their local areas. 43 The GenomeTrakr platform
serves as a key tool in the FDA Whole Genome Sequencing Project
by providing an international reference database of pathogen
genomes. 44 GenomeTrakr enables public health officials to infer the
origin of contamination in food products by comparing the genomes
of new outbreak pathogens, obtained from WGS, to references in the
database from various geographical locations. 45 In 2013, CDC
announced its existing PulseNet network of genomic food safety
laboratories would begin collecting WGS data.46 PulseNet aims to
recognize outbreaks earlier by finding common strains of specific
pathogens in different clinical cases and whole genome data should
augment these efforts. 47 FSIS contributes to both CDC’s PulseNet
and FDA’s GenomeTrakr, and, in 2017, indicated interest in
conducting its own analyses of pathogen genomic data. 48 An
overview of the efforts of IFSAC agencies to implement WGS
techniques in food safety are described in Figure 1.

Jenny C. Taylor et al., Factors Influencing Success of Clinical Genome
Sequencing Across a Broad Spectrum of Disorders, 47 NATURE GENETICS 717, 717
(2015).
42
Xavier Didelot et al., Transforming Clinical Microbiology with Bacterial Genome
Sequencing, 13 NATURE REV. GENETICS 601, 610 (2012).
43
Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb.
15, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/food/foodscienceresearch/wholegenomesequencing
programwgs/.
44
GenomeTrakr Fast Facts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/WholeGenomeSequencingProgra
mWGS/ucm403550.htm.
45
Id.
46
PulseNet: Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS), U.S. CTR. DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/pathogens/wgs.html.
47
Id.; Fast Facts About PulseNet, U.S. CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb.
16, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/about/fast-facts.html.
48
Use of Whole Genome Sequence Analysis to Improve Food Safety and Public
Health, 82 Fed. Reg. 44378 (Sept. 22, 2017).
41
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Figure 1. IFSAC Agencies and WGS Initiatives

Early evidence suggests these WGS methods for pathogen
characterization may improve the response capacity of food safety
regulators. 49 FDA reports cases showing WGS affords the ability to
identify and distinguish between problematic pathogens in the food
system, even in products with ingredients from diverse geographic
locations. 50 In 2013, CDC launched a pilot project to detect food
contaminated with listeria using WGS techniques.51 Initial results
demonstrate that WGS methods enabled public health officials to
identify as many as 50% more related cases of foodborne listeria in
a year and reduced the average number of cases reported per outbreak
by up to 50%. 52 The listeria project points to significant possible
public health and economic savings by reducing the burden of
foodborne illness. 53 The expanding international adoption of
PulseNet and GenomeTrakr should allow for further improved
results. 54 Moreover, WGS systems may offer a platform for public
health officials to monitor the food supply chain and intervene earlier
49
See E. Kurt Lienau et al., Identification of a Salmonellosis Outbreak by Means of
Molecular Sequencing, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 981, 981 (2011) (discussing how
genome sequencing methods were used in identifying a salmonella outbreak in
2009-2010).
50
Examples of How FDA Has Used Whole Genome Sequencing of Foodborne
Pathogens for Regulatory Purposes, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/WholeGenomeSequencingProgra
mWGS/ucm422075.htm.
51
Brendan R. Jackson et al., Implementation of Nationwide Real-time Wholegenome Sequencing to Enhance Listeriosis Outbreak Detection and Investigation,
63 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DIS. 380, 380–81 (2016).
52
Id. at 382 (comparing data from the year prior to WGS implementation to year 2
of WGS use).
53
Robert L. Scharff et al., An Economic Evaluation of PulseNet: A Network for
Foodborne Disease Surveillance, 50 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S66, S66 (2016).
54
See Marc W. Allard et al., Practical Value of Food Pathogen Traceability through
Building a Whole-Genome Sequencing Network and Database, 54 J. CLINICAL
MICROBIOLOGY 1975, 1975 (2016); Celine Nadon et al., PulseNet International:
Vision for the Implementation of Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) for Global
Food-Borne Disease Surveillance, 22 EUR. SURVEILLANCE 1.
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than otherwise possible to mitigate the spread of detected
pathogens. 55
Despite advances in WGS food regulation, gaps exist in
industry and regulatory entities’ abilities to trace food through the
supply chain. 56 Paper documentation in the food supply chain
continues to be used despite inefficiency. 57 No comprehensive digital
system exists to track food products through the supply chain,
slowing down regulatory responses to outbreaks of foodborne
illnesses. 58 The summer 2018 regulatory investigation of an E. coli
outbreak in lettuce from Arizona lasted for weeks, 59 illustrating long
response times despite access to CDC and FDA genomic databases.
Challenges in traceability can lead to significant waste as well. For
example, after struggling to identify the source of an E. coli outbreak
in November 2018, CDC and FDA warned consumers and
distributors to discard all romaine lettuce from all producers. 60 This
extensive response to the uncertain source of contamination further
raised objections from farmers feeling they were unfairly forced to

Proactive Approaches of Whole Genome Sequencing Technology, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/W
holeGenomeSequencingProgramWGS/ucm422077.htm.
56
See King et al., supra note 5 at 160, 170.
57
Myo Min Aung & Yoon Seok Chang, Traceability in a Food Supply Chain: Safety
and Quality Perspectives, 39 FOOD CONTROL 172, 181 (2014).
58
Sylvain Charlebois et al., Comparison of Global Food Traceability Regulations
and Requirements, 13 COMPREHENSIVE REV. FOOD SCI. & FOOD SAFETY 1104, 1108
(2014).
59
Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on Developments in the
Romaine Outbreak Investigation U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 28, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm612187.ht
m.
60
CDC Food Safety Alert: E. coli Outbreak Linked to Romaine Lettuce, U.S. CTR.
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/media/rele
ases/2018/s1120-ecoli-romain-lettuce.html; Statement from FDA Commissioner
Scott Gottlieb, M.D., On the Current Romaine Lettuce E. coli Outbreak
Investigation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/Ne
wsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm626716.htm [hereinafter FDA
Update]. CDC even recommended consumers discard lettuce when unsure if lettuce
was romaine. Id. FDA Commissioner Gottlieb expressed frustration that the
contaminated food could not be well identified or traced to specific producers. See
Susan Scutti, Don’t Eat Romaine Lettuce, CDC Urges Amid E. coli Concerns, CNN
(Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/20/health/romaine-lettuce-e-colicdc/index.html. Some commentators were wry in their description of the regulatory
inefficiency. See, e.g., Tom McKay, CDC: Do Not Eat Any Romaine Lettuce Until
We Can Figure Out What the Hell Is Going On, GIZMODO (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://gizmodo.com/cdc-do-not-eat-any-romaine-lettuce-until-we-can-figure-1830
580265.
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carry the costs of traceability issues.61 New approaches for digitally
managing food safety data and tracing food products will be needed
to complement other advances in preventing and responding to
foodborne illness.
III. Blockchain and Applications in the Food Supply
Chain
Improving traceability in the food supply chain may require
novel tools. Opportunities to optimize and streamline the food safety
infrastructure and to trace contaminated foods identified by WGS
through the supply chain may arise with new technological
approaches offered by blockchain. 62 These approaches offer
platforms for a host of participants to collectively build a record of
data while ensuring that only one, authoritative version exists at any
time. 63
Blockchain represents a large category of upcoming
technologies anchored in the larger umbrella of distributed ledger
technologies. 64 Blockchain systems have gained substantial attention
by stakeholders from myriad industries due to several key elements

See Martin Finucane & Katie Camero, Farmer Worries CDC Has Gone Too Far
With Its Lettuce Warning, BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.bostonglob
e.com/metro/2018/11/23/has-cdc-gone-too-far-with-its-lettuce-warning/F6WaKxS
WQ81AsZtg8lLjuO/story.html. Some groups began labeling lettuce by its location
and date of harvesting in response. Jesse Newman, Lettuce Producers Prepare
Labeling Changes in Response to New E. coli Outbreak, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26,
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lettuce-producersprepare-labeling-changes-inresponse-to-newe-coli-outbreak-1543255194?mod=hp_lead_pos10.
62
See generally Massimo Di Pierro, What Is the Blockchain?, 19 COMPUTING SCI.
& ENGINEERING 92 (2017); Explainer: What Is a blockchain?, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr.
23, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610833/explainer-what-is-a-block
chain/.
63
See, e.g., Ryan Surujnath, Off the Chain: A Guide to Blockchain Derivatives
Markets and the Implications on Systemic Risk Notes, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 257, 262 (2017) (discussing the efficiency of blockchains compared to a
centralized system); see Sorkin, supra note 8 (comparing blockchains to the use of
Google Docs).
64
WORLD BANK GROUP, DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY (DLT) AND
BLOCKCHAIN 1 (2017), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1779115137140
62215/pdf/122140-WP-PUBLIC-Distributed-Ledger-Technology-and-BlockchainFintech-Notes.pdf; R3, BLOCKCHAIN BYTE: WHAT IS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A
BLOCKCHAIN AND A DISTRIBUTED LEDGER? 2–3 (2017), https://www.finra.org/sites
/default/files/2017_BC_Byte.pdf.
61
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of the technology. 65 First, blockchain acts as a ledger or recording
system for data or transactions. 66 Data are loaded onto the ledger in
discrete “blocks” and coupled to the prior block, forming a “chain”
with a timeline. 67 Second, blocks are placed on the ledger
chronologically and users can view all blocks dating back to the
original. 68 Third, that ledger is distributed across all nodes in the
system, signifying that all users have a copy of the record. 69 Finally,
verified blocks become immunized from changes by individual
users, because altering an old block requires a majority of nodes to
agree on the change. 70
Classifying blockchains can occur in multiple manners,
though a useful lens comes from viewing systems as permissioned or
permissionless, public or private (as in Figure 2). 71 Permissionless
blockchains enable any party to add a block to the chain, where
permissioned systems require users to first obtain prior authorization
from an administrator. 72 The public-private dimension instead
distinguishes whether anyone can access and review data stored on
the ledger, or if only authorized entities can access the information.73
While Bitcoin functions as a public, permissionless system without
a central authority, businesses looking for more top-down

The National Academies describes blockchain as “a technology meant to achieve
and unalterable, decentralized, public, append-only log of transactions, without any
single authority in a position to change the log.” NAT’L ACAD. SCI., ENG’G, & MED.,
SECURING THE VOTE: PROTECTING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 103 (2018).
66
See NIST Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra note 6, at 13–1717 (explaining the ways blockchain can
track data); Konstantinos Christidis & Michael Devetsikiotis, Blockchains and
Smart Contracts for the Internet of Things, 4 IEEE ACCESS 2292, 2293 (2016).
67
NIST Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra note 6, at 13–17; Christidis & Devetsikiotis, supra note 66,
at 2293; see also Wessel Reijers, Fiachra O’Brolcháin & Paul Haynes, Governance
in Blockchain Technologies & Social Contract Theories, 1 LEDGER 134, 136 (2016).
68
X. Xu et al., A Taxonomy of Blockchain-Based Systems for Architecture Design,
in 2017 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE (ICSA)
243, 244 (2017).
69
WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 64, at 5–6; see also R3, supra note 64, at 2
(noting that while blockchains are distributed, they can be built as both centralized
or decentralized systems).
70
Nir Kshetri, Blockchain’s Roles in Strengthening Cybersecurity and Protecting
Privacy, 41 TELECOMM. POL’Y 1027, 1027–28 (2017); see Yli-Huumo et al., supra
note 9, at 3 (discussing the process of forming blockchain).
71
Weizhi Meng et al., When Intrusion Detection Meets Blockchain Technology: A
Review, 6 IEEE ACCESS 10179, 10183 (2018).
72
See NIST REPORT, supra note 6, at 5–6.
73
See Meng et al., supra note 71, at 10183.
65
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approaches generally select private and permissioned schemes.74
These characteristics may change the method of verifying blocks
before being added to the immutable chain, called consensus
models. 75 Proof of work consensus models have become
commonplace in permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin, which
competitively reward the first participating node to verify blocks by
solving algorithmic “puzzles.” 76 However, consensus protocols
better suited for permissioned systems may provide useful
alternatives to proof of work models and their high fiscal and energy
costs. 77 For greater flexibility, data recorded on the distributed ledger
and associated applications can be stored on- or off-chain. 78
Figure 2. Basic Blockchain Structural Classifications 79

Praveen Jayachandran, The Difference Between Public and Private Blockchain,
IBM BLOG (May 31, 2017), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2017/05/thedifference-between-public-and-private-blockchain/.
75
For a comprehensive review of consensus mechanisms, see NIST Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra
note 6, at 18–24.
76
Id. at 19–20.
77
See id. at 21–24; CATHERINE MULLIGAN ET. AL. BLOCKCHAIN BEYOND THE HYPE
5, WORLD ECON. F. (2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/48423_Whether_Block
chain_WP.pdf.
78
See Jose Luis Bellod Cisneros et al., Public Health Surveillance using
Decentralized Technologies, 1 BLOCKCHAIN HEALTHCARE TODAY 1, 7 (2018).
79
Adapted from information in NIST Report, supra note 6, at 5–6; Meng et al.,
supra note 71, at 10183.
74
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Blockchain has gained a reputation as a financial technology,
with its popularization through Bitcoin and the oscillating market
value of cryptocurrencies since then. 80 However, blockchain
applications also offer substantial promise in the health care and
public health sectors. 81 Perhaps best documented is the anticipated
application of blockchain to power electronic health records to
enhance privacy and portability. 82 But various other opportunities to
advance public health through blockchain exist, including tracing
medical products through the supply chain. 83 Converging with the
interest in blockchain for logistics, 84 blockchain has been proposed
as a system to track prescription opioids through the drug supply
chain. 85
The intersection of blockchain, supply chain logistics, and
public health has recently sparked attention for its applications in
food safety. In August 2017, IBM and food industry giants including
Walmart announced a partnership to pilot a blockchain-based food
surveillance system. 86 The permissioned IBM platform aims to
record data throughout the supply chain for individual food batches
including location of origin, identification numbers, expiration dates,
shipping records, and other processing information. 87 Notably, the
Walmart-IBM collaboration promises to identify the source of an
See JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS,
MERCATUS CTR. 1–2, 6 (2016), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/gmu_bitcoin
_042516_webv3_0.pdf.
81
Ron Ribitzky et al., Pragmatic, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Blockchain and
Distributed Ledger Technology: Paving the Future for Healthcare, 1 BLOCKCHAIN
HEALTHCARE TODAY 1, 5–9 (2018), https://blockchainhealthcaretoday.com/index.p
hp/journal/article/view/24/21.
82
See Gammon, supra note 10, at 378–79.
83
Liam Bell et al., Applications of Blockchain Within Healthcare, 1 BLOCKCHAIN
HEALTHCARE TODAY 1, 2 (2018), https://blockchainhealthcaretoday.com/index.php
/journal/article/view/8/29.
84
See WORLD ECON. FORUM, TRADE TECH – A NEW AGE FOR TRADE AND SUPPLY
CHAIN FINANCE 11 (2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/White_Paper_Trade_Te
ch_report_2018.pdf.
85
Susan Galer, Betting on Blockchain as a Miracle Cure for the $78 Billion Opioid
Crisis, FORBES (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2017/09/12/bett
ing-on-blockchain-as-a-miracle-cure-for-the-78b-opioid-crisis/.
86
IBM Press Release, supra note 13.
87
Brigid McDermott, Improving Confidence in Food Safety with IBM Blockchain,
IBM BLOCKCHAIN BLOG (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2
017/09/improving-confidence-in-food-safety-with-ibm-blockchain/. (In general,
relevant supply chain data loaded on the blockchain may include “time, location,
price, parties involved, and other relevant information when an item changes
ownership.”); See Kshetri, supra note 70, at 1034.
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outbreak “in seconds rather than days or weeks.”88 The blockchain
application could give retailers the confidence to only discard food
products from the affected farms, rather than wasting considerably
more food. 89 By September 2018, Walmart announced it would
retain the program permanently to trace lettuce products.90 Walmart
will require direct suppliers and over 100 upstream farms to comply
over the course of 2019. 91
Though no public data on the project have been released, the
Walmart-IBM pilot offers a valuable case study in leveraging
distributed ledger technology to promote public health. 92 The
preliminary reports of success for blockchain in the food supply
chain will likely draw further interest from industry competitors and
regulators alike for uses beyond leafy greens. 93 In November 2018,
the French distributor Auchan SA announced its own blockchain
See IBM Press Release, supra note 13.
IBM Food Trust Expands Blockchain Network to Foster a Safer, More
Transparent and Efficient Global Food System, IBM (Oct. 8, 2018),
https://newsroom.ibm.com/2018-10-08-IBM-Food-Trust-Expands-BlockchainNetwork-to-Foster-a-Safer-More-Transparent-and-Efficient-Global-Food-System;
see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
90
Matt Smith, In Wake of Romaine E. coli Scare, Walmart Deploys Blockchain to
Track Leafy Greens, WALMART , https://news.walmart.com/_news_/2018/09/24/inwake-of-romaine-e-coli-scare-walmart-deploys-blockchain-to-track-leafy-greens
(last accessed Apr. 8, 2019).
91
Michael Corkery & Nathaniel Popper, From Farm to Blockchain: Walmart Tracks
Its Lettuce, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/24/bu
siness/walmart-blockchain-lettuce.html; Kim S. Nash, Walmart Requires Lettuce,
Spinach Suppliers to Join Blockchain, WSJ BLOG (Sept. 24, 2018),
https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2018/09/24/walmart-requires-lettuce-spinach-suppliersto-join-blockchain/.
92
The late 2018 expansion of the pilot to include European food distributor
Carrefour may open more opportunities for evaluation. See Food Traceability:
Carrefour, a Blockchain Pioneer in Europe, Has Joined the IBM Food Trust
Platform to Take Action on a Global Scale (Oct. 8, 2018),
http://www.carrefour.com/current-news/food-traceability-carrefour-a-blockchainpioneer-in-europe-has-joined-the-ibm-food. However, should the pilot fail and these
industry leaders abandon a blockchain approach, this may ripple into the food supply
chain industry. See Christian Catalini & Catherine Tucker, When Early Adopters
Don’t Adopt, 357 SCIENCE 135, 135–36 (2017).
93
See From Shore to Plate: Tracking Tuna on the Blockchain, PROVENANCE (July
15,
2016),
https://www.provenance.org/tracking-tuna-on-the-blockchain.
Contamination in other common food products also cause public health burdens, as
the 2018 FSIS recalls on raw beef indicate. See News Release, U.S. Food Safety &
Inspection Serv., JBS Tolleson, Inc. Recalls Raw Beef Products Due to Possible
Salmonella Newport Contamination (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps
/portal/fsis/topics/recalls-and-public-health-alerts/recall-casearchive/archive/2018/recall-085-2018-EXP-release.
88
89
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pilot to trace meat and vegetables through the supply chain. 94 The
World Wildlife Fund has launched a blockchain project to trace tuna
through the supply chain in Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji.95
Insurers may support the drive towards blockchain, given the
potential for lowering fiscal risk in the food supply chain.96
Publicized foodborne illness outbreaks may add pressure to adopt
blockchain, with some coverage casting blockchain as a potential
solution to traceability issues arising from the November 2018 E. coli
outbreak. 97 CDC and FDA already collaborate with IBM on
blockchain applications in public health, 98 and may take new steps to
infuse their food safety operations with blockchain. 99 While vital to
acknowledge that blockchain technology cannot solve all
problems, 100 its potential to reduce foodborne illness will likely drive
further experimentation and implementation.
IV. Governance Considerations for Combining
Blockchain and Genomics
Two rising trends in food safety may soon converge. On one
side, food regulators have begun to implement WGS methods and
databases to enhance responses to foodborne illness, aiming also to

94
Globalized blockchain: Auchan implements food traceability technology on
international scale, FOODINGREDIENTSFIRST (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.foodingr
edientsfirst.com/news/globalized-blockchain-auchan-implements-foodtraceability-technology-on-international-scale.html
95
New Blockchain Project Has Potential to Revolutionize Seafood Industry, WORLD
WILDLIFE FUND (Jan 8, 2018), https://www.wwf.org.nz/what_we_do/marine/blockc
hain_tuna_project/.
96
See David Hundeyin, Australian Insurer Announces Blockchain Trial for Beef
Export Supply Chain, CCN (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.ccn.com/australianinsurer-announces-blockchain-trial-for-beef-export-supply-chain/.
97
See Bruce Y. Lee, What Blockchain Has to Do with Turkey, Romaine Lettuce, and
Food Safety, FORBES (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucelee/2018/
11/28/what-does-blockchain-have-to-do-with-turkey-lettuce-and-food-safety/#41fb
5c7b7399.
98
Steven Melendez, How IBM and the CDC Are Testing Blockchain to Track Health
Issues Like the Opioid Crisis, FAST COMPANY (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.fastcom
pany.com/90231255/how-ibm-and-the-cdc-are-testing-blockchain-to-track-healthissues-like-the-opioid-crisis; IBM Watson Health Announces Collaboration to Study
the Use of Blockchain Technology for Secure Exchange of Healthcare Data, IBM
(Jan. 11, 2017), https://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/51394.wss.
99
See Fox, supra note 14.
100
R. Jᴇꜱꜱᴇ MᴄWᴀᴛᴇʀꜱ, THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 18, WORLD
ECON. FORUM (2016), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_future_of_financ
ial_infrastructure.pdf.
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augment prevention efforts. 101 On the other, private industry is
developing blockchain capabilities for data recording to streamline
regulatory compliance and minimize discarded products during an
outbreak. Blockchain offers strengths to cover the weaknesses of
WGS, enabling officials to trace contaminated food products through
the supply chain and potentially increasing data liquidity. 102 In turn,
whole genomic sequencing methods should enable determining the
exact type of pathogen and its geographical origin, when blockchain
is limited to tracing backwards rather than starting at the beginning.
If combined effectively, the nexus of blockchain and WGS could
enhance the capacity of public health actors to respond to and prevent
foodborne illness mortality and morbidity.
More specifically, benefits might accrue from fusing the
power of WGS methods and government reference databases with
the advantages of blockchain containing an authoritative,
timestamped, readily searchable record (as depicted in Figure 3).
Since blockchain systems likely cannot store the amount of data
constituting a full genomic sequence, 103 useful information about
each sequenced organism including species and location could
instead be recorded directly on the chain. 104 The full DNA sequence
of pathogens could instead be stored “off the chain,”105 with a central
authority providing permission to access the full sequence data on
request by public health officials. In one possible scheme, during an
outbreak of foodborne illness, pathogen information from clinical
samples could be compared to reference databases and on-chain data
to narrow the search for a matching organism. Permissioned access
to off-chain genomic sequences could then be used to infer where the
contamination originated and which downstream facilities were
affected.

See Proactive Applications of Whole Genome Sequencing Technology, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceRes
earch/WholeGenomeSequencingProgramWGS/ucm422077.htm.
102
Halil Ibrahim Ozercan et al., Realizing the Potential of Blockchain Technologies
in Genomics, 28 GENOME RES. 1255, 1262 (2018).
103
See Nadon et al., supra note 54, at 4–5.
104
See Bellod Cisneros et al., supra note 78, at 5.
105
William J. Gordon & Christian Catalini, Blockchain Technology for Healthcare:
Facilitating the Transition to Patient-Driven Interoperability, 16 COMPUTATIONAL
& STRUCTURAL BIOTECH. J. 224, 228 (2018).
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Figure 3. Potential Food Safety Benefits in Integrating
Blockchain and WGS

Beyond public health benefits, incentives exist to encourage
private actors to pursue the integration of blockchain and WGS in
food safety operations. Despite upfront costs in developing or leasing
the blockchain platform, the Walmart case study suggests substantial
potential savings for food distribution corporations by increasing
response time to contamination in food products. 106 The heightened
agility and specificity offered by combining WGS and blockchain
should therefore promote greater internal savings and less waste for
industry actors. More targeted responses to contamination should
also protect farming entities from the economic impact of distributors
discarding even uncontaminated food products when faced with
uncertainty about the source and path of an outbreak. 107 The potential
for blockchain and WGS combination systems to streamline and
speed compliance should reduce or mitigate regulatory penalties
resulting from contamination. 108
Though offering great promise, excitement for a pragmatic
new public health tool should be tempered by a realistic
understanding of remaining technical, corporate, and governance
challenges. 109 Whether developers can adequately scale up the
blockchain supply chain pilot projects remains an open question, and
See IBM Press Release, supra note 13.
See, e.g., Finucane & Camero, supra note 61.
108
See generally, EMILY M. LANZA, CONG. RES. SERV., R43927, FOOD SAFETY
ISSUES: FDA JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R43927.pdf.
109
See CHRIS JAIKARAN, CONG. RES. SERV., R45116, BLOCKCHAIN: BACKGROUND
AND POLICY ISSUES 9 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45116.pdf.
106
107
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may require years to accomplish.110 Scaling up may also come with
added risks of cybersecurity vulnerability. 111 Further increasing
adoption of and participation in FDA and CDC pathogen sequencing
programs will take time and appropriate standardization of the
technology. 112 Deploying blockchain and WGS sequencing
technologies at all nodes in a food supply chain will demand
substantial time, resources, and, likely, political capital. Notably,
while implementing blockchain would allow for improved supply
chain management and mitigate the extent and duration of foodborne
illness outbreaks, it would not directly resolve existing food safety
issues leading to contamination.113
Moreover, technical decisions about the most appropriate
architecture for a blockchain will be required and have regulatory
implications. Blockchain-powered food supply chain systems
promise to reduce fraud by holding all users accountable for the data
they enter. 114 However, this benefit is only possible from within a
permissioned blockchain system, as all users creating blocks must be
identifiable to gain permissioned access. 115 Permissionless systems
could create insurmountable challenges in data integrity and
compliance by enabling any party to add blocks to the ledger.116

110
Evelyn Cheng, For All the Hype, Blockchain Applications Are Still Years, Even
Decades Away, CNBC (June 4, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/04/for-allthe-hype-blockchain-applications-are-still-years-even-decades-away.html; Melissa
Gilmour, Blockchain for Supply Chains—More Hype Than Reality?, SWEETBRIDGE
(June 11, 2018), https://blog.sweetbridge.com/blockchain-for-supply-chains-morehype-than-reality-150f9962b80c.
111
See WORLD ECON. FORUM, supra note 84, at 11. See also, Aleksey K. Fedorov et.
al., Quantum Computers Put Blockchain Security at Risk, 563 NATURE 465, 465–67
(2018); Quantum Computers Pose an Imminent Threat to Bitcoin Security, MIT
TECH. REV. (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609408/quantumcomputers-pose-imminent-threat-to-bitcoin-security/.
112
Jacob Moran-Gilad, Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) for Food-Borne
Pathogen Surveillance and Control – Taking the Pulse, 22 EUROSURVEILLANCE
30547, 30547 (2017).
113
Jenny Splitter, Walmart’s Blockchain Offers Tech Fix, But There’s More to Leafy
Greens Than Data, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jennysp
litter/2018/09/28/walmarts-blockchain-offers-tech-fix-but-theres-more-to-leafygreens-than-data/.
114
Nir Kshetri, Blockchain Systems Are Tracking Food Safety and Origins, THE
CONVERSATION (Nov. 21, 2018 6:49 AM), https://theconversation.com/blockchainsystems-are-tracking-food-safety-and-origins-106491.
115
See NIST Report, supra note 6, at 5–6.
116
Les Wilkinson et. al., Blockchain Meets Healthcare: Understanding the Business
Model and Implementing Initiatives, 2017 ACC DOCKET 57, 59, https://www.nelso
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Permissioned systems could also avoid proof of work consensus
mechanisms, avoiding substantial energy consumption and
environmental impacts upon scaling up. 117
If permissioned platforms advance, questions may arise
about whether industry or government entities will hold centralized
control of the blockchain to grant permission to participate and add
blocks. 118 The potential public health utility and existing government
stewardship over WGS databases may support placing public actors
in control of permissioned blockchains. Federal regulators
administering the permissioned systems may maximize
accountability for industry and the effectiveness of enforcement
actions. 119 The possibility of deliberate food contamination in acts of
agroterrorism 120 may provide further rationale for federal
government control. Yet, the technology and supply chain industries
will likely lead the efforts to build blockchain infrastructure in the
food supply chain. 121 Despite incentivizes to minimize fiscal harm
from contamination, blockchain development will require private
firms to expend notable resources in a competitive market.
Accordingly, economic factors will likely disincentivize industry
members who have invested the most in creating and maintaining
platforms to cede control of their permissioned systems to federal
food safety regulators. 122

nmullins.com/storage/4db2ba62b5531942d89ab659e2921280.pdf (“Depending on
the industry, knowing who is on the network may not only be desired but legally
required.”).
117
See Camilo Mora et al., Bitcoin Emissions Alone Could Push Global Warming
Above 2°C, 2018 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 1.
118
Australia recently announced a pilot project for a national blockchain to act as a
platform for blockchain based commerce in Australia, highlighting the possibility of
a state-run blockchain for commercial and potentially regulatory functions. See
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL BLOCKCHAIN, https://www.australiannationalblockchain.co
m/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
119
Direct federal control would facilitate more traditional command and control
regulation, often perceived as more accountable, transparent, and directly
enforceable. See Diana M. Bowman & Graeme A. Hodge, ‘Governing’
Nanotechnology Without Government?, 35 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 477 (2008).
120
U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-310, HIGH RISK SERIES: AN
UPDATE 28–29 (2007), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07310.pdf.
121
Bernard Marr, How Blockchain Will Transform the Supply Chain and Logistics
Industry, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018
/03/23/how-blockchain-will-transform-the-supply-chain-and-logistics-industry/#1f
be6eb45fec (highlighting use cases all arising from private industry).
122
REDUCING THE RISK OF POLICY FAILURE: CHALLENGES FOR REGULATORY
COMPLIANCE 18, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (2000), https://www.oecd.org/
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Further governance challenges could arise in the decision for
public or private blockchain architecture. A public blockchain could
enable public health officials globally to monitor food safety in the
supply chain without procedural constraints on gaining access to the
blockchain, likely leading to improved foodborne illness responses.
The open-access model of a public ledger may also offer the most
pragmatic interface between blockchain and the growing
international adoption of GenomeTrakr and the PulseNet
International network of WGS public health laboratories. 123
However, a public design would also enable any other party to view
data on the chain, including competitors, yielding corporate
confidentiality dilemmas.124 Accordingly, businesses generally seek
to utilize private blockchains. 125 Off-chain storage of confidential
data could ease such concerns, but off-chain storage can carry
independent security vulnerabilities. 126 Though a public blockchain
could maximize transparency in supply chain governance, 127
business incentives may resist regulatory moves granting
competitors access to confidential supply chain and compliance data.
The presence of competition in crafting blockchain
platforms for the food supply chain also highlights the potential for
interoperability challenges. 128 Given the competitive pressures to
protect confidential data, each supply chain manager will likely
gov/regulatory-policy/1910833.pdf (illustrating how corporate “[c]ompliance rates
are lower when regulation does not fit well with existing market practices or is not
supported by cultural norms and civic institutions.”).
123
See Nadon et al., supra note 54, at 10.
124
See Charlebois, supra note 12. Developing new tools for blockchain platforms,
including zero knowledge proofs, may mitigate the disclosure of confidential data
by enabling parties to reveal no more data than is required for a given transaction.
See Vinayaka Pandit & Pankaj Dayama, Privacy in Blockchain Collaboration with
Zero Knowledge Proofs, IBM BLOG (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/bl
ockchain/2019/01/privacy-in-blockchain-collaboration-with-zero-knowledge-proof
s/.
125
See Jayachandran, supra note 74.
126
Ana Reyna et al., On Blockchain and Its Integration with IoT. Challenges and
Opportunities, 88 FUTURE GENERATION COMPUTER SYSTEMS 173, 177 (2018).
127
Benjamin Herzberg, Blockchain: The Solution for Transparency in Product
Supply Chains, PROVENANCE (Nov. 21, 2015), https://www.provenance.org/whitepa
per.
128
As in health care, blockchain is not an inherent solution to interoperability and
issues will likely develop when blockchain platforms are implemented. Raj Sharma,
Don’t Look to Blockchain to Solve Healthcare’s Interoperability Woes, FORBES
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/09/18/dontlook-to-blockchain-to-solve-healthcares-interoperability-woes/#7a19bd5e6eab.
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obtain and operate their own blockchain with limited incentives to
ensure it could interface with others. 129 Moreover, firms will lack
incentives to switch to a new, more centralized blockchain platform
once committed to one, as logged data will remain on the original
blockchain and protocols to transfer data to a new blockchain remain
limited. 130 Food blockchains lacking interoperability may complicate
efforts by public health officials to effectively track foodborne illness
outbreaks and apply WGS data, particularly when outbreaks span
facilities and regions involving multiple supply chains. 131 Food
products packaged with multiple types of ingredients, 132 potentially
tracked through different blockchains, may exacerbate
interoperability challenges. 133 Government pressure or mandates to
create interoperable platforms could be opposed by industry, citing
potential anticompetitive effects. 134
No simple solution exists to these governance challenges,
given the conflicting public health and business interests in designing
and deploying a blockchain to integrate with existing WGS
operations. Overly aggressive actions or requirements by regulators,
even made in the interest of public health, may disincentivize
industry from ever developing the blockchain platforms.135
Command and control regulatory approaches administered by a
central government may suffer from perceived or real inefficiency,

Absent standardization or other pressures, blockchain developers will have
significant latitude to build unique platforms to the specifications of individual
clients, likely resulting in interoperability issues. See DAVID SCHATSKY, ET. AL.,
BLOCKCHAIN AND THE FIVE VECTORS OF PROGRESS 4, DELOITTE, (2018),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/4600_Blockchain-fivevectors/DI_Blockchain-five-vectors.pdf.
130
See JAIKARAN, supra note 109, at 8.
131
See Aung & Chang, supra note 57, at 178.
132
John A. Painter et al., Attribution of Foodborne Illness, Hospitalizations, and
Deaths to Food Commodities by Using Outbreak Data, United States, 1998-2008,
19 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 407, 408–09 (2013) (describing these products
as “complex foods”).
133
See BLOCKCHAIN USE CASES FOR FOOD TRACEABILITY AND CONTROL 23, KAIROS
FUTURE (2017), https://www.sklkommentus.se/globalassets/kommentus/bilder/publ
ication-eng-blockchain-for-food-traceability-and-control-2017.pdf.
134
See IOANNIS LIANOS, BLOCKCHAIN COMPETITION: GAINING COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 73 (2018), https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/sites/c
les/files/cles_8-2018.pdf.
135
See Laura Shin, Crypto Industry Frustrated by Haphazard Regulation, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/business/dealbook/cr
ypto-industry-regulation.html.
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overly burdensome costs to industry, and restricting flexibility to
innovate with emerging blockchain systems. 136
Instead, handling the synthesis of WGS methods and
blockchain in the food supply chain may benefit from “softer”
regulatory approaches. As opposed to command and control
schemes, softer approaches offer a spectrum of regulatory
mechanisms lacking traditional legal enforceability. 137 So called
“soft law” enables more voluntary, innovative, and adaptable
regulatory possibilities by expanding definitions of oversight to
include regulation by private or public-private entities. 138 Limitations
of these softer approaches should guide their implementation and
combination, including the potential for reduced legitimacy,
inconsistent enforcement, and regulatory capture, as well as
coordination issues in public-private settings.139
Softer oversight should offer useful tools for advancing the
effective combination of blockchain and WGS technologies while
responding to governance challenges. Public-private or voluntary
oversight programs140 may ease tensions between government or
industry control over permissioned blockchains through leaving
control with industry while creating infrastructure for collaboration.
Such arrangements could promote the flow of blockchain and WGS
data across the public-private border during an outbreak while also
enabling government information gathering to measure the
effectiveness of blockchain implementation. 141 Federal regulators
already facilitate food industry action on traceability without
Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False
Dichotomies, 19 L. & POL’Y 529, 530 (1997).
137
Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 401–
02 (2000).
138
Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and
Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 103, 105–
12 (2001); David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct, 49
BUS. & SOC. 68, 69–70 (2010).
139
See Bowman & Hodge, supra note 119, at 477.
140
See Kenneth W. Abbott, et. al., Soft Law Oversight Mechanisms for
Nanotechnology, 52 JURIMETRICS 279, 298–300 (2017) (describing voluntary and
partnership programs in nanotechnology).
141
See GUIDANCE ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE INFORMATION SHARING 5, WORLD ECON.
FORUM (2016) (describing the utility of information sharing in collaboratively
addressing cybercrime); Gary E. Marchant, et. al., Risk Management Principles for
Nanotechnology, 2 NANOETHICS 43, 53–54 (2008) (describing information gathering
as a preliminary governance tool for emerging technologies).
136

96

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.15

wielding formal regulatory power. Following the November 2018
lettuce contamination, FDA coordinated stakeholders in forming a
task force to generate recommendations for improving traceability
with labeling. 142 These existing relationships could provide the
groundwork for close collaboration on governing blockchain and
WGS tools.
Technical standards, another soft regulatory tool, could
promote interoperability and facilitate common blockchain
architecture for WGS compatibility. 143 Third party standards can
provide technical guideposts to direct and stimulate innovation in
nascent technologies with various forms. 144 Civilian standard setting
bodies with high credibility including ISO and IEEE could build on
their existing projects on blockchain 145 to craft standards for
interoperability in food safety applications and WGS compatibility.
In the U.S., the National Institute of Standards and Technology could
provide a similar function as a public entity with expertise on
blockchain, 146 crafting voluntary standards with stakeholder input to
encourage data fluidity across blockchains and intersections with
public genomic databases.
V. Conclusion
Blockchain and WGS represent powerful emerging
technologies capable of bolstering regulatory and corporate response
to foodborne illnesses. The technologies carry complementary
strengths, combining increased traceability and accountability in the
food supply chain with enhanced identification of pathogens and
location of origin. With the clear potential to advance public health,
the convergence of blockchain and WGS appears inevitable.

See FDA Update, supra note 60.
For a review of blockchain technical features amenable to standardization, see
Advait Deshpande et al., Understanding the Landscape of Distributed Ledger
Technologies/Blockchain, RAND (2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_rep
orts/RR2223.html.
144
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Uncertain Markets, 46 RES. POL’Y 249, 258 (2017).
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ISO/TC 307: Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technology, ISO,
https://www.iso.org/committee/6266604/x/catalogue/p/0/u/1/w/0/d/0 (last visited
Apr. 11, 2019); P2418.3 – Standard for the Framework of Distributed Ledger
Technology (DLT) Use in Agriculture, IEEE, https://standards.ieee.org/project/2418
_3.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2019).
146
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However, synthesis and implementation will require addressing
technical and governance challenges.
Government-based WGS operations must effectively
intersect with industry-driven blockchain developments to realize the
promise of both technologies. Questions arise over whether public or
private entities should retain control of permissioned platforms,
whether to use public or private blockchain architectures, and how to
address interoperability. Soft regulatory approaches offer a path to
balancing public and private interests in resolving these governance
challenges, though selecting exact oversight instruments should be
reevaluated as both technologies mature independently and together.
Successfully navigating governance and technical challenges to
bring blockchain and WGS together, though complex, should
promote public health and reduce foodborne illness burdens.

Federal Regulation of Pesticide Residues: A Brief History
and Analysis
Kate Z. Graham, Esq.*
I. Introduction
In the United States today, there are over 900 pesticides in
use 1 and over 400 are approved for use in food production, 2 whether
used as part of the growing process or in post-harvest handling.
Although the history of pesticide use in food crops goes back
centuries, the post-war period has seen an enormous growth in the
varieties and amounts of pesticides used in our food system. As our
reliance on pesticides has grown, pesticides have become a divisive
issue. Pesticide advocates view them as essential to a secure and
reliable food supply needed to feed a growing world population.
Detractors, however, point out the public health risks—both known
and not yet fully understood—that widespread pesticide use may
entail. Meanwhile, consumer demand for products grown without
the use of pesticides is increasing, while at the very same moment
farmers are applying more and different pesticides to combat
pesticide-resistant “superweeds.” These tensions are playing out
both globally and locally in a variety of arenas, from debates over
pesticide bans within international organizations and national
governments, to the litigation of personal injury claims in American
courts.
As policy-makers and the public rethink the current
regulatory framework, it is helpful to have a basic understanding of
what that framework is. This paper seeks to explain the process by
which the U.S. government approves the use of pesticides for food
production, manages potential public health risks associated with
pesticides in our diets, and enforces these policies throughout the
food system. First, I will begin with a discussion of what pesticides
are and the relationship of pesticides to the history of agriculture in
the U.S., tying together both this history with the history of our laws
addressing pesticide use in food. Second, I will describe the features
* Kate Z. Graham, J.D., LL.M., is an associate attorney at the law firm of Fafinski
Mark & Johnson, PA in New Ulm, Minnesota; B.A., Carleton College; J.D.,
William Mitchell College of Law; LL.M., Agriculture & Food Law, University of
Arkansas School of Law.
1
John E. Casida, The Greening of Pesticide-Environment Interactions: Some
Personal Observations, 120 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 487, 487 (2012).
2
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-38, FOOD SAFETY: FDA AND USDA
SHOULD STRENGTHEN PESTICIDE RESIDUE MONITORING PROGRAMS AND FURTHER
DISCLOSE MONITORING LIMITATIONS 25 (2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/66
6408.pdf [hereinafter GAO Fᴏᴏᴅ SAFETY Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ].
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and complexities of our current pesticide-residue regulatory system.
Finally, I will discuss criticisms of our current regulatory system and
opportunities for improvement.
But first, what are pesticides? Simply put, pesticides are any
substance used to kill or mitigate the harmful effects of organisms
viewed as “pests.” “Pests,” broadly defined, are any organisms that
are unwelcome from a human perspective. 3 In the context of food
and agriculture, pests of concern include weeds and insects that
compete with crops or predate upon them, as well as fungi and
rodents that attack food plants in the field and after harvest.
The U.S. government has defined “pesticides” as “(1) any
substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing,
destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, [and] (2) any substance
or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant regulator,
defoliant, or desiccant.” 4 “Pests” are defined in the law as “(1) any
insect, rodent, nematode, fungus, weed, or (2) any other form of
terrestrial or aquatic plant or animal life or virus, bacteria, or other
micro-organism (except viruses, bacteria, or other micro-organisms
on or in living man or other living animals) which the Administrator
declares to be a pest under section 136w(c)(1) of [Title 7].”5
Basically, any chemical applied to a food crop or to the medium in
which a food crop is grown is most likely regulated in the U.S. as a
pesticide.
II. A Brief History of Pesticide Use and Regulations
Pesticides are nearly as old as agriculture itself. Pre-Roman
civilizations used sulfur as a fumigant and insect repellent, a practice
recorded by Homer in the Odyssey in 1000 BC. 6 Until the 19th
century, however, most pesticides were derived from botanical
preparations, sulfur, oil soaps, kerosene emulsions, lime, and sodium
chloride (i.e. salt). 7 In 1867, a grape-grower in Europe discovered
that the paint known as Paris Green, a substance that contained
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE FUTURE ROLE OF PESTICIDES IN US
AGRICULTURE 18 (2000).
4
7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (2012) (including “nitrogen stabilizers,” defined under
subsection (hh). The definition expressly excludes substances that are considered
“new animal drugs” under 21 U.S.C. § 321(w) and liquid chemical sterilants for use
on devices defined in 21 U.S.C. § 321).
5
Id. at § 136(t).
6
FREDERICK M. FISHEL, U. FLA./INST. FOOD & AG. SCI. EXTENSION, PEST
MANAGEMENT AND PESTICIDES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 2 (2016),
https://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/PI/PI21900.pdf.
7
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 3, at 23.
3
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arsenic and copper, not only deterred would-be grape thieves, but
also kept insects away. 8 This led to the widespread use of arsenicals
as both insecticides and herbicides. 9 Not only were arsenicals highly
effective on a broad array of insects, they were cheap, allowing
farmers to boost yields and profits. 10 Other heavy-metals were also
employed as pesticides, such as the mixture of hydrated lime and
copper sulfate known as Bordeaux mixture, a fungicide still in use
today to control downy mildew, 11 and lead arsenate, used to halt the
spread of the gypsy moth. 12
During the first three decades of the 20th century, use of
arsenicals as insecticides increased significantly.13 Aside from the
fact that these chemicals were inexpensive and effective against
pests, other changes in agriculture drove farmers to embrace
pesticides in a way they had not previously. Advances in agricultural
technology, including the adoption of mechanized plows, cultivators,
and harvesters and the application of crop rotation and fertilizers
allowed farmers to grow more crops in large monocultures with a
much smaller labor force. 14 But these monoculture fields presented
a veritable buffet for would-be pests, a problem compounded by the
loss of natural habitat for pest predators and alternative sources of
pest foods. 15 Thus, between 1919 and 1929, total insecticide use
quadrupled from 14.5 million pounds to 58 million pounds. 16
As the number of pesticide chemicals on the market
increased, so too did the number of fraudulent products. Farmers had
no way of knowing that the products they purchased actually worked.
Thus, the first law regulating pesticides was intended to ensure their
efficacy rather than their safety. Passed in California, the Insecticide
Law of 1901 standardized arsenic content in arsenical pesticides.17
Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Congress passed the first federal law
Id.; see also ERIC L. TAYLOR, ET AL., SOUTHERN REGIONAL EXTENSION FORESTRY,
PESTICIDE DEVELOPMENT: A BRIEF LOOK AT THE HISTORY 3 (2007),
https://sref.info/resources/publications/pesticide-development---a-brief-look-at-the
-history/at_download/file (noting that “Paris green . . . was used extensively to
control the potato beetle and protect grapes from insect damage.”)
9
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 3, at 23.
10
FREDERICK ROWE DAVIS, BANNED: A HISTORY OF PESTICIDES AND THE SCIENCE OF
TOXICOLOGY 4 (2014).
11
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 3, at 23; see also Eric L. Taylor, et
al., supra note 8, at 3.
12
DAVIS, supra note 10, at 4.
13
Id. at 10.
14
Id. at 3.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 11.
17
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 3, at 24.
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aimed at regulating pesticides. The Insecticide Act of 1910
prohibited the manufacture, sale, and transportation of adulterated or
misbranded pesticides. 18 The law also standardized the content of
the two most popular pesticides of the time: Paris green and lead
arsenate. 19 The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), whose
mission was to support and promote U.S. agriculture, was tasked
with enforcement of the new pesticide law.20
Arsenical pesticides were the mainstay of pest control until
the introduction of synthetic organic compounds following World
War II.
Dichlorodiphenyl trichloroethane (DDT) was first
synthesized in 1874 but was not used as an insecticide until 1939
when a researcher discovered it was extremely toxic to a wide variety
of insects. 21 During the war, DDT was used effectively to reduce
casualties of malaria and other insect-borne diseases for troops in the
Pacific theater, and likely saved the lives of many troops.22 DDT
was the first in a long line of these second-generation pesticides
developed during WWII, including organophosphates like parathion
(originally developed by the Germans as a nerve gas) and the
herbicide 2,4-D, still widely used today. 23 Insecticide use in this
period increased significantly as farmers were advised to apply
chemicals at rates intended to totally eradicate pests and “sterilize”
farm fields. 24 This sterilization approach eliminated crop pests but
also eliminated beneficial insects, and as was later discovered, it had
a disastrous effect on bird populations. 25
Meanwhile, a revolution in food safety was taking place. A
grassroots movement known as the Pure Food movement led to the
creation of the first federal law governing food safety in 1906. 26
Passage of the law was finally made possible following public outcry
over the publication of Upton Sinclair’s novel, The Jungle, a book
intended to spotlight dangerous labor practices in the meatpacking
industry but caused a greater stir over its revelations about what was
JORGE FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ERS, PESTICIDE USE IN
U.S. AGRICULTURE: 21 SELECTED CROPS, 1960-2008 3 (2014), https://www.ers.usd
a.gov/webdocs/publications/43854/46734_eib124.pdf.
19
DAVIS, supra note 10, at 5.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 24.
22
Id.
23
TAYLOR, ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note 8, at 4.
24
Id. at 5.
25
Id.
26
Wallace F. Janssen, The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels, FDA CONSUMER
MAG. 1, 2 (1981), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/aboutfda/history/forgshistory/e
volvingpowers/ucm593437.pdf.
18
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in the meat that people were consuming. 27 The 1906 Food and Drugs
Act prohibited the interstate transport of unlawful food and drugs.28
The law focused on the accuracy of food and drug labeling and
prohibited certain food adulterants, including ingredients intended to
substitute for the food, conceal, damage, harm human health, or
constitute a filthy or decomposed substance. 29
Despite the benefits of the 1906 law, by the 1930s it became
clear that the law was insufficient to protect consumers. For
example, the law had no judicial enforcement mechanism to halt the
sale of adulterated food products. 30 Because the law did not punish
noncompliance, adulterated products continued to proliferate in the
marketplace. Further, the economic climate of the 1930s exacerbated
the impacts of the law’s shortcomings and spurred renewed interest
among the public in better food safety regulation. 31 These concerns
led to the passage of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FFDCA), which ushered in our modern regulatory framework for
food labeling. Among other things, the new law beefed up
enforcement by authorizing courts to issue injunctions to halt the sale
of adulterated products and allowed the federal government to
establish food standards to promote honesty and fair dealing. 32
But it was not until the 1950s that the two most important
sections of the FFDCA relating to pesticide use were passed. In
1952, a committee of the U.S. House of Representatives released a
report that investigated the “nature, extent and effect of the use of
chemicals” in food and food production. 33 The committee, led by
Congressman John Delaney, concluded that many chemicals used in
food production may be linked to cancer and that additional
regulation of chemical residues in food was necessary. 34 As a result,
Congress passed the Miller Amendment in 1954, which added
Section 408 to the FFDCA. 35 Section 408 directed the federal
government to establish limits, known as “tolerances,” on the amount
DAVIS, supra note 10, at 1.
History of FDA’s Internal Organization – Part I: The 1906 Food and Drugs Act
and Its Enforcement, FDA (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/History
/FOrgsHistory/EvolvingPowers/ucm054819.htm.
29
Id.
30
Janssen, supra note 26, at 8.
31
Id. at 9.
32
Id. at 7.
33
Bruce S. Wilson, A Legislative History of the Pesticide Residues Amendment of
1954 and the Delaney Clause of the Food Additives Amendment of 1958, in
REGULATING PESTICIDES IN FOOD: THE DELANEY PARADOX, 161, 163 (1987).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 165.
27
28
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of chemical residues permitted in food. 36 In order to establish
appropriate tolerances, the government was directed to balance the
interest of food safety against the interest in providing an adequate
food supply. This risk-benefit balancing standard appealed broadly
to industry groups because it meant the government could only
curtail pesticide use to the extent that it did not interfere with
agricultural production. 37 Prior to the establishment of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, pesticide residue
tolerances were set by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 38
Four years later, Congress passed Section 409 of the
FFDCA, which required that all food additives be found “safe”
before being allowed on the market. 39 Pesticide residues were
included in the definition of food additives and regulated under
Section 409 if they became concentrated in the food product through
processing such that it exceeded the tolerance in the raw product, or
where the residue had not been sufficiently reduced through good
manufacturing practices. 40 In addition, the law included what
became known as the Delaney Clause (named for Congressman
Delaney), which prohibited any food additive known to induce
cancer in humans or animals. 41 Although technically the Delaney
Clause only applied to processed foods, because pesticides are
generally applied to the raw product prior to processing it was
impossible to omit such residues without also banning them from use
on the raw product. Thus, the Delaney Clause had the practical effect
of banning virtually all pesticides linked to cancer from use in the
food system.
By the 1950s, over 300 million pounds of pesticides were
being manufactured each year, a huge increase from the 100 million
pounds produced in 1945. 42 This growth in production mirrored a
steady increase in the number of different products available on the
market. It soon became clear that the 1910 Insecticide Act was
stretched to the limits. In 1947, Congress passed the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) in an attempt
Id. at 25.
Id. at 165.
38
David M. Bearden et al, Environmental Laws: Summaries of Major Statutes
Administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 114
(Dec. 20, 2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30798.pdf.
39
James Smart, All the Stars in the Heavens Were In the Right Places: The Passage
of the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 273, 279 (1998).
40
Id. at 280.
41
Id. at 279.
42
Pamela A. Finegan, FIFRA Lite: A Regulatory Solution or Part of the Pesticide
Problem?, 6 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 615, 619 (1989).
36
37
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to update the law, and in doing so established the basic framework
for pesticide regulation that is still in effect today.43 Although it
enhanced enforcement mechanisms, the law remained essentially a
labeling law that prohibited the manufacture and sale of any pesticide
that was adulterated or mislabeled. Once again, the emphasis was on
protecting pesticide purchasers from fraud rather than protecting
applicators and the public at large from pesticide exposures. 44 In
1959, FIFRA was amended to require the registration of all new
pesticides prior to sale to the public. 45 The USDA continued to be
the agency responsible for enforcement of pesticide regulations
under FIFRA.
By the 1960s, public outcry over the widespread use of
pesticides was again piqued by the publication in 1962 of Silent
Spring by Rachel Carson, a scientist and former employee of the
federal Bureau of Fisheries (a predecessor to the US Fish and
Wildlife Service). 46 In her book, which sold 162,000 copies in
hardback and several million in paperback, Carson described serious
harms to the environment and human health from pesticide
exposures. 47 Such harms included massive die-offs of fish and birds,
cow’s milk containing pesticide residues, and pesticide-induced
diseases in humans. 48 Carson’s work galvanized the emerging
environmental movement, led to an all-out ban on DDT, and
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 80-104, 61 Stat.
163 (1947).
44
See Finegan, supra note 42, at 623 (noting that the “[Federal Insecticide Act]
prevented the manufacture, sale, or shipment of certain adulterated insecticides in
order ‘to protect farmers and consumers against fraudulent products.’”).
45
Barbara Kennedy Kahn, New Developments in Pesticide Regulation, 13 TEMP.
ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 309, 310-11 (1994).
46
See JoAnne L. Dunec, On a Farther Shore: The Life and Legacy of Rachel Carson,
27-SPG NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 62, 62 (2013) (noting how Rachel Carson (a
scientist and former employee of the federal Bureau of Fisheries, a predecessor to
the US Fish and Wildlife Service) published her book Silent Spring in 1962, creating
a “national debate” over the “’growing concern among scientists as to the possibility
of dangerous long-range side effects from the widespread use of DDT and other
pesticides’”).
47
Edwin McDowell, Silent Spring,’ 20 Years a Milestone, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
1982, at C16, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1982/09/27/178690
.html?action=click&contentCollection=Archives&module=LedeAsset&region=Ar
chiveBody&pgtype=article.
48
See Finegan, supra note 42, at 619–20 (“In the 1960s, public enthusiasm for
pesticide use dwindled following publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring which
focused public awareness on the environmental and public health problems posed
by pesticides. Carson presented a frightening picture of massive fish kills, residuesaturated milk from cows grazing on treated pastures, a poisoned wildlife
population, and a human population plagued by a host of new pesticide-induced
diseases.”).
43
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contributed in no small part to the creation of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970. 49
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Federal
Environmental Pesticide Control Act (FEPCA), which contained a
number of amendments to FIFRA. 50 First, the law shifted regulatory
enforcement from USDA to the new EPA. 51 Second, the law
amended the criteria for pesticide registration to include
consideration of a pesticide’s adverse impacts on the environment
and human health. 52 Third, the law required the EPA to reregister all
previously registered pesticides in light of this new standard. 53 The
law kept in place the risk-benefit balancing test, however. Following
these changes, FIFRA emerged not only as a consumer protection
law but as an environmental protection law as well.
Despite these changes, however, the law had little effect on
the amount of pesticides making their way into the environment. In
fact, pesticide use in the US hit a peak in 1979. 54 For the next twenty
years, there were no major changes in the pesticide regulatory
system, but the use and variety of pesticides continued to grow and
change. By 1981, farmers in the U.S. were applying 632 million
pounds of pesticides annually. 55 The increased use of pesticides
resulted from the increase in the total number of acres planted as well
as a decline in herbicide costs.56 Additionally, whereas most
pesticides applied in the 1950s and 1960s were insecticides, by the
1980s and 1990s the vast majority of pesticides applied to crops were
herbicides. 57 With the rising popularity of organophosphates, like
atrazine and 2,4-D, farmers shifted their dependence from the more
acutely toxic and persistent heavy metals to compounds that were
See Mcdowell, supra note 47 (“[Silent Spring] led to a spate of state and local
laws regulating the use of pesticides, it helped to make ecology one of the great
popular causes of the 1960’s, and eventually it helped lead to the creation of the
Environmental Protection Agency.”).
50
Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat.
973 (1972).
51
Finegan, supra note 42, at 624,
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
GAO FOOD SAFETY REPORT, supra note 2, at 5–6.
55
FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, ET AL., supra note 18, at 11.
56
See id. at 13–15 (describing how increasing herbicide use due to relatively falling
prices combined with increasing crop acreage contributed to increased pesticide use
from the early 1960s to early 1980s).
57
See id. at 11 (“Pesticide use more than tripled between 1960 and 1981. Herbicide
use increased more than tenfold (from 35 to 478 million pounds) as more U.S.
farmers began to treat their fields with these chemicals. By contrast, insecticide use
declined from 114 million pounds in 1960 to 97 million pounds in 1981.”).
49
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less persistent in the environment but entailed different health and
environmental risks. 58 Further, the overall increase in the use of
pesticides led to an increase in the potential human exposures to these
chemicals.
In 1993, the National Research Council issued a
groundbreaking study examining pesticide exposures in infants and
children. 59 Pesticides in the Diets of Infants and Children revealed
that the EPA was failing to adequately consider the different
physiologies of young children when calculating pesticide residue
tolerances. 60 Compared to adults, children consume more food per
pound of body weight, which means that they also consume more
pesticides relative to their body weight when pesticide residues are
present in their food. 61 In addition, infants and children tend to
consume a lesser variety of foods compared to adults, which can lead
to a greater concentration of certain pesticides in their diets. 62 The
report raised concerns about the heavy reliance on organophosphates
in particular, which have been shown to cause neurological problems
and developmental delays in children. 63 The report urged the EPA
to take infants and children into account when determining tolerance
levels, to move away from the risk-benefit balancing test, and to
consider exposures from a variety of dietary and nondietary
exposures. 64
In reaction to the study and public outcry, Congress passed
the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA), which revised
Section 408 of the FFDCA. The new law replaced the risk-benefit
balancing test for establishing tolerances with a new test focused
entirely on safety. In establishing tolerances, the EPA was required
to determine “to a reasonable certainty” that “no harm would result”
from “aggregate exposures” to pesticide residues.65 In addition, the
See id. at 16 (“In 1968, atrazine and 2,4-D were among the top five pesticides
used, but the other three were insecticides: toxaphene, DDT, and methyl parathion
(fig. 9). In 2008, each of the top five herbicides (glyphosate, atrazine, acetochlor,
metolachlor, and 2,4-D) were more heavily used than the top insecticide.”).
59
COMMITTEE ON PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN i (1993).
60
See id. at 344–45 (discussing how traditional toxicity tests do not make allowances
for the unique feature of infants and children).
61
See id. at 4 (noting how children are at more risk to pesticide exposure because
they eat more food per unit of body weight than adults do).
62
See id. (discussing how children are at more risk to pesticide exposure because
they consume fewer types of foods than adults do).
63
Id. at 63.
64
Id. at 8–9.
65
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, § 408(b)(A)(ii), 110
Stat. 1489, 1516.
58
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EPA had to take into account the particular susceptibilities of infants
and children, including incorporating an additional tenfold safety
factor when setting tolerances. 66 This new standard required not only
that the EPA solely consider health risks when setting tolerances in
most cases, but also that the EPA had to obtain and incorporate data
on American diets to determine what an average person’s aggregate
exposure to pesticides might be. 67 In addition, the new law removed
the Delaney Clause which had barred pesticides linked to cancer;
now, all pesticides would be subjected to the same scrutiny, whether
they were linked to cancer or to other health problems. 68 Finally, the
law required the EPA to re-evaluate all existing tolerances using the
new “no harm” standard within the following ten years. 69
In the years that followed, the EPA canceled some
registrations for certain highly toxic organophosphates for use on
some crops and farmers began to shift away from a reliance on more
acutely toxic organophosphates to new products believed to be safer
and less persistent in the environment. 70 The introduction in the
1990s of herbicide-resistant seed varieties developed with the use of
genetic engineering and generated a significant increase in the use of
the herbicide glyphosate. Glyphosate, originally released under the
tradename RoundUp by Monsanto (now Bayer), was believed to be
both safe for humans and wildlife and able to break down quickly in
the environment.
Even though glyphosate is a type of
organophosphate, which is known to cause neurological and
development issues, initial studies indicated there were few health
risks. Combined with glyphosate-resistant crop varieties, farmers
could apply significant amounts of glyphosate to control weeds
throughout the growing season without damaging their crop. By the
2000s, glyphosate was the number one most applied pesticide in the
U.S., amounting to 38% of all pesticides used in 2008, trailed by
atrazine at only 13%. 71
By 2008, farmers were applying
approximately 516 million pounds of pesticides. 72 About 80% of

Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, § 408(b)(C)(ii)(II),
110 Stat. 1489, 1517.
67
See id. (discussing what the EPA is required to determine by law).
68
See Andrew J. Miller, The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996: Science and Law
at a Crossroads, 7 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 393, 396 (1997) (discussing how the
new law steps away from the Delaney act).
69
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, § 408(b)(C)(ii)(II),
110 Stat. 1489, 1517.
70
FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, ET AL., supra note 18, at 40.
71
Id. at 20.
72
Id. at 5.
66
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pesticides are applied to five major crops: corn, soybeans, potatoes,
cotton, and wheat. 73
III. Pesticide Regulation Today: A Patchwork of
Agencies and Laws
Our current system of pesticide regulation reflects the
complex history and evolution of our laws governing the various
disciplines that touch on pesticide use, including agricultural law,
environmental law, and human health law. The laws that make up
this regulatory framework include FIFRA, enforced by the EPA, and
the FFDCA, enforced by the FDA and the USDA. In brief, the
following agencies have the following responsibilities in regulating
pesticide residues in food:
●
●
●
●

EPA registers pesticides and establishes tolerances;
FDA enforces pesticide residue limits on most foods;
USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) enforces
pesticide residue limits in meat and poultry; and
USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) researches
and issues reports on the levels of pesticide residues found
in foods.
A. Pesticide Registration: FIFRA

All pesticides must be registered with the EPA in accordance
with FIFRA. 74 Recall that FIFRA is essentially a labeling law, which
means that the applicant must provide the EPA with information
about the product along with a proposed label to qualify for
registration. 75 FIFRA allows the EPA to approve a pesticide for sale
on the market so long as the manufacturer’s claims about the product
are warranted, the product is properly labeled, and when used “with
widespread and commonly recognized practice” it will not “cause
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”76 In certain
circumstances, the EPA may classify a pesticide as “restricted-use,”
meaning that the pesticide may only be applied by or under the
supervision of a trained and certified applicator. 77 The EPA may also
issue “conditional use” registrations, which means that a pesticide
Id. at 27.
About Pesticide Registration, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/a
bout-pesticide-registration (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
75
40 C.F.R. § 152.50(d) (2018).
76
7 U.S.C. § 136a (2012).
77
40 C.F.R. § 152.170(a) (2018).
73
74
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may be available for purchase and use even before the agency has
received all data regarding the safety and efficacy of the product.78
A pesticide may be conditionally registered in situations where a
similar product is already on the market or where the manufacturer
can show that no harm will come about as a result of the conditional
use registration. 79 If a product receives a conditional use registration,
however, the manufacturer is still required to provide the necessary
information at some future date. 80 The applicant must also specify
the intended use for the product. If a new use is proposed for a
product that is already registered, the applicant must still go through
the registration application process, although it may qualify for
conditional registration. 81
After a pesticide registration application is received, whether
for a new active ingredient or a new use, the EPA issues a notice of
receipt in the Federal Register describing the new active ingredient
or proposed new use and soliciting public comment. 82 Once the EPA
reviews the application and issues a decision to conditionally or
unconditionally register the product for the proposed use, it publishes
a notice of issuance in the Federal Register. The notice of issuance
describes the new chemical or new use, summarizes the EPA’s
conclusions, lists any missing data and the conditions for their
submission, and responds to comments received from the initial
notice of application. 83
B. Tolerance Setting: FFDCA
In addition to the registration requirement under FIFRA, a
pesticide intended for use on food must also receive a tolerance
pursuant to the FFDCA. A tolerance is the maximum residue level
of a pesticide that may legally be present in food, measured in parts
per million (ppm). 84 According to the FFDCA, a food is considered
adulterated if it contains a pesticide residue for which no tolerance is
established (and no exemption from the tolerance requirement was
7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(7) (2012).
40 C.F.R. § 152.113–14 (2018).
80
Id. at § 152.115.
81
See id. at § 152.102.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Pesticide Registration Manual: Chapter 11 - Tolerance Petitions, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/pesticide-registration-manual-chapter11-tolerance-petitions#main-content (last visited Apr. 22, 2018); see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 346 (2012) (regulating the “tolerances for poisonous or deleterious substances in
food”).
78
79
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established) or where the amount of the residue is in excess of the
established tolerance. 85 A tolerance may be established for pesticide
residues in a raw agricultural commodity or in a processed
commodity under the same procedures. 86 But where pesticide
residues are not in greater concentration after processing, the
tolerance in effect for the raw agricultural product is applicable and
a separate processed tolerance is not necessary. 87
Prior registration of the pesticide is not necessary to obtain a
tolerance from EPA. In fact, there are certain situations in which
obtaining a registration for a product for which a tolerance is required
is not possible, such as where the product is approved for use in a
foreign country but is not in use in the U.S.88 To register a product
under FIFRA, the applicant must either state that a tolerance or
exemption from tolerance was previously obtained or that the
applicant is requesting that a tolerance be obtained pursuant to EPA
regulations. 89 A tolerance or an exemption from tolerance must be
established for all active and inert ingredients in a pesticide. 90
In order to obtain a tolerance determination from the EPA,
the applicant must provide, among other things, a description of the
chemical, data regarding how the chemical is used and how much of
its residue remains on food, a summary of studies regarding the
safety of the chemical, proposed tolerances, methods for removing
residues in excess of the proposed tolerance, whether processing
increases the concentration of residues, practical methods for
detecting and measuring the chemical’s residues in foods, and a
description of any effects on infants and children or to the human
reproductive or endocrine systems. 91 The applicant must also
provide a summary of the application, which the EPA will publish in
the Federal Register along with a notice of filing of a petition for
tolerance. 92 After the application is submitted and published, the
EPA must decide whether to issue an order establishing, modifying,
or revoking a tolerance regulation, or whether to publish a proposed
regulation and request public comment, or whether to deny the
petition. 93
21 U.S.C. § 346a(a) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(B) (2012).
40 C.F.R. § 180.7(10) (2018).
87
21 U.S.C. § 346a(a)(2) (2012).
88
Pesticide Registration Manual, supra note 84.
89
40 C.F.R. § 152.50(i) (2018).
90
Pesticide Registration Manual, supra note 84.
91
40 C.F.R. § 180.7 (2018).
92
Id. at § 180.7(d), (f).
93
Id. at § 180.7(h).
85
86

2019]

FEDERAL REGULATION OF PESTICIDE RESIDUES 111

The standard by which EPA must establish a tolerance is
whether the tolerance is “safe.” 94 “Safe” means the EPA has
determined “there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will result
from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue, including
all anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures for which
there is reliable information.” 95 EPA applies this standard differently
depending on whether a chemical is deemed to have a no observed
adverse effect level (NOAEL), which is also known as a threshold
effect, or, whether no threshold can be identified. 96 Residues below
a NOAEL are considered to have no known or anticipated adverse
effects, whereas residues for nonthreshold chemicals have no dose
below which there is any certainty that no harm will occur. 97 For
threshold chemicals, EPA applies a 100-fold safety factor to account
for potential differences between human and animal physiologies
since safety studies are generally conducted on animals and not
humans. 98 In addition, EPA is directed to apply an additional 10-fold
safety factor to account for the unique susceptibilities of infants and
children. 99 But EPA is permitted to use a different (i.e. lower) safety
factor if “on the basis of reliable data, such margin will be safe for
infants and children.” 100
For nonthreshold chemicals, the “safe” test is satisfied if the
increased lifetime adverse risk is “negligible,” which is defined as no
greater than a one-in-a-million lifetime risk.101 Cancer risks
generally fall into the nonthreshold category. 102 Recall that, prior to
passage of the FQPA, the Delaney Clause effectively established a
zero-tolerance policy for chemicals associated with cancer risks;
post-FQPA, cancer-causing chemicals may receive a tolerance so
long as the established tolerance does not exceed this “negligible”
risk limit. 103 In addition, for certain nonthreshold chemicals that
entail up to a ten-in-a-million annual risk or a two-in-a-million
lifetime risk of adverse health effects, the EPA is permitted to
21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
Id. at § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii).
96
See id. at § 346a(b)(2)(B) (stating that a pesticide chemical residue that has a
nonthreshold effect is assessed by quantitative risk analysis while a pesticide
chemical residue that has a threshold effect is assessed by determining the level of
aggregate exposure that is safe); see also LYNN L. BERGESON, FIFRA: FEDERAL
INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND RODENTICIDE ACT 31 (2000).
97
BERGESON, supra note 96, at 31.
98
Id.
99
21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C)(ii) (2012).
100
Id.
101
BERGESON, supra note 96, at 31.
102
Id.
103
Wilson, supra note 33, at 161; CONG. RES. SERV., 96-759 ENR, PESTICIDE
LEGISLATION: FOOD QUALITY PROTECTION ACT OF 1996 (P.L. 104-170) 11 (1998).
94
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consider the pesticide’s offsetting benefits when establishing a
tolerance. 104 EPA may consider benefits to human health and to
avoid a “significant disruption in domestic production of an
adequate, wholesome, and economical food supply.”105
In general, if a pesticide residue is found on a food for which
there is no tolerance or exemption from tolerance, the food is
considered adulterated. However, if the residue is unavoidable
through good agricultural and manufacturing practices, the food may
still be marketable. For instance, many pesticides that are no longer
authorized for use on food are persistent and remain in the soil,
finding their way into the food supply even though they are no longer
registered and approved for use. 106 In this case, the FDA may issue
an “action level.”107 An “action level” is a recommended level above
which an environmental contaminant in food should not exceed. 108
The action level is not legally binding, and FDA may take
enforcement action, or not, at its sole discretion. 109 In addition, while
the EPA sets tolerances for most pesticides used on crops, the FDA
establishes tolerances for animal drug residues found in foodproducing animals. 110
C. Diet Surveys: FDA & USDA
As previously discussed, FFDCA requires the federal
government to establish tolerances by taking into account all dietary
exposures to pesticide residues. As a practical matter, this
requirement also mandates that the government monitor American
diets for the presence of pesticide residues in the foods most
commonly consumed. USDA and FDA each have a program that
monitors the amount of pesticide residues consumed in the average
American diet. 111 While these programs sometimes find tolerance
21 U.S.C. § 346a (Westlaw through P.L. 116-5).
21 U.S.C. § 346a (Westlaw through P.L. 116-5).
106
Pesticide residues in food, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 19, 2018).
https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/pesticide-residues-in-food.
107
Pesticide Residue Monitoring Program Question and Answers, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/food/foodborneillnesscontaminants/pesticides/
ucm583711.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERV., GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR EVALUATING THE
HUMAN FOOD SAFETY OF NEW ANIMAL DRUGS USED IN FOOD-PRODUCING ANIMALS:
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 4 (2018), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Ani
malVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/ucm05218
0.pdf.
111
Pesticide Data Program, U.S. DEPT. AGRIC. https://www.ams.usda.gov/datasets
104
105
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violations, they are not designed for enforcement purposes; rather,
they are intended to simply gather data to inform EPA’s tolerancesetting process and other government food safety and nutrition
programs and policies. 112
i. FDA Total Diet Study
The FDA’s Total Diet Study (TDS) is an annual report of the
levels of various contaminants and nutrients in commonly consumed
foods in the U.S. 113 The TDS has been conducted continuously by
FDA since the early 1960s. 114 To conduct the study, the FDA buys,
prepares, and tests about 280 different foods and beverages for the
presence of about 800 different contaminants and nutrients. 115 The
study adopts a “market basket” methodology: Researchers purchase
the same foods from retailers around the country four times a year
and at least once in each of four regions per year (West, North
Central, South, and North East). 116 The list of foods purchased is
based upon food consumption surveys performed by USDA. 117 To
select which foods will be added to the list of products to be tested,
FDA groups similar foods together, choosing the one specific food
that is most commonly consumed in that group to represent an entire
group of foods. 118 About every ten years, FDA revises its list of
tested foods to account for changes in eating patterns. 119 In
performing the tests, the researchers attempt to closely mimic how
the average consumer would likely consume the food by purchasing
it from a retail outlet and preparing it as it would normally be
prepared (i.e., peeling, cooking, etc.). 120 The testing methods used
/pdp (last visited Apr. 14, 2019); Pesticide Residue Monitoring Program Reports
and Data, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/food/foodborneillness
contaminants/pesticides/ucm2006797.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).
112
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., PESTICIDE DATA PROGRAM ANNUAL
SUMMARY, CALENDAR YEAR 2016 ii (2018), https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/defau
lt/files/media/2016PDPAnnualSummary.pdf.pdf.
113
Total Diet Study, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.fda
.gov/food/foodscienceresearch/totaldietstudy/default.htm.
114
Katie Egan, FDA’s Total Diet Study: Monitoring U.S. Food Supply Safety, FOOD
SAFETY MAG. (June/July 2002), https://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/maga
zine-archive1/junejuly-2002/fdas-total-diet-study-monitoring-us-food-supply-safet
y/.
115
Total Diet Study, supra note 113.
116
Total Diet Study Design, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 21, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/TotalDietStudy/ucm184232.htm.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.; see Lauran Neergaard, Monitoring the Chemicals We Eat, MONT. STANDARD
(Aug. 7, 2003), https://mtstandard.com/special-section/news/monitorin
g-the-chemicals-we-eat/article_2ad357d5-4e7f-5f23-afda-de5c09ab12d5.html.
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to detect contaminants are extremely sensitive, able to detect
chemicals in concentrations as low as 100 parts-per-billion (ppb),
which is significantly more sensitive than the tests used for
regulatory enforcement. 121
While the TDS results are not generally used for
enforcement, they have in some cases led to further investigation and
regulatory action. For example, test results from the 1970s revealed
unusually high levels of iodine in dairy products that was traced back
to the use of iodine-based cleaners in the dairy industry, the use of
which was subsequently reduced. 122
And in 1971, higher
concentrations of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) were identified
in boxed cereals; it was subsequently discovered that cereal boxes
made with PCB-contaminated recycled paper were leaching PCBs
into the breakfast cereals. The federal government issued regulations
limiting PCB content of packaging and industry began bagging foods
inside paper boxes to prevent chemical contamination. 123
ii. AMS Pesticide Data Program
The Pesticide Data Program (PDP) is a national pesticide
residue monitoring program conducted by the Monitoring Programs
Division of the USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS)
since 1991. 124 PDP data are primarily used by EPA to assess dietary
exposure to pesticide residues to assist with the establishment of
tolerance levels. 125 PDP data are also used by FDA in planning its
enforcement and regulatory programs, such as the TDS (discussed
above). 126 The PDP is similar to the TDS in that it samples foods
determined to be representative of the foods most commonly eaten
in the U.S., with a special emphasis on the diets of infants and
children. 127 In addition, the samples are collected from a variety of
sampling sites in ten states representing each of the four census
regions of the U.S. 128 However, rather than purchase samples from
retail outlets, PDP researchers acquire samples from “terminal
Egan, supra note 114.
Id.
123
See id.
124
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., THE PESTICIDE DATA PROGRAM HELPING
MONITOR THE SAFETY OF AMERICA’S FOOD SUPPLY 2 (2015),
https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/PDP%20factsheet.pdf.
125
U.S. Dᴇᴘ’ᴛ Aɢʀɪᴄ., Aɢʀɪᴄ. Mᴋᴛɢ. Sᴇʀᴠ., supra note 112, at 1.
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See id.
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Id. at ii.
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Id. at 3 (currently, the ten states involved in the PDP are Washington, California,
Colorado, Texas, Michigan, Ohio, New York, Maryland, North Carolina, and
Florida).
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markets,” which are generally wholesale distributors that voluntarily
participate in the program. 129
AMS coordinates with state
governments to select the samples and ship them to the appropriate
laboratories for testing. 130 In addition, instead of a “market basket”
approach to testing, the PDP does not test the same foods each year.
Rather, it cycles commodities through the testing program about
once every five years for “high-consumption items,” and less
frequently for other items. 131 In any given year, the majority of
products tested are fruits and vegetables, whereas grains and dairy
are only rarely tested. 132 In 2012, AMS decided to stop testing beef,
pork, and poultry products with the expectation that USDA FSIS
would provide this data to the EPA. 133 PDP tests are performed after
the food is prepared in a manner that emulates consumer practices. 134
Like the TDS, the PDP tests for a variety of pesticides at the
lowest detectable levels. In 2016, about 77% of samples tested
positive for the presence of pesticide residues, but over 99% of
samples had residues below the tolerance established by the EPA.135
15.7% of samples tested positive for 1 pesticide and 61.6% tested
positive for more than one pesticide. 136 In addition to testing for
pesticide residues, the PDP tests for environmental contaminants,
which include pesticides that are no longer authorized for use in the
U.S. but persist in the environment, and pesticides found on imported
goods;137 for example, a metabolite of DDT was found in 39.2% of
spinach samples. 138 About 2.6% of samples tested in 2016 contained
residues with no established tolerance and .46% contained pesticide
residues in excess of tolerance. 139 These tolerance violations were
reported to the FDA for enforcement, but by the time the PDP study
results are available it is often too late for the FDA to issue any
enforcement action. 140

Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
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Id. at 4.
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See id. at ix (90.3% of samples collected and analyzed in 2016 were fruits and
vegetables).
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U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 54, at 14.
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U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., supra note 112, at 1.
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Id. at ix–x.
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D. Enforcement Programs: FDA & USDA
The USDA and the FDA are charged with enforcing EPA
tolerances in the foods that each agency is required to regulate. Due
to the unique histories of these two organizations, USDA is charged
with regulating meat, poultry, egg products (not shell eggs), and
catfish, whereas FDA is charged with regulating nearly everything
else, including fruits, vegetables, dairy, seafood, and spices. 141 Both
agencies also regulate imports as well as domestically produced
goods in the categories of food for which each agency has
jurisdiction. Each agency also takes a different approach to its
regulatory enforcement procedures. Because USDA regulates a
comparatively much smaller segment of the food system, it has
greater enforcement resources available to it relative to the number
of products it oversees, which enables it to take a more rigorous
approach to testing and enforcement. 142 The FDA, by contrast, is
saddled with regulating around 75% of the food system, requiring it
to divert limited resources to known problem areas.
i. FSIS National Residue Program
The National Residue Program (NRP) is designed to identify
and control chemical and pesticide residues, including veterinary
drug residues, found in the products that the USDA regulates. 143 The
Food Safety and Inspection Service, a division of USDA, administers
the program under the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), 144 the
Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), 145 and the Egg Products
Inspection Act (EPIA). 146 In carrying out the program, FSIS
conducts random sampling of carcasses at the slaughter
establishments it regulates,147 testing for over 80 veterinary drugs
and over 100 pesticides as well as certain metals.148 Meat carcasses
Daniela Galarza, USDA vs. FDA: What’s the Difference?, EATER (Mar. 24, 2017),
https://www.eater.com/2017/3/24/15041686/fda-usda-difference-regulation.
142
See USDA and FDA One Step Closer to Securing More Government Funding for
FY 2019, FOOD SAFETY MAG. (May 24, 2018), https://www.foodsafetymagazin
e.com/news/usda-and-fda-one-step-closer-to-securing-more-government-fundingfor-fy-2019/.
143
U.S. DEPT. AGRIC., FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., UNITED STATES NATIONAL
RESIDUE PROGRAM FOR MEAT, POULTRY, AND EGG PRODUCTS: 2019 RESIDUE
SAMPLING PLANS 2 (2018), https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/3
94f0bd4-2c5d-47bc-ba4f-f65992972e43/2019-blue-book.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
144
21 U.S.C. §§ 601–695 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-5).
145
21 U.S.C. §§ 451–472 (Westlaw through Pub L. No. 116-5).
146
21 U.S.C. §§ 1031–1056 (Westlaw through Pub L. No. 116-5); U.S. DEPT.
AGRIC., FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., supra note 143, at 1.
147
U.S. DEPT. AGRIC., FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., supra note 143, at 4.
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Id. at 3.
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are required to be held pending the testing results, whereas poultry
and catfish are not required to be held but FSIS regulations
recommend that establishments hold these items pending the testing
results. 149 Not all livestock are included in the sampling program,
however; each year FSIS generates a sampling plan to identify which
classes of livestock will be tested. 150 A Surveillance Advisory Team
(SAT), consisting of representatives from FSIS, FDA, EPA, USDA’s
Agricultural Research Service (ARS), USDA’s AMS, and HHS’s
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, assist FSIS in
identifying its sampling targets each year. 151 For 2019, FSIS’s
sampling plan will sample production classes covering about 95% of
domestic meat and poultry consumption. 152 In addition, FSIS
conducts random sampling of imported meat and poultry. 153
In addition to gathering data on the presence of residues in
the food system, the NRP plays an important role in enforcement. A
violation occurs when an FSIS laboratory detects a chemical
compound in excess of an established tolerance or FDA action level
or if the detected chemical has no established tolerance. 154 FSIS
enters violation data into the Residue Violator Tracking (RVT)
system, which is an FDA/FSIS interagency database. 155 FSIS
notifies the slaughter establishment and the producer of the violation,
and recommends that the establishment also notify the producer of
the violation. 156 FSIS also shares the violation data with the EPA
and the FDA, giving the FDA the opportunity to further investigate
the producer in cooperation with state agencies, and to take further
enforcement action if necessary. 157 Information about repeat
violators is posted publicly on FSIS’s website each week on the
Residue Repeat Violators List to warn processors and deter
violations. 158 In addition, FSIS requires all slaughter establishments
to implement Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP)
inspection systems that identify and mitigate all food safety hazards
posed by chemical residues. 159 In general, data from the NRP show
that tolerance violations in FSIS-regulated products are extremely
rare. For example, FSIS found a total of 30 pesticide residue
Id. at 4.
Id.
151
Id. at 1.
152
Id. at 4.
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Id. at 6–7.
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Id. at 2.
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violations out of nearly 55,000 random samples of domestic and
imported products between 2000 and 2011. 160 The most frequently
found violations were for products that are now banned but have
persisted in the environment, such as hexachlorobenzene, DDT, and
chlordane. 161
ii. FDA Pesticide Residue Monitoring Program
Whereas the USDA regulates meat, poultry, egg products
(except shell eggs), and catfish, the FDA regulates all other food
products, amounting to 75% of the U.S. food supply. 162 The amount
and variety of food products that fall within the FDA’s jurisdiction
is staggering, amounting to $417 billion worth of domestic food and
$49 billion worth of imported food. 163 In addition, the number of
imports within the FDA’s jurisdiction has increased dramatically,
doubling in the ten years between 1999 and 2009 and reaching 9.7
million individual “entry lines” in 2012. 164 The FDA also tests and
regulates animal food products, focusing on feed for animals
intended for human consumption. 165 The sheer magnitude of
products that fall within the FDA’s jurisdiction underscores the
important role the FDA plays in ensuring the safety of the U.S. food
supply, but also evidences the growing strain on the FDA’s limited
enforcement resources.
In contrast to the USDA, the FDA does not take a statistical
approach to its sampling program to test for pesticide residue
violations. The agency acknowledges that such an approach would
be impossible given the limited resources allocated to it for
enforcement and the magnitude of its regulatory jurisdiction.166
Instead, the FDA focuses its limited resources on sampling targeted
commodities based on a number of different factors, including the
frequency of consumption, the history of prior violations, findings
from other studies (including the TDS and PDP), and toxicity of

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 54, at 38.
Id. at 39.
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U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA AT A GLANCE 1 (2017), https://www.fda.gov
/downloads/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/UCM553532.pdf.
163
CFSAN – What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 19, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofFoods/CFSAN/WhatWe
Do/default.htm.
164
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 54, at 38.
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U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PESTICIDE RESIDUE MONITORING PROGRAM FISCAL
YEAR 2016 PESTICIDE REPORT 12 (2016), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/Fo
odborneIllnessContaminants/Pesticides/UCM618373.pdf.
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See id. at 10–11.
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particular pesticide residues. 167 The FDA also partners with state and
local regulators to coordinate sampling and testing of targeted
commodities. 168 When a tolerance violation is identified in a
product, the FDA may issue a Warning Letter to the producer, or it
may seize the product or issue an injunction to correct the cause of
the violation. 169 The FDA may also request that a company recall its
products, or in very serious cases the FDA has the authority to require
a recall if the FDA believes the product would cause serious health
consequences or death in humans. 170 For imported products, the
shipment may be refused entry into U.S. commerce, or the FDA may
place an import alert for all future shipments of the product, allowing
future shipments to be detained without physical examination.171
The import alert also shifts the burden to the producer or shipper to
prove their products are not in violation of tolerance levels before the
product will be permitted to enter U.S. commerce.172
As part of its sampling program, the FDA uses a multiresidue method (MRM) capable of detecting a majority (but not all)
of the approximately 400 pesticides with EPA tolerances, plus
several others that lack tolerances. 173 Occasionally, the FDA also
uses selective residue methods to test for the presence of specific
residues that are not picked up by the MRM. 174 No one test is capable
of detecting all pesticide residues. 175 Results of the FDA’s
enforcement sampling generally show very low levels of tolerance
violations; however, the FDA’s sample size is small relative to the
total number of products available for human or animal consumption.
For 2016, FDA tested just 7,413 samples, of which 6,946 were
human foods and 467 were animal foods (mostly foods for
livestock). 176 Of all the samples, 2,670 were from domesticallyproduced foods and 4,276 (60% of samples) were imported,
reflecting FDA’s targeted enforcement of imports based on historical
data indicating more frequent violations in imported goods.177
Violative residues were detected in 0.9% of domestic samples and
9.8% of import samples. 178 Of domestic samples, 46.2% contained
167
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some pesticide residues below tolerance (non-violative), whereas
39.5% of imports contained some pesticide residues below
tolerance. 179
IV. Criticism of Pesticide Residue Regulatory
Framework
Since the passage of the FQPA in 1996, many of the most
toxic pesticides have been taken off the market or their usage has
been significantly decreased. 180 By one measure, overall dietary risk
from pesticide residues declined 81% between 1996 and 2013.181
Even so, USDA residue data indicate that residues from highly toxic
pesticides are still a significant risk factor, particularly for certain
organophosphate pesticides still in use and for fungicides applied
post-harvest. 182 In addition, the use of lower-toxicity pesticides, such
as glyphosate and neonicotinoids, raises questions about their safety
relative to their dosage as such chemicals are being applied in larger
and larger quantities on more and more crops. 183 The reliance on
genetically engineered (GE) herbicide resistant crops has led to
overapplications of herbicides and the development of herbicideresistant weeds, leading to even greater increases in the use of
herbicides to eliminate these “superweeds.” 184 During the first 15
years of commercial use, genetically engineered crops caused an
increase of 527 million pounds of herbicides used. 185 Recently, with
the introduction of GE crops resistant to 2,4-D, the USDA estimates
that the use of 2,4-D will increase from 77.8 million pounds per year
to 176 million pounds per year. 186
In the following sections, I discuss some of the criticisms
leveled at the current pesticide regulatory system. These criticisms
primarily described the following shortcomings: inadequate
protection of children and infants, insufficient protection from
nonthreshold effects, and tolerance setting that fails to consider
sufficient nonbiased data.
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See CONSUMER REP., PESTICIDE REPORT: FROM CROP TO TABLE 15 (2015),
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A. Protection of Children

The protection of infants, children, and pregnant women
were the focus of the reforms brought about by the FQPA, and with
good reason—immature humans suffer a greater detrimental impact
from exposure to pesticide residues than adults. Children consume
more food relative to their body weight and are less able to detoxify
their bodies due to differences in their metabolism and the
immaturity of their immune systems and neurological
development. 187 Empirical studies have shown that children exposed
to pesticide residues disproportionately suffer from neurological
disorders. For example, several studies of children living on or near
farms have shown that such children suffer from increased rates of
neurological problems, including autism and developmental
delays. 188
In particular, a class of pesticides known as
organophosphates are especially neurotoxic to humans, with serious
implications for infants and children. 189 The National Institutes of
Health has concluded that exposure to organophosphate pesticides at
even very low, infrequent doses can permanently affect developing
brains, leading to changes in brain chemistry and behavior, including
hyperactivity. 190 A Harvard School of Public Health study showed
that children with higher detectable levels of organophosphate
pesticide metabolites in their urine were more likely to be diagnosed
with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).191 While the
use of organophosphate pesticides declined 70% between 2000 and
2012, their use still represented 33% of all insecticides applied in
2012. 192 For example, residues of malathion, a highly toxic
organophosphate, were detected in 6.2% of samples of strawberries
tested by the USDA in 2016. 193
The FQPA requires the EPA to impose an additional ten-fold
safety factor to account for the particular susceptibilities of children,
unless the EPA finds that “on the basis of reliable data, such [other]
Id. at 12.
Id. at 17–18.
189
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https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-01/documents/pesticides-industry
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margin [of safety] will be safe for infants and children.” 194 Despite
this requirement, a 2001 report showed that in more than two-thirds
of cases, the EPA was not applying the ten-fold safety factor in
organophosphate pesticides. 195 Overall, the EPA has applied the tenfold safety factor in only 16% of tolerances. 196 The EPA’s evident
reluctance to apply the mandated additional safety factor to pesticide
tolerances along with its sanction of organophosphate pesticides for
use on fruits that are commonly consumed by children raises
questions about whether the EPA is sufficiently protecting the health
of U.S. children.
B. Protection from Nonthreshold Effects
In establishing tolerances for pesticide residues in food, the
EPA categorizes chemical compounds into two classes based upon
empirical data: (1) those chemicals with no discernable harms below
a certain dosage, and (2) those chemicals without an identifiable
“threshold” dosage below which no adverse effects are detected. The
latter category is referred to as “nonthreshold” chemicals. This
distinction is significant because the EPA is permitted to use a
different regulatory approach for nonthreshold chemicals. Even
though there is no known dosage of a nonthreshold chemical that
entails no health risk from exposure, the EPA is permitted to consider
the chemical’s offsetting benefits to society when determining the
appropriate tolerance. 197 Thus, even though exposure to a pesticide
may entail an increased risk of cancer, such risk may be balanced
against the benefit that use of the pesticide would provide in
increased access to a low-cost and stable food supply.
Many critics have expressed concern that the EPA’s
approach to regulating nonthreshold chemicals does not go far
enough to protect human health from risks of cancer and other health
problems. Many chemicals in common use in agriculture have been
linked to the development of various cancers. For example, the
commonly-used herbicide 2,4-D and related chlorophenoxy
herbicides are listed by the International Agency for Research on
Cancer (IARC), a division of the World Health Organization of the
United Nations, as “possibly carcinogenic to humans.” At least one
study has found a correlation between cancer mortality and proximity
to farm fields treated with 2,4-D. 198 Glyphosate, the leading
21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C) (Current through P.L. 116-5).
CONSUMER REP., supra note 180, at 14.
196
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pesticide in agriculture today, was identified as a “probable”
carcinogen by the IARC in 2015. 199 In all, around 40 different EPAregistered pesticides are classified as carcinogens, probable
carcinogens, or possible carcinogens by the IARC. 200
In addition, emerging research has shown that even low-dose
exposure to pesticide residues can cause adverse health effects, and
may be linked to neurological disorders, obesity, heart disease, and
diabetes. 201 The concern stems in large part from the fact that many
pesticides are “endocrine disrupting chemicals” (EDCs), meaning
they interfere with the body’s natural hormone-driven processes,
including metabolism, reproduction, and the development of some
cancers. 202 While much of the concern is focused on the
organophosphate pesticides, some of which (like DDT) are no longer
in use, even newer generation pesticides may pose serious risks,
although the research is less settled. For example, neonicotinoid
pesticides have generally been considered a safer alternative to
organophosphate pesticides. 203 But at least one study has shown that
these chemicals’ effects mimic the effects of nicotine in developing
mammal brains, indicating they may disrupt brain development.204
Although food is not the only pesticide-exposure pathway, it is one
of the most significant ones. 205
Reuters, W.H.O. Report Links Ingredient in Roundup to Cancer, N.Y. TIMES
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2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3138025/.
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The possibility that even low-dose exposure to pesticide
residues entails serious health risks is particularly concerning given
the extent to which most people are now exposed to pesticides
through their diets. According to data from the 2016 PDP, a mere
22.7% of the fruits, vegetables, and milk sampled that year contained
no pesticide residues; 15.7% contained residues of 1 pesticide, and
the majority of samples (61.6%) contained residues from at least two
or more pesticides. 206 And, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) has found that the bodies of most Americans
contain the metabolites of 29 different pesticides.207
C. Insufficient Data
The FFDCA requires the government to establish residue
tolerances at safe levels, considering aggregate exposures from all
possible exposure sources. 208 However, the government no longer
has a program that tracks the aggregate amount of pesticides applied
each year. 209 The last year for which we have such data is 2007, and
in that year an estimated 684 million pounds of pesticides were
applied, which was an increase from the prior year, but less than the
peak of 843 million pounds in 1979. 210 In addition, there is no
reliable data on the breakdown of which types of active ingredients
are in use, which is significant because one type of pesticide may be
significantly more toxic to human health than another, meaning that
a total increase or decrease in the use of all pesticides does not mean
the risk to human health has proportionately changed. 211 In short, we
simply do not know the quantity and types of pesticide chemicals in
use, making it difficult to predict the quantity and types of residues
that will end up in American diets.
See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., supra note 112, at 20. However,
results vary greatly year to year since the PDP tests a different mix of commodities
each year. Compare U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., PESTICIDE DATA
PROGRAM ANNUAL SUMMARY, CALENDAR YEAR 2017 20 (2017),
https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/2017PDPAnnualSummary.pdf
(For 2017, 53% of samples had no pesticide residues, 19.5% of samples contained
residues of one pesticide, and 27.5% contained residues of two or more pesticides);
with U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., PESTICIDE DATA PROGRAM ANNUAL
SUMMARY, CALENDAR YEAR 2015 20 (2015), https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/defa
ult/files/media/2015PDPSummary.pdf (For 2015, 15.5% of samples contained no
pesticide residues, 11.5% contained residues of just one pesticide, and 73.0% of
samples contained residues of two or more pesticides.).
207
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In addition, the EPA generally relies on animal studies when
establishing tolerances. But whether and to what extent the animal
subjects of studies respond in the same way human subjects would is
a question that is not well understood. In fact, animal studies may
not accurately represent the reproductive and endocrine-disrupting
harms caused by pesticide exposure in humans. 212 The EPA attempts
to compensate for this information gap by applying a 100-fold safety
factor, and in some cases, the EPA applies an additional 10-fold
safety factor to account for the susceptibilities of children and
infants. But it is not known whether a 100-fold or 1,000-fold safety
factor accurately accounts for the differences between humans and
the animals subjected to study. Further, these safety factors can only
be applied where the chemical demonstrates a threshold effect; for
non-threshold effects where there is no level below which there is no
risk of harm, the safety factor is inapplicable.
Finally, the tolerance-setting system depends upon data
supplied by the chemical makers, which creates a conflict of interest
that invites bias into the system. Industry-sponsored studies have
been shown to be more likely to provide results favorable to the
pesticide manufacturer. 213 And in most cases, the EPA makes its
findings based primarily on data supplied by industry rather than
independent researchers, in part due to the way the study criteria are
determined. The EPA develops the research methodologies and
study design with industry representatives, a process that results in
stringent and prohibitively expensive study criteria that effectively
excludes independent researchers from the process. 214 While some of
these additional criteria are necessary to exclude inherently flawed
studies, some industry-proposed criteria eliminate from
consideration so-called “qualitative studies” that may provide useful
data on cause and effect relationships.215 In some cases, the EPA
applies rigid study criteria retroactively to existing independent
laboratory studies; unsurprisingly, few or no independent studies
meet the qualifications for consideration by the EPA. 216 In addition,
the EPA may disregard studies that do not show a uniform response
at the species or population level or that were done in situ instead of
in the laboratory. Studies have shown, however, that, there is
See, CONSUMER REP., supra note 180, at 10.
Pesticide Residue Monitoring Program Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodborneIllnessContami
nants/Pesticides/ucm583711.htm.
214
Michelle D. Boone, et al., Pesticide Regulation Amid the Influence of Industry,
64 BioScience 917, 918 (Oct. 2014), https://academic.oup.com/bioscience/article/
64/10/917/1782021.
215
Id.
216
Id.
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213
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significant natural variation among organism response at individual,
population, and species levels, and further that laboratory research is
not inherently better than experiments conducted in the field. 217 By
excluding data from independent researchers and relying primarily
on industry-supplied data, the EPA may not be seeing the whole
picture when it engages in tolerance setting.
D. Lack of Enforcement
i. FDA
The FDA is tasked with enforcing pesticide residue
tolerances for the vast majority of foods produced in and imported to
the United States. The FDA enforces tolerances by taking samples
of domestic and imported foods and testing those samples for the
presence of chemical residues. 218 But the FDA’s sampling procedure
does not use statistical methods; instead the FDA aims its limited
resources at targeting products that the FDA believes are more likely
to be out of tolerance. This means that its sampling results and the
number of tolerance violations is not representative of the entire
portion of the food system that falls within the FDA’s jurisdiction.219
Further, when the FDA does sample a commodity, it takes very few
samples, which further dilutes the representational quality of its
testing. 220 Thus, the fact that the FDA’s targeted enforcement
program shows very low rates of tolerance violations is not
generalizable to the food system as a whole. For example, compare
the results of the FDA’s sampling of lettuce with AMS’s sampling
of lettuce in the same year. In 2005, the FDA took 26 samples of
head lettuce and 44 samples of leaf lettuce. Of those samples, none
of the head lettuce was violative, and 2.3% of the leaf lettuce was
violative, with one sample presenting with a residue that was out of
tolerance. 221 By contrast, data from AMS in 2005 found presumptive
residue violations in 17.77% of lettuce samples. 222 As previously
discussed, AMS uses a statistically valid sampling method and tests
a greater number of samples of the small number of products it tests.

Id. at 919.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 213.
219
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 2, at 19.
220
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 2, at 19–20.
221
FDA, Pesticide Residue Monitoring Program Results and Discussion FY 2005,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 20, 2017), https://wayback.archiveit.org/7993/20170723105235/https://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodborneIllnessContami
nants/Pesticides/ucm125186.htm#appa-05.
222
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 2, at 21.
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In addition, the FDA has decreased the amount of samples it
takes from a high of over 12,000 domestic and imported food
samples in 1993 to a low of about 5,000 total samples in 2008. 223 In
2016, FDA tested just 7,413 samples. 224 In addition, roughly 60% of
these samples were from imports, even though the majority of the
U.S. food supply is domestic in origin. 225 Even looking solely at
imports, however, FDA tests less than 1/10th of 1% of imports.226
The FDA’s methodology for targeting certain samples of the food
supply often misses the mark. For example, its PREDICT system
designed to recommend which imported foods to test based on prior
history and other data has failed to accurately estimate which foods
will have the highest violation rates.227 The FDA relies on data from
its Total Diet Study and AMS’s Pesticide Data Program to
supplement its enforcement data. But while these programs use
statistical sampling methods, the sample sizes used in these studies
are too small to be representative. For example, the PDP tests only
about 20 to 30 foods each year. 228
When the FDA tests a food sample, it does not test for all
known pesticide residues because doing so would be prohibitively
expensive. Instead, the FDA uses a multi-residue method test
(MRM) that detects many different pesticides, but not all. The
FDA’s MRM cannot detect six of the most commonly used
pesticides. 229 And the FDA only rarely uses selective residue
methods (SRMs) due to their cost. 230 The following pesticides are
listed in the top 25 most used pesticides, but the FDA rarely if ever
tests for their presence in the food supply: glyphosate, 2,4-D, MCPA,
mancozeb, paraquat, and methyl bromide. 231 Further, the FDA does
not disclose in its reports that its testing methods cannot detect these
pesticides. 232
In a 2014 report, the U.S. Government Accountability Office
made the following observation:
If, for example, the agency wanted to know
incidence and level of pesticide residues across all
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 2, at 23.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 165, at 15.
225
Id. at 11; See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 2, at 25.
226
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 2, at 24.
227
Id. at 33.
228
Id. at 37.
229
Id. at 25.
230
Id.
231
Id. at 26.
232
Id.
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domestic and imported foods, it would need to
design statistically valid random samples of those
two broad categories of foods. If, on the other hand,
FDA wanted to know about residue levels within
particular commodities, it would need to design a
survey of random samples of those commodities that
meets statistical standards. FDA is not currently
taking either of these approaches in its regulatory
monitoring program. Finally, FDA’s ability to
evaluate the effectiveness of its targeted monitoring
program (i.e., enforce pesticide residue tolerances in
foods established by EPA) is limited because it has
not determined the incidence and level of pesticide
residues in the foods it regulates against which it can
compare the results of its targeted compliance and
enforcement monitoring. 233
ii. USDA
Compared to the FDA, the USDA is tasked with regulating
a much smaller proportion of the U.S. food system. Its jurisdiction
is limited to meat, poultry, some (but not all) egg products, and
catfish. 234 Like the FDA, the USDA uses a multi-residue method to
test for veterinary drugs and pesticide residues as part of its
enforcement program. Its methods test for over 80 veterinary drug
analytes and over 100 pesticide analytes. 235 However, as of 2014,
there were 191 pesticides with established tolerances for direct or
indirect use in animals. 236 In addition, of the pesticides for which the
USDA tests, it does not perform all tests on all categories of animal
products. 237 For instance, the USDA only recently began using the
multi-residue pesticide method on egg products. 238 The USDA does
not disclose in its reports which pesticides its tests do not detect or
the potential bias caused by its selection of production classes for
testing. 239 Although the USDA tests samples from the production
classes that represent that vast majority of the animal products

Id. at 34–35.
Principal Food Safety Regulatory Organizations: FDA vs. USDA-FSIS, N.C.
ST.,https://ncfsma.ces.ncsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/FDA-versus-USDA.p
df?fwd=no (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
235
U.S. DEPT. AGRIC. FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., supra note 143, at 3.
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U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 2, at 41.
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See U.S. DEPT. AGRIC. FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., supra note 143, at 11.
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U.S. DEPT. AGRIC. FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., supra note 143, at 7.
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U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 2, at 42.
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consumed it the U.S., it routinely does not test whole production
classes that are less frequently consumed, like ducks and rabbits. 240
Although the USDA reduced the number of scheduled
samples it took from over 8,000 per year in 2000 to less than 1,900
per year in 2009, it has since increased the number of scheduled
samples. 241 In Fiscal Year 2017, the USDA took over 7,000
scheduled domestic samples and over 2,700 import samples. 242 In
addition, for that same year, FSIS took over 177,000 inspectorgenerated (i.e. non-random) samples. 243
The USDA is also responsible for the Pesticide Data
Program (PDP), conducted by AMS. Although the PDP uses
statistically valid sampling methods, the number of food types
sampled each year is very small. The AMS reports do not
demonstrate to what extent the foods chosen for testing differ from
or are similar to other foods in the overall food system or to what
extent the distribution centers chosen for study differ from or are
representative of all distribution centers in the food system. 244 The
PDP is limited by not having a complete record of all food
distribution centers and data regarding how food obtained from nonparticipating centers may differ from the food obtained from those
that voluntarily participate.245
V. Conclusion
On August 10, 2018, a California jury ordered Monsanto
(now a division of Bayer) to pay $289 million to Dewayne Johnson,
a former pest control manager for a public-school system who
contracted non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. 246 Johnson’s doctors stated
that his cancer is aggressive, and it is unlikely that Johnson will live
past 2020. 247 Johnson’s lawyers persuaded the jury that Monsanto,
240
Id. at 43; see also, U.S. DEPT. AGRIC. FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., supra
note 143, at 19.
241
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 2, at 43.
242
U.S. DEPT. AGRIC. FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., NATIONAL RESIDUE
PROGRAM FOR MEAT, POULTRY, AND EGG PRODUCTS: FY 2017 RESIDUE SAMPLE
RESULTS 5 (2017), https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/93ae550c-6fac42cf-8c11-006748a4d817/2017-Red-Book.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
243
Id. at 6.
244
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 2, at 54–55.
245
Id. at 54.
246
Tina Bellon, Monsanto Ordered to Pay $289 Million in World’s First Roundup
Cancer Trial, Rᴇᴜᴛᴇʀꜱ (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/usmonsanto-cancer-lawsuit/monsanto-ordered-to-pay-289-million-in-worlds-firstroundup-cancer-trial-idUSKBN1KV2HB.
247
Id.

130

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.15

the maker of the glyphosate-based herbicide RoundUp, was
responsible for Johnson’s cancer. The verdict was the first of its
kind, but possibly not the last—Monsanto faces more than 5,000
similar lawsuits across the U.S.248
Glyphosate is one of many pesticides previously assumed to
be safe, but new research is casting doubt on this assumption and
raising questions about the efficacy of our current regulatory system.
This system, originally devised to guarantee the effectiveness of
pesticides, has since been tasked with guaranteeing their safety and
limiting the public’s exposure to them. But limited resources and
industry influence may be hampering the ability of federal regulators
to carry out this task. And due to the unique history of the regulatory
system, enforcement authority is fragmented among several different
federal agencies. These shortcomings are now giving rise to a wave
of litigation over pesticide safety and an increase in the demand for
products made without pesticides such as foods that are certified
organic. Maintaining and restoring public confidence in the safety
of the U.S. food system may depend on the ability of policy makers
to reform our current regulatory system to better guarantee the
public’s protection from the adverse health effects of pesticide
residues.
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Legislative and Executive Branch Developments Affecting
the United States Department of Agriculture
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
Sheila Fleischhacker*, Alyssa Moran**, and Sara N.
Bleich***
Abstract
For more than forty years, the United States Department of
Agriculture Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP;
formerly Food Stamps) has offered nutrition assistance to nearly
forty million eligible individuals and families each month. This
article first provides a brief overview of the evolution of the United
States’ largest domestic food security and nutrition safety net
program. Then, the article reviews Congressional actions taken
regarding SNAP during the 2018 Farm Bill deliberations,
appropriations for fiscal years 2017 through 2020, and oversight
(in)activities. The article focuses on Congressional activities
regarding block grants; participant eligibility; benefit adequacy,
issuance, and redemption; and strengthening SNAP’s nutritional
impacts. Next, the article discusses a variety of executive orders,
administrative actions, initiatives, nominations, budget proposals,
and tweets with SNAP implications put forth thus far by President
Donald Trump, the 45th President of the United States. These actions
include the America’s Harvest Box, natural disaster responses, the
public charge rule, tariffs on Chinese imports, and various agency
relocations and reorganizations. The article reflects on how each of
these legislative and executive developments might impact SNAP's
organization, operations at the federal, tribal, state and retailer levels,
and, ultimately, eating patterns and health of participating and
eligible children and families, persons with disabilities, and elders.
I. Introduction
While the United States (US) has not explicitly enshrined the
right to food in our Constitution or adopted national legislation
specifically recognizing the fundamental right to freedom from
hunger 1, the national government has an extensive history of using
* Sheila Fleischhacker is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown
University where she teaches a first-of-its-kind nutrition law and policy course in its
fifth offering. She is developing a course book that synthesizes key law and policy
approaches from historical and contemporary perspectives across the globe for
improving healthy eating and reducing nutrition-related non-communicable diseases
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policy and programmatic approaches to ensure individuals and
families in most need have access to nutritious and safe foods and
beverages. 2 Helping secure access to nutritious and safe foods and
beverages has been associated with a variety of positive impacts
including but not limited to economic growth and job creation,
increased global security and stability, improved health, poverty
reduction, reduced healthcare burden, and trade opportunities. 3 The
US Department of Agriculture (USDA) leads the national efforts to
tackle hunger and promote food security through the administration
of fifteen federal food and nutrition assistance programs, including
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP; formerly
Food Stamps). 4 In the 2008 Farm Bill, the Food Stamps Program
and food insecurity. Sheila has more than 15 years of food, nutrition, and health law
and policy experience in academic, government, and civil society organizational
sectors.
** Alyssa Moran is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Health Policy and
Management at The Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. Her
research centers on the identification, adoption, and dissemination of effective
public health policies to promote equitable access to healthful food, reduce food
insecurity, improve diet quality, and prevent diet-related chronic diseases. She has
collaborated with government agencies, advocates, and retailers on policy strategies
to promote public health through SNAP through the use of financial incentives,
changes to benefit issuance, and coordination across other federal safety net
programs.
*** Sara N. Bleich is a Professor of Public Health Policy at the Harvard Chan School
of Public Health in the Department of Health Policy and Management. She is also
the Carol K. Pforzheimer Professor at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study
and a member of the faculty at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Sara’s
research provides evidence to support policies to prevent obesity and diet-related
diseases, particularly among vulnerable populations. Sara served as a White House
Fellow from 2015 to 2016 where she worked as a Senior Policy Advisor to the U.S.
Department of Agriculture and the First Lady Michelle Obama’s Let’s Move
initiative.
1
Food: A Fundamental Human Right, FAO OF THE UN, http://www.fao.org/FOCU
S/E/rightfood/right7.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2018).
2
A Short History of SNAP, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., https://www.fn
s.usda.gov/snap/newa-short-history-snap (last visited Aug. 20, 2018); see also FNS
Strategic Priorities, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., https://www.fns.usda
.gov/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2018) (laying out the following strategic priorities:
Provide Americans with access to nutritious food; utilize data-driven strategies to
improve program integrity; maintain a high-performing workforce by improving
performance and increasing accountability; deliver FNS programs in a manner that
maximizes customer service and ensures equal access and opportunity; and ensure
FNS programs pave a pathway to self-sufficiency).
3
Global Food Security, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. NAT’L INST. FOOD AGRIC., https://nifa.us
da.gov/topic/global-food-security (last visited Aug. 20, 2019).
4
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD &
NUTR. SERV., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/supplemental-nutrition-assistanceprogram-snap (last visited Aug. 20, 2019); see also Policy Basics: The Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb.
13, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-the-supplemental-nutrition
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was renamed to SNAP to include a greater emphasis on nutrition. 5
For more than forty years, SNAP has been the nation’s largest
program in the domestic food security and nutrition safety net and
accounted for sixty-eight percent of all federal food and nutrition
assistance in fiscal year 2018. 6
Each month, SNAP offers nutrition assistance to nearly forty
million eligible individuals and families, persons with disabilities,
and elders. 7 In fiscal year 2018, twelve percent of the population
participated in SNAP; this marked the fifth consecutive year that
participation decreased after increasing in twelve of the previous
thirteen years. 8 The monthly benefits are delivered to electronic
benefits transfer accounts, allowing beneficiaries to purchase eligible
foods and beverages from 247,861 authorized retailers. 9 The per
person SNAP benefits for fiscal year 2018 averaged $125.25 per
month. 10 SNAP also lifts individuals and families out of poverty; in
2014, this included more than four million people. 11 And, SNAP is
known as an “automatic economic stabilizer” that dampens the
depths of recession and protects the larger national economy;
because, as an entitlement program, SNAP automatically expands
-assistance-program-snap (explains how SNAP works, who is eligible, how do
people apply for SNAP, how much do households receive in benefits, how much
does SNAP cost, current trends in SNAP participation, and other special features of
SNAP).
5
About FNS, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., https://www.fns.usda.gov/a
bout-fns (last updated June 1, 2019); see Dottie Rosenbaum, Food Stamp Provisions
of the Final 2008 Farm Bill, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES (July 1, 2008),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-stamp-provisions-of-the-final-2008-farm-bill
(provides a brief summary of each of the food stamp provisions in the 2008 Farm
Bill).
6
VICTOR OLIVEIRA, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV., THE FOOD ASSISTANCE
LANDSCAPE: FY 2018 ANNUAL REPORT iv, (2019), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdo
cs/publications/92896/eib-207.pdf?v=8949.8.
7
RANDY ALISON AUSSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42505, SUPPLEMENTAL
NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP): A PRIMER ON ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFITS
1 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42505.pdf.
8
OLIVEIRA, supra note 6, at 4–5.
9
Facts About SNAP, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., https://www.fns.usd
a.gov/snap/facts-about-snap (last updated Aug. 14, 2019); Dottie Rosenbaum,
USDA to Fund SNAP for February 2019, But Millions Face Cuts if Shutdown
Continues, https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/millions-face-cut-in-sna
p-food-assistance-if-government-shutdown-continues (last updated Jan. 10, 2019);
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., Where Can I Use SNAP EBT?,
https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/retailer-locator (last updated Oct. 22, 2013).
10
OLIVEIRA, supra note 6, at 4.
11
Brynne Keith-Jennings, SNAP Kept 4.7 Million Americans Out of Poverty Last
Year, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.cbpp.o
rg/blog/snap-kept-47-million-americans-out-of-poverty-last-year.
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when individuals and families qualify for the program without direct
legislative or executive actions at the federal or state levels.12
SNAP was initially developed to prevent hunger and enable
workers to work and children to grow up and thrive, even if their
families or our nation fell on tough times. 13 Hunger is a potential but
not necessarily physiological consequence of food insecurity. 14 A
1990 Life Sciences Research Office of the Federation of American
Societies for Experimental Biology report explained, “food
insecurity exists whenever the availability of nutritionally adequate
and safe foods or the ability to acquire acceptable foods in socially
acceptable ways is limited or uncertain.”15 According to the World
Food Summit of 1996, food security “exists when all people at all
times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and
nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences
for an active and healthy life.”16 This definition encompasses food
availability, food access (physical and financial), utilization
(sufficiently nutritious and safe foods and beverages that are
equitably distributed within the household), and stability of these
three dimensions over time. 17 Since 1995, the USDA Economic
Research Service (ERS) has monitored national and state-level food
insecurity through the Current Population Survey Food Security
Supplement (CPS-FSS), administered monthly by the Census Bureau
and Bureau of Labor Statistics. 18 The CPS-FSS uses the eighteenitem US Household Food Security Survey Module, which
categorizes households as having very low food security (reports of
multiple indications of disrupted eating patterns and reduced food
intake), low food security (reports of reduced quality, variety, or
Rachel West & Rebecca Vallas, Trump’s Effort to Cup SNAP by Fiat Would Kill
178,000 Jobs Over the Next Decade, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 14, 2019),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/news/2019/03/14/466700/trumps
-effort-cut-snap-fiat-kill-178000-jobs-next-decade/.
13
JEFFREY M. BERRY, FEEDING HUNGRY PEOPLE: RULEMAKING IN THE FOOD STAMP
PROGRAM 21 (1984).
14
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, FOOD INSECURITY AND HUNGER IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURE 44 (Gooloo S. Wunderlich & Janet L. Norwood eds.
2006).
15
FED’N OF AM. SOC’Y FOR EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY, CORE INDICATORS OF
NUTRITIONAL STATE FOR DIFFICULT-TO-SAMPLE POPULATIONS vi (Sue Ann
Anderson ed. 1990), https://www.faseb.org/Portals/2/PDFs/LSRO_Legacy_Reports
/1990_Core%20Indicators%20of%20Nutritional%20State%20for%20Difficult-tosample%20Populations.pdf.
16
Food Security 1, FAO (June 2006), http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/faoi
taly/documents/pdf/pdf_Food_Security_Cocept_Note.pdf.
17
Id.
18
Current Population Survey-Food Security Supplement, HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV,
https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/data-source/current-population-survey-foodsecurity-supplement (last visited Aug. 20, 2019).
12
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desirability of diet; little or no indication of reduced food intake),
marginal food security (one or two reported indications—typically
of anxiety over food sufficiency or shortage of food in the house;
little or no indication of changes in diets or food intake), or high food
security (no reported indications of food-access problems or
limitations). 19
In 2017, “an estimated 11.8 percent of US households were
food insecure, down from 2016 and continuing a decline from a high
of 14.9 percent in 2011, while still above the pre-recession (2007)
level of 11.1 percent.” 20 Among households with children, an
estimated 7.7 percent were food insecure, slightly down from 8.0
percent in 2016. 21 Evidence suggests undocumented immigrants
face “unique vulnerabilities for food insecurity related to unfamiliar
food environments, remittances and separation, employment, and
community and government resources” that are likely not accurately
captured in national estimates of household food insecurity. 22
Besides households, growing concerns have emerged on college
campuses. 23 A 2017 systematic review of grey and peer-reviewed
literature reported average rates of food insecurity on postsecondary
education campuses of 35% and 42%, respectively. 24 Similarly, a
2018 Government Accountability Office report noted there are no
national estimates for food insecurity among college students and
recommended areas for improvement for communicating to eligible
students the options for federal food and nutrition assistance, such as
Definitions of Food Security, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV.,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/food-security-in-the-us/
definitions-of-food-security.aspx (last updated Sept. 5, 2018); Survey Tools, U.S.
DEPT. OF AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutritionassistance/food-security-in-the-us/survey-tools/ (last updated Aug. 6, 2019).
20
ALISHA COLEMAN-JENSEN, ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV.,
HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2017 v (2018), https://www.e
rs.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/90023/err-256.pdf?v=0.
21
Id. at ii.
22
Ashley Munger et al., More than Just Not Enough. Experiences of Food Insecurity
for Latino Immigrants, 17 J. IMMIGR. & MINORITY HEALTH, 1548, 1548 (2015).
23
Erika Dunyak, The End of the Ramen Diet: Higher Education Students and SNAP
Benefits, 14 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 154, 154 (2018).
24
See Meg Bruening et al., The Struggle is Real: A Systematic Review of Food
Insecurity on Postsecondary Education Campuses, 117 J. ACAD. NUTRITION &
DIETETICS 1767, 1767 (2017) (reviews the peer-reviewed and gray literature to
assess the prevalence of food insecurity on postsecondary education institutions, as
well as factors related to food insecurity among students and suggested/practiced
solutions and included seventeen peer-reviewed studies and forty one sources of
gray literature in the analysis and found food insecurity was high among students
and more studies are needed to assess the long-term influence of food insecurity
among this vulnerable population).
19
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SNAP. 25 Food insecurity among older adults “remains a persistent
problem, particularly in minority and rural populations.” 26
Across the life course, food insecurity—even marginal food
security—has direct and indirect consequences with short and long
term impacts including inadequate dietary intake, suboptimal
development and function, increased hospitalizations, disrupted or
under use of prescribed medications, poorer management of chronic
diseases, elevated and prolonged periods of stress, reduced academic
achievement, decreased interpersonal skills, and fetal epigenetic
changes. 27 A 2014 systematic review of the associations between
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-95, FOOD INSECURITY: BETTER
INFORMATION COULD HELP ELIGIBLE COLLEGE STUDENTS ACCESS FEDERAL FOOD
ASSISTANCE BENEFITS (2018), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-95.
26
Wilson O’Dare, Community Food Environments and Healthy Food Access Among
Older Adults: A Review of the Evidence for the Senior Farmers’ Market Nutrition
Program (SFMNP), 56 SOC. WORK HEALTH CARE 193227-243 (2017).
27
See Ellen Barnidge et al., Clinic-to-Community Models to Address Food Security,
JAMA PEDIATRICS, 507-508 (2017) (discusses how food insecurity is a social and
economic condition with direct and indirect consequences, including poor dietary
intake, poor physical and mental health, hospitalizations, stress, reduced academic
achievement, and fetal epigenetic changes); John T. Cook et al., Are Food
Insecurity’s Health Impacts Underestimated in the U.S. Population? Marginal Food
Security also Predicts Adverse Health Outcomes in Young U.S. Children and
Mothers, 4 ADV. NUTRITION 51, 51–52 (2013) (reviews the literature regarding
households with marginal food security and found these households should not be
classified as food secure, as is current practice, and should be reported in a separate
discrete category); John T. Cook & Deborah A. Frank, Food Security, Poverty, and
Human Development in the United States, 1136 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI., 196–202
(2008) (summarizes the data on household and children’s food insecurity and its
relationship with children’s health and development and with mothers’ depressive
symptoms); Robert .C. Whitaker et al., Food Insecurity and the Risks of Depression
and Anxiety in Mothers and Behavior Problems in their Preschool-Aged Children,
118 PEDIATRICS e859, e866 (2006) (conducted a cross-sectional survey and found
mental health problems in mothers and children are more common when mothers
are food insecure); Diana F. Jyoti et al., Food Insecurity Affects School Children’s
Academic Performance, Weight Gain, and Social Skills, 135 J. NUTRITION 2831,
2835–2836 (2005) (used longitudinal data and found food insecurity was a positive
predictor of poor developmental trajectories in children); Craig Gunderson & James
P. Ziliak, Food Insecurity and Health Outcomes, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1830, 1832–1835
(2015) (reviews the literature and discusses how food insecurity is consistently
associated with poor health); Seth A. Berkowitz et al., Treat or Eat: Food Insecurity,
Cost-Related Medication Underuse, and Unmet Needs, 127 AM. J. MED. 303, 308
(2014) (conducted a cross-sectional study with chronically ill adult patients and
found about 1 in 3 were unable to afford food, medications, or both); Jung Sun Lee
et al., Food Insecurity and Health Across the Lifespan, 3 ADVANCES NUTRITION 744,
745 (2012) (summarizes a symposium that aimed to learn about the prevalence and
severity of food insecurity in the US across the lifespan, understand the growing
body of research that documents the impact of varying degrees of food insecurity on
physical and mental health across the lifespan, examine how food insecurity is
related to chronic disease, and explore research methodology to determine the
25
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food insecurity and dietary quality reported that food insecure adults
consumed fewer vegetables, fruit, and dairy products in comparison
to food secure adults and had lower intakes of vitamin A and B6,
calcium, magnesium, and zinc. 28 Food insecure children only
impact of food insecurity on healthcare costs and utilization); Hillary K. Seligman
& Dean Schillinger, Hunger and Socioeconomic Disparities in Chronic Disease,
363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 6, 6–8 (2010) (discusses the relationship between hunger,
socioeconomic disparities, and chronic disease); Seth A. Berkowitz et al., Material
Need Insecurities, Control of Diabetes Mellitus, and Use of Health Care Resources:
Results of the Measuring Economic Insecurity in Diabetes Study, 175 JAMA
INTERNAL MED. 257, 258 (2015) (conducted cross-sectional analyses and reported
material need insecurities were common among patients with diabetes mellitus and
had varying but generally adverse associations with diabetes control and the use of
health care resources); Yiyun Chen & Seth C. Kalichman, Synergistic Effects of
Food Insecurity and Drug Use on Medication Adherence Among People Living with
HIV Infection, 38 J. BEHAV. MED. 397, 403 (2015) (conducted a cross-sectional
survey and found maternal needs were common among patients with diabetes
mellitus and had varying but generally adverse associations with diabetes control
and use of health care resources); Deidra C. Crews et al., Effect of Food Insecurity
on Chronic Kidney Disease in Lower-Income Americans, 39 AM. J. NEPHROLOGY
27, 32 (2014) (conducted cross-sectional analyses and found food insecurity was
associated with a trend towards greater odds of chronic kidney disease); Francesca
Gany et al., Do Our Patients Have Enough to Eat?: Food Insecurity Among Urban
Low-Income Cancer Patients, J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 1153,
1164 (2014) (found underserved cancer patients had higher rates of food
insecurity—nearly five times those of the state average); Shalon M. Irving et al.,
Food Insecurity and Self-Reported Hypertension Among Hispanic, Black, and White
Adults in 12 States, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2009, 11
PREVENTATIVE CHRONIC DISEASE E161, E162 (2014) (conducted cross-sectional
study and found a positive relationship between food insecurity and hypertension);
Amanda W. Singer et al., Does Food Insecurity Undermine Adherence to
Antiretroviral Therapy? A Systematic Review, 19 AIDS BEHAV. 1510-1526 (2015)
(summarized the literature and found antiretroviral therapy adherence was
negatively associated with food insecurity); Savannah Hobbs & Christian King, The
Unequal Impact of Food Insecurity on Cognitive and Behavioral Outcomes Among
5-year-old Urban Children, 50 J. NUTRITION EDUC. & BEHAV. 687, 689, 692 (2018)
(conducted cross-sectional study and found negative associations between food
insecurity and child behavior problems); Sara E. Grineski et al., Transitional
Dynamics of Household Food Insecurity Impact Children’s Developmental
Outcomes, 39 J. DEV. & BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 715 (2018) (found among a nationally
representative sample of kindergarten and first-grade students that food insecurity
was determinantal to children’s self-control, math, and working memory scores);
Emily A. Wang, et al., Food Insecurity and Health: Data from the Veterans Aging
Cohort Study, 130 PUB. HEALTH REP. 261, 265 (2015) (used cross-sectional data to
find food insecurity was prevalent among veterans in an aging cohort and was
associated with worse control of medical conditions who accessed care in the
Veterans Health Administration).
28
Karla L. Hanson & Leah M. Conner, Food Insecurity and Dietary Quality in US
Adults and Children: A Systematic Review, 100 AM J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 684, 687
(2014) (across all studies, food security or food sufficiency was generally measured
for the household and indicated by one or more of the following categories: 1) food
secure or food sufficient, 2) marginal food security (MFS), 3) food sufficient with
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consumed less fruit than food secure children; however, research
suggests parents or primary care givers protect their children from
compromised dietary quality during food shortages and are also the
ones (mis)reporting their children’s consumption. 29 For almost a
decade and a half, evidence continues to mount demonstrating food
insecurity often co-occurs with being overweight, particularly among
women. 30
The intersections between inadequate dietary intake, weight
gain, and increased risk of non-communicable chronic diseases such
as obesity, cardiovascular disease, type 2 diabetes mellitus, and
certain types of cancer may be linked through a developed
dependence on inexpensive, highly palatable foods and beverages
that are energy dense, but nutrient poor. 31 And, these intersections
could potentially result from a cyclical pattern of having enough food
at certain periods followed by food scarcity, especially if these
episodic food shortages are experienced during critical periods of
growth and development, particularly, pregnancy and infancy. 32
Research indicates overconsumption when food is available and
under-consumption when scarce may contribute to metabolic
disturbances, such as cycles of hyper- and hypoglycemia. 33
Moreover, research regarding the role of body fat in fertility suggests
that women tend to conserve energy even when food is limited,
which may explain gender differences in associations between food
limitations (i.e., “enough but not always what we wanted to eat”), 4) low food
security (LFS), 5) very low food security (VLFS), and 6) food insecure or food
insufficient, which was equivalent to LFS and VLFS combined).
29
Id. at 684 (identifying 16 articles that examined the associations between food
insecurity and dietary quality in US children with 21 results (16%) suggesting an
adverse association but many studies used only a few measures of dietary quality).
30
See Nicole I. Larson & Mary T. Story, Food Insecurity and Weight Status Among
U.S. Children and Families: A Review of the Literature, 40 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE
MED. 166, 166 (2011); Marilyn S. Townsend et al., Food Insecurity is Positively
Related to Overweight in Women, 131 J. NUTRITION 1738, 1742 (2001); J.C.
Eisenmann et al., Is Food Insecurity Related to Overweight and Obesity in Children
and Adolescents? A Summary of Studies, 1995-2009, 12 OBESITY REV. e73, e73
(2011); Lauren M. Dinour et al., The Food Insecurity-Obesity Paradox: A Review
of the Literature and the Role Food Stamps May Play, 107 J. AM. DIETETICS. ASS’N.
1952, 1953 (2007); LISA M. TROY, EMILY ANN MILLER & STEVE OLSON,
RAPPORTEURS; INST. MED. NAT’L ACAD., Setting the State for the Coexistence of
Food Insecurity and Obesity, in HUNGER AND OBESITY: UNDERSTANDING A FOOD
SECURITY PARADIGM: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 13–14 (2011).
31
See Barbara A. Laraia, Food Insecurity and Chronic Disease, 4 ADVANCES
NUTRITION 203, 203–205 (2013) (summarizes the literature on the link between food
insecurity and the following: 1) diet, 2) weight gain, and 3) chronic disease).
32
Id. at 203, 210.
33
Lee M.Scheier, What is the Hunger-Obesity Paradox?, 105 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N
883, 884 (2005).
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insecurity and weight status. 34 Another mechanism is competing
demands; in other words, tradeoffs between medication for chronic
disease management or housing/utility payments and food may
exacerbate food insecurity. 35 Chronic stress associated with food
insecurity and poverty may also increase chronic disease risk by
possibly increasing allostatic load, reducing healthy behaviors (i.e.,
lack of energy for physical activity), increasing unhealthy coping
behaviors (e.g., substance abuse), and diminishing cognitive capacity
to make decisions that support long-term health. 36
This article starts with a brief overview of the evolution of
the largest program in the nation’s domestic food security and
nutrition safety net. Then, this article analyzes current legislative
(One Hundred Fifteenth and initial One Hundred Sixteenth US
Congress) and executive (first two years of the Trump
administration) branch developments impacting SNAP's
organization, operations at the federal, state and retailer levels, and,
ultimately, eating patterns and health outcomes of the United States’
most vulnerable populations. This article focuses on the legal and
policy implications and reflects on how each might affect our ability
to improve nutrition among participating and eligible children and
families, persons with disabilities, and elders.
II. From Breadlines to EBT: SNAP History,
Participation, and Impacts
A. History
The seeds of SNAP date back to the stock market crash of
October 1929 when our country began the worst economic downturn
in our history at that time.37 During this period known as the Great
Depression, farm prices were at record lows and farmers held huge
surpluses of leading agricultural products while thousands of
poverty-stricken Americans stood in bread lines across the nation’s
cities for free food supported by private charities, individuals
Daniel Nettle et al., Food Insecurity as a Driver of Obesity in Humans: The
Insurance Hypothesis, 40 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 1, 19 (2017).
35
SENDHILL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR. SCARCITY: WHY HAVING TOO LITTLE
MEANS SO MUCH (2013).
36
Amanda. C. McClain et al., Food Insecurity and Odds of High Allostatic Load in
Puerto Rican Adults: The Role of Participation in the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) During 5 Years of Follow-up, 80 PSYCHOSOMATIC
MED. 737 (2018).
37
JANET POPPENDIECK, BREADLINES KNEE-DEEP IN WHEAT: FOOD ASSISTANCE IN
THE GREAT DEPRESSION ix–x (U. Cal. Press 2014) (1986).
34

140

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.15

including Al Capone, or government agencies. 38 This contrast of
overproduction and under-consumption became known as the
“paradox of want amid plenty” or “the paradox of scarcity and
abundance” and fueled the development of federal food and nutrition
assistance programs in both the Hoover and Roosevelt
administrations. 39 Table 1 highlights other policy and programmatic
developments emerging from the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of the US Government shaping SNAP. Today, the USDA
Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) works with state agencies,
schools, food, nutrition, and health professionals, along with
neighborhood and faith-based organizations to ensure eligible
individuals and households can access federal food and nutrition
assistance benefits. 40 FNS also works with state agencies and the
retail food industry on program administration and integrity. 41
B. Participant Characteristics
In fiscal year 2017, the majority of SNAP households (eighty
percent) included a child, an elderly individual, or an individual with
a disability; these households received eighty-five percent of SNAP
benefits. 42 About half of SNAP participants (forty-three percent) live
in a household with earnings; some of these working individuals are
known as able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs) or
technically: a “person between the ages of 18 and 49 who has no
dependents and is not disabled.” 43 ABAWDs, which we will discuss
further, can only receive SNAP benefits for three months in three
years if they do not meet certain special work requirements. 44 The
program benefits households in both urban and rural areas and across
Id at 25.
Id. at xvi–xvii; see JONATHAN COPPESS, THE FAULT LINES OF FARM POLICY 1
(2018).
40
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., supra note 4.
41
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-167, SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: ACTION NEEDED TO BETTER MEASURE AND ADDRESS
RETAILER TRAFFICKING (2018), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-167
(discusses how some authorized SNAP retailers are “selling” cash instead of food,
anywhere from $960 million to $4.7 billion and recommends the Administrator of
FNS improve the accuracy of the estimates of retailer tracking, assess the benefits
and costs of reauthorizing a sample of high-risk stores more frequently than other
stores, and increase penalties for retailer trafficking, among others).
42
Kathryn Cronquist & Sarah Lauffer, Characteristics of Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program Householders: Fiscal Year 2017 14, Contract N. AG-3198-F18-0005, U.S. DEP’T. AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV. (Feb. 2019), https://fnsprod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/resource-files/Characteristics2017.pdf.
43
Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents (ABAWDs), U.S. DEP’T. AGRIC. FOOD &
NUTR. SERV. (July 17, 2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/able-bodied-adultswithout-dependents-abawds.
44
Id.
38
39
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all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and, via block grants, the US
territories. 45 Economic conditions and state program policies such
as income eligibility criteria, application assistance, online
applications, and the extent of outreach activities influence their
residents’ SNAP participation.46 Moreover, the length of SNAP
participation and state approaches to renewal varies; one study
examining SNAP entrants (between 2008 to 2012) determined
twenty-six percent of SNAP households participated for a four month
period, fifty-two percent participated for a year or less, and sixtyseven percent participated for two years or less. 47 Improvement in
financial circumstances is the most common “exit trigger” for ending
SNAP participation. 48
C. Economic and Health Impacts
An integral component of the evolution of SNAP has been
research and evaluation of demonstration projects that examine the
impact of SNAP on poverty, food insecurity, dietary intake and
quality, weight status, healthcare costs, and academic achievement.
Evidence indicates SNAP benefits help lift individuals out of
poverty. 49 That is, if SNAP benefits are included as income, 10
percent of SNAP households would move above the federal poverty
SNAP – It Ain’t Just for Cities, AM. FARM. BUREAU FED’N. (Aug. 14, 2017),
https://www.fb.org/market-intel/snap-it-aint-just-for-cities; Tim Marema, Keep It
Rural: SNAP Enrollment as Percent of County Population, DAILY YONDER (Dec.
31, 2018), https://www.dailyyonder.com/geographyfoodstamps/2018/05/07/25422
/?utm_source=SNEB+Members&utm_campaign=de7ca8b706-EMAIL_CAMPAI
GN_2017_08_25&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_15f2e0b4a4-de7ca8b706709861073.
46
Brian Stacy et al., Using a Policy Index to Capture Trends and Differences in
State Administration of USDA’s Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 18,
ERR-No.244, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV. (Feb. 2018),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/87096/err-244.pdf?v=0/;
U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-670, SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: IMPROVED OVERSIGHT OF STATE ELIGIBILITY EXPANSIONS
NEEDED 39–40 (2012), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-670.
47
Current Perspectives on SNAP Participation: Dynamics of Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program Participation from 2008 to 2012 66, U.S. Dᴇᴘ’ᴛ.
Aɢʀɪᴄ. Fᴏᴏᴅ & Nᴜᴛʀ. Sᴇʀᴠ (Dec. 2014), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/defaul
t/files/ops/Dynamics2008-2012.pdf.
48
Id. at 9.
49
Laura Tiehen et al, The Effect of SNAP on Poverty 20 (U. Ky. Ctr. Poverty Res.
Discussion Paper Series DP2013-06, 2013), https://uknowledge.uky.edu/cgi/viewco
ntent.cgi?article=1014&context=ukcpr_papers; but see, Laura Tiehen et al.,
Alleviating Poverty in the United States: The Critical Role of SNAP Benefits 17,
ERR-No.132, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV. (Apr. 2012) (claiming that,
“prevalence of poverty, as measured by the headcount index, was not reduced much
by SNAP”), https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=44965.
45
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guidelines. 50 Among women, childhood participation in SNAP
increases economic self-sufficiency, including educational
attainment, earnings, and income. 51
Emerging evidence is
illustrating connections between SNAP participation and reduced
health care costs and hospital utilization. 52 In terms of academic
achievements, a 2006 longitudinal study of a nationally
representative sample found starting Food Stamp program
participation during the four years from kindergarten to third grade
was associated with about a three-point greater improvement in
reading and mathematics scores compared with stopping Food Stamp
program participation during that period. 53

Cronquist & Lauffer, supra note 42, at xv.
Hilary Hoynes, Diane W. Schanzenbach, & Douglas Almond, Long-Run Impacts
of Childhood Access to the Safety Net, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 893-934 (2016).
52
See Seth Berkowitz, Hilary Seligman, Joseph Rigdon, James Meigs & Sanjay
Basu, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Participation and Health
Care Expenditures Among Low-Income Adults, 177 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. INTERN.
MED. 1642-1649 (2017) (found SNAP participation was associated with reduced
health care spending among low-income American adults); Steven Carlson &
Brynne Keith-Jennings, SNAP is Linked with Improved Nutritional Outcomes and
Lower Health Care Costs (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/foodassistance/snap-is-linked-with-improved-nutritional-outcomes-and-lower-healthcare (discusses how SNAP may promote better health and lower health care costs);
Laura J. Samuel, Sarah L. Szanton, Rachel Cahill, Jennifer L. Wolff, Pinchuan Ong,
Ginger Zielinskie & Charles Betley, Does the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program Affect Hospital Utilization Among Older Adults? The Case of Maryland,
21 POPUL. HEALTH MANAG. 88-95 (2018) (estimated that enrolling the forty-seven
percent of the 2012 population who were eligible nonparticipants in SNAP could
have been associated with nineteen million in hospital cost savings); Chinedum O.
Ojinnaka & Colleen Heflin, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Size and
Timing and Hypertension-Related Emergency Department Claims Among Medicaid
Enrollees, 12 J. AM. SOC. HYPERTENSION e27-e34 (2018) (found higher SNAP
benefit amount was associated with a decreased probability of hypertension-related
emergency department claims); Rajan A. Sonik, Susan L. Parish & Monika Mitra,
Inpatient Medicaid Usage and Expenditure Patterns After Changes in Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program Benefit Levels, 15 PREV. CHRONIC DIS. E120 (2018)
(found changes in SNAP benefit levels were associated with changes in inpatient
Medicaid usage and cost problems); Irma Arteaga & Colleen Heflin, SNAP Benefits
and Pregnancy-Related Emergency Room Visits, 37 POP. RES. POLICY REV. 10311052 (2018) (found that women who received SNAP benefits in the second or third
week of the calendar month were less likely to receive pregnancy-related care
through the emergency room in the week following benefit receipt).
53
Edward A. Frongillo, Diana F. Jyoti & Sonya J. Jones, Food Stamp Program
Participation is Associated with Better Academic Learning Among School Children,
136 J. NUTR. 1077-1080 (2006).
50
51
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SNAP also helps individuals and households “put food on
the table” 54 and reduces the prevalence of very low food security.55
For example, an analysis of nearly three thousand households with
children found SNAP participation for six months was associated
with improved food security. 56 But impacts on dietary intake and
quality have been mixed. 57 Although many studies have linked
Steven Carlson et al., SNAP Works for America’s Children 2, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/s
nap-works-for-americas-children.
55
Mark Nord & Anne Marie Golla, Does SNAP Decrease Food Insecurity?
Untangling the Self-Selection Effect i, ERR-No. 85, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES.
SERV. (Oct. 2009), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/46295/10977_
err85_1_.pdf?v=0.
56
James Mabli & Julie Worthington, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
Participation and Child Food Security, 133 PEDIATRICS. 610, 610 (2014).
57
See Parke E. Wilde, Paul E. McNamara & Christine K. Ranney, The Effect of
Income and Food Programs on Dietary Quality: A Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Analysis with Error Components, 81 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON 959, 698 (1999) (used a
maximum likelihood estimator and found Food Stamp participation was associated
with higher intake of meats, added sugars, and total fats); Steven T. Yen, The Effects
of SNAP and WIC Programs on Nutrient Intakes of Children, 35 FOOD POL’Y 576,
579 (2010) (used a system of nutrient equations to examine the effects of SNAP and
WIC participation among young children and found SNAP had a small and negative
effect on fiber intake); Cindy W. Leung et al., Dietary Intake and Dietary Quality
of Low-Income Adults in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, 96 AM. J.
CLINICAL NUTRITION 977, 977 (2012) (finding SNAP participants had lower dietary
quality scores than did non-participants); Meenakshi M. Fernandes, Effect of the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) on Frequency of Beverage
Consumption Among Youth in the United States, 112 J. ACAD. NUTRITION &
DIETETICS 1241, 1244 (2012) (reporting SNAP participation did not have a
predictive effect on soft drink, 100% fruit juice or milk consumption among youth);
Rebecca L. Franckle et al., Transactions at a Northeastern Supermarket Chain:
Differences by Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Use, 53 AM. J. PREV.
MED. e131, e131 (2017) (found transactions with SNAP benefit use in comparison
to transactions without SNAP benefit use included higher spending on less healthful
food categories including sugar-sweetened beverages, red meat, and convenience
foods, and lower spending on more healthful food categories such as fruit,
vegetables, and poultry); Anna H. Grummon & Lindsey S. Tallie, Nutritional Profile
of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Household Food and Beverage
Purchases, 105 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1433, 1433 (2017) (determined SNAP
participants purchased an additional 15 to 20 more calories per person from sugarsweetened beverages, and an additional 174 to 195 mg more sodium per person);
Cindy W. Leung et al, Associations of Food Stamp Participation with Dietary
Quality and Obesity in Children, 131 PEDIATRICS 463, 463 (2013) (SNAP
participants were below national recommendations for whole grains, fruits,
vegetables, fish, and potassium while exceeding recommended limits for processed
meat, sugar-sweetened beverages, saturated fat, and sodium); Cindy W. Leung et al,
Few Changes in Food Security and Dietary Intake from Short-term Participation in
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Among Low-Income Massachusetts
Adults, 46 J. NUTRITION EDUC. BEHAV. 68, 70 (2014) (found SNAP participants
increased refined grain intake by 1.1 serving/day from baseline to follow-up and no
other associations were observed with other foods, nutrients, or dietary quality);
54
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SNAP participation to obesity, the most rigorous assessments show
no effect of SNAP on body weight. 58 Similarly, differences in
Cindy W. Leung et al, SNAP Participation and Diet-Sensitive Cardiometabolic Risk
Factors in Adolescents, 52 (2 Suppl. 2) AM. J. PREV. MED. S127, S127 (2017)
(SNAP participants had lower Healthy Eating Index scores versus income-eligible
non-participants); Lindsey S. Tallie et al., Nutritional Profile of Purchases by Store
Type: Disparities by Income and Food Program Participation, 55 AM. J.
PREVENTATIVE MED. 167, 172 (2018) (reported SNAP households purchased more
calories from starchy vegetables, processed meat, desserts, sweeteners and toppings,
total junk food, sugar-sweetened beverages, and milk than income-eligible and
higher-income SNAP non-participants and SNAP participant purchases were higher
in sodium density); Hilary W. Hoynes & Diane W. Schanzenbach, Safety Net
Investments in Children, BROOKINGS (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/bp
ea-articles/safety-net-investments-in-children/ (examined a variety of US social
safety net program investments including SNAP and found access to safety net
programs during childhood improves outcomes for children in the short and long
term).
58
Joseph Rigdon, Seth A. Berkowitz, Hilary K. Seligman & Sanjay Basu, ReEvaluating Associations Between the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
Participation and Body Mass Index in the Context of Unmeasured Confounders, 192
SOC. SCI. MED. 112-124 (2017) (determined SNAP participation was associated with
increased Body Mass Index); Amy L. Webb, Andrew Schiff, Douglas Currivan &
Eduardo Villamor, Food Stamp Participation But Not Food Insecurity is Associated
with Higher Adult BMI in Massachusetts Residents Living in Low-Income
Neighborhoods, 11 PUBLIC HEALTH NUTR. 1248-1255 (2008) (reported participation
in the food stamp program twelve months prior to the survey was associated with
higher Body Mass Index); Diane Gibson, Food Stamp Program Participation is
Positively Related to Obesity in Low Income Women, 133 J. NUTR. 2225-2231
(2003) (determined participation in the food stamp program was associated with a
9.1% increase in the predicted probability of current obesity); Stephanie B. Jilcott,
Elizabeth D. Wall-Bassett, Sloane C. Burke & Justin B. Moore, Associations
Between Food Insecurity, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
Benefits, and Body Mass Index Among Adult Females, 111 J. AM. DIETETIC ASSOC.
1741-1745 (2011) (reported mean Body Mass Index was significantly greater among
women receiving <$150 in SNAP benefits per household member versus those
receiving > $150 in benefits per household member); Stephanie B. Jilcott, Haiyong
Liu, Katrina D. Dubose, Susan Chen & Sibylle Kranz, Food Stamp Participation is
Associated with Fewer Meals Away From Home, Yet Higher Body Mass Index and
Waist Circumference in a Nationally Representative Sample, 43 J. NUTR. EDUC.
BEHAV. 110-115 (2011) (reported food stamp authorization was associated with
higher Body Mass Index and waist circumference among females and higher food
stamp benefits received were associated with lower Body Mass Index); Binh T.
Nguyen, Kerem Shuval, Farryl Bertmann &Amy L. Yaroch, The Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program, Food Insecurity, Dietary Quality, and Obesity
Among US Adults, 105 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1453-1459 (2015) (reported adult
SNAP participants with marginal food security from the 2003 to 2010 National
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey data had lower Body Mass Index and
lower probability of obesity than SNAP participants with low or very low food
security); Cindy W. Leung, Susan J. Blumenthal, Elena E. Hoffnalge, Helen H.
Jensen, Susan B. Foerster, Marion Nestle, Lilian W.Y. Cheung, Dariush
Mozaffarian & Walter C. Willett, Associations of Food Stamp Participation and
Diet Quality and Obesity in Children, 131 PEDIATRICS 463-472 (2013) (found SNAP
participation was not associated with a higher rate of childhood obesity); Cindy W.
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dietary intake between SNAP participants and non-participants are
small, and the most recent, well-conducted studies show virtually no
direct effect of program enrollment on diet quality. 59 In short, the
diet quality of most Americans is bad and this is not a poor person’s
problem. Moreover, inconsistent findings are due to the majority of
published studies not adequately accounting for self-selection into
SNAP. 60 Essentially, small differences between SNAP participants
and non-participants do not reflect SNAP’s causal effect on obesity
or diet quality, but rather: 1) a change in circumstances that both
precipitates SNAP enrollment and effects diet and obesity (for
example, a pay cut or recent illness), or 2) a greater propensity for
people with obesity and poorer diets to enroll in SNAP. 61
In 2012, FNS published a SNAP profile capturing key
accomplishments and lessons learned over the program’s four decade
history including strategies used to serve Americans most in need,
improve diet quality, promote self-sufficiency, and increase
administrative efficiencies. 62 FNS recognized how nationwide
standards for eligibility and benefits helped ensure SNAP is available
to most households with gross income less than 130 percent of the
Leung, June M. Tester, Eric B. Rimm & Walter C. Willett, SNAP Participation and
Diet-Sensitive Cardiometabolic Risk Factors in Adolescents, 52 (2 Suppl. 2) AM. J.
PREV. MED. S127-S137 (2017) (reported SNAP participants had higher Body Mass
Index for age Z scores, waist circumference Z scores, and waist-to-height ratios than
higher income nonparticipants but SNAP participation was not associated with most
cardiometabolic risk factors); Marlana J. Kohn, Janice F. Bell, H. Mollie Grow &
Galant Chan, Food Insecurity, Food Assistance and Weight Status in US Youth: New
Evidence from NHANES 2007-08, 9 PEDIATR. OBES. 155-166 (2014) (reported food
assistance program participation including SNAP, WIC, and school meals was
associated with increased body size in food secure youth but not food insecure
youth); Mary T. Gorski Findling, Julia A. Wolfson, Eric B. Rimm, Sara N. Bleich,
Differences in the Neighborhood Retail Food Environment and Obesity Among US
Children and Adolescents by SNAP Participation, 26 OBESITY (SILVER SPRING)
1063-1071 (2018) (determined greater neighborhood access to retail food outlets is
associated with higher obesity prevalence for children overall and for children who
participate in SNAP).
59
Tatiana Andreyeva, Amanda S. Tripp & Marlene B. Schwartz, Dietary Quality of
Americans by Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Participation Status: A
Systematic Review, 49 AM. J. PREV. MED. 594-604 (2015).
60
Id.; see also Sara Bleich, et al., Strengthening the Public Health Impacts of the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program through Policy, ANN. PUB. HEALTH
(forthcoming 2019); Hilary K. Seligman & Seth A. Berkowitz, Aligning Programs
and Policies to Support Food Security and Public Health Goals in the United States,
11 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 1-19 (2018).
61
Id.
62
BUILDING A HEALTHY AMERICA: A PROFILE OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV. (Apr. 2012),
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/BuildingHealthyAmerica.pdf.
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federal poverty guidelines across the country. 63 And then, in 2018,
ERS provided historical and analytical perspective on major SNAP
design issues under consideration including block grants, restricting
SNAP foods and beverages, adequacy and timing of SNAP benefits,
retailer eligibility standards, program access and outreach, and work
requirements. 64 Rooted in SNAP policy and programmatic history,
we will draw on these 2018 ERS analyses, among others, to now
focus on current legislative (One Hundred Fifteenth US Congress
and initial One Hundred Sixteenth US Congress) and executive (first
two years of the Trump administration) branch developments
impacting SNAP's organization, operations at the federal, state, and
retailer levels, and, ultimately, eating patterns and health outcomes
of the nation's most vulnerable populations.
III. 115th US Congress on SNAP - The Farm Bill,
Appropriations and Oversight (In)Activities

The One Hundred Fifteenth US Congress met in
Washington, District of Columbia (DC) from January 3, 2017
to January 3, 2019, during the final weeks of Barack Obama’s
presidency and the first two years of Donald Trump’s
presidency. 65 The House, Senate, as well as the Presidency—
once Trump took office—were all under Republican Party
control; nonetheless, party unity and legislative
accomplishments were comparatively modest. 66 Consistent
with efforts to erode the American safety net including efforts
to roll back provisions of the Affordable Care Act (P.L.111148) that expand Medicaid, passing the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
(P.L. 115-97) that likely makes low- and middle-income
households worse off, and calls for mandatory Medicaid work
requirements, the One Hundred Fifteenth US Congress
Id. at 2.
VICTOR OLIVEIRA ET AL., DESIGN ISSUES IN THE USDA’S SUPPLEMENTAL
NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: LOOKING AHEAD BY LOOKING BACK. i, ERRNo.243, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV. (Jan. 2018), https://www.ers.usda.gov
/webdocs/publications/86924/err-243.pdf?v=43124.
65
See JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RES. SERV., R44762, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 115TH
CONGRESS: A PROFILE i (Dec. 20, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44762.pdf
(presents the profile of the membership of the 115th Congress including data on party
affiliation, average age, occupation, education, length of congressional service,
religious affiliation, gender, ethnicity, foreign births, and military service).
66
Sarah Binder, Dodging the Rules in Trump’s Republican Congress, 80 J. POL.
1454, 1454 (2018); Frances E. Lee, Parties and Partisanship in the Age of Trump
Symposium: The 115th Congress and Questions of Party Unity in a Polarized Era,
80 J. POL. 1464, 1464 (2018).
63
64
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explored a variety of legislative approaches to gut SNAP
including, but ultimately unsuccessfully, the 2018 Farm Bill
(See Table 2).67 The Farm Bill is a recurring omnibus bill reapproved about every five years by Congress. 68 The 2018 Farm
Bill includes twelve titles, ranging from rural development to
nutrition. 69 The nutrition title addresses SNAP. As Table 1
illustrates, about six decades ago, a pilot Food Stamp program
with less than 380,000 participants was integrated into the
Farm Bill to garner urban Congressional members’ support for
farming issues. 70 Now, SNAP is the largest component of the
Farm Bill, with about eighty percent of total spending going to
fund this entitlement program.71
This review will mainly focus on the One Hundred Fifteenth
and initial One Hundred Sixteenth Congressional actions taken
regarding SNAP during the 2018 Farm Bill deliberations in addition
to fiscal year 2017 through 2020 appropriations and oversight
(in)activities. The progress made in the 2018 Farm Bill and the
negative implications of the recent government shutdown on the
USDA Food Distribution Program for Indian Reservations (FDPIR),
which continues to lack a shutdown contingency plan, is not within
the scope of this law review; nonetheless, policy developments
affecting FDPIR have significant implications for SNAP given
eligible individuals and families who do not participate in FDPIR

William G. Gate, Once the Tax Bill is Paid For, Low- and Middle-Income
Households will be Worse Off, BROOKINGS (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.brookings.ed
u/blog/up-front/2018/01/02/once-the-tax-bill-is-paid-for-low-and-middle-incomehouseholds-will-be-worse-off/; Nathaniel Weixel, GOP Senator Calls for
Mandatory Medicaid Work Requirements, THE HILL (May 10, 2018), https://thehill.
com/policy/healthcare/medicaid/387128-gop-senator-calls-for-mandatory-medicai
d-work-requirements; Dylan Matthews, The War on the Poor: Donald Trump’s Win
Opens the Door to Paul Ryan’s Vision for America, VOX (Nov. 22, 2016),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/22/13641654/paul-ryan-trumppoverty-safety-net.
68
Overview and History of the Farm Bill I, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
https://www.coursera.org/lecture/food-system/overview-and-history-of-the-farmbill-i-Hm3Xt (last visited Aug. 21, 2019).
69
The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, P.L. 115-334, https://docs.house.gov
/billsthisweek/20181210/CRPT-115hrpt1072.pdf.
70
COPPESS, supra note 39.
71
The United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service,
Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018: Highlights and Implications (2019),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/agriculture-improvement-act-of-2018-highlights-andimplications/.
67
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tend to participate in SNAP.72 Moreover, this review does not
address specific policy developments and needs affecting SNAP
participation among active-duty service members, although more
than $21 million SNAP benefits were redeemed at commissaries
from September 2014 through August 2015. 73 Specifically, this
review focuses on actions, or the lack thereof, on the following areas:
block grants; participant eligibility; benefit adequacy, issuance, and
redemption; and strengthening SNAP’s nutritional impacts.
A. Block Grants
A block grant is a fixed level of annual funding regardless of
need. 74 A change in this direction would be significant as SNAP is
currently an entitlement program that is designed to be responsive to
economic fluctuations which allow enrollment to expand rapidly
when the economy weakens and shrink when it improves. 75 Charged
in part by a new Federalism to give states more flexibility and control
costs, initial 2018 Farm Bill discussions leading up to the One
Hundred Fifteenth US Congress’ legislative agenda re-explored
combining safety net programs including SNAP into a meta-block

Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC. FOOD &
NUTR. SERV. (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/fdpir/food-distributionprogram-indian-reservations-fdpir; Kayla Gebeck & Philip Baker-Shenk, 2018
Farm Bill is Historic for Indian Country, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://www.hklaw.com/NativeAmericanLawBlog/2018-Farm-Bill-is-Historic-forIndian-Country-12-20-2018/; Mark Trahant, Congressional Hearing Looks at the
Impact of Shutdown on Indian Country, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/news/congressional-hearing-looks-atthe-impact-of-shutdown-on-indian-country-XhiLWA1JIkSfrkOdPbE89g/; Nancy
M. Pindus et al., STUDY OF THE FOOD DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM ON INDIAN
RESERVATIONS (FDPIR): FINAL REPORT, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV.
(June 2016), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ops/StudyofFDPIR.p
df; Kenneth Finegold et al., Tribal Food Assistance: A Comparison of the Food
Distribution Program on Indian Reservations (FDPIR) and the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) i, U. INST. (Nov. 2009), https://www.urban.o
rg/sites/default/files/publication/28396/412034-Tribal-Food-Assistance.PDF.
73
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-561, DOD NEEDS MORE COMPLETE
DATA ON ACTIVE-DUTY SERVICEMEMBERS’ USE OF FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 1
(2016), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-561; SNAP Benefits, MIL.
BENEFITS, https://militarybenefits.info/snap-benefits/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2019).
74
What is a Block Grant?, GRANTS.GOV (June 15, 2016), https://blog.grants.gov/20
16/06/15/what-is-a-block-grant/; ROBERT JAY DILGER & EUGENE BOYD, CONG. RES.
SERV., 7-5700, BLOCK GRANTS: PERSPECTIVES AND CONTROVERSIES 1 (July 15,
2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40486.pdf.
75
David Reich et al., Block-Granting Low-income Programs Leads to Large
Funding Declines Over time, History Shows, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES
(Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/block-granting-lowincome-programs-leads-to-large-funding-declines-over-time.
72
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grant to states. 76 That is, the “Agenda for Renewed Opportunity”
proposed each state would receive a fixed, annual amount of funding
for several safety net programs.77 A pilot program was also pitched
to explore different ways of distributing this federal aid in addition
to establishing a commission to examine rigorous analysis of the
proposed safety net programs. 78 Known as the Commission on
Evidence-Based Policy Making, this multi-disciplinary group would
be tasked with advising Congress on whether or how to create a
Clearinghouse for Program and Survey Data that would “facilitate
the merging of data on government programs with other
administrative data so researchers could link anonymous participants
across programs” while maintaining privacy rights of program
participants, incorporate outcome measurements, and institutionalize
randomized controlled trials into program design, among others
charges “without adding to the federal budget deficit (such as
through user fees for participating academic and other research
institutions).” 79
There is precedent for block granting social safety net
programs in the US. 80 In fact, permitted by the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, the Nutrition Assistance Program (NAP)
operates via block grants in a growing number of US territories
including Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of
the Northern Marian Islands, although we will discuss later how a
recently introduced Senate bill aims to allow these US territories to
finally participate in SNAP. 81 Research indicates total funding for
NAP does not substantially change over time, which results in
restricting program eligibility and benefits to the most financially
needy individuals and households. 82 Experience from other safety
Paul Ryan, Expanding Opportunity in America: A Discussion Draft from the
House Budget Committee (June 24, 2014), https://www.ncsha.org/wp-content/uplo
ads/2016/06/expanding_opportunity_in_america.pdf; Robert Greenstein, Ryan and
Block-Granting the Safety Net, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Dec. 3, 2015),
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/ryan-and-block-granting-the-safety-net; Lucas Berger,
Food Stamps and Federalism, ROOSEVELT INST. (Mar. 23, 2014), https://www.corn
ellrooseveltinstitute.org/dom/food-stamps-and-federalism; Kenneth Finegold et al.,
Block Grants: Details of the Bush Proposals, THE URBAN INST. 1 (Apr. 2004),
http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310990_A-64.pdf.
77
See Ryan, supra note 76, at 14.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 67.
80
Reich et al., supra note 75, at 1.
81
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 H.R. 3982, 97th Cong. (19811982), https://www.congress.gov/bill/97th-congress/house-bill/3982/titles.
82
Elizabeth Wolkomir, How is Food Assistance Different in Puerto Rico Than in
the Rest of the United States?, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 27, 2017),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/how-is-food-assistance-different76
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net programs similarly illustrates the generally static impact of block
granting on funding levels. 83 For example, the cash assistance
provided by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
which replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children, has
steadily declined over time. 84 One study found the purchasing power
of TANF was at least twenty percent lower now than when the
program was created in 1996. 85
While innovative approaches to lifting Americans out of
poverty and promoting food security are needed, the “Agenda for
Renewed Opportunity” or the “Opportunity Grant” was deemed to
essentially erode SNAP’s long-standing entitlement status; most
likely provide weaker and less comprehensive and responsive
versions of our existing federal aid programs; and result in large
funding declines over time. 86 According to an ERS report, a block
grant approach to SNAP could potentially result in states restricting
SNAP eligibility, hinder a state’s ability to respond quickly to
increased need during an economic downturn, and increase the
prevalence of food insecurity. 87 Another consideration is that a fixed
block grant challenges most states’ disaster SNAP approaches (e.g.,
hurricanes, tornadoes, or earthquakes), which is problematic given
in-puerto-rico-than-in-the-rest-of-the;
ASSESSING
THE
FEASIBILITY
OF
IMPLEMENTING THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARINA ISLANDS 21, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD
& NUTRITION SERV. (Aug. 2016), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/
ops/SNAPCNMI.pdf.
83
DILGER & BOYD, supra note 74, at 8; Reich et al., supra note 75, at 2.
84
LIZ SCHOTT ET AL., HOW STATES USE FUNDS UNDER THE TANF BLOCK GRANT 3–
4, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/res
earch/family-income-support/how-states-use-funds-under-the-tanf-block-grant; R.
Kent Weaver, The Structure of the TANF Block Grant, BROOKINGS (Apr. 3, 2002),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-structure-of-the-tanf-block-grant/.
85
ASHLEY BURNSIDE & IFE FLOYD, TANF CASH BENEFITS HAVE FALLEN BY MORE
THAN 20 PERCENT IN MOST STATES AND CONTINUE TO ERODE 1, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 22, 2019), http://www.cbpp.org/research/family-incomesupport/tanf-cash-benefits-have-fallen-by-more-than-20-percent-in-most-States.
86
DILGER & BOYD, supra note 74, at 14–15; KENNETH FINEGOLD ET AL., BLOCK
GRANTS: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND LESSONS LEARNED, No.A-63, U. INST. (Apr.
2014), http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310991_A-63.pdf ; Greenstein,
supra note 76; LIZ SCHOTT, LESSONS FROM TANF: BLOCK-GRANTING A SAFETYNET PROGRAM HAS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED ITS EFFECTIVENESS 2, CTR. ON BUDGET
& POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/family-incomesupport/lessons-from-tanf-block-granting-a-safety-net-program-has; Berger, supra
note 76; Reich et al., supra note 75, at 3; DOTTIE ROSENBAUM, BLOCK-GRANTING
SNAP WOULD ABANDON DECADES-LONG FEDERAL COMMITMENT TO REDUCE
HUNGER 1, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.cbpp
.org/research/food-assistance/block-granting-snap-would-abandon-decades-longfederal-commitment-to.
87
OLIVEIRA ET AL., supra note 64, at iv.
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the increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters.88
Ultimately, the 2018 Farm Bill did not convert SNAP to a block grant
program. 89 Notwithstanding, work remains to identify more
effective ways to consistently alleviate poverty and food security in
our country while providing state and local government agencies
flexibility to meet their residents’ needs and streamline
administrative safety net program processes.90
B. Participant Eligibility
Legislative deliberations leading up to the 2018 Farm Bill
impacting SNAP participant eligibility included intense
consideration but ultimately unsuccessful legislative attempts to
eliminate broad-based categorical eligibility (BBCE) and establish
stricter work requirements. Other eligibility related legislative
actions in the 2018 Farm Bill included simplifying homeless housing
cost provisions, preserving states’ option to coordinate SNAP
benefits with low-income energy payments assistance (LIHEAP)
(i.e., helping households “afford to heat and eat”), rejecting a lifetime
ban on individuals convicted of certain felonies, and eliminating state
performance bonuses to recognize best or most-improved in SNAP
operations that have been historically reinvested in supporting SNAP
integrity and effectiveness. 91 The USDA also recently issued a
memo to states urging them to strengthen their policy and
programmatic approaches to restrict individuals from participating
who have failed to make child support payments. 92

Tony Abernathy, Responsibilities of the USDA-Food and Nutrition Service in
Nutrition Assistance Response to Natural Disasters, 61 J. NUTRITION SCI.
VITAMINOLOGY S14, S14 (2015).
89
Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, H.R.2, 115th Cong. (2017-2018)
(enacted), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2.
90
Id.
91
FOOD RESEARCH & ACTION CENTER’S ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL FARM BILL
CONFERENCE REPORT AGRICULTURE IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2018 TITLE IV—
NUTRITION, FOOD RES. & ACTION CTR., http://frac.org/wp-content/uploads/2018farm-bill-conference-report-analysis.pdf; see also U.S. DEPT. AGRIC. FOOD NUTR.
SERV., FY19 Homeless Shelter Deduction Memo (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.fns.usd
a.gov/snap/fy19-homeless-shelter-deduction-memo (explaining the self-executing
simplified homeless housing cost provisions of the 2018 Farm Bill); Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program: Student Eligibility, Convicted Felons, Lottery and
Gambling, and State Verification Provisions of the Agricultural Act of 2014 – Final
Rule, 7 C.F.R. Parts 271, 272, and 273 [FNS 2015-0038] (Apr. 15, 2019) (outlining
how states can determine whether certain felons should be disqualified and
clarifying restrictions regarding lottery winners).
92
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., State Flexibilities Related to Custodial
and Noncustodial Parents’ Cooperation with State Child Support Agencies (May 1,
88
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i. Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility
Since 2000, states have been permitted to use BBCE, which
allows them to align the SNAP asset test or gross income eligibility
thresholds with certain other non-cash means-tested programs. 93
That is, BBCE allows states to grant automatic eligibility for families
that receive TANF assistance and meet State-determined income
limits. 94 According to an ERS report, BBCE simplifies the
application process for potential SNAP participants and reduces
administrative costs, without significant increases in eligibility.95
Recognizing program integrity concerns and escalating program
costs, the US Government Accountability Office stressed improved
oversight of state implementation of BBCE is needed. 96 A
preliminary House version of the 2018 Farm Bill (H.R.2), which was
drafted in an untraditional partisan manner and passed by two votes
with no support from Democrats, eliminated BBCE and proposed
changes to countable resources. 97 Countable resources include a
portion of the value of a household’s vehicle(s), which states have
been able to exclude some or all of, consistent with TANF; however,
the preliminary H.R.2 proposed to eliminate the state vehicle policy
option and increase the amount of most vehicles’ value that is
excluded for countable resources from $4,650 to $12,000.98 On the
other hand, the preliminary Senate version of the Farm Bill (S.3042)
did not propose significant changes to participant eligibility. 99 A
2018 analysis of these proposed participant eligibility changes
estimated almost two million households would no longer be eligible
2019), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/resource-files/SNAP-childsupport-policy-050119.pdf.
93
Daryll E. Ray & Harwood D. Schaffer, Categorical Eligibility for Food Stamps:
It’s Origin and Adoption by States, AGRIC. POL’Y ANALYSIS CTR., https://www.agpol
icy.org/weekpdf/641.pdf; AUSSENBERG, supra note 7, at 1; GENE FALK & RANDY
ALISON AUSSENBERG, CONG. RES. SERV., R42054, THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP): CATEGORICAL ELIGIBILITY 2, 4 (2019), https://fas.or
g/sgp/crs/misc/R42054.pdf.
94
AUSSENBERG, supra note 7, at i.
95
OLIVEIRA ET AL., supra note 64, at 52–53.
96
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 46, at 39.
97
Final Vote Results for Roll Call 284, CONGRESS.GOV (June 21, 2018),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2018/roll284.xml (finding that no democrats supported
this preliminary version of the bill and that the bill passed by two votes); Agriculture
Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. § 4006, § 4013 (2018),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2.
98
Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. § 4013 (2018).
99
See Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, S. 3042, 115th Cong. (2018) (lacking
a section that proposes changes to SNAP participant eligibility under Title IV–
Nutrition), https://www.agriculture.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Agriculture%20Imp
rovement%20Act%20of%202018.pdf.
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for SNAP benefits or eight percent of those who participated in
SNAP in fiscal year 2015. 100 Others estimate more than three million
Americans would be impacted and speculate more than 500,000
children’s access to free USDA school breakfast and lunch would be
jeopardized since children who live in households that receive SNAP
benefits would no longer be directly certified or automatically
eligible to participate in the USDA school meal programs. 101 The
elimination of BBCE will also impact a school’s use of the
Community Eligibility Provision, which allows a school to offer free
meals to all students without collecting meal applications based on
the school area’s SNAP eligibility numbers. 102 Still, the USDA
published a proposed rule on July 23, 2019 in the Federal Register
that aims to end “this loophole” and “limits SNAP/TANF automatic
eligibility to households that receive substantial, ongoing TANFfunded benefits aimed at helping families move towards selfsufficiency.” 103 Days prior to the release of this rule, the House
Agriculture Subcommittee on Nutrition, Oversight, and Department
Operations held a hearing regarding the potential implications of
eliminating BBCE that included discussion of “the Minnesota
millionaire,” Rob Undersander, who applied for and received SNAP
benefits while owning one million in assets and then donated the
funds to his church and other charities. 104 The House Committee of
Education and Labor Chairman Scott also wrote a letter to Secretary
Perdue raising concerns about the USDA’s estimates regarding the

Karen Cunnyngham, Simulating Proposed Changes to the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program: Countable Resources and Categorical Eligibility 2,
MATHEMATICA POL’Y RES. (2018), https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/ourpublications-and-findings/publications/simulating-proposed-changes-to-the-supple
mental-nutrition-assistance-program-countable-resources.
101
Crystal FitzSimons & Ellen Vollinger, FRAC Chat: Broad-Based Categorical
Eligibility and School Meals (2019), https://www.frac.org/blog/broad-basedcategorical-eligibility-and-school-meals.
102
Simone Del Rosario, 17,000 Washington Students Could Lose Free Meals Over
Food Stamp Changes (2019), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/money/17000washington-students-could-lose-free-meals-over-food-stamp-changes/arAAFjAlA.
103
Revision of Categorical Eligibility in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP), 84 Fed. Reg. 142 (July 24, 2019).)
104
The United States House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture
Subcommittee on Nutrition, Oversight, and Department Operations, The Potential
Implications of Eliminating Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility for SNAP
Households, https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=
109661; see also Julia Limitone, How this Minnesota Millionaire Received
‘Hundreds of Dollars’ in Food Stamps (2019), https://www.foxbusiness.com/perso
nal-finance/how-this-minnesota-millionaire-receives-hundreds-of-dollars-of-foodstamps.
100
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impact of this proposed rule. 105 The public comment period closes
on September 23, 2019. 106 Given that BBCE was not altered in the
2018 Farm Bill, any final rule could potentially evoke a legislative
response. 107
ii. Work Requirements
The preliminary House version of the 2018 Farm Bill (H.R.
2) also proposed significant changes to the work requirements
imposed on able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWD)
unable to find work. 108 As explained earlier, ABAWD describes a
person between the ages of 18 and 49 who has no dependents and is
not disabled that is currently eligible to receive SNAP benefits for
three months in three years if they do not meet certain special work
requirements. 109 SNAP work requirements are popular with House
Republicans, State Republican leadership, the Trump administration,
and the public. 110 Various Congressional hearings, reports, and
mandated pilot projects preceded the proposed SNAP work
requirements in the preliminary H.R.2, along with similar legislative
and executive branch efforts targeting other social safety net
programs, including recent changes to Medicaid. 111 However, most

Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Educ. and Labor,
Chairman Scott to Secretary Perdue: Release Internal Estimates Showing Impact of
Proposed SNAP Changes on Free School Meals (July 29, 2019), https://edlabor.hou
se.gov/media/press-releases/chairman-scott-to-secretary-perdue-release-internal-es
timates-showing-impact-of-proposed-snap-changes-on-free-school-meals.
106
Revision of Categorical Eligibility in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program, supra 103.
107
The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, P.L. 115-334, https://docs.house.go
v/billsthisweek/20181210/CRPT-115hrpt1072.pdf.
108
Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. § 4015 (2018) (as
introduced in the House, Apr. 12, 2018).
109
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., supra note 43.
110
Helena Bottemiller Evich, Morning Agriculture: Critics Question Stricter SNAP
Work Requirements, POLITICO (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.politico.com/newslette
rs/morning-agriculture/2018/10/16/critics-question-stricter-snap-work-requirement
s-375598.
111
The Agricultural Act of 2014 Pub. L. No. 113-79, sec. 4022, 128 Stat. 649, 799
(2014); PAUL RYAN, EXPANDING OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA: A DISCUSSION DRAFT
FROM THE HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE 310 (2014), http://budget.house.gov/upload
edfiles/expanding_opportunity_in_america.pdf; Public Hearing: To Review the
Implementation of Section 4022 of the Agricultural Act of 2014: Pilot Projects to
Reduce Dependency and Increase Work Requirements and Work Effort Under the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 113th
Cong. (2014), https://archives-agriculture.house.gov/hearing/review-implementatio
n-section-4022-agricultural-act-2014-pilot-projects-reduce-dependency; How Our
Welfare System Can Discourage Work: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Agric., 114th Cong. (2015), https://www.govinfo.
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working-age adults in SNAP who can work do, while often for low
pay, without benefits, and unstable schedules. 112 The current
ABAWD requirements, as set forth in the Food and Nutrition Act of
2008, include registering for work, accepting suitable employment,
not voluntarily quitting a job or reducing hours, and participating in
workfare (unpaid work through a special state-approved program),
or employment and training programs. 113 While several exemptions
exist, including permitting states to provide waivers to ABAWD
during periods of high unemployment, if work requirements are not
met, inability to participate in SNAP may exaggerate an ABAWD’s
food insecurity. 114 The preliminary H.R.2 proposed stricter work
gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg97912/html/CHRG-114hhrg97912.htm; How Our
Welfare System Can Discourage Work: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means & the Subcomm. on Oversight of
the H. Comm. on Agric., 114th Cong. (2015) (discussing the work requirement and
efforts to coordinate programs in regards to this aspect); Hearing: Past, Present, and
Future of SNAP: The Means to Climbing the Economic Ladder, U.S. House of
Representatives Committee Repository (June 10, 2015, 10:00 AM),
https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=103569; How
Our Welfare System Can Discourage Work (2016), Subcommittee on Nutrition –
Public Hearing RE: Past, Present, and Future of SNAP: Improving Innovation and
Success in Employment and Training Programs, House Committee on Agriculture
Republicans (Sept. 13, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://republicans-agriculture.house.gov
/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=3511; Letter From Department of Health and
Human Services to State Medicaid Director (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.medicaid.
gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf (discussing, amongst other
issues, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ policy to incentivize work
engagement).
112
Brynne Keith-Jennings & Raheem Chaudhy, Most Working-Age SNAP
Participants Work, But Often in Unstable Jobs, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/mostworking-age-snap-participants-work-but-often-in-unstable-jobs; Brynne KeithJennings & Vincent Palacios, SNAP Helps Millions of Low-Wage Workers: Crucial
Financial Support Assists Workers in Jobs with Low Wages, Volatile Income, and
Few Benefits, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (May 10, 2017), https://www.c
bpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-helps-millions-of-low-wage-workers;
LAUREN BAUER ET AL., WORK REQUIREMENTS AND SAFETY NET PROGRAMS 2,
HAMILTON PROJECT (2018), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/WorkRequ
irements_EA_web_1010_2.pdf.
113
The Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(1); U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.
FOOD & NUTR. SERV., supra note 43.
114
OLIVERIRA ET AL., supra note 64; Kristin F. Butcher et al., Most Workers in LowWage Labor Market Work Substantial Hours, in Volatile Jobs, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES (July 24, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-andinequality/most-workers-in-low-wage-labor-market-work-substantial-hours-in
(stating that proposals for work requirements in SNAP . . . vary in terms of . . . the
economic conditions under which the requirements may be temporarily waived”);
Ed Bolen et al., More than 500,000 Adults Will Lose SNAP Benefits in 2016 as
Waivers Expire, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Mar 18, 2016),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/more-than-500000-adults-willlose-snap-benefits-in-2016-as-waivers-expire.
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requirements called for almost all adult SNAP participants under the
age of sixty to work or participate in employment and job training
for at least twenty hours per week and permitted states to target
limited resources to those who they deem may benefit most from
employment and training programs. 115
The Congressional Budget Office estimated more than one
million adults would lose SNAP benefits as a result of the
preliminary H.R.2’s proposed stricter mandatory work
requirements. 116 In addition, the Congressional Budget Office
determined other impacts on states including: the likely need for
more than the proposed two years to establish new employment and
training opportunities that will likely serve relatively few eligible
SNAP participants in each state; possible increased costs for tracking
SNAP work status or exemptions from work requirements; and
potential financial hardships contending with at least seven
provisions deemed unfunded mandates (i.e., a regulation(s) that
requires a state to perform certain actions with no funding allocated
to support its fulfillment). 117 Notably, states have had the option to
implement work requirements in SNAP, but many have stopped or
opted not to start as the requirements are burdensome on participants
and state agencies. 118 The Heritage Foundation reported, “as of late
2017, six states and the District of Columbia have statewide
ABAWD work waivers, 27 states have partial waivers, and roughly
1,300 counties are ‘labor surplus areas’ as designated by the
Department of Labor.” 119 Recent reports indicate that Illinois’
request for a waiver to reinstate a number of cases was denied and
resulted in what federal investigators determined as an over-issuance
of SNAP benefits during a four-month period. 120 In a similar
situation but for a longer period of time, the State of New Mexico

Ed Bolen et al., House Farm Bill Would Increase Food Insecurity and Hardship,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/foodassistance/house-farm-bill-would-increase-food-insecurity-and-hardship.
116
CONG. BUDGET OFF., COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 2 AGRICULTURE AND NUTRITION ACT
OF 2018 12 (2018), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files?file=2018-07/hr2_1.pdf.
117
Id. at 13, 22.
118
FNS CONTROLS OVER SNAP BENEFITS FOR ABLE-BODIED ADULTS WITHOUT
DEPENDENTS 4 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. (2016),
https://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/27601-0002-31.pdf.
119
ROBERT RECTOR & VIJAY MENON, ISSUE BRIEF: SNAP REFORM ACT OFFERS
SOUND BASIS FOR WELFARE POLICY 3, HERITAGE F. (2018), https://www.usda.gov/o
ig/webdocs/27601-0002-31.pdf.
120
Cole Lauterbach, USDA Says Illinois Over-Issued Food Stamps, May Face
Significant Fines, ILL. NEWS NETWORK. (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.ilnews.org/ne
ws/state_politics/usda-says-illinois-over-issued-food-stamps-may-facesignificant/article_02f08c50-c422-11e8-a5f3-4b474cacffd6.html.
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was fined more than $163 million. 121 On the other hand, Maine
announced in 2014 it would no longer grant waivers from the work
requirements for ABAWDs, resulting in eighty percent ABAWD
caseload drop in only a few months. 122 Likewise, in 2014, Indiana
reinstated work requirements. 123 Between October 2017 and March
2018, Georgia ended SNAP benefits for an average of 356
participants for failing to meet work requirements.124 Recently, in
April 2018, Wisconsin increased work requirements for SNAP
recipients, among other provisions to limit the state’s welfare
programs. 125
Employment and training programs (SNAP E&T) are
administered by the USDA, using a formula-based grant program
that provides about $300 million annually to support states (or state
partners) offering a package of services including, but not limited to,
participant assessment, employment and training activities, and
supportive services. 126 SNAP to Skills (S2S) is a USDA project that
is designed to provide direct and intensive technical assistance, tools
and resources to ten states to help each of them build more effective
and job-driven SNAP E&T programs. 127 While Congressional
appropriations to SNAP E&T have grown and USDA has learned a
lot about how to provide states technical assistance in developing and
operating these programs, preliminary evaluations generally found
states only offered basic job search services and have not had
significant impacts on helping ABAWD transition into the
workforce. 128 A recent Government Accountability Office report
121

Id.
ROBERT RECTOR ET AL., MAINE FOOD STAMP WORK REQUIREMENT CUTS NONPARENT CASELOAD BY 80 PERCENT 1, HERITAGE F. (2016), https://www.heritage.org
/welfare/report/maine-food-stamp-work-requirement-cuts-non-parent-caseload-80percent.
123
Reinstatement of Work Requirements for Able-Bodied SNAP Recipients Without
Dependents, IND. FAM. & SOC. SERV. ADMIN., https://www.in.gov/fssa/dfr/4929.ht
m.
124
Chris Joyner, Ga. Cuts Food Stamps for Thousands with New System Tracking
Recipients, Aᴛʟ. J. CONSTITUTION (Dec. 24, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/state-regional-govt--politics/cuts-food-stamps-for-thousands-with-new-system-tracking
-recipients/GUlvrSd5v5CFosItLktYlK/.
125
Scott Bauer, Walker Signs 9 Bills Limiting Wisconsin Welfare Into Law, U.S.
NEWS (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/wisconsin/article
s/2018-04-10/walker-to-sign-9-welfare-overhaul-bills-into-law.
126
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., What is SNAP E&T?, https://snaptoski
lls.fns.usda.gov/about-snap-skills/what-is-snap-et (last visited Aug. 21, 2019).
127
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., About SNAP to Skills,
https://snaptoskills.fns.usda.gov/about-snap-skills (last visited Aug. 21, 2019).
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DEBORAH KOGAN ET AL., SNAP EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING (E&T) BEST
PRACTICES STUDY: FINAL REPORT III-23, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD &NUTR. SERV.
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determined SNAP E&T programs have served a small percentage of
SNAP recipients—less than 1% per month on average in 2016; the
data regarding these programs and their impacts were limited and of
poor quality, and several states have not leveraged work force
development system resources. 129 A 2017 report by the American
Enterprise Institute (AEI)—a conservative think tank—discussed
how SNAP work requirements might hinder a state’s ability to
respond to local economic conditions and the availability or lack of
education and training programs. 130 The AEI report also found this
punitive approach fails to provide robust investment in more
effective pathways to transition ABAWDs into the workforce. 131
The local labor market conditions are an important consideration; to
illustrate, an ERS report found “a 10 percent increase in local
employment raises the average [SNAP] recipient’s probability of
program exit by nearly seven percent.” 132 A recent report from the
White House Council of Economic Advisors found the proposed
work requirements in the preliminary H.R.2 may facilitate the
placement of certain ABAWD into the workforce. 133 However,
evidence from TANF, which has work requirements, suggests that
employment gains were inconsistent and participation in the program
dropped sharply. 134 Ultimately, the 2018 Farm Bill did not include
stricter work requirements and included provisions aiming to
strengthen employment and training operations such as increasing
https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/snap-employment-and-training-et-best-practicesstudy-final-report.
129
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-56, SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: MORE COMPLETE AND ACCURATE INFORMATION NEEDED ON
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING PROGRAMS (2018), https://www.gao.gov/products/GA
O-19-56.
130
See DIANE WHITMORE SCHANZENBACH, THE FUTURE OF SNAP: CONTINUING TO
BALANCE PROTECTION AND INCENTIVES 17, AM. ENTER. ISNT. (2017), http://www.aei
.org/publication/the-future-of-snap-continuing-to-balance-protection-and-incentive
s/ (discussed how SNAP responds quickly to increased need during times of
economic downturns and strengthens the macroeconomy but could do more to assist
participants with finding employment).
131
Id.
132
ERIK SCHERPF ET AL., PARTICIPATION IN USDA’S SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP): EFFECT OF LOCAL LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS IN
OREGON. i, ERR-257, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV. (2018), https://www.ers
.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/90038/err-257.pdf?v=5890.6.
133
EXPANDING WORK REQUIREMENTS IN NON-CASH WELFARE PROGRAMS 5, EXEC.
OFF PRESIDENT COUNS. ECON. ADVISORS (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/Expanding-Work-Requirements-in-Non-Cash-WelfarePrograms.pdf.
134
Marian Jarlenski & Sara N. Bleich, The New Push for Work Requirements in
Medicaid and SNAP: Implications for Children and Families, MED. CARE BLOG
(May 24, 2018), https://www.themedicalcareblog.com/the-new-push-for-work-requ
irements-in-medicaid-and-snap-implications-for-children-and-families/.
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funding, expanding the definition of SNAP E&T programs, and
requiring state agencies to reach out to private employers in
developing their SNAP E&T plans. 135 The 2019 Agricultural
Appropriations allocated $487,707 to employment and training
programs. 136 On March 6, 2019, as part of its Farm Bill
Implementation, the USDA issued an information memorandum on
the self-executing Employment and Training provisions. 137
Altogether, the proposed stricter work requirements in the
preliminary H.R.2 were one of the most contentious differences
between the preliminary House and Senate versions and ultimately
was not a part of 2018 Farm Bill approved by both the House (39047) and Senate (87-13) and signed by President Trump on December
20, 2018. Shortly after the President signed the 2018 Farm Bill, the
USDA Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), issued a new proposed
rule aiming to strengthen the criteria for mandatory SNAP work
requirements and significantly restrict state waiver allowance. 138
The USDA proposed rule indicated the widespread use of ABAWD
waivers during periods when unemployment rates were low
necessitated strengthening the criteria for granting waivers. 139 The
proposed rule also aims to end the unlimited carryover of ABAWD
exemptions, which states have used to extend SNAP eligibility for

See Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-334 § 4005
(discussing employment and training programs for SNAP recipients).
136
DIVISION A – AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2019 30,
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTIVES, https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/do
c/FY%202019%20Explanatory%20Statement%20for%20Division%20A%20(Ag)
%20(1.21.19).pdf.
137
Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t Agric., Food & Nutr. Serv. to the Regional
Directors of Food & Nutr. Serv. 1 (Mar. 6, 2019), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sit
es/default/files/Section-4005-Agriculture-Act-2018.pdf.
138
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for Able-Bodied
Adults Without Dependents, 84 Fed. Reg. 980 (proposed Feb. 1, 2019) (to be
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 273); Olivia Paschal, The Farm Bill and the Assault on Poor
Families: Stringer New Work Requirements for Food-Stamp Recipients Could
Doom Passage of a New Farm Bill, ATLANTIC (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.theatla
ntic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/the-farm-bill-and-the-assault-on-poorfamilies/568441/.
139
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for Able-Bodied
Adults Without Dependents, supra note 138, at 981; see also U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP): STATUS OF STATE ABLEBODIED ADULT WITHOUT DEPENDENTS (ABAWD) TIME LIMIT WAIVERS – FISCAL
YEAR 2019 – 2ND QUARTER (Mar. 13, 2019), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/defa
ult/files/snap/FY19-Quarter2-ABAWD-Waiver-Status.pdf (listing the current
ABAWD time limit waivers approved for State agencies, which is updated each
fiscal quarter).
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ABAWDs. 140 The USDA indicated the proposed rule would not
apply to the disabled, elderly, or women who are pregnant. Over ten
years, the proposed rule is projecting an estimated one billion and
half dollar reduction. Close to eight thousand public comments were
submitted during a sixty-day period that was only briefly extended
for three days due to technical issues with the website;141 even
though, on February 1, 2019 during the historic shutdown,
Representative Marcia Fudge requested an extension for the public
comment period. 142
Legislation was introduced during the 115th Congress to
prevent the USDA from implementing the proposed rule.143 In
addition, Title 1 of a Rules Committee package (H.Res. 6) directs the
House of Representatives’ Office of General Counsel to explore legal
options for responding to the proposed SNAP rule, recognizing, in
part, Congress had the opportunity to address work requirements in
the 2018 Farm Bill and did not. 144 During a Senate hearing on
February 28, 2019, Secretary Perdue was asked several contentious
questions about the proposed rule and then fired back with a press
release reiterating “the need to restore the original intent of SNAP:
A second chance, not a way of life.” 145 On April 3, 2019, the House
Agriculture Subcommittee on Nutrition, Oversight and Department
Operations held a hearing regarding the proposed rule and most
members expressed strong opposition, emphasizing Congressional
intent was expressed during the 2018 Farm Bill to not impose stricter
work requirements and the USDA should await the results of the
2018 Farm Bill provisions aiming to strengthen SNAP E&T
programs. 146 The day before the hearing, more than 100 House
140
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for Able-Bodied
Adults Without Dependents, supra note 138, at 980.
141
Id. at Enhanced Content – Public Comments.
142
Press Release, Rep. Marcia L. Fudge (D-OH-11), Congresswoman Marcia L.
Fudge Requests Immediate Extension of USDA’s Comment Period on SNAP Rule
(Feb. 1, 2019), https://fudge.house.gov/press-statements/congresswoman-marcia-lfudge-requests-immediate-extension-of-usdas-comment-period-on-snap-rule/.
143
Protect SNAP Act, H.R. 7372, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018), https://delauro.house.go
v/sites/delauro.house.gov/files/Protect_SNAP_Act.pdf?eType=EmailBlastContent
&eId=9ecb2bc8-24c4-45f2-974b-a80c3bbce3ad.
144
Adopting the Rules of the House of Representatives for the One Hundred
Sixteenth Congress, and for other purposes, H.R. Res. 6, 116th Cong. § 103(o)
(2019).
145
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Agric., Perdue Reiterates Need to Restore Original
Intent of SNAP: A Second Chance, Not A Way of Life (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2019/02/28/perdue-reiterates-needrestore-original-intent-snap-second-chance.
146
Hearing: Subcommittee on Nutrition, Oversight and Department Operations –
RE: “Examining the Proposed ABAWD Rule and its Impact on Hunger and
Hardship”, REPUBLICAN HOUSE COMM. ON AGRIC. (Apr. 3, 2019), https://republica
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Democrats sent a letter to Secretary Perdue urging him to withdraw
the proposed rule and demanding detailed demographic data on
ABAWDs. 147 The USDA only provided a publicly available report
at this time, which lacked the requested detailed assessment.148 In
addition, Secretary Perdue acknowledged the definition of ABAWDs
might need further refining. 149 Similarly, close to half of the
members of the Senate in a bipartisan effort sent a letter to Secretary
Perdue explaining how the proposed rule is “…contrary to
Congressional intent, evidenced by the passage of the Agriculture
Improvement Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-334), which rejected similar
harmful changes to SNAP and passed Congress by a historic vote of
87-13 in the Senate and by 369-47 in the House of
Representatives.” 150
The proposed rule will likely affect participation rates and
participant churn in SNAP, which occurs when a SNAP participant
exits and then reenters within four months or less. 151 Evidence
suggests the stronger enforcement of mandatory work requirements
and stricter standards for waivers put forth in this proposed rule could
potentially affect the food security status of more than one million
individuals. 152 Retail food outlets could also lose millions of
ns-agriculture.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=4523&utm_source=
SNEB+Members&utm_campaign=cb428b769a-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_08
_25_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_5640af03cf-cb428b769a709895345.
147
Press Release, Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT-3rd), DeLauro, House Dems Urge
Secretary Perdue to Withdraw Harmful Changes to SNAP Work Requirements (Apr.
2, 2019), https://delauro.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/delauro-house-dem
s-urge-secretary-perdue-withdraw-harmful-changes-snap.
148
Ryan McCrimmon, Dems Turn Up Heat on SNAP data, POLITICO (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-agriculture/2019/04/04/dems-turnup-heat-on-snap-data-570428.
149
Ryan McCrimmon, Disaster Aid Talks Break Down as New Storm Nears,
POLITICO (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-agricultur
e/2019/04/10/disaster-aid-talks-break-down-as-new-storm-nears-577842.
150
Press Release, Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA), Warner, Kaine Urge Trump Admin.
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29, 2019), https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/3/warner-kaineurge-trump-admin-to-withdraw-rule-that-would-take-away-nutrition-benefits-elim
inate-jobs.
151
GREGORY MILLS ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE RATES, CAUSES, AND COSTS OF
CHURNING IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP).:
Final Report 14, U.S. DEP’T. AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV. (2014), https://fnsprod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ops/SNAPChurning.pdf.
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Karen Cunnyngham, Proposed Changes to the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program: Waivers to Work-Related Time Limits 1, MATHEMATICA POL’Y
RES. (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-publications-andfindings/publications/proposed-changes-to-the-supplemental-nutrition-assistanceprogram-waivers-to-work-related-time.

162

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.15

dollars. 153 According to a recent Hamilton Project analysis, the
proposed rule would likely weaken states’ ability to respond to
deteriorating economic conditions and negatively affect the
important automatic stabilizer SNAP provides in our fiscal policy
toolkit. 154 Likewise, a recent Urban Institute case study of ABAWD
in Kentucky found at least 13,122 SNAP participants lost benefits
because they reached the three-month time limit after work
requirements were reinstated. 155 The study authors expressed
concern about this “rapid loss of SNAP benefits associated with a
policy change without clear evidence.” 156 In Wisconsin, a New Food
Economy analysis found the state’s expanded work requirements fell
short of expectations and was expensive (more than one billion
annually was paid to the one company awarded the employment
training program contract). 157 On the other hand, The Foundation for
Government Accountability contends states have used “loopholes
and gimmicks” to waive work requirements, which were “only
intended for areas with unemployment rates above ten percent or that
otherwise lacked job opportunities for ablebodied adults.” 158
Future research can further examine how best to utilize a
program aimed at preventing food insecurity as a means of
transitioning participants with a range of marketable skills and life
circumstances into more stable and stronger workforce situations.159
Leslie Gersing, City Grocers Could Lose Millions Monthly in Federal FoodStamp Proposal, CRAINS N.Y. BUS. (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.crainsnewyork.c
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(2017), https://snaptoskills.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2017-05/S2SBrief6_Int
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Evidence suggests that food and nutrition assistance is often still
needed even when an individual is employed full time. 160 In
addition, more state demonstrations might provide better insights on
how to provide states flexibility and other administrative supports
necessary to meet their constituents’ food security and employment
needs through administering SNAP, among other safety net
programs. Future research could also focus on how to develop,
implement, and scale up more effective and efficient employment
and training activities aiming to provide more than basic job
searching tips and target developing marketable skills. 161
C. Benefit Adequacy, Issuance & Redemption
i. Benefit Adequacy
The 2018 Farm Bill did not significantly alter benefit
adequacy or issuance, with the exception of establishing an interstate
data system to prevent the simultaneous issuance of SNAP benefits
to an individual by more than one state. 162 Fortunately, the 2018
Farm Bill did not eliminate the minimum SNAP benefit proposed in
President Trump’s 2018 budget. 163 But bipartisan support was not
secured for the Closing the Meal Gap Act that aimed to revise the
requirements for calculating SNAP benefits using the Low-Cost
Food Plan instead of the Thrifty Food Plan. 164 A SNAP benefit
allotment is calculated by multiplying an individual’s or household’s
net monthly income by 0.3 and then subtracting the result from the

om/economics/the-implementation-of-snap-work-requirements-could-be-hugelyharmful-to-the-lgbt-community (discusses how there is limited data available to
understand potentially harmful impacts of stricter work requirements to the LGBT
community).
160
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https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2019/04/25/food-assistance-programs-snap
-funding-000894 (finding among 100 families studied in North Carolina that even
when participants worked full time for usually low wages, food stamps often helped
ensure all household members remained food secure).
161
USDA FNS SNAP E and T Pilots, DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV. (Aug. 24,
2019), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/usda-fns-snap-e-and-t-pilots.
162
Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong § 4011 (2017-2018);
Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, S. 3042, 115th Cong. § 4019 (2018).
163
OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR AMERICAN GREATNESS. FISCAL YEAR 2018
10, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2018-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-20
18-BUD.pdf.
164
Closing the Meal Gap Act of 2017, H.R. 1276, 115th Cong. (2017-2018),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1276.
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maximum monthly allotment for an individual or household size.165
Allotments are different in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and the US Virgin
Islands. 166 According to a 2006 USDA report, the Thrifty Food Plan
is the basis for SNAP benefit allotments and aims to provide a
“representative healthful and minimal cost meal plan that shows how
a nutritious diet may be achieved with limited resources.” 167 This
2006 report updated the 1999 version of the Thrifty Food Plan.168
The USDA also puts forth three other plans at different costs known
as: Low-Cost, Moderate-Cost, and Liberal Food. 169 On a monthly
basis, the USDA provides weekly and monthly costs for each of the
four food plans. 170 While Closing the Meal Gap was not supported,
the 2018 Farm Bill requires the USDA Secretary to re-evaluate and
publish the Thrifty Food Plan every five years based on dietary
guidance, food prices, food composition data, and consumption
patterns. 171
Recently, the Closing the Meal Gap Act was
reintroduced in the House (H.R. 1368) to amend the Food and
Nutrition Act of 2008 to require SNAP benefits be based on the Low
Cost Food Plan. 172 In the Senate, a bill (S.677) proposes to amend
the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 to provide for participation of
Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands in SNAP (instead of NAP, a block grant
program explained earlier), which will enable equitable nutrition
165
Am I Eligible for SNAP?, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV. (Nov. 16,
2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibility#How%20much%20could%20I%2
0receive%20in%20SNAP%20benefits?.
166
Id.
167
See ANDREA CARLSON ET AL., THRIFTY FOOD PLAN, 2996, CNPP-19, CTR. ON
BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES i (2007), https://www.cnpp.usda.gov/sites/default/f
iles/usda_food_plans_cost_of_food/TFP2006Report.pdf (explains how the 2006
Thrifty Food Plan is based on the 2005 Dietary Guidelines for Americans as well as
the 2005 MyPyramid Food Guidance System, uses the prices low-income people
paid for many foods, uses the latest data on food consumption, nutrient content, and
food prices, the 2001-2002 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey and
the 2001-2002 Food Price Database, and offers a more realistic reflection of the time
available for food preparation).
168
Id. at ES-1; THE THRIFTY FOOD PLAN, 1999: ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, CNPP-7,
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. CTR. FOR NUTRITION POL’Y & PROMOTION (1999),
https://www.cnpp.usda.gov/sites/default/files/usda_food_plans_cost_of_food/Food
Plans1999ThriftyFoodPlanAdminReport.pdf.
169
THE LOW-COST, MODERATE COST, AND LIBERAL FOOD PLANS: 2003
ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, CNPP-13, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. CTR. FOR NUTRITION POL’Y
& PROMOTION (2003), https://www.cnpp.usda.gov/sites/default/files/usda_food_pla
ns_cost_of_food/FoodPlans2003AdminReport.pdf.
170
USDA Food Plans: Cost of Food, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. CTR. FOR NUTRITION POL’Y
& PROMOTION https://www.cnpp.usda.gov/USDAFoodPlansCostofFood/reports
(last visited Aug. 27, 2019).
171
Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-334, § 4002, 132 Stat.
4490, 4624 (2018).
172
Closing the Meal Gap Act of 2019, H.R. 1368, 116th Cong. (2019-2020).
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assistance for SNAP eligible individuals and households living in US
territories. 173 A legal battle is underway against the USDA, among
other federal agencies, regarding “policies awarding lower federal
benefits to US citizens who reside in Puerto Rico than to similarly
situated and equally needy US citizens residing in any of the 50 states
of the US.”174 The plaintiffs seek an injunction and declaration that
these federal laws violate their right to equal protection guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment. 175 At the state level, starting March 1,
2019, Maine enacted a working families supplement benefit that was
authorized by the Maine State Legislature in 2011 and is funded
through TANF that will more than triple benefits from $15 to $50 per
month for approximately 13,000 working families receiving SNAP
benefits. 176
A 2013 Institute of Medicine (IOM) examination of the
evidence to define SNAP benefit adequacy concluded it is possible
to develop a definition of allotment adequacy that factors in cost-time
trade-offs involved in procuring and preparing a safe and nutritious
diet, geographic price variations, and access to retail food outlets.177
The IOM report also found the assumptions regarding a SNAP
participant’s time built into the Thrifty Food Plan are “inconsistent
with the time available for most households at all income levels,
particularly those with a single working head.” 178 Similarly, the ERS
determined more attention is needed on how best to balance program
costs with benefit adequacy and to make appropriate adjustments for
geographic variations in food and beverage prices; cost variations
associated with nutrient requirements of household members of
varying life stages; and the costs of time spent in food preparation
built into the dated Thrifty Food Plan. 179 A 2018 analysis found the
SNAP benefit does not cover the cost of a low-income meal in
ninety-nine percent of US continental counties and the District of
Columbia and suggested Congress consider strategies to better align
Equitable Nutrition Assistance for the Territories Act of 2019, S. 677, 116th
Cong. (2019-2020).
174
Martinez v. Azar, No. 3:18-cv-01206, 2018 WL 1795786, at *2 (D. P.R. Apr. 13,
2018); see also Martinez v. Azar, 376 F. Supp. 3d 191 (D. P.R. Apr. 15, 2019)
(explaining how the complaint barely survived a motion to dismiss).
175
Martinez, 2018 WL 1795786, at *6.
176
News Release, Me. Dep’t Health & Hum. Serv., Maine DHHS Takes Steps to
Support Working Families, (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.maine.gov/dhhs/pressrelease.shtml?id=1100668.
177
COMM. ON EXAMINATION ADEQUACY FOOD RES. & SNAP ALLOTMENTS, ET AL.,
SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE TO
DEFINE BENEFIT ADEQUACY 4 (Julie A. Caswell & Ann L. Yaktine, eds. 2013).
178
Id.
179
OLIVEIRA ET AL., supra note 64, at iv.
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the maximum SNAP benefit with county-level meal costs.180
Another recent study determined that SNAP benefits may be
insufficient to support eating patterns recommended by the Dietary
Guidelines for Americans. 181 Increasing SNAP benefits resulted in
increased food expenditures, decreased levels of food insecurity, and
modest improvements in dietary quality among school-aged children
participating in a Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer for Children
demonstration. 182 Similarly, increases in SNAP benefits following
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5)
were associated with increased food expenditures and decreased
levels of food insecurity. 183 Recently, the Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities conducted a review of the literature on SNAP
benefit adequacy and found families in high-cost areas find it
especially difficult to afford a healthy diet.184 Thus, more timely and
sufficient legislative attention is needed towards defining,
calculating, and providing adequate SNAP benefits. This work
includes improving the evidence base for how minimum wage laws,
among other improvements in the social safety net, supports impact
SNAP benefit adequacy.
ii. Benefit Issuance
Aside from benefit adequacy, further work is needed to
explore how state authority to make decisions about the timing and
frequency of benefit issuance impact SNAP participants. Currently,
households participating in SNAP receive benefits once monthly,185

ELAINE WAXMAN ET AL., HOW FAR DO SNAP BENEFITS FALL SHORT OF
COVERING THE COST OF A MEAL? 6, URB. INST. (2018), https://www.urban.org/resea
rch/publication/how-far-do-snap-benefits-fall-short-covering-cost-meal.
181
Kranti Mulik & Lindsey Haynes-Maslow, The Affordability of MyPlate: An
Analysis of SNAP Benefits and the Actual Cost of Eating According to the Dietary
Guidelines, 49 J. NUTRITION EDUC. & BEHAV. 623, 623 (2017).
182
Ann M. Collins & Jacob A. Klerman, Improving Nutrition by Increasing
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Benefits, 52 AM. J. PREV. MED. S179,
S181 (2017).
183
MARK NORD & MARK PRELL, FOOD SECURITY IMPROVED FOLLOWING THE 2009
ARRA INCREASE IN SNAP BENEFITS iii, ERR-116, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES.
SERV. (2011), https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=44839.
184
Steven Carlson, More Adequate SNAP Benefits Would Help Millions of
Participants Better Afford Food (July, 30 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/foo
d-assistance/more-adequate-snap-benefits-would-help-millions-of-participants-bett
er.
185
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) When Are Benefits
Available?, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV., https://www.fns.usd
a.gov/snap/snap-monthly-benefit-issuance-schedule.
180
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and most benefits are spent within two weeks of receipt. 186 Research
consistently shows that early exhaustion of benefits leads to food
insecurity at the end of the SNAP benefit month. 187 This monthly
cycle of food insecurity has been called the “SNAP nutrition cycle,”
and is linked to a host of negative health and societal outcomes,
including reduced caloric intake and diet quality, increased hospital
admissions for hypoglycemia, lower standardized test scores, and
increased crime. 188 More frequent issuance (e.g., distributing
benefits every two weeks) could potentially help SNAP participants
smooth consumption and reduce the severity of food insecurity
experienced at the end of the month. 189 In 2006, a proposal in
Michigan aimed to do just this, 190 but was halted by language in the
2008 Farm Bill, which makes it infeasible for states to issue benefits
more frequently than once per month absent an act of Congress.191
By contrast, states have authority to decide when, during the course
of the month, individual households receive their benefits.192
Currently, there is substantial variation across states regarding
benefit issuance. 193 In seven states, all SNAP participants receive
their benefits on a single day of the month (single-day issuance); in
another seven states, SNAP participants receive their monthly
benefits spread over three to seven different days; and in the
Policy Basics: The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), CTR. ON
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-thesupplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap (last updated June 25, 2019).
187
K.S. Hamrick & M. Andrews, SNAP Participants’ Eating Patterns Over the
Benefit Month: A Time Use Perspective, 11 PLOS One e0158422 (2016).
188
C. Cotti, J. Gordanier, & O. Ozturk, When Does It Count? The Timing of Food
Stamp Receipt and Educational Performance, 66 ECONOMICS EDUC. REV. 40-50
(2018).
189
A. Ammerman, T. Hartman, & M.M. DeMarco, Behavioral Economics and the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Making the Healthy Choice the Easy
Choice, 52 AM J. PREV. MED. S145-S150 (2017); Tommy Tobin, Semi-Monthly
Benefit Transfers Are A Simple Way to Improve Food Stamps, FORBES (Apr. 23,
2018) https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommytobin/2018/04/23/fixing-food-stampsfor-families/#6ad45bc638d7.
190
Id.; Changing the Monthly Food Stamp Cycle, U.S. FOOD POLICY (May 13, 2006),
http://usfoodpolicy.blogspot.com/2006/05/changing-monthly-food-stamp-cycle.ht
ml.
191
Sec. 7. Issuance and Use of Program Benefits, (g) Alternative Benefit Delivery,
The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-234), https://www.agric
ulture.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/110-246%20%20Food,%20Conservation,%20And%20Energy%20Act%20Of%202008.pdf.
192
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) When Are Benefits
Available?, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV., https://www.fns.us
da.gov/snap/snap-monthly-benefit-issuance-schedule (last updated Apr. 23, 2014).
193
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): Monthly Issuance Schedule
for All States and Territories, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV.,
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/Monthly-Issuance-ScheduleAll-States.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2019).
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remaining thirty-six states, benefits are received on eight to twentyeight different days each month (each beneficiary is assigned a day
usually by case number or last name). 194 But these state issuance
schedules continue to evolve. 195 Some research suggests that
issuance schedules affect retailer behaviors, with retailers operating
in states with single-day or short issuance schedules increasing prices
or targeting advertisements during the first week of the benefit
month. 196 For example, one study found in-store sugar-sweetened
beverage marketing was 4.35 times higher during SNAP issuance
compared with non-issuance days in census tracts with high SNAP
enrollment. 197 Shutdown implications on issuance are discussed in

194

Id.
Kel Dansby, Expect Changes in SNAP Issue Dates Beginning July (May 31,
2019), https://www.8newsnow.com/news/local-news/expect-changes-in-snap-issue
-dates-beginning-july/ (explaining how in the beginning of July 2019, the State of
Nevada Division of Welfare and Supportive Services will spread out the issue date
to the first 10 days of the month determined by the last digit of the recipient’s birth
year); see also Jessica E. Todd & Christian A. Gregory, ERS’s SNAP Distribution
Schedule Database Allows for New Research on Program Impacts, USDA ERS
AMBER WAVES (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2019/augu
st/ers-s-snap-distribution-schedule-database-allows-for-new-research-on-programimpacts/.
196
E. Castellari, C. Cotti, J. Gordanier, & O. Ozturk, Does the Timing of Food Stamp
Distribution Matter? A Panel-Data Analysis of Monthly Purchasing Patterns of US
Households, 26 HEALTH ECON. 1380-1393 (2017); Justine S. Hasting & Ebonya L.
Washington, The First of the Month Effect: Consumer Behavior and Store
Responses (2008), NBER Working Paper No. 14578, https://www.nber.org/papers
/w14578; L.A. Gennetian, R. Seshardi, N.D. Hess, A.N. Winn, & R.M. George,
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Benefit Cycles and Student
Disciplinary Infractions, 90 SOC. SER. REV. 403-433 (2016); P.E. Wilde & C.K.
Ranney, The Monthly Food Stamp Cycle: Shopping Frequency and Food Intake
Decisions in an Endogenous Switching Regression Framework, 82 AM. J. AG. ECON.
200-213 (2000); J.M. Shapiro, Is There a Daily Discount Rate? Evidence from the
Food Stamp Nutrition Cycle, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 303-325 (2005); J.E. Todd, Revisiting
the Supplementation Nutrition Assistance Program Cycle of Food Intake:
Investigating Heterogeneity, Diet Quality, and a Large Boost in Benefit Amounts,
37 APPLIED ECON. PERSPECTIVES & POL’Y 437-458 (2015); E.D. Whiteman, B.W.
Chrisinger, & A. Hillier, Diet Quality Over the Monthly Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program Cycle, 55 AM J. PREV. MED. 205-212 (2018); K.S. Hamrick &
M. Andrews, SNAP Participants’ Eating Patterns Over the Benefit Month: A Time
Use Perspective, 11 PLOS ONE e0158422 (2016); M.A. Kuhn, Who Feels the
Calorie Crunch and When? The Impact of School Meals on Cyclical Food
Insecurity, 166 J. PUB. ECON. 27-38 (2018); N. Sanjeevi & J. Freeland-Graves,
Monthly Variations in Dietary Intake of Women Participating in the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program, 119 J. ACAD. NUTR. DIET. 261-271 (2019); H.K.
Seligman, A.F. Bolger, D. Guzman, A. Lopez, & K. Bibbins-Domingo, Exhaustion
of Food Budgets at Month’s End and Hospital Admissions for Hypoglycemia, 33
HEALTH AFF. (Milwood) 116-123 (2014).
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the appropriations section. More research is needed to better inform
federal and state policy and programmatic decisions regarding
benefit issuance, along with how best to work with retailers and
participants to maximize benefit utilization that preserves SNAP’s
mission to promote food security and improve nutrition.
iii. Benefit Redemption
Unlike benefit adequacy and issuance, recent legislative
actions have explored approaches to modernizing the redemption of
SNAP benefits, particularly at farmers’ markets, restaurants, and
through online delivery 198 and during the summer months when
child(ren) are not participating in school-based child nutrition
assistance programs. Indeed, more than seven thousand farmers’
markets and direct-marketing farmers are now SNAP authorized and
$22.4 million (less than 0.1%) of SNAP benefits were redeemed at
direct-marketing farmers or farmers’ markets in fiscal year 2017.199
USDA reported SNAP redemptions at farmers’ markets increased
from $2.7 million in fiscal year 2008 to more than $19 million in
fiscal year 2015, which is an increase of about 620 percent and, since
fiscal year 2008, the number of farmers’ markets authorized to accept
SNAP increased by 587 percent. 200
Community Supported
Agriculture (CSAs) is another possible innovative mode now eligible
to help connect local farmers with SNAP participants. 201 This is
tremendous given SNAP participants could potentially improve
access to and consumption of fresh fruits and vegetables and these
purchases help farmers. 202
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Benefit Issuance in New York, 55 AM
J. PREV. MED. 55-62 (2018).
198
Parke Wilde & Mehreen Ismail, Beyond the Farm in the Farm Bill: What
Nutrition Professionals Need to Know about the Nutrition Title, 52 NUTR. TODAY
273, 277 (2017).
199
UNITED STATES DEP’T AGRIC., COMPARISON OF SNAP AUTHORIZED FARMERS
AND MARKETS FY2012 AND FY2017, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/fil
es/snap/SNAP-Farmers-Markets-Redemptions.pdf.
200
Dennis Pillion, Increased Food Stamp Use at Alabama Farmers Markets Puts
Healthy Food On Tables, Officials Say, ALABAMA (Jul. 21, 2015), https://www.al.co
m/news/index.ssf/2015/07/food_stamps_at_farmers_markets.html.
201
UNITED STATES DEP’T. AGRIC., OPERATING A CSA AND SNAP PARTICIPATION,
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/CSA.pdf.
202
D.A. Freedman et al., Systematic Review of Factors Influencing Farmers’ Market
Use Overall and Among Low-Income Populations, 116 J. ACAD. NUTR. DIET. NUTR.
1136, 1151 (2016); H.M. Black et al., Improving Fruit and Vegetable Consumption:
Use of Farm-to-Consumer Venues Among US Adults, 8 PREV. CHRONIC DIS. 1, 2
(2011); R.C. Woodruff et al., Urban Farmers Markets as a Strategy to Increase
Access to and Consumption of Fresh Vegetables Among SNAP and Non-SNAP
Participants: Results from an Evaluation, 8 J. AGRIC. FOOD SYSTEMS & COMM. DEV.
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The Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79) requires
authorized SNAP retailers to pay for their own electronic benefit
transfer (EBT) equipment but provided an exception for eligible
farmers’ markets and direct-marketing farmers, among others. 203 In
addition, appropriations were authorized to allow the USDA to
provide EBT equipment to eligible markets and farmers.204
Unfortunately, on July 14, 2018, the FNS Administrator responded
to news that a major provider of mobile EBT technology for farmers’
markets would be discontinuing this service and outlined a variety of
strategies available to ensure markets and farmers have the
equipment needed to continue to process SNAP transactions. 205 FNS
recently increased the cost for markets to accept EBT and now
requires each farmers’ market location to obtain its own EBT
authorization number and machine, even if multiple locations are
operated by a single organization. 206 The 2018 Farm Bill only made
modest adjustments to EBT system rules including temporarily
banning the switching and routing of fees and easing of EBT
authorization processes for farmers’ markets serving multiple
locations. 207 In other words, the 2018 Farm Bill allows farmers’
market vendors to use a single device to accept SNAP EBT at
multiple farmers’ market locations. The current regulations require
one device per location. Fortunately, a financial tech company
provided a two million dollar lifeline to ensure continuance of EBT
cards at farmers’ markets and the company is exploring how to
ensure the appropriate technology is in place to enable vendors to use
one device at multiple locations, which should lower costs and
reduce administrative burdens. 208 Farmers’ market vendors are also
93, 101 (2018); A.M. Buttenheim et al., Increasing Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program/Electronic Benefit Transfer Sales at Farmers’ Markets with
Vendor-Operated Wireless Point-of-Sale Terminals, 112 J. ACAD. NUTR. DIET. 636,
641 (2012); Brenda Robles et al., Dietary Behaviors Among Public Health Center
Clients with Electronic Benefit Transfer Access at Farmers’ Markets, 117 J. ACAD.
NUTR. DIET. 58, 65 (2017).
203
H.R. 2642, 113th Cong (2014) (enacted).
204
Id.
205
USDA Statement on SNAP Access at Farmers Markets, Release No. FNS 000518, UNITED STATES DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV. (July 14, 2018),
https://www.fns.usda.gov/pressrelease/2018/fns-0005-18.
206
UNITED STATES DEP’T. AGRIC., INFORMATION ABOUT FARMERS MARKETS AND
DIRECT MARKETING FARMERS PARTICIPATION IN SNAP, https://fns-prod.azureedge.n
et/sites/default/files/snap/SNAP-Farmers-Market-FAQs.pdf; Policy Priorities
Request that FNS Revise its “One Site, One Permit, One Machine” Policy, FARMERS
MARKET COALITION, https://farmersmarketcoalition.org/advocacy/snap/ (last visited
Aug. 27, 2019).
207
H.R. 2, 115th Cong. § 4006 (2018) (enacted).
208
Jane Block, Tech Company Comes to the Rescue of Food Stamp Benefits at
Farmers Markets, WA. POST (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifes
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expecting additional support through the Local Agriculture Market
Program (LAMP), which was created in the 2018 Farm Bill and
provides $50 million annually in permanent, mandatory funding.209
LAMP aims to improve coordination for local and regional food
systems funding across agencies and streamlines certain existing
programs by putting them under one umbrella such as the Farmers
Market and Local Food Promotion Program (FMLFPP) and ValueAdded Producer Grants (VAPG). 210
Restaurants’ redemption is evolving. Back in 1971, in
Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cleveland v. United States, the US
Supreme Court determined the Secretary of Agriculture acted within
his scope of authority granted under the Food Stamp Act of 1964 in
denying the applicant fast food restaurant request to participate as a
“retail food store” in the Food Stamp Program and only approved
grocery establishments which stock a large number of low-cost
staples. 211 In the Food Stamp Act of 1977, states were granted
flexibility to authorize certain restaurants as SNAP retailers to enable
SNAP redemption for homeless, elderly, and/or disabled. 212 If states
elected to operate a Restaurant Meals Program for certain eligible
SNAP participants, the Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79)
established requirements for plans and reports to help monitor the
program’s effectiveness and integrity. 213 California, Arizona, and
Rhode Island, among others, have well developed Restaurant Meal
Programs. 214 Yet, determining if a state participates in the Restaurant
tyle/food/tech-company-comes-to-the-rescue-of-food-stamp-benefits-at-farmers-m
arkets/2019/01/30/ba22def2-24e7-11e9-90cd-dedb0c92dc17_story.html?eId=1105
89c8-7f5b-45ec-9adb-37d5af509426&eType=EmailBlastContent&utm_term=.250
f86780028.
209
A Closer Look at the 2018 Farm Bill: Local Agriculture Market Program, NAT’L
SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COAL. (Jan. 22, 2019), http://sustainableagriculture.net/blog/2
018-farm-bill-local-agriculture-market-program/.
210
Id.
211
Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cleveland v. United States, 449 F.2d 255, 256 (5th
Cir. 1971).
212
The Food Stamp Act of 1977 (P.L. 88-525); Marion Nestle, Using SNAP Benefits
for Fast Food Restaurants is a State Decision, ATLANTIC (Sept. 14, 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/09/using-snap-benefits-for-fastfood-restaurants-is-a-state-decision/245085/; Nicole, Low Income Relief: These
Fast Food restaurants Accept EBT, LOW INCOME RELIEF (Feb. 18, 2017),
https://lowincomerelief.com/fast-food-restaurants-ebt/; William Lipovsky, First
Quarter Finance: What Fast-Food Places Take EBT/Food Stamps/SNAP? Here’s
the List, FIRST QUARTER FINANCE (Mar. 21, 2019), https://firstquarterfinance.com/w
hat-fast-food-places-take-ebt-food-stamps-snap/.
213
H.R. 2642, supra note 203.
214
Cynthia Hsu, Food Stamps Accepted in Restaurants in AZ, CA, FL, MI, FINDLAW
(Sept. 8, 2011), https://blogs.findlaw.com/law_and_life/2011/09/food-stamps-forrestaurants-accepted-in-az-ca-fl-mi.html; Restaurant Meals Program, CAL. DEP’T
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Meal Program using a state SNAP website is not always
straightforward and even if a state does participate in the program,
identifying which restaurants are authorized could be difficult.215
Similarly, using the USDA retailer website to determine if a
restaurant participates can be challenging. 216 Little is known about
the health impacts of this SNAP redemption option.
An emerging redemption innovation being explored is the
Summer Electronic Benefits Transfer for Children (SEBTC)
demonstration to study the use of SNAP and the USDA
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program for Women, Infants, and
Children (WIC) electronic benefits transfer to provide assistance to
low-income children during the summer. 217
In a recent
demonstration project, SEBTC provided certain households with
additional resources during the summer months when they were not
participating in school meal programs such as the USDA National
School Lunch Program and School Breakfast Program. 218 The 2010
Agriculture Appropriations Act (P.L.111-80) authorized and
provided funding for the USDA to implement and rigorously
evaluate demonstrations to reduce summer food insecurity for
children. 219 The SEBTC demonstration project findings indicate the
benefit of $60 per month per child reduced the most severe category
of food insecurity among children during the summer by one-third
and receiving either a $30 or $60 monthly were both associated with
higher fruit and vegetable consumption. 220 The 2018 Farm Bill did
not address the use of SNAP to provide additional benefits during the
summer but future legislative action might occur as the Child
Nutrition Reauthorization processes get underway.
SOC. SERV., https://www.cdss.ca.gov/inforesources/CalFresh/Restaurant-MealsProgram (last visited Aug. 27, 2019); Restaurant Meals Program, ARIZ. DEP’T
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0FLYER%20Q&A.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2019).
215
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https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/retailerlocator (last visited Aug. 27, 2019); Retailer
Eligibility – Restaurants, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., https://www.fns
.usda.gov/retailer-eligibility-restaurants (last visited Aug. 27, 2019).
216
Id.
217
Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer for Children (SEBTC), U.S. DEP’T. AGRIC.
FOOD & NUTR. SERV., https://www.fns.usda.gov/ops/summer-electronic-benefittransfer-children-sebtc (last updated Nov. 8, 2013).
218
Id.
219
H.R. 2997, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted).
220
Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer for Children (SEBTC) Demonstration:
Summary Report 2011-2014 (Summary), U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV.
(May 2016) https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ops/sebtcfinalreportsummary.pdf.
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Congress has taken steady legislative actions to explore the
use of online delivery among SNAP participants, given one-third of
SNAP participants use someone else’s car, walk, bike or use public
transit to grocery shop. 221 The Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 11379) mandated Online Purchasing Pilots to test the feasibility of online
transactions using SNAP benefits. 222 FNS recently requested public
comments about the evaluation planned for the two-year online
transaction pilots taking place with the following retail food outlets
(in the following states): Amazon (Maryland, New Jersey, New
York), FreshDirect (New York), Safeway (Maryland, Oregon,
Washington), ShopRite (Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania), HyVee, Inc. (Iowa), Hart’s Local Grocers (New York), and Dash’s
Market (New York). 223 These pilots, among other studies, can help
better understand the challenges and motivators to successfully
implementing an online delivery option for SNAP eligible
individuals and families. 224 The 2018 Farm Bill directs the USDA
Secretary to authorize the use of mobile technologies for the purpose
of accessing SNAP benefits, after conducting no more than five
demonstration projects to pilot such technologies. 225 Put another
way, the 2018 Farm Bill requires nationwide implementation of
Michele Ver Ploeg et al., Where Do Americans Usually Shop for Food and How
Do They Travel To Get There? Initial Findings from the National Household Food
Acquisition and Purchase Survey, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ERS, (Mar. 2015)
https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=79791.
222
H.R. 2642, supra note 203.
223
Agency Information Collection Activities: Evaluation of Technology
Modernization for SNAP Benefit Redemption
Through Online Transactions for the USDA Food and Nutrition Service, 83 Fed.
Reg. 36515, 36515 (July 30, 2018), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2018-0730/pdf/2018-16220.pdf (request for comments); USDA Announces Retailer
Volunteers for SNAP Online Purchasing Pilot, U.S. DEP’T. AGRIC. (Jan. 5, 2017),
https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2017/01/05/usda-announces-retailer-vo
lunteers-snap-online-purchasing-pilot (indicating the pilot retailers and the
locations of each retailer); Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
Online Purchasing Pilot, U.S. DEP’T. AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., https://www.fns
.usda.gov/snap/online-purchasing-pilot (last updated June 27, 2019) (indicating the
pilot retailers and their locations).
224
See e.g. Olivia Martinez, Barbara Tagliaferro, Noemi Rodriguez, Jessica Athens,
Courtney Abrams, & Brian Elbel, EBT Payment for Online Grocery Orders: A
Mixed-Methods Study to Understand Its Uptake among SNAP Recipients and the
Barriers to and Motivators for Its Use, 50 J. NUTR. EDUC. BEHAV. 396, 396 (2018)
(examining “uptake of the pilot program and its impact on SNAP recipients’ food
purchases” and concluding that “[e]lectronic Beneﬁt Transfer for online grocery
purchases has the potential to increase food access among SNAP beneﬁciaries,” but
“[u]nderstanding online food shopping barriers and motivators is critical to the
success of policies targeting the online expansion of SNAP beneﬁts”).
225
Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-334, § 4006(e), 132 Stat.
4490, 4635–4636 (2018).
221
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online acceptance for SNAP benefits after the pilots required in the
2014 Farm Bill are implemented. 226 On April 18, 2019, participants
in the two-year test (pilot) in New York State were the first ever to
select and pay for their groceries online; eventually, the other pilots
will get underway. 227 Recent analyses have raised concern about the
data privacy requirements set out in the pilot’s Request for
Volunteers might not sufficiently safeguard against predatory
marketing practices tailored at an already disadvantaged
population. 228 Therefore, permitting online transactions might help
ensure home bound SNAP participants or those with limited
transportation options have modernized redemption alternatives;
however, much remains before nationwide implementation.
Another redemption development is the recent legal battle
over whether SNAP redemption data at the retailer level (online or
brick or mortar) is confidential business information; 229 recently
Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch stayed a lower court’s order
requiring the disclosure of how much money retail food outlets earn
from SNAP transactions230 until the plaintiff, Argus Leader,
responds to the Food Marketing Institute’s request to appeal to the
US Supreme Court. 231 On April 22, 2019, the Supreme Court heard
oral arguments and, based on the Justices questions, most Justices
appear to be leaning towards maintaining the existing standard,
centering on the competitive harm that could result from expanding
the types of traditional confidential business information that could
FOOD RES. & ACTION CTR., FOOD RESEARCH & ACTION CENTER’S ANALYSIS OF
FINAL FARM BILL CONFERENCE REPORT AGRICULTURE IMPROVEMENT ACT OF
2018: TITLE IV– NUTRITION 3, http://frac.org/wp-content/uploads/2018-farm-billconference-report-analysis.pdf; see also Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-334, § 4001(a), 132 Stat. 4490, 4624 (2018) (“Section 3(o)(1) of
the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (7 U.S.C. 2012(o)(1)) is amended by striking ‘or
house-to-house trade route’ and inserting ‘, house-to-house trade route, or online
entity.’”).
227
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Agric., USDA Launches SNAP Online Purchasing
Pilot (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2019/04/18/usdalaunches-snap-online-purchasing-pilot.
228
2017 Annual Report, CTR. DIGITAL DEMOCRACY, https://www.democraticmedia
.org/annual_reports.
229
See SNAP Retailer Data, U.S. DEP’T. AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV.,
https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap-retailer-data (detailing the timeline of this legal
battle); see also Texas Retailers Ass’n v. USDA, No. 01:18-CV-659-DAE, 2018
WL 6427347 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2018) (detailing how the Texas Retailers
Association asked a Federal judge in Texas for an injunction to block the USDA
from releasing the SNAP redemption data of its members).
230
Argus Leader Media v. USDA, 889 F.3d 914, 916 (8th Cir. 2018).
231
Arthur Delaney, Big Retailers Don’t Want You to Know How Much Their Stores
Earn from Food Stamps, HUFFPOST (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.co
m/entry/food-stamps-supreme-court_us_5b71d6dfe4b0bdd0620bcda0/.
226
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be accessed through potential Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
(P.L. 89-487) requests. 232 On June 24, 2019, the Supreme Court held
that commercial information submitted to the federal government
qualifies as “confidential” under FOIA’s Exemption 4 when, at a
minimum, it is “actually” and “customarily” “kept private” and the
federal government provides assurances that the information will be
maintained in confidence. 233 Thus, more attention is needed to
explore innovative administrative data linkages and public-private
partnerships around retail transactional data that protect SNAP
participants’ privacy and SNAP authorized retailers’ propriety
information while enabling a better understanding of SNAP
participants’ purchasing patterns.
D. Appropriations
i. Fiscal Years 2017 and 2018
Agriculture and related agencies’ appropriations for fiscal
years 2017 and 2018 provided about $74 billion to SNAP in required
mandatory spending plus a reserve fund for any unexpected
participation increases. 234 These appropriations are about four
billion dollars below the fiscal year 2016 level and more than two
million dollars below the President’s budget request. 235 These
budget cuts reflect declining enrollment, decreasing food costs,
eliminating connections between the Low Income Home Energy
Assistance Program and SNAP, and budget cuts laid out in the 2012
Farm Bill that put additional cost burdens on SNAP authorized
retailers and state governments. 236
SCOTUS Hears Oral Arguments in FMI SNAP Data Case, PROGRESSIVE GROCER
(Apr. 23, 2019), https://progressivegrocer.com/scotus-hears-oral-arguments-fmisnap-data-case; Ryan McCrimmon, SCOTUS Leans Towards Allowing USDA to
Keep SNAP Data Secret, POLITICO (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.politico.com/news
letters/morning-agriculture/2019/04/23/scotus-leans-toward-allowing-usda-tokeep-snap-data-secret-594316.
233
Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, No. 18–481, slip op. (June 24, 2019),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-481_5426.pdf.
234
JIM MONKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45128, AGRICULTURE AND RELATED
AGENCIES: FY2018 APPROPRIATIONS 13 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45128
.pdf ($78,480.7 millions in 2017 and $73,610.0 millions in 2018).
235
See id. (demonstrating that Congress appropriated $80,849.4 millions in 2016
and $73,610.0 millions in 2018 but that the Administration requested $73,612.5
millions).
236
Dottie Rosenbaum, Ed Bolen, Elizabeth Wolkomir, Brynne Keith-Jennings,
Lexin Cai, & Catlin Nchako, Administration’s 2018 Budget Would Severely Weaken
and Cut the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/administrations-2018budget-would-severely-weaken-and-cut-the-supplemental.
232
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ii. Fiscal Year 2019 Including the Historic Government
Shutdown
For fiscal year 2019, the House and Senate provided
appropriation bills in May 2018 and the House passed the four-bill
minibus spending package, H.R. 6147(115) on September 26, 2018
that needed and did not secure President Trump’s signature. 237 For
SNAP, H.R. 6147 provided $73.2 billion in required mandatory
spending plus a reserve fund, which is $794 million below last year’s
level and similar to the President’s budget request. 238 Continuing
resolutions kept USDA, among other government agencies,
operating until December 20, 2018. 239 Starting December 21, 2018,
the government was partially closed for a record-long thirty-five days
due to a conflict with Congress regarding the lack of funding of the
US-Mexico border wall. 240 In the first days of the 116th Congress,
House Democrats passed legislation to reopen the government that
put forth six of the seven remaining appropriations bills. 241 To
separate the border dispute from the shutdown, the House Democrats
proposed funding the Department of Homeland Security through
February 8, 2019 without funding allocated to the border wall.242 But
Senator Majority Leader Mitch McConnell indicated the
Republican-controlled Senate will only vote on a bill the President
AGRICULTURE AND RELATED AGENCIES: FY2019 APPROPRIATIONS (2018),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20180803_R45230_6b5c7527c99479ec92fe
d651f1f7af970e6e00fb.pdf.
238
See id. at 13 (showing that the Administration requested $73,218.3 million and
that the House and Senate approved $73, 219.3 million for SNAP in FY2019).
239
See Resolution Making Further Continuing Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 115-298,
132 Stat. 4382 (2018) (amending Pub. L. 115-245 to extend such appropriations
until December 21, 2018); Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human
Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations
Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, 132 Stat. 2981 (2018) (making such appropriations
until December 6, 2018).
240
See Appropriations Watch: FY 2019, COMMITTEE RESP. FED. BUDGET,
http://www.crfb.org/blogs/appropriations-watch-fy-2019 (“On January 25, a threeweek continuing resolution was enacted to reopen the government after a 35-day
partial government shutdown, the longest in American history.”).
241
See Julie Grace Brufke, House Votes on 10th Bill to Reopen Government, THE
HILL (Jan. 23, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/426666-house-passeseighth-bill-to-reopen-government (“The House passed a Democratic-backed
package of six appropriations bills Wednesday that would fund the government
through the end of the fiscal year.”).
242
See id. (“[T]he chamber would then vote on a three-week continuing resolution
(CR) to fund the rest of the government through Feb. 8 . . . The president has asserted
he won’t sign legislation that doesn’t provide border wall funding while Democratic
leaders have called on Trump to reopen the government before they negotiate on
how to address securing the border.”).
237
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will support. 243 The President showed no sign of supporting any
legislation that did not allocate funding for a border wall. 244
Ultimately, a three week short-term continuing resolution was passed
to end the longest government shutdown. 245
The inability to timely finalize fiscal year 2019 Agricultural
Appropriations resulted in unprecedented logistical challenges for
SNAP benefit issuance. 246 During the historic thirty-five day partial
government shutdown, February SNAP benefits were issued by most
states at the end of January; specifically January 20th. 247 That is,
Jordain Carney, McConnell Blocks House Bills to Reopen Government, THE HILL
(Jan. 15, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/425414-mcconnell-blockshouse-bill-to-reopen-government-for-second-time.
244
See id. (“Roughly a quarter of the government has been shut down since Dec. 22
over an entrenched fight on funding for Trump’s proposed wall on the U.S.-Mexico
border wall . . . [T]he president walked out of a White House meeting last week
when Pelosi told him that Democrats would not consider border wall funding even
if he fully reopened the government.”).
245
See Resolution Making Further Continuing Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 116-5,
133 Stat. 10 (2018) (amending Pub. L. 115-245 to extend appropriations until
February 15, 2019); Grace Segers, Trump Signs Bill to Reopen Government for 3
Weeks, Ending Longest-Ever Shutdown, CBS NEWS (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/government-shutdown-deal-reached-trump-speec
h-announcement-opens-government-shutdown-over-today-live-updates-2019-0125/.
246
Peter Wade, The Shutdown’s Next Victims Are America’s Poorest Families: Food
Stamps, Housing Assistance, and Tax Refunds Are All at Risk (Jan. 6 2019),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/shutdown-affects-poor-familie
s-775446/; Government Shutdown Puts the Public’s Health at Risk: Potential for
Harm Increases as Impasse Continues, AMERICAN PUB. HEALTH ASS’N (Jan. 10,
2019), https://www.apha.org/news-and-media/news-releases/apha-news-releases/2
019/government-shutdown-statements; Bryce Gray, Grocers Eye Government
Shutdown’s Impact on SNAP Disbursements with Caution, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/grocers-eyegovernment-shutdown-s-impact-on-snap-disbursements-with/article_e7d7e9001975-5f2c-a9b2-ac7d8c6ff8d1.html; Helena Bottemiller Evich, Food Stamps for
Millions of Americans Become Pawn in Shutdown Fight, POLITICO (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/07/food-stamps-government-shutdown1062090; Tal Axelrod, Shutdown May Jeopardize Tax Refunds, Food Stamps:
Report, THE HILL (Jan. 4, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/42
3988-shutdown-may-jeopardize-tax-refunds-food-stamps-report.
247
FNS Contingency Plan For Shutdown Due to a Lapse in Appropriations, U.S.
DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV. (Jan. 2018), https://www.usda.gov/sites
/default/files/documents/usda-fns-shutdown-plan.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., USDA Announces Plan to Protect SNAP Participants’ Access to SNAP in
February (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2019/01/08/us
da-announces-plan-protect-snap-participants-access-snap-february; Helena
Bottemiller Evich, White House Reverses Course on Food Stamp Funding, POLITICO
(Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/08/usda-funds-februarysnap-benefits-1069641; Jory Heckman, USDA Buys Time for SNAP Under
Shutdown – But for How Long?, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 19, 2019),
243
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some SNAP participants received February benefits more than a
month early. 248 As a result, SNAP-authorized retailers scrambled to
meet increased demand, and about one percent of retailers who were
not able to renew their SNAP authorization prior to the shutdown
were not able to accept SNAP benefits until reauthorized. 249 This
https://federalnewsnetwork.com/government-shutdown/2019/01/usda-buys-timefor-snap-under-shutdown-but-for-how-long/; Jeff Stein, Trump Team Promises
Shutdown Won’t Stop Food Stamp Payments in February, Says Program Lacks
Funds for March, WA. POST (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/busin
ess/economy/trump-administration-promises-food-stamp-benefits-will-continuethrough-february-despite-shutdown-says-program-lacks-funds-for-march/2019/01
/08/b4b0b30c-139b-11e9-803c-4ef28312c8b9_story.html?utm_term=.e2a6db41b
2a5; Beth McEnoy, NBS News Center Maine, Gov. Mills Calls for End to Shutdown,
Issues SNAP Benefits a Month Early, NEWS CTR. ME. (Jan. 14, 2019),
https://www.newscentermaine.com/article/news/gov-mills-calls-for-end-to-shutdo
wn-issues-snap-benefits-a-month-early/97-ce148830-6b4d-4550-aa69-5de38fc02c
21; Impact of the Federal Government Shutdown on SNAP: What You Need to
Know!, N.M. CTR. ON LAW AND POVERTY, http://nmpovertylaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/shutdown-and-snap-2019-01-14.pdf (last visited Aug. 30,
2019); Government Shutdown Threatens the National Emergency for Millions of
Hungry Households, FOOD RESEARCH AND ACTION CTR., http://frac.org/news/gove
rnment-shutdown-threatens-national-emergency-for-millions-of-hungry-household
s-2 (last visited Aug. 30, 2019); S.E. Smith, Government Shutdown Threatens
Section 8 and Food Stamps, TRUTHOUT.ORG (Jan. 11, 2019), https://truthout.org/art
icles/government-shutdown-threatens-section-8-and-food-stamps/; Roberto
Ferdman, How the Government Shutdown Hurt Millions of People on Food Stamps,
VICE (Jan. 25, 2019), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/mbzady/how-thegovernment-shutdown-hurt-millions-of-people-on-food-stamps; Ellyn Ferguson,
States Scramble to Get February Food Stamps Out Amid Shutdown, ROLL CALL
(Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/states-scramble-to-getfebruary-food-stamps-out; Helena Bottemiller Evich, States Warn Food Stamp
Recipients to Budget Early Benefit Payments Due to Shutdown, POLITICO (Jan. 15,
2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/15/state-food-stamp-benefits-shutd
own-2491182; Helena Bottemiller Evich, Billions in Food Stamp Payments to Come
Early Because of Shutdown, POLITICO (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.politico.com/sto
ry/2019/01/11/shutdown-food-stamp-scramble-benifits-1081210.
248
Joe Davidson, USDA’s SNAP Decision Means There Will Be a Gap in Food
Assistance Program, WA. POST (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/p
olitics/2019/02/01/oh-snap-shutdown-leads-gap-food-assistance-program/; Jeanne
Kuang, February Food Stamps to Come Early Amid Government Shutdown, March
Funding Uncertain, DEL. ONLINE (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.delawareonline.com
/story/news/2019/01/15/february-food-stamps-come-early-amid-government-shutd
own/2580389002/; Joy Burton, Food Security Still An Issue Despite Government
Reopening, IND. DAILY STUDENT (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.idsnews.com/article/
2019/01/food-insecurity-still-an-issue-despite-government-reopening?eType=Ema
ilBlastContent&eId=ac87bad2-4755-4f85-9bda-378ca5937cf3; Bobby Allyn, Food
Stamp Crisis Looming in Pa. Because of Government Shutdown, WHYY.ORG (Jan.
24, 2019), https://whyy.org/articles/food-stamp-crisis-looming-in-pa-because-ofgovernment-shutdown-says-state-data/; Lisa L. Colangelo, Advocates Warn of
‘SNAP Gap’ Following Government Shutdown, AMNEWYORK (Feb. 5, 2019),
https://www.amny.com/news/snap-government-shutdown-1.26947428.
249
Jossie Carbonare, York County Grocery Store Unable to Process Food Stamps
Due to Government Shutdown, FOX 43 (Jan. 16, 2019), https://fox43.com/2019/01/
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change in distribution or the “SNAP Gap” may provide some insight
into the role of issuance in early exhaustion of benefits and related
health outcomes. 250 For example, in Vermont, which normally issues
benefits to all households on the first of the month, February benefits
came nearly two weeks early. 251 On January 3rd, the average SNAP
household in Vermont had a balance of $145; on February 3rd, it was
only $88. 252 Although it is too soon to evaluate the effects of this
shift on participant outcomes, there are anecdotal reports of
households running out of money weeks before receiving March
benefits and reports of spikes in food pantry utilization. 253
The continuing resolution enabled the USDA to issue March
benefits, which in most states occurred earlier than usual. 254 While
16/york-county-grocery-store-unable-to-process-food-stamps-due-to-governmentshutdown/; Laura Santhanam, Many Families and Stores Rely on SNAP Benefits.
The Shutdown May Pinch Them Both, PBS (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/n
ewshour/health/many-families-and-stores-rely-on-snap-benefits-the-shutdownmay-pinch-them-both; Michael Chen, More Shutdown Fallout: Some Retailers Now
Unable to Accept Food Stamps, 10 NEWS (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.10news.com
/news/local-news/more-shutdown-fallout-some-retailers-now-unable-to-accept-foo
d-stamps?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=ac87bad2-4755-4f85-9bda-378ca5937c
f3.
250
Savannah Eadens, Government Shutdown Over, But Food-Stamp Recipients Will
Feel Effects for Awhile, CHICAGO SUN TIMES (Feb. 20, 2019), https://chicago.sunti
mes.com/working/government-shutdown-over-but-food-stamp-recipients-will-feeleffect-for-awhile/; Jennifer Mobilia, Advocates Distribute Food to Help Food Stamp
Recipients Bridget ‘SNAP gap’, WHEC (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.whec.com/n
ews/advocates-distribute-food-to-help-food-stamp-recipients-bridge-snap-gap/525
0637/.
251
Tiffany Tan & Bennington Banner, Vermont to Issue February Food Benefits
Early Due to Shutdown, BENNINGTON BANNER (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.benning
tonbanner.com/stories/vermont-to-issue-february-food-benefits-early-due-to-shutd
own,561583.
252
Tina Rosenberg, When It’s Hard to Make Ends Meet, Can Smart Apps Help?,
N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/opinion/navigat
ing-bureaucracy-try-technology.html.
253
Id.; Mackenzie Huck, Some People Will Receive March SNAP Benefits Early,
1011 NOW (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.1011now.com/content/news/Some-peoplewill-receive-March-SNAP-benefits-early-505754131.html.
254
Dottie Rosenbaum, SNAP Can Cover Full Benefits Through March, But
Participants Face Big Gaps Between February and March Benefits, CTR. ON
BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/snapcan-cover-full-benefits-through-march-but-participants-face-big-gaps-between-feb
ruary-and; Eric Russell, Mills Administration Will Increase Supplemental Food
Stamp Benefit For Working Mainers, PRESS HERALD (Feb. 20, 2019),
https://www.pressherald.com/2019/02/20/mills-adminstration-will-increase-supple
mental-food-stamp-benefit-for-working-mainers/; Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Illinois
Food Stamp Recipients Will Get March Benefits Early to Ease Gaps Caused by
Government Shutdown, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.chicagotri
bune.com/business/ct-biz-food-stamps-march-benefits-illinois-20190213-story.htm
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the status of April benefits and beyond was unclear until the
agricultural appropriations were finally finalized, it was speculated
that the USDA could use a similar approach as used in February, or
some states could use their own budget to issue SNAP benefits,
among other approaches. 255 To ensure a reasonable continuation of
benefits during a government shutdown, there are possible grounds
for legal action by participants and state agencies, given the unique
funding provisions of this entitlement program. 256 Namely, Section
5(a) of the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 gives eligible individuals
and households a legal right to continued SNAP benefits and the only
exception is that Section 18 allows Congress to pass an appropriation
that is insufficient to fund full benefits, which does not apply when
Congress has passed no appropriation for SNAP. 257 States could
potentially sue the USDA “for reimbursement of the administrative
costs necessary to continue issuing SNAP benefits.” 258 Thus,
additional work is needed to understand the legal and policy
implications of a government shutdown, as well as the USDA
contingency plans for an entitlement program—but not an “essential

l; Helena Bottemiller Evich, Most States Plan to Move Up Food Stamp Payments
Due to Lingering Shutdown Pain, POLITICO (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.politico.c
om/story/2019/02/15/states-move-up-snap-payments-shutdown-1180074;
SNAP
March Issuance, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV. (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/SNAP-March-Issuance.pdf.
255
Dottie Rosenbaum, USDA to Fund SNAP for February 2019, But Millions Face
Cuts if Shutdown Continues, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 10, 2019),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/millions-face-cut-in-snap-foodassistance-if-government-shutdown-continues; Travis Anderson, Antihunger
Groups Tell Governor Baker to Craft “Disaster Plan” for Emergency Food
Requests Amid Shutdown, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.bostonglob
e.com/metro/2019/01/16/anti-hunger-groups-gov-baker-craft-disaster-plan-for-eme
rgency-food-requests-amid-shutdown/PFpOlBW72fsGcScQuA4b4M/story.html;
Jillian Jorgensen & Marco Poggio, De Blasio Warns of ‘Full-Blown Crisis’ for New
Yorkers on Food Stamps If Shutdown Continues, NY DAILY NEWS (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-pol-deblasio-food-stamps-crisisshutdown-20190117-story.html; EOA Staff, Maryland Ensures Residents to
Receive SNAP Benefits Despite Federal Shutdown, EYE ON ANNAPOLIS (Jan. 15,
2019), https://www.eyeonannapolis.net/2019/01/maryland-ensures-residents-to-rec
eive-snap-benefits-despite-federal-shutdown/.
256
David A. Super, Continuing SNAP in a Government Shutdown, GEORGETOWN
LAW (Jan. 9, 2019) https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/
SNAP-Govt-Shutdown-Memo-Jan-2019.pdf; Tom Temin, USDA Says SNAP Can
Last Until February, Law Professor Says Longer, FEDERAL NEWS NETWORK (Jan.
24, 2019), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/federal-drive/2019/01/usda-says-snapcan-last-til-february-law-professor-says-longer/.
257
Id.
258
Id.
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service”—affecting food security and financial stability of more than
forty million individuals and families each month.259
Aside from SNAP benefits, USDA supported SNAP
activities, such as SNAP-Ed or SNAP relevant research, were halted
during the historically long shutdown. 260 The shutdown also resulted
in unpaid federal workers and contractors, among others, who had
not been paid for almost two bimonthly pay dates that could
potentially have been eligible for SNAP, among other federal food
and nutrition assistance programs. 261 This strain was particularly
pronounced among Native American tribes, where federal
employment is high and the Food Distribution Program on Indian
Reservations (FDPIR), an alternative federal food and nutrition
assistance program to SNAP, was disrupted. 262 Moreover, these
furloughed workers were tapping into the charitable food system that
many SNAP participants or SNAP-eligible families depend on

Emily Victor, Local Leaders Want Congress to Consider Food Stamps
‘Essential’ During Shutdowns, WRAL.COM, https://www.wral.com/local-leaderswant-congress-to-consider-food-stamps-essential-during-shutdowns/18184352/
(last visited Aug. 30, 2019).
260
Jeffrey Mervis, End of U.S. Shutdown Won’t Mean Return to Business As Usual
For Research Agencies, SCIENCEMAG.ORG (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.sciencemag.
org/news/2019/01/end-us-shutdown-won-t-mean-return-business-usual-researchagencies.
261
Stephanie Ebbs & Anne Flaherty, During Shutdown, Janitors, Security Guards,
and Other Federal Contractors Receive No Back Pay, ABC NEWS (Jan. 2, 2019),
https://abcnews.go.com/beta-story-container/US/shutdown-janitors-securityguards-federal-contractors-receive-back/story?id=60116026; Lisa Lerer, For Some,
the Shutdown Isn’t About Politics. It’s About Bills and Groceries, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/07/us/politics/on-politics-governmentshutdown-contractors.html; Lauren Egan, After Criticism He’s ‘Totally Tone Deaf’,
Wilbur Ross Walks Back Furloughed Worker Comments, NBC NEWS (Jan. 24,
2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-commerce-secretaryi-don-t-understand-why-furloughed-workers-n962246; Jackie Prager, Children
Impacted by Government Shutdown Qualify for New York Free School Meals
Program, WBNG.COM (Jan. 24, 2019), https://wbng.com/news/local-news/2019/0
1/24/children-impacted-by-government-shutdown-qualify-for-new-york-freeschool-meals-program/; Dillon Mullan, Lee County Schools Offer Help to Families
Affected by Government Shutdown, DAILY JOURNAL (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.djournal.com/news/lee-county-wants-furloughed-gov-workers-to-ap
ply-for-free/article_8f5b128d-069c-53f6-9458-da4a24771d3e.html?eType=EmailB
lastContent&eId=ac87bad2-4755-4f85-9bda-378ca5937cf3; Jacqueline Howard,
What an Ongoing Government Shutdown Could Mean for School Lunches, CNN
(Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/24/health/government-shutdownschool-lunch-bn/index.html.
262
Mitch Smith & Julie Turkewitz, Shutdown Leaves Food, Medicine, and Pay in
Doubt in Indian Country, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/201
9/01/01/us/native-american-government-shutdown.html.
259
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regularly. 263 Several unique charitable offers emerged during the
shutdown to help provide food assistance to those affected by the
shutdown. 264 These ramifications to SNAP and the charitable food
network are important considerations in understanding the short and
long term implications of a government shutdown. There are also
intriguing short- and long-term knowledge gaps about the food
security, health, and financial impacts this thirty-five-day shutdown
had on furloughed workers, among others whose salary and business
stability are closely tied to affected governmental entities. 265
Ultimately, four months into the fiscal year and after the
historic shutdown, 2019 Agricultural Appropriations bill (H.J.Res.31
(116)) was passed and appropriated about $73.5 billion dollars in
mandatory funding to SNAP. 266 As we’ll discuss in various sections
263
Ian Stewart, As Shutdown Continues, Thousands of Federal Workers Visit D.C.Area Pop-Up Food Banks, NPR (Jan. 13, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/13
/684824384/as-shutdown-continues-thousands-of-federal-workers-visit-d-c-areapop-up-food-ba; Michael Burke, Coast Guard Chief: ‘Unacceptable’ that Service
Members Must Rely on Food Pantries, Donations Amid Shutdown, THE HILL (Jan.
22, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/defense/426539-coast-guard-chief-unacceptab
le-that-service-members-must-rely-on-food-pantries?fbclid=IwAR0IK0XdZAlJ77
z65mQwh3qPdJ8MD25xNAbhZKRMoUKii_aktUmklmlCHEY; Patrick Madden,
D.C.’s Biggest Food Pantry Is ‘Definitely Busier’ As Unpaid Workers Struggle to
Make Ends Meet, DCIST (Jan. 16, 2019), https://dcist.com/story/19/01/16/itsdefinitely-busier-d-c-food-pantry-opens-doors-to-furloughed-federal-workers/;
Claudia Boyd-Barrett, Food Banks Brace Themselves for Influx of Hungry People
Amid Shutdown, CAL. HEALTH REPORT (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.calhealthrepo
rt.org/2019/01/14/food-banks-brace-influx-hungry-people-amid-shutdown/; 2019
Government Shutdown Operations FAQ, FEEDING AMERICA (Jan. 29, 2019),
https://www.feedingamerica.org/take-action/advocate/2019-GovernmentShutdown.
264
Rachel Kurzius, 20,000 Free Pies Later, One of the Highest Profile Shutdown
Deals Ends Before the Shutdown Does, DCIST (Jan. 23, 2019), https://dcist.com/sto
ry/19/01/23/20000-free-pies-later-one-of-the-highest-profile-shutdown-deals-endsbefore-the-shutdown-does/; Tim Carman, Americans Across the Country are
Helping Feed Federal Workers as the Shutdown Enters its Second Month, WA. POST
(Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/food/wp/2019/01/23/amer
icans-across-the-country-are-helping-feed-federal-workers-as-the-shutdown-enters
-its-second-month/?utm_term=.184d6fbf2aaa; Andrea Diaz, Chef Jose Andres will
Serve Free Meals Daily to Furloughed Federal Workers in Washington, CNN (Jan.
23, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/15/us/chef-jose-andres-feeding-federalworkers-shutdown-trnd/index.html; Lori McCue, Kraft – Yes, That Kraft – Is
Opening A Pop-Up Grocery Store in D.C. for Furloughed Feds this Week, DCIST
(Jan. 15, 2019), https://dcist.com/story/19/01/15/kraft-yes-that-kraft-is-opening-apop-up-grocery-store-in-d-c-for-furloughed-feds-this-week/.
265
Bruce Japsen, Health Risks Rise As Shutdown Hits Second Month, FORBES (Jan.
21, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2019/01/21/as-shutdown-ente
rs-second-month-public-health-risks-rise/#351094c4652a.
266
Division A – Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2019, Congressional Directives:
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, supra note 136, at 29.
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of this review, this appropriations bill, along with accompanying
Congressional Directives, included a number of SNAP relevant
mandates and funding priorities.
iii. Fiscal Year 2020
The shutdown delayed the fiscal year 2020 appropriations
process but it is moving forward in the House and the Senate. 267 As
explained further under Disaster Assistance, Congress first focused
on finalizing a contentious disaster aid package. Then, attention
turned to lifting caps on the fiscal year 2020 budget set out in the
2011 Budget Control Act (P.L. 112-25) since there was no bicameral
approved budget for fiscal year 2020 to guide the appropriations
process. 268 This two-year budget deal to increase budget caps (P.L.
116-37) was critical since without one sequestration would have
occurred in fiscal year 2020 for both defense and non-defense
programs to meet the caps set out in the 2011 Budget Control Act.269
The House Appropriations Committee has put forth target funding
levels for each of the twelve fiscal year 2020 funding bills, including
a proposed $71.1 billion in required mandatory spending for
SNAP. 270
The Senate Appropriations Committee has been
conducting a series of hearings regarding fiscal year 2020
appropriations. 271 Another partial government shutdown is possible
Overview of the Federal Budget Process, PRESERVATION ACTION,
https://preservationaction.org/this-is-a-general-overview-of-the-federal-budget-pro
cess-for-a-single-fiscal-year-october-1-through-september-30-fall-federal-agencies
-develop-and-submit-draft-budgets-to-the-office-of-management-an/ (last visited
Aug. 30, 2019).
268
The United States House Committee on the Budget, Issue Brief: The Devastating
Consequences of the 2020 and 2021 Budget Caps (Apr. 2, 2019), https://budget.hou
se.gov/publications/report/devastating-consequences-2020-and-2021-budget-caps;
see also Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019, P.L. 116-37, 116th Congress (2019-2020).
269
The United States House Committee on the Budget, Issue Brief: The Devastating
Consequences of the 2020 and 2021 Budget Caps (Apr. 2, 2019), https://budget.hous
e.gov/publications/report/devastating-consequences-2020-and-2021-budget-caps.
270
The United States House Committee on Appropriations, Chairwoman Lowey
Statement at Full Committee Markup of FY 2020 302 (b) Subcommittee Allocations
(May 8, 2019), https://appropriations.house.gov/news/statements/chairwoman-low
ey-statement-at-full-committee-markup-of-fy-2020-302b-subcommittee; see also
Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Appropriations,
Appropriations Committee Releases Fiscal Year 2020 Agricultural-Rural
Development-FDA Funding Bill (May 22, 2019), https://appropriations.house.gov/
news/press-releases/appropriations-committee-releases-fiscal-year-2020-agricultur
e-rural-development?fbclid=IwAR1BupazcPfXMWOzv4n0_6rkEu5r-34lHwoh5H
VDVlYjzzL3AMenaoJyYDM.
271
The United States Senate Committee on Appropriations, Hearings,
https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings (lists a variety of hearings to review
the fiscal year 2020 budget requests of various federal departments and agencies);
267
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as Congress works to finalize spending bills for fifteen agencies after
its August recess.
iv. Congressional Agricultural Appropriation Summary
Therefore, the agricultural appropriations and appropriation
processes, particularly the historic fiscal year 2019 and the now
delayed fiscal year 2020 appropriations process, have significant
impacts on SNAP at the federal, tribal, state, and local administrative
levels, on retailers, the charitable food network, and on those actively
participating, eligible to participate, or who may become eligible as
a result of not getting paid during a government shutdown.
E. Oversight
Congressional oversight is derived from the implied powers
of the US Constitution and, when conducted in a bipartisan manner,
can be an effective strategy for maintaining the separation of
powers. 272 There is not much to report regarding the 115th Congress’
SNAP oversight responsibilities. A record number of hearings
reviewing SNAP were held over the course of the 114th Congress,
totaling 60 witnesses in 16 hearings and a report was published
synthesizing the findings. 273 Congressional letters of inquiry have
also been submitted to the USDA regarding the proposed agency
moves discussed in the Trump administration section of this article.
The 116th Congress has started to hold hearings relevant to SNAP,
such as the House Agriculture hearing noted earlier focused on the
implications of eliminating broad-based categorical eligibility and a
few others which we will discuss in the Trump administration
section.

see also Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2020, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/Appropriations+for+Fiscal+Y
ear+2020 (last visited Aug. 30, 2019).
272
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”); ALISSA
M. DOLAN ET AL., CRS., RL30240, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE:
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL 24 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30
240.pdf (“Oversight and investigative authority is implied from Article I of the
Constitution and rests with the House of Representatives and Senate.”).
273
Past, Present, and Future of SNAP, AGNET WEST (Dec. 7, 2016),
http://agnetwest.com/past-present-future-snap/.
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F. Strengthening SNAP’s Nutrition Impacts
While not extensively during the 115th session, Congress has
been exploring additional, more direct ways to strengthen SNAP’s
impact on dietary quality and health; specifically, through restricting
product eligibility, incentivizing fruit and vegetable purchases,
enhancing minimum stocking requirements for authorized SNAP
retailers, and supporting nutrition education and promotion through
SNAP-Ed.
i. Restricting Product Eligibility
Although the 115th Congress held a hearing focused on the
pros and cons of restricting SNAP purchases in the initial weeks of
their session, the 2018 Farm Bill did not put forth any provisions to
restrict SNAP purchases. 274 Historically, foods and beverages are
eligible for purchase with SNAP benefits except alcoholic beverages
and tobacco and hot foods or foods intended to be eaten in the store,
except by individuals who cannot cook for themselves. 275 States,
most notably New York and Maine, have submitted unsuccessful
waiver requests to the USDA to examine the feasibility of restricting
the use of SNAP benefits, 276 particularly sugar-sweetened beverages
which research suggests about “20 cents out of every dollar are spent

Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, Pros and Cons of Restricting SNAP Purchases,
BROOKINGS (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/pros-and-consof-restricting-snap-purchases/.
275
Determining Product Eligibility for Purchase with SNAP Benefits, U.S. DEP’T.
AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV. (Jan. 26, 2010), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/d
efault/files/eligibility.pdf.
276
A Proposal to Create a Demonstration Project in New York City to Modify
Allowable Purchases Under the Federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program, FOOD POLITICS, https://foodpolitics.com/wp-content/uploads/HealthyNY-Allowable-SNAP-Purchase-Detailed-Proposal-2010-SNAPfinal-2_.doc (last
visited Aug. 30, 2019); Patrick McGeehan, Ban on Using Food Stamps to Buy Soda
Rejected by USDA, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/0
8/20/nyregion/ban-on-using-food-stamps-to-buy-soda-rejected-by-usda.html; M.C.
Mayhew, Letter to Bonnie Brathwaite Regarding a New Approach for the SNAP-Ed
Program and Renewal of Soda and Candy Restriction Waiver, MAINE.GOV (Feb. 17,
2017),
https://www.maine.gov/dhhs/documents/FNS-Waiver-Request-2-17.pdf;
Mike Berger, USDA Rejects Maine’s SNAP Petition to Restrict Sugar Drinks,
Candy, SHELBY REPORT (Jan. 22, 2018), http://www.theshelbyreport.com/2018/01/
22/usda-rejects-maine-snap-request/; N.E. Negowetti, The SNAP Sugar-Sweetened
Beverage Debate: Restricting Purchases to Improve Health Outcomes of LowIncome Americans, 14 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y. 83 (2018).
274
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on sweetened beverages, desserts, salty snacks, candy, and sugar.”277
Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, South
Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin, among others, have also explored
legislative options at the state level to restrict SNAP purchases.278
Under the Obama and Trump administrations, the USDA has
consistently responded to state SNAP waiver requests, generally
noting concerns regarding the waivers’ rationale, feasibility, and
potential effectiveness. 279 The USDA published a summary of these
concerns, which include: no standards exist for defining healthy
foods and beverages; implementing restrictions would increase
program complexity and costs; no guarantee restricting the use of
SNAP would affect food and beverage purchases; and other ways
exist to encourage healthier purchases without limiting participant
choice. 280
SNAP is the only federal food and nutrition assistance
program that subsidizes sugar-sweetened beverages, which are
estimated to account for between $1.7 to $4.2 billion dollars in SNAP
spending annually. 281 A randomized trial of adults who were
income-eligible but not participating in SNAP found that restricting
sugar-sweetened beverages, candy, and sweets from purchase in a
S. GARASKY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., FOODS
TYPICALLY PURCHASED BY SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
(SNAP) HOUSEHOLDS 4 (2016), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/op
s/SNAPFoodsTypicallyPurchased.pdf.
278
John Moritz, Arkansas Panel Backs Junk-Food Cutoff for Food-Stamp
Recipients, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.arkansas
online.com/news/2017/jan/18/panel-backs-junk-food-cutoff-20170118/?f=newspolitics; John Lyon, Arkansas Panel Rejects Bill to Restrict Food-Stamp Purchases,
ARK.DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.arkansasnews.com/news/201
70208/arkansas-panel-rejects-bill-to-restrict-food-stamp-purchases; Sam Bloch,
Maine’s Governor Can’t Stop Trying to Limit SNAP Purchases, Nᴇᴡ Fᴏᴏᴅ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍʏ
(Jan. 23, 2018) https://newfoodeconomy.org/maine-governor-paul-lepage-snappurchases-limit/; Florida House Rejects Food Stamp Junk Food Ban, FOOD
NAVIGATOR USA (Feb. 24, 2012), https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/201
2/02/24/Florida-House-rejects-food-stamps-junk-food-ban; Patrick McGeehan,
U.S. Rejects Mayor’s Plan to Ban Use of Food Stamps to Buy Soda, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 19, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/nyregion/ban-on-usingfood-stamps-to-buy-soda-rejected-by-usda.html.
279
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., IMPLICATIONS OF RESTRICTING THE
USE OF FOOD STAMP BENEFITS – SUMMARY (Mar. 1, 2007), https://fns-prod.azureed
ge.net/sites/default/files/FSPFoodRestrictions.pdf.
280
Id.
281
R.L. Franckle, A. Moran, T. Hou, D. Blue, J. Greene, A.N. Thorndike, M.
Polacsek, & E.B. Rimm, Transactions at a Northeastern Supermarket Chain:
Differences by Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Use, 53 AM. J. PREV.
MED. e131-e138 (2017); T. Andreyeva, J. Luedicke, K.E. Henderson, & A.S. Tripp,
Grocery Store Beverage Choices By Participants in Federal Food Assistance and
Nutrition Programs, 43 AM. J. PREV. MED.. 411-418 (2012).
277
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SNAP-like food benefit program led to a reduction in total energy
intake, but no differences in consumption of added sugars or sugarsweetened beverages. 282 One simulation study suggested restricting
SNAP purchases could improve participant diet quality and reduce
obesity and type 2 diabetes. 283 Further, retailers have successfully
implemented restrictions required of other federal food and nutrition
assistance programs and for state or local tax requirements. 284 But
these possible nutrition improvements are currently deemed to be at
the expense of limiting consumer choice and decreasing SNAP
participation. 285 Yet, a qualitative study found SNAP participants
were supportive of prohibiting the use of SNAP benefits for
purchasing foods and beverages high in added sugars. 286 Another
consideration is if and how SNAP participants might use their own
money to purchase the restricted items, especially if they are
generally inexpensive items. 287 However, research has found people
are less likely to use cash than SNAP to purchase foods and
beverages. 288 Therefore, more work remains to explore the role of
restrictions and likely the combination of restrictions and incentives
in SNAP to improve participant diet quality and health.

L. Harnack, J.M. Oakes, B. Elbel, T. Beatty, S. Rydell, & S. French, Effects of
Subsidies and Prohibitions on Nutrition in a Food Benefit Program: A Randomized
Clinical Trial, 176 J.A.M.A. INTERN. MED. 1610-1618 (2016).
283
S. Basu et al., Ending SNAP Subsidies for Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Could
Reduce Obesity and Type 2 Diabetes, 33 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1032-1039 (2014).
284
J.L. Pomeranz & J.F. Chriqui , The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program:
Analysis of Program Administration and Food Law Definitions, 49 AM. J. PREV.
MED 428-436 (2015); but see J.E. Todd & M. Ver Ploeg, Restricting SugarSweetened Beverages from SNAP Purchases Not Likely to Lower Consumption, U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON.RESEARCH SERV., (Mar. 1, 2015), https://www.ers.usda.gov
/amber-waves/2015/march/restricting-sugar-sweetened-beverages-from-snap-purc
hases-not-likely-to-lower-consumption/.
285
M.B. Schwartz MB, Moving Beyond the debate Over Restricting Sugary Drinks
in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, 52 AM. J. PREV. MED S199-S205
(2017).
286
S.A. Rydell, R.M. Turner, T.A. Lasswell, S.A. French, J.M. Oakes, B. Elbel, &
L.J. Harnack, Participant Satisfaction with a Food Benefit Program with
Restrictions and Incentives, 118 J. ACAD. NUTR. DIET. 294-300 (2018).
287
OLIVEIRA ET AL., supra note 64.
288
P.E. Wilde, L.M. Troy, & B.L. Rogers, Food Stamps and Food Spending: An
Engel Function Approach, 91 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 416-430 (2009); T.A. Smith, J.P.
Berning, X. Yang, G. Colson, and J.H. Dorfman, The Effects of Benefit Timing and
Income Fungibility on Food Purchasing Decisions Among Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program Households, 98 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 564-580 (2016); J.L.
Hastings & J.M. Shapiro, How Are SNAP Benefits Spent? Evidence From a Retail
Panel, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 3493-3540 (2018).
282

188

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.15

ii. Incentivizing Fruit and Vegetable Purchases
Even though Congress has not garnered significant support
for restrictions on SNAP purchases, there has been growing
bipartisan support for incentivizing fruit and vegetable purchases
among SNAP participants, which evidence suggests helps increase
SNAP participants’ fruit and vegetable purchases. 289 An initial
milestone was in the 2008 Farm Bill, which provided mandatory
funding for the Healthy Incentives Pilot to test point-of-purchase
incentives for fruits, vegetables, and other healthful foods. 290 The
final evaluation indicated Healthy Incentives Pilot participants
consumed almost a quarter of a cup more targeted fruits and
vegetables per day than did nonparticipants. 291 Based on these
findings, among others, the 2014 Farm Bill provided $100 million in
mandatory funding over 2014 to 2018 to establish the Food
Insecurity Nutrition Incentive (FINI) grant program. 292 FINI is

U.S. GAO, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION
AND FORESTRY, U.S. SENATE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM: OPTIONS FOR DELIVERING
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO PARTICIPANTS FOR PURCHASING TARGETED FOODS, GAO08-415 1 (2008), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08415.pdf; M. PRELL & D.
SMALLWOOD, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. COMPARING ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC
289

MECHANISMS TO INCREASE FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PURCHASES i (2017),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/83052/eib-170.pdf?v=0;
A.J.
Cohen et al., Increasing Use of a Healthy Food Incentive: A Waiting Room
Intervention among Low-Income Patients, 52 AM J. PREVENTATIVE. MED. FRUITS
AND VEGETABLES: ENHANCED FEDERAL EFFORTS TO INCREASE CONSUMPTION COULD
YIELD HEALTH BENEFITS FOR AMERICANS, 154, 154 (2017); U.S. GAO, GAO-02657 (2002), https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/235241.pdf; C.R. Young et al.,
Improving Fruit and Vegetable Consumption among Low-Income Customers at
Farmers Markets: Philly Food Bucks, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 2011, 10 PREV.
CHRONIC DIS. E166, E166 (2013); L.E. Olsho et al., Impacts of a Farmers’ Market
Incentive Programme on Fruit and Vegetable Access, Purchase and Consumption,
18 PUB. HEALTH NUTR. 2712, 2712 (2015); An R, Effectiveness of Subsidies in
Promoting Healthy Food Purchases and Consumption: A Review of Field
Experiments, 16 PUB. HEALTH NUTR. 1215, 1215 (2013).
290
Food Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, H.R. 2419, 110th Cong. § 4141
(2008).
291
H.R. 2642, supra note 203; U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., OFFICE
OF POLICY SUPPORT, EVALUATION OF THE HEALTHY INCENTIVES PILOT (HIP) FINAL
REPORT – SUMMARY (2014), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ops/H
IP-Final-Summary.pdf; L.E. Olsho et al., Financial Incentives Increase Fruit and
Vegetable Intake among Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Participants:
A Randomized Controlled Trial of the USDA Healthy Incentives Plot, 104 AM. J.
CLIN. NUTR. 423, 423, 430 (2016).
292
FINI Grant Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV.,
https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/FINI-Grant-Program (last visited Aug. 30, 2019);
Food Insecurity Nutrition Incentive (FINI) Grant Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. NAT.
INST. FOOD & AGRIC. https://nifa.usda.gov/program/food-insecurity-nutritionincentive-fini-grant-program (last visited Aug. 30, 2019); see also KATE
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administered by the USDA National Institute of Food and
Agriculture (NIFA) in cooperation with FNS and aims to improve
dietary quality and health by incentivizing the purchase of fruits and
vegetables by SNAP participants. 293
FINI findings are still emerging but a 2015 report noted
FINI-funded SNAP produce incentive programs operated in twentyseven states in rural and urban communities and at more than nine
hundred farmers’ markets, more than fifty grocery stores, and more
than seventy farmer-to-consumer retailers. 294 A 2018 qualitative
evaluation with FINI grantees and key stakeholders found many
believed FINI was an opportunity for consumers to try new fruits and
vegetables and “cited that for every $1 spent with SNAP, $1.80 was
generated in economic growth.” 295 Moreover, a randomized
controlled study of a same-day supermarket double-dollar fruit and
vegetable incentive program in rural Maine determined that over four
mouths coupons were redeemed among fifty-three percent of eligible
baskets and there was greater increases in fruit and vegetable
spending among SNAP-eligible participants who redeemed coupons
than among non-SNAP eligible participants who redeemed
coupons. 296 Granted, another study recommended stand-alone
coupon incentive programs might need complementary strategies to
build in vegetable preparation skills. 297 The 2018 Farm Bill
increased mandatory commitments to the program up to $250 million
over five years, made the program permanent, and renamed the
program to Gus Schumacher Food Insecurity Nutrition Incentive
FITZGERALD, VOICES FOR HEALTHY KIDS, SNAP INCENTIVES: SUPPORT LOCAL
ECONOMICS AND LOCAL HEALTH EFFORTS 2-3, (2017), https://snapincentives.voices
forhealthykids.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2018/07/Decision-Maker-Fact-She
et.pdf (discusses how a SNAP incentive program can increase economic growth and
help individuals and families reduce food insecurity).
293
Id.
294
K. FITZGERALD, FOOD INSECURITY NUTRITION INCENTIVE GRANT PROGRAM
(FINI): 2015 PROGRAM RESULTS, https://fairfoodnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2
017/03/Consolidated-2015-Report_finaldigital-.pdf.
295
C.A. PARKS ET AL., GRETCHEN SWANSON CTR. FOR NUTRITION, A QUALITATIVE
EVALUATION OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE’S FOOD
INSECURITY NUTRITION INCENTIVE GRANT PROGRAM 8 (2018), https://static1.squares
pace.com/static/58a4dda16a49633eac5e02a1/t/5baaa931e5e5f0b78f5d3ae6/15371
1107757/HER+FINI-updated.pdf.
296
M. Polacsek et al., A Supermarket Double-Dollar Incentive Program Increases
Purchases of Fresh Fruits and Vegetables among Low-Income Families with
Children: The Healthy Double Study, 50 J. NUTR. EDUC. BEHAV. 217, 224–25
(2018).
297
M.S. Wetherill et al., SNAP-Based Incentive Programs at Farmers’ Markets:
Adaptions Considerations for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
Recipients, 49 J. NUTR. EDUC. BEHAV. 743, 743 (2017).
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Program (GusNIP) in honor of an integral champion of this program
who recently passed away. 298 In addition, Congress granted the
Secretary of Agriculture the authority to establish the Produce
Prescription Program and authorized $4,000,000.00 for each of fiscal
years 2019 through 2023 (Sec. 4304). These programs have been
shown to improve patient-clinician communication around diet and
contribute to patient consumption of fruits and vegetables. 299 The
GusNIP request for applications was recently announced and
applications were due in June 2019 for the availability of $ 41 million
in funding for fiscal year 2019 projects for three subprograms:
1) SNAP incentives (competitive grants that use point-of-sale fruit
and vegetable incentives); 2) Produce Prescription Program
(competitive grants for projects that provide “prescriptions” for fruits
and vegetables); and 3) Training, Technical Assistance, Evaluation,
and Information Center (cooperative agreements to establish a center
to help develop and disseminate best practices). 300
For retailer funded incentive programs, the 2018 Farm Bill
requires the USDA Secretary to issue guidance clarifying the process
for retailers to seek waivers to offer SNAP consumers incentives for
purchasing healthy SNAP-eligible staple foods. 301 Recently, Giant
Food’s Pharmacy added fruits and vegetables to its prescription
options at a store in Washington, DC, which is available to Medicaid
The Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. § 4205 (2018).
See Ridberg, et al., A Pediatric Fruit and Vegetable Prescription Program
Increases Food Security in Low-Income Households, 51 J. NUTR. EDUC. BEHAV. 227
(2019) (finding 72% of the 578 low-income families participating in a pediatric,
clinic-based, fruit/vegetable prescription program increased their food security
summative score over the course of the program); see also Trapl, et al., Dietary
Impact of Produce Prescriptions for Patients with Hypertension, 15 PREV. CHRONIC
DISEASE 138, 138 (2018) (concluding produce prescription program lead to
significant changes in dietary behavior); see also Joshi, et al., Implementing a
Produce Prescription Program for Hypertensive Patients in Safety Net Clinics, 20
HEALTH PROMOTION PRACT. 94, 94 (2018) (concluding that program allows for
adaptive treatment); see generally H. Swartz, Produce Rx Programs for Diet-Based
Chronic Disease Prevention, 20 AMA J. ETHICS 960 (2018) (exploring the ethical
and policy implications of produce prescription programs).
300
A Closer Look At The 2018 Farm Bill: Gus Schumacher Nutrition Incentive
Program, NAT’L SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COAL., (Jan. 24, 2019), http://sustainableag
riculture.net/blog/closer-look-2018-farm-bill-fini/; The Gus Schumacher Nutrition
Incentive Program: 2019 Request for Applications (RFA), U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.
NAT’L INST. OF FOOD AND AGRIC. (2019), https://nifa.usda.gov/sites/default/files/rfa
/20190423-fy-2019-gus-schumacher-incentive-program-rfa.pdf.
301
Id. at § 4008; see also Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Provisions of
the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 – Informational Memorandum, U.S. DEP’T
AGRIC. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/Farm-BillInformation-Memo.pdf (noting contact for discussing challenges faced by States
implementing Section 4008 – Retail Incentives).
298
299
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recipients and provides a weekly twenty-dollar coupon for buying
fruits and vegetables. 302 More work is needed to understand the
short- and long-term, multi-sector benefits of these innovative efforts
to improve the consumption of healthier foods and beverages through
incentives and prescription programs.
iii. Combining Restricting Product Eligibility and
Incentivizing Healthier Purchases
Altogether, a combination of restrictions and incentives
might be most effective and supported by SNAP participants, among
other stakeholders. 303 That is, a randomized clinical trial reported
favorable dietary quality changes in the incentives for purchasing
more fruits and vegetables plus restriction on less nutritious foods
and beverages condition that were significantly different from
changes in the control condition. 304
Likewise, a recent
microsimulation study found a combined incentive and disincentive
program through SNAP resulted in the largest modeled gains in
health and healthcare savings and was cost-effective, with a lifetime
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of approximately $5,200 per
quality-adjusted life year. 305 Future research and demonstration
projects could further explore the feasibility and effectiveness of
using restrictions and incentives to improve the dietary quality and
health of SNAP participants. More work is needed to determine how
best to target incentives to individuals and households that would
most benefit them. 306 Additional work could help determine the
302

Giant Food Announces Produce Rx Program Coming to Washington D.C. Store
Location (Apr. 18, 2019), CISION PR NEWSWIRE, https://www.prnewswire.com/ne
ws-releases/giant-food-announces-produce-rx-program-coming-to-washington-dcstore-location-300834433.html.
303
C.W. Leung et al., Support for Policies to Improve the Nutritional Impact of the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program in California, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1576, 1579 (2015); Cindy W. Leung, Aviva Musicus, Walter C. Willett, & Eric B.
Rimm, Improving the Nutritional Impact of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program: Perspectives from the Participants, 52 Aᴍ. J. PREV. MED. S193, S193,
S196–97 (2017).
304
Lisa Harnack et al., Effects of Subsidies and Prohibitions on Nutrition in a Food
Benefit Program: A Randomized Clinical Trial, 176 J. AM. INTERN. MED. 1610, 1610
(2016); S.A. Rydell et al., Participant Satisfaction with a Food Benefit Program
with Restrictions and Incentives, 118 J. ACAD. NUTR. DIET. 294, 294 (2018).
305
D. Mozaffarian et al., Cost-Effectiveness of Financial Incentives and
Disincentives for Improving Food Purchases and Health through the US
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): A Microsimulation Study, 15
PLOS Mᴇᴅ. E1002661 (2018).
306
James R. Farmer, Angela Babb, Sara Minard, & Marcia Veldman, Accessing
Local Foods: Households Using SNAP Double Bucks and Financial Incentives at a
Midwestern Farmers Market, 8 J. AGRIC. FOOD SYS. & COMM. DEV. 1-13 (2019).
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optimal incentive amount and mix of eligible foods (e.g., fruits,
vegetables, whole grains, healthy oils, etc.) that optimize diet quality
while containing costs.
iv. Enhancing Minimum Stocking Standards
Congress granted the USDA the authority to authorize
SNAP retailers and establish eligibility criteria. 307 Over the last
decade, the number of SNAP authorized retailers grew by fifty
percent to 250,000, while the demand for food assistance grew
during the Great Recession of 2007 to 2009 and because an increase
in convenience stores receiving authorization. 308 Having SNAP
authorized stores near communities with eligible SNAP participants
is essential for promoting food security and nutrition; however,
research indicates retailers in SNAP eligible communities tend to sell
less fresh fruits and vegetables, whole grain-rich foods, and low-fat
dairy products. 309 As one example, a study conducted store audits in
2014 in ninety-one randomly selected, licensed food stores in
Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota and found only one-third
stocked one or more varieties of fresh vegetables and only onequarter stocked whole-grain-rich products. 310
Another study
assessed a sample of ninety SNAP authorized dollar stores in sixteen

Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cleveland v. United States, 449 F.2d 255, 256–57
(5th Cir. 1971); The Food Stamp Act of 1977, H.R. 2649, 95th Cong. § 9 (1977);
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Is My Store Eligible?, U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/my-storeeligible.
308
Victor Oliveira, Mark Prell, & Laura Tiehen, Eligibility Requirements for SNAP
Retailers: Balancing Access, Nutrition, and Integrity, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ERS (Jan.
25, 2018), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2018/januaryfebruary/eligibility
-requirements-for-snap-retailers-balancing-access-nutrition-and-integrity/.
309
HEALTHY EATING RESEARCH, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, MINIMUM
STOCKING LEVELS AND MARKETING STRATEGIES OF HEALTHFUL FOODS FOR SMALL
RETAIL FOOD STORES 1–2 (2016), http://healthyeatingresearch.org/wp-content/uplo
ads/2016/02/her_minimum_stocking_final.pdf; C.E. Caspi et al., Differences in
Healthy Food Supply and Stocking Practices Between Small Grocery Stores, GasMarts, Pharmacies and Dollar Stores, 19 PUB. HEALTH & NUTR. 540, 540 (2016);
E.F. Racine et al., Accessibility Landscapes of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program-Authorized Stores, 118 J. ACAD. NUTR. DIET. 836, 836 (2018).; C. Lorts,
Participation in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and Dietary
Behaviors: Role of Community Food Environment, 119 J. ACAD. NUTR. DIET. 938940 (2019).
310
M.N. Laska et al., Lack of Healthy Food in Small-Size to Mid-Size Retailers
Participating in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Minneapolis-St.
Paul, Minnesota, 2014, 12 PREV. CHRONIC DIS. 15071, 15071 (2015) (stores selected
did not include retailers participating in WIC that are expected to stock prescribed
food and beverage items).
307
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counties in southern and western sections of North Carolina in 2014
and found none of these stores sold fresh fruits and vegetables. 311
Requiring SNAP authorized retailers to stock certain types
of foods and beverages might affect a retailer’s interest or ability to
be authorized and, thereby, limit a participant’s ability to redeem
SNAP benefits or participate at all. 312 Even so, the USDA requires
WIC authorized retailers stock certain food and beverage items and
these changes have been successfully implemented in retailers across
the nation without much disruption to retailer or participant
participation in the program and has had significant impacts on
dietary quality of mothers and infants participating in WIC.313
Informed by these findings, the Agricultural Act of 2014 required the
USDA to update the stocking standards for authorized SNAP
retailers, which only required a store to “sell food for home
preparation and consumption and offer for sale at least three different
varieties of food in each of the following four staple food groups,
with perishable foods in at least two categories, on a daily basis:
breads and grains; dairy; fruits and vegetables; and meat, poultry, and
fish or at least fifty percent of the total sales (e.g., food, non-food,
services, etc.) . . . must be from the sale of eligible staple food.” 314
The USDA rule making process involved hosting listening
sessions, calls for public comments, and conducting regulatory
impact analyses, as well as extensions, delays, and technical
assistance. 315 Ultimately, the staple food requirements put forth in

E.R. Racine et al., Availability of Foods and Beverages in Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program-Authorized Dollar Stores in a Region of North Carolina, 116
J. ACAD. NUTR. DIET. 1613, 1613, 1616 (2016).
312
See OLIVEIRA ETAL, supra note 64, at 49–50 (summarizing the legislative debate
on stocking requirements for SNAP authorized retailers).
313
7 C.F.R. § 246.1 (2019); see also ANDREYEVA ET AL., RUDD CTR. FOOD POL’Y &
OBESITY, CHANGES IN ACCESS TO HEALTHY FOODS AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
WIC FOOD PACKAGE REVISIONS 3, https://naldc.nal.usda.gov/download/48404/PDF
(describing significantly increased availability and variety of health foods in subject
stores).
314
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, § 4002, 128 Stat 649, 782 (2014)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.A. § 2012(o)(1) (2019)).
315
Enhancing Retail Food Store Eligibility—Listening Sessions, 78 Fed. Reg.
52,899 (Aug. 27, 2013); Request for Information: Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) Enhancing Retail Food Store Eligibility, 78 Fed. Reg.
64468 (Oct. 29, 2013); Submission for OMB Review: Comment Request, 79 Fed.
Reg. 43706 (July 28, 2014); Enhancing Retailer Standards in the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Clarification of Proposed Rule and Extension
of Comment Period, 81 Fed. Reg. 65 (Apr. 5, 2016); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 7 CFR PARTS 271 ᴀɴᴅ 278: ENHANCING RETAILER
311
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the 2016 final rule required authorized stores to meet one of two
staple food requirements: Criterion A (staple food inventory) or
Criterion B (staple food sales). 316 According to the USDA, “staple
foods are the basic foods that make up a significant portion of a
person’s diet and are usually prepared at home and eaten as a meal .
. . and do not include prepared foods, heated foods, or accessory
foods.” 317 Criterion A “requires a store to stock, on a continuous
basis, a certain variety and quantity of staple foods in each of the four
staple food categories, including some perishable staple foods.”318
The majority of stores are authorized under Criterion A. 319 Criterion
B “requires a store to have more than 50 percent of its total gross
retail sales from the sale of staple foods.” 320 These new, enhanced
stocking standards emerged despite efforts to weaken them during
the 2017 and 2018 Agriculture Appropriations Acts and President
Trump’s calls for regulatory rollbacks and delays, including the
rollback of the stronger nutrition standards for the USDA National
School Lunch Program. 321
Research indicates these new stocking standards are
feasible; as one example, a recent study of 57 small stores in four
states that are SNAP authorized determined these stores are capable
of stocking healthy products but recommended technical and
infrastructure support and incentives be offered to retailers.322
Nevertheless, the fiscal year 2019 Agricultural Appropriations
prohibited funds be used to “implement, administer, or enforce the
STANDARDS IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP)
(2016), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/RIA-Enhancing-Reta
iler-Standards.pdf; STAFF OF H. RULES COMM., 115TH CONG., RULES COMMITTEE
PRINT 115-TEXT OF THE HOUSE AMENDMENT TO SENATE AMENDMENT NUMBERED 1
TO H.R. 244, THE HONORING INVESTMENTS IN RECRUITING AND EMPLOYING
AMERICAN VETERANS ACT OF 2017, § 765, at 110. (Comm. Print 2017) (requiring
an expansion to the definitions of “staple food” and “variety” as applied to “staple
food” before the funds made available by the act could be implemented); Final Rule:
Enhancing Retailer Standards in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP), 81 Fed. Reg. 90,675 (Dec. 15, 2016) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R §§ 271,
278).
316
7 C.F.R. § 271.2 (defining “Retail food store”); see also 7 C.F.R. § 278.1
(providing Criteria A and Criteria B).
317
What are Staple Foods, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (2018), https://fns-prod.azureedge
.net/sites/default/files/snap/SNAP-Staple-Foods.pdf.
318
Is My Store Eligible?, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV. (May 9, 2018),
https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/my-store-eligible.
319
Id.
320
Id.
321
Sara N. Bleich, Food Policy in the Era of Trump – Limits to Deregulation, 113
Aᴍ. J. PREV. MED. 13, 13 (2018).
322
A. Karpyn et al., Examining the Feasibility of Healthy Minimum Stocking
Standards for Small Food Stores, 118 ACAD. NUTR. DIET. 1655, 1655 (2018).
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‘variety’ requirements of the final rule . . . until the Secretary of
Agriculture amends the definition to increase the number of items
that qualify as acceptable varieties in each staple food category. . .”323
On April 5, 2019, the USDA published a proposed rule that would
provide regulatory flexibility for retailers in SNAP in meeting the
2016 final rule, by only modifying the definition of the term
“variety” and thereby permitting “canned spray cheese, beef jerky,
and pimiento-stuffed olives [to] count as staple foods.” 324 More
research is needed on how the SNAP authorization process and the
new, enhanced stocking requirements affect SNAP participants’
access to SNAP authorized stores, stocked with affordable, healthful
options and their dietary quality and health, taking into consideration
the cost-benefit analysis for retailers to participate in the program.
v. Expanding Access to Foods through a National Healthy
Food Financing Initiative
Expanding on the success of local and state initiatives, the
Healthy Food Financing Initiative (HFFI) is an innovative national
program that works to increase access to retail food outlets in
communities predominantly characterized as low-income, high
racial/ethnic minority status, and/or rural which tend to have less
access to grocery stores and supermarkets in comparison to higherincome, white, and urban communities. 325 During fiscal year 2010
through fiscal year 2016, the Departments of Agriculture, Health and
Human Services, and Treasury each administered HFFI projects
independently and met periodically to share implementation
strategies and issues. 326 In the Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 11379, Sec. 4206), the Secretary of Agriculture was given enhanced
Sec. 727 of H.J.Res.31 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, https://www.co
ngress.gov/116/bills/hjres31/BILLS-116hjres31enr.pdf.
324
Providing Regulatory Flexibility for Retailers in the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program SNAP, 7 CFR Parts 271 and 278 [FNS-2019-0003] (Apr. 5,
2019), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/fr-040519; see also Mike Dorning, Spray
Cheese Would Count as Staple Under Trump Food Stamp Rule, BLOOMBERG (May
30, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-30/spray-cheese-wo
uld-count-as-staple-under-trump-food-stamp-rule.
325
Sheila E. Fleischhacker, Rebecca Flournoy, & Latetia V. Moore, Meaningful,
Measurable, and Manageable Approaches to Evaluating Healthy Food Financing
Initiatives: An Overview of Resources and Approaches, 19 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT.
PRAC. 541, 541–42 (2013); see also USDA Announces New Partnership to Increase
Rural Residents’ Access to Healthy Foods, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RURAL DEV.,
https://www.rd.usda.gov/newsroom/news-release/usda-announces-new-partnership
-increase-rural-residents%E2%80%99-access-healthy-food (last updated Jan. 13,
2017) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Agric., New Partnership].
326
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NEW PARTNERSHIP, supra note 325.
323
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authority and appropriated $125,000,000 to establish HFFI. 327
Currently, HFFI is administered by the Reinvestment Fund on behalf
of USDA Rural Development. 328 In fiscal years 2017 and 2018,
Congress appropriated one million to launch HFFI at USDA. 329 In
the 2018 Farm Bill (Sec. 12408), slight amendments were made to
the HFFI established in the 2014 Farm Bill including expanding
eligible projects beyond retail to include food hubs, mobile markets,
direct to consumer markets, and food business incubators. 330 In total,
over the last eight years, HFFI has leveraged more than $220 million
in grants plus more than one billion in additional financing and
supported nearly one thousand retail food projects in more than
thirty-five states. 331 In Agricultural Appropriations 2019, not less
than $22,000,000 is available until September 30, 2020 to provide
financial assistance, technical assistance, training, and outreach to
community development financial institutions for the purpose of
offering affordable financing and technical assistance to expand the
availability of healthy food options in distressed communities. 332 In
both the House (H.R. 1717) and Senate (S.786), bills have been
reintroduced to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to
establish a new tax credit and grant program to stimulate investment
and healthy retail options in food deserts. 333 More multi-sectoral,
multi-level research is needed to understand the impacts of federal
investments aiming to improve access to retail food outlets.334

Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, § 4206. 128 Stat. 649, 824 (2014)
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6953(d) (2019)).
328
Healthy Food Financing Initiative, REINVESTMENT FUND, https://www.reinvestm
ent.com/initiatives/hffi (last visited Aug. 30, 2019).
329
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–31, § 767, 131 Stat.
135, 180 (2017); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44588, AGRICULTURE AND RELATED
AGENCIES: FY2017 APPROPRIATIONS 45 (2017); Agriculture, Rural Development
Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2018,
H.R. 3268, 115th Cong. §759 (2017).
330
Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. §§ 4204; see id. at
§ 12614 (establishing Food Access Liaison).
331
Healthy Food Financing Initiative, supra note 328.
332
Community Development Financial Institutions Fund Program Account (4) of
H.J.Res.31 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/11
6/bills/hjres31/BILLS-116hjres31enr.pdf.
333
H.R.1717 – Healthy Food Access for All Americans Act, 116th Congress (20192020); S.786 – Healthy Food Access for All Americans Act, 116th Congress (20192020).
334
Nicole Larson, Mary Story, & Melissa Nelson, Neighborhood Environments:
Disparities in Access to Healthy Foods in the US, 36 AM. J. PREV. MED. 74, 74
(2009).
327
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vi. Supporting Nutrition Education and Promotion
One final way that Congress could strengthen the nutrition
impacts of SNAP is to require nutrition education be a mandatory
part of the program, with adequate appropriations dedicated to
evaluating the program’s impact on dietary quality and health.335
Currently, states can participate in SNAP - Education (SNAP-Ed), a
federally funded grant program, to develop, implement, and evaluate
nutrition education and promotion, social marketing campaigns, and
policies, systems, and environmental approaches to improve access
to healthy eating (e.g., helping develop a new community garden or
implement the federal local school wellness policy at a school or state
level). 336 However, these efforts only reach roughly about five
percent of the SNAP population. 337 SNAP-Ed has evolved since it
began in 1988 in Wisconsin and now is being conducted in all fifty
states with success. 338 The estimated SNAP-Ed allocations for fiscal
year 2019 illustrate the range of support states and US territories
receive; for example, California is estimated to receive $99,284,451
and the Virgin Islands is estimated to receive $182,243. 339 SNAPEd was significantly transformed during the last Child Nutrition
Reauthorization process into a formula funded nutrition education
and obesity prevention grants program that has increasingly
permitted the integration of efforts to promote active living as
well. 340
M. Mueller & E. Kennedy, The US Farm Bill: Opportunities and Challenges, 51
Nᴜᴛʀ. Tᴏᴅᴀʏ 82, 85 (2016).
336
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP-Ed), U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.
FOOD & NUTR. SERV., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/supplemental-nutrition-assist
ance-program-education-snap-ed (last updated June 27, 2019); see also
Supplemental Nutrition Education Program – Education (SNAP-Ed), U.S. DEP’T
AGRIC., NAT’L INST. FOOD & AGRIC., https://nifa.usda.gov/program/supplemental-n
utrition-education-program-education-snap-ed (last visited Aug. 30, 2019)
(providing general overview of the scope of SNAP-ed) [hereinafter USDA, SNAPEd].
337
S.N. Bleich et al., U.S. Nutrition Assistance, 2018 – Modifying SNAP to Promote
Population Health, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1205, 1207 (2017).
338
USDA, SNAP-Ed, supra note 336.
339
SNAP-Ed Estimated Allocations for FY 2019, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NAT’L INST.
FOOD & AGRIC., https://snaped.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FY2019
EstimatedAllocations.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2019).
340
The Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, Pub. Law No. 111-296, 124 Stat.
3183, 3227–3234 (2010); see also Nutrition Education and Obesity Prevention
Grant Program, 81 Fed Reg. 18447, 18447–18448 (Mar. 31, 2016) (codified at 7
C.F.R § 271) (describing goals and funding apparatus); see also U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.
FOOD & NUTR. SERV., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM,
EDUCATION PLAN GUIDANCE FY 2018 NUTRITION EDUCATION AND OBESITY
PREVENTION GRANT PROGRAM, https://snaped.fns.usda.gov/snap/Guidance/FY2018
SNAP-EdPlanGuidance.pdf.
335
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Over the years, various efforts have examined—with mixed
success—the impacts of USDA investments in nutrition education
and promotion. 341 As one example, a conference that took place in
1995 convened a broad range of stakeholders to help chart a course
for nutrition education and promotion evaluation in USDA food
assistance programs. 342 Another milestone was the development and
evaluation of Statewide Nutrition Education Networks (1995-1999)
that found sixty percent of the participating networks achieved their
stated objectives and were able to leverage more than $20 million in
non-federal funding and identified additional in-kind contributions
from non-governmental organizations. 343 A 1999 Congressionally
requested report identified opportunities and barriers to enhance
USDA’s investment in nutrition education and promotion, including:
authority and funding levels vary widely by program; state and local
infrastructures are necessary to deliver integrated, comprehensive
programs; and the evaluation system for USDA’s nutrition education
is fragmented and lacks outcome measures. 344 A 2000 Food Stamp
Nutrition Education Report further illustrated the diversity of state
administrative approaches to the program and in the delivery of
nutrition education and promotion in addition to the need for stronger
coordination and systematic reporting systems. 345 Another report
released in 2000 provided “circumstantial evidence” for the
importance of nutrition education and promotion among Food Stamp
participants but emphasized the need for additional research. 346
Furthermore, a 2002 Congressionally requested report reiterated the
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., CHARTING THE COURSE FOR
EVALUATION: HOW DO WE MEASURE THE SUCCESS OF NUTRITION EDUCATION AND
PROMOTION IN FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS? (1997), https://fns-prod.azureedge.ne
t/sites/default/files/ChartingSummary.pdf.
342
Id.
343
RES. TRIANGLE INST. & HEALTH SYS. RES., INC., EVALUATION OF STATEWIDE
NUTRITION EDUCATION NETWORKS. REPORT PREPARED FOR THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD AND NUTRITION OFFICE OF ANALYSIS,
NUTRITION AND EVALUATION 69 (1999), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/defaul
t/files/NetReport2.pdf.
344
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., OFF. RES. & ANALYSIS, DIETARY
INTAKE AND DIETARY ATTITUDES AMONG FOOD STAMP PARTICIPANTS AND OTHER
LOW-INCOME INDIVIDUALS (2000), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files
/FSPDiet_Summary.pdf.
345
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., NUTRITION EDUCATION IN FNS: A
COORDINATED APPROACH FOR PROMOTING HEALTHY BEHAVIORS: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/CongressNutEd%2822002%29.pdf.
346
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., NUTRITION EDUCATION AND
PROMOTION: THE ROLE OF FNS IN HELPING LOW-INCOME FAMILIES MAKE
HEALTHIER EATING AND LIFESTYLE CHOICES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (2010),
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/NutritionEdRTC.pdf .
341
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needs put forth in the 1999 report regarding policy changes and
funding disparities. 347 Then, in 2010, USDA committed to Congress
to better coordinate nutrition education efforts across its food
assistance programs. 348 A recent 2018 analysis of SNAP-Ed

U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., ANALYSIS OF SUPPLEMENTAL
NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM EDUCATION (SNAP-ED) DATA FOR ALL STATES
STUDY (SUMMARY) (2018), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ops/SN
APED-Data-AllStates-Summary.pdf.
348
See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., OFF. RES. & ANALYSIS,
NUTRITION AND EVALUATION. NUTRITION EDUCATION: PRINCIPLES OF SOUND IMPACT
EVALUATION (2005), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/EvaluationPr
inciples.pdf (puts forth the following principles of impact evaluation: 1) make
certain that the nutrition education intervention can be evaluated; 2) build on
available research; 3) hold out for research designs with random assignment but use
them selectively; 4) choose impact measures that fit the intervention and approach
existing standards for credible assessment; 5) observe standards for the fair
treatment of study participants; 6) collect impact data after start-up problems get
resolved but before implementation rolls out; 7) report both positive and negative
results–but do so accurately; and 8) share results to maximize their value); U.S.
DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., NUTRITION EDUCATION RESEARCH REVIEW
(2007), https://www.fns.usda.gov/nutrition-education-research-review-0 (generated
three different reviews on message framing, use of interactive technology to tailor
messages, and intervention intensity); U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV.,
OFF. RES. & ANALYSIS, SNAP EDUCATION AND EVALUATION STUDY (Wᴀᴠᴇ I): FINAL
REPORT (2012), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/SNAPEdWaveI.pd
f (evaluated four SNAP-Ed demonstration projects and put forth recommendations
for SNAP-Ed program implementation and evaluation); U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD &
NUTRITION SERV., OFF. RES. & ANALYSIS SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM EDUCATION AND EVALUATION STUDY (Wᴀᴠᴇ II) (2013), https://fnsprod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/SNAPEdWaveII.pdf (evaluated three SNAPEd demonstration projects and put forth recommendations for SNAP-Ed program
implementation and evaluation); U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., OFF.
POL’Y SUPPORT, APPROACHES FOR PROMOTING HEALTHY FOOD PURCHASES BY
SNAP PARTICIPANTS (2014), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ICFIHC-Final-Report-0714.pdf (evaluated possible pilot design approaches for
promoting healthier purchases); U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV.,
SNAP-ED CONNECTION: SUCCESS STORIES, https://snaped.fns.usda.gov/successstories (provides a searchable database of SNAP-Ed success stories); U.S. DEP’T
AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., SNAP-ED CONNECTION: EDUCATION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTING SYSTEM (EARS), https://snaped.fns.usda.gov/program
-administration/ears-form-training (last visited Aug. 30, 2019) (illustrates the form
designed to provide uniform data and information about the activities of all States
participating in SNAP-Ed); U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTR. SERV., SNAP-ED
CONNECTION: SNAP-ED PLAN GUIDANCE AND TEMPLATES, https://snaped.fns.usda.g
ov/program-administration/guidance-and-templates (last visited Aug. 30, 2019)
(provides guidance on how to develop your SNAP-Ed plan); U. N.C. CHAPEL HILL
CTR. HEALTH PROMOTION & DISEASE PREVENTION SUPPORTED BY U.S. DEP’T
AGRIC., SNAP-ED TOOLKIT, https://snapedtoolkit.org/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2019)
(provides resources to help States develop their SNAP-Ed plan and evaluation
approaches); U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., HHFKA
IMPLEMENTATION RESEARCH BRIEF SERIES HHFKA (2016), https://www.fns.usda.g
347
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similarly reported a variety of implementing agencies delivering a
variety of nutrition education and promotion approaches, across a
variety of settings, and using various reporting metrics. 349 Other
efforts have explored how best to deliver nutrition education and
promotion through USDA food and nutrition assistance programs
and how best to evaluate SNAP-Ed at the local, state, tribal, regional,
and national levels. 350 Moreover, the Bipartisan Policy Center
worked with a SNAP Task Force to develop recommendations to
leverage federal programs for better health and recommended
“enhancing technical assistance from the USDA regional offices,
reducing planning and reporting burdens, restructuring state reports
to focus on program impact, developing new tools and components,
and sharing best practices.”351 The Bipartisan Policy Center SNAP
Task Force also suggested realigning the Expanded Food and
Nutrition Education Program (EFNEP) to better enable this program
and SNAP-Ed to “work synergistically while avoiding
duplication.”352 An estimated $100 million over five years was
suggested to support “pilot comprehensive, multipronged
interventions that address the core objectives of diet quality, food
security, and fiscal responsibility.” 353 A recent GAO study found the
USDA lacks information on whether SNAP-Ed is meeting its goals
and recommended: 1) the Administrator of FNS improve how the
agency gathers information on the effectiveness of SNAP-Ed
interventions; 2) the Secretary of Agriculture should direct the Under
Secretaries for Food, Nutrition and Consumer Services and for
Research, Education, and Economics to develop a formal
mechanism, such as a designated individual or group of individuals,
for providing cross-departmental leadership for USDA’s nutrition
education efforts and facilitating cross-program information sharing;
and 3) the Secretary of Agriculture should direct the Under
Secretaries for Food, Nutrition, and Consumer Services and for
Research, Education, and Economics to identify and implement

ov/hhfka-implementation-research-brief-series (shares a series of research briefs
examining best practices in School Food Authorities’ implementation of key
provisions and their impacts in the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010,
including fruits and vegetables, plate waste, sodium, participation, revenue, whole
grains, smart snacks, and a special view of obesity).
349
Leading with Nutrition: Leveraging Federal Programs for Better Health:
Recommendations from the BPC SNAP Task Force, BIPARTISAN POL’Y. CTR. (Mar.
12, 2018), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/leading-with-nutrition-leveragingfederal-programs-for-better-health/.
350
Id.
351
Id.
352
Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. §§ 4019.
353
Id.
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mechanisms to fully leverage the department’s nutrition expertise for
its nutrition education efforts.354
Ultimately, the 2018 Farm Bill only made modest
modifications to SNAP-Ed. The House proposal to merge SNAP-Ed
and EFNEP was rejected and instead the 2018 Farm Bill encourages
better coordination across the two programs, including requiring an
annual report to Congress detailing the evaluation of the level of
coordination between SNAP-Ed, EFNEP, and other USDA nutrition
education programs. 355 The 2018 Farm Bill now requires SNAP-Ed
programs to use an electronic reporting system to measure and
evaluate projects and account for state administrative costs. 356 In
addition, the 2018 Farm Bill establishes an online information
clearinghouse to share best practices in planning, implementing, and
evaluating SNAP-Ed programs. 357 The USDA Secretary is required
to provide technical assistance to state agencies in developing and
implementing SNAP-Ed plans and state agencies are required to
submit an annual SNAP-Ed report to the USDA Secretary. 358 In the
2019 Agricultural Appropriations, $433,000,000 was allocated to
SNAP-Ed. 359 The SNAP-Ed Plan Guidance for fiscal year 2020 has
been posted, which provides policy guidance for states regarding the
SNAP-Ed operations and estimates funding allocations. 360
Taken together, based on USDA’s analyses over the last
three decades and the recent GAO report, adequately supported
research and evaluation is needed to better understand the role of
SNAP-Ed, particularly how the recent transformation of the program
impacts SNAP participants’ dietary quality and health. The 2018
Farm Bill lacked strong Congressional investments into research and
evaluation that could potentially maximize and better harmonize
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-572, NUTRITION EDUCATION:
USDA ACTIONS NEEDED TO ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS, COORDINATE PROGRAMS, AND
LEVERAGE EXPERTISE (2019), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-572.
355
Id.
356
Id.
357
OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2019: EFFICIENT, EFFECTIVE,
ACCOUNTABLE: AN AMERICAN BUDGET, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/u
ploads/2018/02/budget-fy2019.pdf.
358
Id.
359
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV. SNAP-ED, FY2019 FINAL
STATE SNAP-ED ALLOCATIONS, https://snaped.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/docu
ments/FY2019SNAP-EdFinalAllocation_3.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2019).
360
SNAP-Ed Plan Guidance and Templates, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. SNAP-ED
CONNECTION, https://snaped.fns.usda.gov/program-administration/guidance-andtemplates?utm_source=SNEB+Members&utm_campaign=cb428b769aEMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_08_25_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=
0_5640af03cf-cb428b769a-709895345 (last visited May 14, 2019).
354
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existing benefits in SNAP and SNAP-Ed across all fifty States and
US territories. But, the annual reporting on coordination between
SNAP-Ed and EFNEP could possibly be a foundation for future
considerations to make nutrition education across the USDA and
across the federal government more effective and efficient.
IV. America’s Harvest Box and Other Outside of the
Box Trump Administration Approaches with
SNAP Implications
On January 20, 2017, President Donald Trump became the
45th President of the United States and since that date has put forth a
variety of executive orders, initiatives, nominations, budget
proposals, and tweets with SNAP implications (See Table 3). On
May 7, 2019, the Executive Office of the President, Office of
Management and Budget requested public comment on the consumer
inflation measures produced by federal statistical agencies, which are
used to calculate the official definition of poverty used by the Census
Bureau to estimate the size of our nation’s poor population and used
to determine eligibility for government benefits including SNAP. 361
A. America’s Harvest Box
The first and most direct proposal from the Trump
administration to change the nature of SNAP is known as the
America’s Harvest Box and was put forth in the President’s fiscal
year 2019 budget. 362 Under this proposed approach to support the
President’s leadership on Buy American, all SNAP participating
households receiving $90 per month or more in SNAP benefits
would receive a package of nutritious, one hundred percent US
grown and produced food and the remainder of the benefits would be
provided via EBT cards. 363 States would be given flexibility in
distributing these boxes to participants, through “existing
infrastructure, partnerships, and/or directly to residences through
Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Request
for Comment on the Consumer Inflation Measures Produced by Federal Statistical
Agencies (84 FR 19961) (May 7, 2019), https://www.federalregister.gov/document
s/2019/05/07/2019-09106/request-for-comment-on-the-consumer-inflation-measur
es-produced-by-federal-statistical-agencies; A. Karni, Trump Administration Seeks
to Redefine Formula for Calculating Poverty, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/us/politics/trump-poverty-level-proposal.ht
ml.
362
Id.
363
USDA America’s Harvest Box, U.S. Dᴇᴘᴛ’ Aɢʀɪᴄ., https://www.agripulse.com/ext/resources/pdfs/Americas-Harvest-Box.pdf (last visited Aug. 30,
2019).
361
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commercial and/or retail delivery services.” 364 Secretary of
Agriculture Sonny Perdue believed America’s Harvest Box was “a
bold, innovative approach to providing nutritious food to people who
need assistance feeding themselves and their families—and all of it
is home grown by American farmers and producers.” 365 A variety of
stakeholders criticized the idea, including negative perspectives on
feasibility and public health impacts based on past and present efforts
of the USDA with distributing federal commodities. 366 Put simply,
why take fresh produce, meat, and dairy options out of SNAP for a
much higher logistical cost? 367 A recent study found sixty percent of
the SNAP participants and food-insufficient non-participants
surveyed opposed the America’s Harvest Box proposal. 368 This
proposal was tabled but effectively stirred up attention to the
President’s severe budget cuts proposed for SNAP during Farm Bill
deliberations. 369 Then, the concept reappeared in the Trump
administration’s fiscal year 2020 budget. 370 Recent stories discuss
364
E. Goldberg, The US Already Tested Trump’s Canned Goods Idea on Native
Americans. It was Bad, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.huffington
post.com/entry/trump-snap-canned-goods-native-americans_us_5a8c403de4b0e1a
cb11d833a; E. Hunzinger et al., Trump Administration Wants to Decide What Food
SNAP Recipients Will Get, NPR (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesa
lt/2018/02/12/585130274/trump-administration-wants-to-decide-what-food-snaprecipients-will-get; M. Hiltzik, Economists Overwhelmingly Agree: Trump’s FoodBox Idea is Absurd, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/business/
hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-economists-foodstamps-20180305-story.htm; J. Poppendieck,
The Trump Budget: Ignoring 75 years of Food Assistance Experience, CUNY
URBAN FOOD POL’Y INST. (Feb. 19, 2018), http://www.cunyurbanfoodpolicy.org/ne
ws/2018/2/18/ignoring-75-years-of-food-assistance-experience.
365
M. Nestle, Trump’s “Blue Apron” Plan for SNAP: Real or Smokescreen?, FOOD
POLITICS (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.foodpolitics.com/2018/02/trumps-blueapron-plan-for-snap-real-or-a-smokescreen/.
366
Catherine Boudreau, Farm Bill on the Campaign Trail, POLITICO (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-agriculture/2018/10/19/farm-billon-the-campaign-trail-380089.
367
Id.
368
Cindy W. Leung & Julia A. Wolfson, Perspectives from Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program Participants on Improving SNAP Policy, 3.1 HEALTH EQUITY
81, 82 (2019).
369
OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, American First: A Budget Blueprint to Make America
Great Again, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2018_blue
print.pdf; OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, Fiscal Year 2019: Efficient, Effective,
Accountable: An American Budget, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploa
ds/2018/02/budget-fy2019.pdf.
370
Catherine Boudreau, Farm Bill on the Campaign Trail, POLITICO (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-agriculture/2018/10/19/farm-billon-the-campaign-trail-380089; Arthur Delaney, The Trump Administration Still
Wants to Put Food Benefits in a Box, HUFFPOST (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-harvest-box-food-assistance_n_5c8691d9e
4b0d936162a8825; Stephanie Ebbs, Trump’s New Budget Resurrects Controversial
‘Harvest Box’ Proposal for Food Stamps as Part of Broader Welfare Reform: The

204

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.15

the new “Meals to You” program offered through funding by the
USDA FNS, which offers a box including the equivalent of five
breakfasts, lunches, and snacks per student delivered to each
participating student’s door via UPS during the summer months. 371
B. SNAP Budget Cuts
So, what were the proposed SNAP cuts? Citing projected
budget deficits, President Trump’s fiscal years 2018, 2019, and now
2020 budgets consistently proposed massive cuts to SNAP and
included provisions to reconfigure the program by establishing a
state match, limit categorical eligibility and the use of waivers that
exempt able-bodied adults without dependents from work, and
establish application fees for retailers seeking to participate in
SNAP. 372 The President also ordered all federal agencies to cut
spending by five percent for fiscal year 2019 and again for fiscal year
2020. These proposals are consistent with Trump’s Executive Order
to reform the welfare system, Medicaid work requirements, and the
Republican-led 115th House efforts discussed earlier that would
significantly alter the nation’s safety net, decrease SNAP
participation, and increase food insecurity among vulnerable
individuals and households. 373 Fortunately, the President proposes
and Congress disposes and so far the severity of Trump’s proposed
Change to Food Stamps is Part of Several Proposals to Reform Welfare, ABC NEWS
(Mar. 12, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trumps-budget-resurrects-harvestbox-proposal-food-stamps/story?id=61627707.
371
Shelli Parker, ‘A Hungry Child Can’t Learn’ – Round Table Discussions
Examines Meal Program, ATHENS DAILY REVIEW (Aug. 14, 2019),
https://www.athensreview.com/news/a-hungry-child-can-t-learn---round-table/artic
le_07610d6c-be1a-11e9-8a70-a3c4155d3ffc.html.
372
OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, American First: A Budget Blueprint to Make America
Great Again, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2018_blue
print.pdf; OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, Fiscal Year 2019: Efficient, Effective,
Accountable: An American Budget, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploa
ds/2018/02/budget-fy2019.pdf; OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, A BUDGET FOR A BETTER AMERICA: PROMISES KEPT. TAXPAYERS FIRST.,
FISCAL YEAR 2020 (2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads
/2019/03/budget-fy2020.pdf.
373
Executive Order Reducing Poverty in America by Promoting Opportunity and
Economic Mobility, OFF. WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.g
ov/presidential-actions/executive-order-reducing-poverty-america-promoting-oppo
rtunity-economic-mobility/; U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CTRS. MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERVS., SMD: 18-002 RE: OPPORTUNITIES TO PROMOTE WORK AND
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AMONG MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf.;
DISASTER ASSISTANCE EXEC. OFF. PRES. U.S., COUNCIL ECON. ADVISORS,
EXPANDING WORK REQUIREMENTS IN NON-CASH WELFARE PROGRAMS (2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Expanding-Work-Requi
rements-in-Non-Cash-Welfare-Programs.pdf.
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SNAP cuts have not been implemented for fiscal years 2018 and
2019. 374 Notwithstanding, as explained previously, the fiscal year
2019 Agricultural Appropriations were part of the longest
government shutdown in our nation’s history. The 116th Congress is
not giving the President’s fiscal year 2020 budget proposal much
attention, but it does provide signals for where this administration
stands, including consistent efforts at USDA’s sister agency, the US
Department of Health and Human Services, to redesign assistance
programs that focus more on promoting personal responsibility and
self-sufficiency. 375
C. Disaster Assistance through SNAP
The Trump administration has responded to a variety of
hurricanes, wild fires, floods, and other natural disasters thus far
using the USDA’s Disaster Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (D-SNAP). 376 This program, which has different income
eligibility requirements than SNAP, provides supplemental nutrition
assistance similar to SNAP to Americans struggling with the
aftermaths of a natural disaster. 377 Hurricanes Irma and Maria
ravaged the island of Puerto Rico in the summer of 2017 and
presented unique challenges for Puerto Rico’s Nutrition Assistance
Program (NAP). The unprecedented length and scale of power
outages and internet connectivity issues hindered the operation of
EBT, participants’ ability to prepare meals, and safe storage of foods
and beverages. 378 On a positive note, innovative approaches

Ebbs, supra note 370.
Id.
376
Disaster Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (D-SNAP),
DISASTERASSISTANCE.GOV, https://www.disasterassistance.gov/get-assistance/form
s-of-assistance/5769 (last updated May 3, 2019); Steve Benen, Trump: Puerto Rico
Disaster Response was ‘An Incredible Unsung Success’, MSNBC (Sept. 11, 2018),
http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/trump-puerto-rico-disaster-responsewas-incredible-unsung-success; Avery Anapol, Houston Chronicle: Trump
Ridiculed Hurricane Victims Instead of Helping, HILL (June 11, 2018),
https://thehill.com/homenews/media/391708-houston-chronicle-trump-ridiculedhurricane-victims-instead-of-helping; Kendra Pierre-Louis, Trump’s Misleading
Claims About California’s Fire ‘Mismanagement’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/12/us/politics/fact-check-trump-california-firetweet.html.
377
D-SNAP Resources for State Agencies and Partners, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD &
NUTR. SERV., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/d-snap-resources-state-agencies-andpartners (last updated Aug. 22, 2013).
378
N, Kishore et al., Mortality in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria. 379 N. ENGL.
J. MED. 162-170 (2018); N. Weixel, Trump Officials Allow Puerto Ricans to Use
Food Stamps for Hot Food, THE HILL (Oct. 3, 2017), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog374
375
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emerged to “Feed an Island”; specifically, Chef Jose Andres, in
collaboration with thousands of volunteers who made up Chefs for
Puerto Rico, prepared and delivered more than three million meals
to every part of the island for months. 379 News stories reported the
national response was often slow, uncoordinated and inadequate. 380
As noted earlier, S.677 has been introduced to enable Puerto Rico
and other US territories to participate in SNAP and a legal battle is
underway against the USDA regarding “policies awarding lower
federal benefits to US citizens who reside in Puerto Rico than to
similarly situated and equally needy US citizens residing in any of
the 50 states of the US.”381 The Government of Puerto Rico reached
out via a video message to President Trump pleading for support of
the country’s NAP, which has experienced drastic increases in
applications since Hurricane Maria. 382 An estimated 670,000 Puerto
Rico residents received a twenty-five percent decrease in their SNAP
benefits for March 2019. 383
Supplemental Congressional
appropriations have helped provide some relief but a recent political
stalemate over additional aid had put all US disaster funding in

briefing-room/353685-trump-admin-denied-puerto-rico-request-to-let-hurricanevictims-use?amp.
379
T. Carman, Jose Andres’s Riveting ‘We Fed an Island’ Calls for a Revolution in
Disaster Relief, WA. POST (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifesty
le/food/jose-andress-riveting-we-fed-an-island-calls-for-a-revolution-in-disasterrelief/2018/09/05/b126d766-ad70-11e8-b1da-ff7faa680710_story.html?utm_term=
.f13d45a26f1a.
380
B. Weir, 20,000 Pallets of Bottled Water Left Untouched in Storm-Ravaged
Puerto Rico, CNN (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/12/us/puertorico-bottled-water-dump-weir/index.html; J. Wise, Donations for Puerto Rico
Hurricane Victims Found Rotting in Parking Lot, THE HILL (Aug. 10, 2018),
https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/401360-donations-for-puertorico-hurricane-victims-found-rotting-in; A.D. Fragose, ‘People are Getting
Desperate’ in Puerto Rico as Federal Response Not Equal to the Crisis, EARTH
JUSTICE (Oct. 2, 2017), https://earthjustice.org/blog/2017-september/people-aregetting-desperate-in-puerto-rico-as-federal-response-not-equal-to-the-crisis;
Snopes, Did Trump Administration Refuse Puerto Rico’s Request to Allow Food
Stamps to be Used for Hot Meals?, SNOPES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.snopes.com
/fact-check/puerto-rico-food-stamps/.
381
Martinez, 2018 WL 1795786, at *2; see also Martinez, 376 F. Supp. 3d 191
(explaining how the complaint barely survived a motion to dismiss).
382
Camilo Montoya-Galvez, Puerto Rico’s Leaders Slam Trump Administration for
Opposing Food Assistance Funding, CBS Nᴇᴡꜱ (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/puerto-rican-officials-blast-trump-administrationfor-opposing-bill-to-fund-the-islands-nutritional-program/.
383
Jeff Stein, More than 670,000 Puerto Rico Residents Have Received Cuts to Food
Stamp Benefits Amid Congressional Impasse, WA. POST (Mar. 12, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2019/03/08/puerto-rico-starts-cuttingfood-stamp-benefits-used-by-more-than-million-people-amid-congressionalimpasse/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.0292a7fb37a1.
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jeopardy. 384 Ultimately, on June 6, 2019, a $19.1 billion standalone
disaster supplemental bill was enacted, which included $643 million
for food and nutrition assistance in Puerto Rico and Pacific
territories. 385
Altogether, SNAP can play an integral role in working with
intra- and inter-departmental agencies, multi-jurisdictional agencies,
and non-governmental organizations such as Red Cross, Feeding
America, and the Salvation Army to develop standards and strategies
for ensuring safe and nutritious foods and beverages reach vulnerable
Americans in an efficient, effective, and consistent manner. 386 These
strategies need to tackle logistical barriers for preparing, storing,
cooking, and cleaning meals and snacks utilizing traditional best
practices and emerging technologies, as well as sensitively managing
the strong emotional ramifications of enduring a natural disaster.
D. Immigration
President Trump has taken a variety of actions ranging from
executive orders, budget cuts, and administrative agency initiatives
that raise concern over immigrant participation in federal food and
nutrition assistance programs including SNAP. 387 The most recent
explicit action that involved SNAP was a proposed rulemaking
notice by the Department of Homeland Security that indicates
immigrants could potentially be denied “lawful permanent
residency” if they have received certain government benefits
Lowey, House Democrats Release Emergency Disaster Appropriations Bill (Jan.
4, 2019), COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, https://appropriations.house.gov/news/pressreleases/lowey-house-democrats-introduce-emergency-disaster-appropriations-bill;
Lauren Lluveras, A Political Stalemate Over Puerto Rican Aid is Leaving All US
Disaster Funding in Limbo, CONVERSATION (Apr. 17, 2019), http://theconversation.
com/a-political-stalemate-over-puerto-rican-aid-is-leaving-all-us-disaster-fundingin-limbo-114498.
385
Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act of 2019, H.R.
2157, 116th Congress (2019-2020).
386
T. Abernathy, Responsibilities of the USDA-Food and Nutrition Service in
Nutrition Assistance Response to Natural Disasters, 61 J. NUTR. SCI. VITAMIOL. S14
(2015).
387
President Trump’s Executive Orders on Immigration and Refugees, CTR.
MIGRATION STUD., http://cmsny.org/trumps-executive-orders-immigration-refugee
s/?gclid=CjwKCAjworfdBRA7EiwAKX9HeDr7Dk2m06VsUjcnRpmAV1v0X24
Zy4Q_AS3hao6m-NJalBZdKwqZaxoCK90QAvD_BwE (last visited Aug. 30,
2019); G. Kaufmann, Why Immigrants in California are Canceling their Food
Stamps: Confusion and Fear about an Immigration Crackdown are Causing Some
Families to Avoid Food Banks and Public Assistance Programs, NATION (Mar. 17,
2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/why-immigrants-in-california-are-cancel
ing-their-food-stamps/.
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including SNAP or if the government anticipates they may seek
government benefits in the future. 388 Known as the “public charge
rule,” the Trump administration would significantly expand the 1999
Interim Field Guidance that defined dependence on government
assistance as participation in cash assistance or long-term
institutionalized care. 389 An estimated 382,000 people seeking to
adjust their immigration status could be subjected to the proposed
rule. 390 The sixty-day public comment period closed on December
10, 2018 and more than 216,000 comments have been submitted.391
Several anti-hunger organizations, along with local and state social
service agencies submitted comments expressing concern regarding
the short- and long-term implications of expanding the definition of
dependence. 392 A final rule was put forth on August 12, 2019
detailing the factors the Department “will consider in the totality of
the circumstances when making a public charge inadmissibility
determination” beginning October 15, 2019. 393 The rule indicates
the Department will not consider public benefits received on behalf
of another, such as a citizen child in the household. 394 The National
Immigration Law Center, among others, indicated it will file suit and
others re-expressed concerns this rule will have on food insecurity
and a range of health outcomes. 395

388

DHS Announces New Proposed Immigration Rule to Enforce Long-Standing Law
that Promotes Self-Sufficiency and Protects American Taxpayers, U.S. DEP’T
HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 22, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/09/22/dhsannounces-new-proposed-immigration-rule-enforce-long-standing-law-promotesself; Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 8 CFR Parts 103, 212, 213, 214,
245, and 248, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (2018), https://www.dhs.gov/publication
/proposed-rule-inadmissibility-public-charge-grounds.
389
Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds,
64 Fed. Reg. 28689 (proposed Mar. 26, 1999).
390
T. Hesson, et al., Immigrants May be Denied Green Cards if They’ve Received
Benefits, POLITICO (Sept. 22, 2018) https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/22/poo
r-immigrants-green-cards-trump-836456; M.D. Shear & E. Baumgaertner, Trump
Administration Aims to Sharply Restrict New Green Cards for Those on Public Aid,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/22/us/politics/imm
igrants-green-card-public-aid.html.
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Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, REGULATIONS.GOV,
https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=USCIS-2010-0012 (last visited Aug. 30,
2019).
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the Trump Administration’s Proposed Public Charge Rule, 51 J. NUTR. EDUC.
BEHAV. 501, 501 (2019).
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Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 8 CFR Parts 103, 212, 213, 214, 245
and 248 (Aug. 12, 2019).
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The Latest on President Donald Trump’s New Rules for Immigrants Receiving
Public Assistance, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/wo
rld/articles/2019-08-12/the-latest-trump-administration-defends-green-card-rules.
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The Trump administration indicates it is concerned about
declining enrollments in federal food and nutrition assistance
programs, particularly for WIC eligible mothers and infants. 396 But
the Acting Deputy Under Secretary for Food, Nutrition, and
Consumer Services and FNS administrator Brandon Lipps noted the
Department is mainly aware of only anecdotal evidence of decreased
participation relating to immigration concerns. 397 On March 25,
2019, Mr. Lipps blogged about a series of roundtable meetings he is
participating in with WIC directors, participants, retailers, and other
partners from across the US to address the obstacles WIC
participants and potential participants and how to better support state
and local agency staff. 398 Evidence suggests the risk of deportation
is negatively associated with participating in WIC and that Mexicanorigin families are the most sensitive when it comes to deportations
and program use. 399 A recent news report explained how an
unprecedented number of women and children are withdrawing from
WIC since the proposed public charge rule last fall.400
Without question, there is limited nationally representative
monitoring and surveillance of immigrant and refugee populations
and, particularly, scarce time-sensitive evaluation methodologies and
funding support structures in place to objectively track food security
or other health related outcomes among these populations as a series
of policy actions transpire. 401 More research is needed to understand
the breadth and depth of these impacts on immigrants’ short- and
E. Baumgaertner, Spooked by Trump Proposals, Immigrants Abandon Public
Nutrition Services, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/0
6/us/politics/trump-immigrants-public-nutrition-services.html.
397
Id.
398
B. Lipps, WIC: A Pathway to Long-Term Success, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (Mar. 25,
2019), https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2019/03/25/wic-pathway-long-term-succ
ess.
399
E.D. Vargas ED & M.A. Pirog, Mixed-Status Families and WIC Uptake: The
Effects of Risk of Deportation on Program Use, 97 SOC. SCI. 555, 568 (2016).
400
Alfred Lubrano, More Moms and Kids Withdrawing from Nutrition Program
Because of Deportation Fears, Administrators Say, INQUIRER (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://www.philly.com/news/wic-trump-immigration-deportation-pregnant-wom
en-infants-20190320.html.
401
Food Insecurity Among Immigrants, Refugees, and Asylees, FOOD RES. & ACTION
CTR. (Feb. 2016), http://org2.salsalabs.com/o/5118/p/salsa/web/common/public/co
ntent?content_item_KEY=13089; A.S. Venkataramani, S.J. Shah, R. O’Brien, I.
Kawachi & A.C. Tsai, Health Consequences of the U.S. Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Immigration Programme: A Quasi-Experimental
Study, 2 LANCET PUB. HEALTH e175, e176 (2017); M. Venkataramani, C.E. Pollack,
L.R. DeCamp, K.M. Leifheit, Z.D. Berger & A.S. Venkataramani, Association of
Maternal Eligiblity for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program With
Citizen Children’s Participation in the Women, Infants, and Children Program, 172
J. AM. PEDIAT. 699 (2018).
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long-term health, as well as financial stability.402 Attention should
also be directed towards evaluating the likely increased burden
placed on the charitable food sector (e.g. food banks and soup
kitchens) and healthcare system. 403 More work is needed to
understand if the likely deterrent effect of this rule is associated with
increases in per capita resources available to reduce food security and
promote public health.
E. Trade
In an effort to bail out farmers affected by the President’s
recent tariffs on Chinese imports and resulting Chinese tariffs on US
goods, the Trump administration purchased $1.2 billion commodities
from farmers and distributed them through the child nutrition and
emergency food assistance programs. 404 This doubles the amount
the USDA usually distributes through its food bank network. 405 The
plan for trade aid 2.0 includes additional direct payments and
commodity purchases. 406 Time-sensitive research is needed to see
how these unusually high contributions affect food security among
SNAP participants in addition to SNAP eligible non-participating
individuals and households. Little is known at this time about the
dietary quality of these contributions either or the logistical capacity
of food banks to effectively and efficiently manage the influx during
non-disaster related periods. A recent story explained how trade
mitigation is already shaping the menus of school lunches and food
pantry offerings. 407

S. Calvert, Food Banks Reap Unexpected Bounty from Trade Disputes:
Government Set to Deliver $1.2 Billion in Products Bought from Farmers as Tariff
Relief, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/food-banks-reapunexpected-bounty-from-trade-disputes-1538731801; V. Pelham, Generation of
Sicker Kids Feared Under Immigrant Proposal, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 30, 2018),
https://www.bna.com/generation-sicker-kids-n73014482133/.
403
R. Nixon, Food Banks Anticipate Impact of Cuts to Food Stamps, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/us/politics/food-banks-antic
ipate-impact-of-cuts-to-food-stamps.html.
404
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Jeff Stein, Food Banks Scramble to Make Trump’s Farm Bailout Work, MSN
NEWS (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/food-banks-scrambl
e-to-make-trumps-farm-bailout-work/ar-BBNX9IW?ocid=spartanntp.
406
Ryan McCrimmon, Next Steps for Trade Aid 2.0 Rollout, POLITICO (June 12,
2019), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-agriculture/2019/06/12/nextsteps-for-trade-aid-20-rollout-651844; see also Laura Reiley, Trump Administration
Reveals Details of $16 Billion Farm Bailout in U.S. Trade War, WA. POST (July 25,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/07/25/trump-administratio
n-reveals-details-billion-farm-bailout-us-trade-war/?noredirect=on.
407
Candice Choi, What’s On School Menus this Fall? Trade Mitigation, ASSOC.
PRESS (Aug. 11, 2019), https://news.yahoo.com/whats-school-menus-fall-trade402
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F. Administrative
The Trump administration has moved forward a variety of
administrative actions affecting the capacity and skill of federal
employees most relevant to developing the science that informs
SNAP policy or critical to carrying out vital SNAP operations and
evaluation. This includes a memo ordering USDA scientists to add
a disclaimer to peer-reviewed publications that “the findings and
conclusions in this preliminary publication have not been formally
disseminated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and should not
be construed to represent any agency determination or policy.”408
This requirement was later revised to include the more traditional
federal agency disclaimer: “The findings and conclusions in this
[publications/presentation/blog/report] are those of the author(s) and
should not be construed to represent any official USDA or U.S.
Government determination of policy.” 409 Congress directed the
Office of Budget and Program Analysis of the USDA to provide an
organizational charge for each agency funded in the 2019
Agricultural Appropriations. 410
i. Hiring Freeze
On January 23, 2017, President Trump signed a Presidential
Memorandum instituting a ninety-day hiring freeze for United States
federal employees. 411 There is not much data to objectively
understand the impacts of this hiring freeze or how severe budget

124106650.html;_ylt=AwrEZ7Bx11Jd6x8AtiUPxQt.;_ylu=X3oDMTByOHZyb21
tBGNvbG8DYmYxBHBvcwMxBHZ0aWQDBHNlYwNzcg--.
408
Ben Guarino, USDA Orders Scientists to Say Published Research is
‘Preliminary’, WA. POST (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/scienc
e/2019/04/19/usda-orders-scientists-say-published-research-is-preliminary/?noredi
rect=on&utm_term=.53f27d1640b2 (noting this disclaimer was on Colleen Helfin,
et al.’s article analyzing SNAP benefits and childhood asthma published in January
2019 in Social Science & Medicine).
409
Informational Memorandum: Final Policy Guidance on Disclaimers,
Disclosures and Acknowledgements in Outside Scientific Publications and
Presentations, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. RESEARCH, EDUC. AND ECON. (May 8, 2019),
https://www.ree.usda.gov/sites/www.ree.usda.gov/files/2019-05/Final%20Guidanc
e%20-%20Scientific%20Publications%20and%20Presentations.pdf.
410
Division A – Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2019, Congressional Directives:
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, supra note 136, at 2.
411
Presidential Memorandum Regarding the Hiring Freeze, 82 Fed. Reg. 8493 (Jan.
25, 2017).
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cuts in fiscal years 2018 and 2019 impacted agencies’ ability to
appropriately staff SNAP operations. 412
ii. Nominations
Repeated concerns have been raised about the administrative
inexperience, lack of scientific expertise, and industry ties Trump
nominations and (relatively few) confirmed appointees have brought
to the USDA to date. 413 Recently, the 115th Congressional Senate
failed to vote on the USDA nominees that had been approved by the
Senate Agriculture Committee; therefore, the process had to start
over with re-nomination by the 116th Congressional Senate. On
January 16, 2019, President Trump re-nominated his selections for
the USDA Undersecretary for Food Safety; Undersecretary for
Research, Education, and Economics; and Assistant Secretary for
Civil Rights. 414 In the interim, Secretary Perdue appointed each of
them to deputy positions that does not hold the same authority but
does not require Senate approval. 415 The Senate Agriculture
Committee advanced these three nominations but a date for a full
chamber vote has not been set at this time.416 No one has been
nominated at this point to be the Undersecretary of Food, Nutrition,
and Consumer Services, which is the mission area for all the federal
food and nutrition assistance programs including SNAP. 417 This
E. Wagner, Trump’s Hiring Freeze Slowed Federal Retirement Processing, Gᴏᴠ.
Exᴇᴄ. (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.govexec.com/management/2017/08/trumpshiring-freeze-slowed-federal-retirement-processing/140099/.
413
M. Lewis, Inside Trump’s Cruel Campaign Against the U.S.D.A.’s Scientists,
VANITY FAIR (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/11/usda-foodstamps-school-lunch-trump-administration; J. Eilperin, Trump Agriculture Nominee
Sam Clovis Confirms He Has No Hard-Science Credentials, Withdraws Over Ties
to Russia Probe, WA. POST (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/energy-environment/wp/2017/11/02/sam-clovis-trumps-nominee-for-usdas-top-sci
entist-confirms-he-has-no-hard-science-credentials/?utm_term=.5bf8b633f8d1;
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SCIENCE UNDER TRUMP: VOICES OF SCIENTISTS
ACROSS 16 FEDERAL AGENCIES 1 (2018), https://www.ucsusa.org/center-scienceand-democracy/promoting-scientific-integrity/scientist-survey-2018#.W70Qk2hKg
dU.
414
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NEWS (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2019/01/brashears-earphutchins-start-work-today-at-usda/.
415
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Secretary Perdue Selects Three Senior
Leaders at USDA (Jan. 28, 2019), https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDA
OC/bulletins/22b518d.
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United States Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, Roberts,
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means the mission area accounting for seventy percent of the
USDA’s budget is not being overseen by a Senate-confirmed
appointee. 418 Notwithstanding, as described throughout this review,
Secretary Perdue and other political appointed USDA staff have lead
a range of significant policy and programmatic changes at the
Department; many of which have been well-received by various
agricultural stakeholders and Congressional Republications. 419
iii. Relocation to New Department of Health and Public
Welfare
The most significant administrative proposal regarding
SNAP President Trump has put forth thus far is relocation. In
Delivering Government Solutions in the 21st Century: Reform Plan
and Reorganization Recommendations, put forth by the Executive
Office of President Trump, one of the thirty-two organizational
realignments to enhance mission and service delivery was to move
the non-commodity nutrition assistance programs (i.e., the “nearcash” benefit programs such as electronic benefit transfers or
vouchers) from the USDA to a newly named Department of Health
and Public Welfare, which is currently known as the Department of
Health and Human Services. 420 These non-commodity nutrition
assistance programs include: SNAP, the Special Supplemental
Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), the
Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP), the WIC Farmers’
Market Nutrition Program (FMNP), and the Senior Farmers’ Market
Nutrition Program (SFMNP). The USDA would continue to
administer the commodity-based programs (i.e., deliver actual foods
and beverages), including the National School Lunch Program
(NSLP) and the School Breakfast Programs (SBP), the Emergency
Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), and the Commodity
Supplemental Food Program (CSFP), among others. 421 Within the
new Department of Health and Public Welfare, SNAP would be
moved into an expanded Administration for Children and Families

418

Id.
Farmers Thank Secretary Perdue for Biofuels Support; Ask for Continued
Advocacy, NAT’L. CORN GROWERS ASS’N (Aug. 29, 2018), http://www.ncga.com/ne
ws-and-resources/news-stories/article/2018/08/farmers-thank-secretary-perdue-forbiofuels-support-ask-for-continued-advocacy.
420
EXEC. OFF. PRES. U.S., DELIVERING GOVERNMENT SOLUTIONS IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: REFORM PLAN AND REORGANIZATION RECOMMENDATIONS, 15 (2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Government-Reform-an
d-Reorg-Plan.pdf [hereinafter DELIVERING GOVERNMENT SOLUTIONS].
421
Id. at 28.
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(ACF). 422 The United States Department of Health and Human
Services currently administers Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) and houses the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS), among other social services.423
This Reform Plan was informed by the Trump
administration’s analysis and comments garnered as a result of the
Executive Order 13781, entitled “Comprehensive Plan for
Reorganizing the Executive Branch.” 424 This Executive Order was
issued on March 13, 2017 and directed the United States Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) to propose a comprehensive plan
to reform and reorganize the Executive Branch and for the OMB to
seek input from Executive Branch agencies, as well as public
comments on organizational alignment that can help reduce
“duplication and redundancy” and improve “efficiency,
effectiveness, and accountability of the executive branch.”425
Reorganization, as discussed in the Reform Plan, is not a new
Executive Branch undertaking and one recent effort highlighted was
the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence after 9/11. Some of the
suggestions put forth in response to the Executive Order 13781 and
public comment period were included in the fiscal year 2019 budget
or were adopted by agencies under existing authorities. The
Executive Order 13781 and the Reform Plan, among other inputs,
informed the President’s Management Agenda: Modernizing
Government for the 21st Century, which identified the following key
drivers of transformation: IT modernization; Data, Accountability,
and Transparency; and People—Workforce for the 21st Century. 426
The Trump administration’s rationale for moving SNAP to
this new Department of Health and Public Welfare was to better align
assistance programs with how they are often managed at the state and
local levels. Currently, some states and local governments
administer the Federal Government’s major public assistance
programs such as TANF and SNAP at a single state agency;
however, this single agency has to contend with two sets of
Id. at 27.
Id.
424
Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13781—Comprehensive Plan for
Reorganizing the Executive Branch, 82 Fed. Reg. 13959 (Mar. 16, 2017),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-03-16/pdf/2017-05399.pdf.
425
Id.
426
President’s Mgmt. Council & Executive Office of the President, The President’s
Management Agenda: Modernizing Government for the 21st Century,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Presidents-Management
-Agenda.pdf.
422
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“reporting, regulatory, and other administrative requirements—one
set imposed by HHS for TANF, and another by USDA for SNAP.”
Therefore, the Reform Plan discussed how consolidating public
assistance programs could potentially help reduce administrative
burden and possible duplication; streamline processes for issuing
guidance, putting forth new or modified regulations, and approving
waivers; improve coordination among public assistance programs;
and increase the likelihood that policies are applied consistently
across public assistance programs.
In addition, the Trump
administration’s Reform Plan proposes the establishment of a
permanent Council on Public Assistance, housed in the new
Department of Health and Public Welfare that would be composed
of all intra- and inter-departmental agencies that administer public
benefit programs, including within the new Department (e.g., TANF,
CMS, and now SNAP and WIC), the USDA (e.g., remaining
commodity-based programs), the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, among others. The Council would have “statutory
authority to establish certain cross-program policies, including on
uniform work requirements.” 427
While a part of the nation’s safety net, SNAP and the other
non-commodity nutrition assistance programs are only one
component and attention to each individual program’s interface with
other safety net components is essential to overall evaluation and
planning for improvement. 428 Indeed, improved coordination and
streamlining of eligibility requirements and certification periods
across the existing social safety net would likely improve efficiencies
and encourage participation. But moving the non-commodity
nutrition assistance programs oddly separates the long-standing food
assistance approach that now includes a suite of fifteen programs. 429
Opportunity exists to explore how best to streamline these programs
but separating them across two Departments is likely not the most
efficient and effective way. These non-commodity nutrition
assistance programs work with the USDA Center for Nutrition Policy
and Promotion to put forth policies and programmatic approaches

427
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ASSISTANCE WORKING TOGETHER 1 (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.irp.wisc.edu/publi
cations/dps/pdfs/dp143517.pdf.
429
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2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/programs-and-services.
428

216

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.15

that aim to align with the latest Dietary Guidelines for Americans.430
Granted, the USDA works in partnership with HHS to develop and
integrate the Dietary Guidelines for Americans into all relevant
federal nutrition policies and programs. 431 Moreover, these noncommodity nutrition assistance programs have a long-standing
history of working with SNAP-Ed, operated from FNS and NIFA,
along with other USDA research agencies including ERS and the
Agricultural Research Service (ARS), which supports national food
consumption surveys, along with eight research centers often
concentrating on the implications of federal food and nutrition
assistance programs. 432 A Departmental divide might hinder access
to program data, data sharing, analysts with the appropriate program
knowledge and analytical skills, and/or introduce other
administrative hurdles that might not justify such a significant
reorganization. Furthermore, an important but overlooked part of reenvisioning our social assistance approach is how best to provide
disaster relief.
Notwithstanding, the Reform Plan acknowledges a proposed
reorganization of this nature requires Congressional approvals and
the 115th and initial signs from the 116th Congress have given these
public assistance reform plans little attention.433 Therefore,
innovative policy and programmatic approaches to strengthen and
streamline our social assistance at the national levels to best serve
and support tribal, state, and local efforts, as well as the role of
charitable organizations is needed. However, these approaches
deserve objective, multidisciplinary analyses and rigorously
evaluated demonstration projects to justify dismantling our domestic
food and nutrition assistance programs.

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Education (SNAP-Ed), U.S. DEP’T
AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., https://wicworks.fns.usda.gov/resources/wicnutrition-education-guidance (last visited Aug. 30, 2019); WIC Works Resource
System, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., https://wicworks.fns.usda.go
v/resources/wic-nutrition-education-guidance (last visited Aug. 30, 2019).
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sp (last visited Aug. 30, 2019).
432
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iv. Reorganization of ERS and Proposed Relocations of
ERS and NIFA
Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue has proposed
significant reorganizations of ERS and relocations of ERS and
NIFA. 434 Specifically, Secretary Perdue proposed ERS move out of
the USDA’s Research, Education, and Economics Mission Area and
back into the Office of the Secretary, Office of the Chief Economist
to enhance the effectiveness of economic analysis at USDA.435 In
addition, the Secretary proposed to relocate ERS and NIFA out of
the Washington, DC area to possibly the Midwest. 436 The leases for
the current headquarter facilities for both agencies are expiring and
the Secretary indicated the rational for these relocations were to
improve USDA’s ability to attract and retain highly qualified staff
with training and interests in agriculture, place these important
USDA resources closer stakeholders, and save on employment costs
and rent. 437
On the day of the announcement the ERS
Administrator—a civil servant—was reassigned to another USDA
agency and the position was posted for hire a few weeks later listing
a Washington, DC location and this position has not yet been filled
with a permanent hire. 438
Before the shutdown, USDA indicated the exact location
would be announced in early 2019, after an external review of the
136 possible options, and both agencies would be relocated by the
end of fiscal year 2019. 439 Key Congressional Committees have
written to Secretary Perdue expressing concerns about these

Notice of Request for Expression of Interest for Potential Sites for Headquarters
Office Locations, 83 Fed. Reg. 40499 (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.federalregister.
gov/documents/2018/08/15/2018-17555/notice-of-request-for-expression-ofinterest-for-potential-sites-for-headquarters-office-locations;
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proposals. 440
Although Secretary Perdue has responded to
Congressional members emphasizing these reorganization and
relocation plans are sound, several former departmental and agency
senior staff have criticized these proposals and numerous scientific
and statistical societies, advocacy groups, among other stakeholders
have as well. 441 During a webinar held on September 20, 2018,
former departmental and agency staff called for Congress to delay or
stop these proposed administrative changes through the pending
agriculture appropriations or Farm Bill. 442 Additional calls were
made for Congress to consider holding oversight hearings or request
an independent study to evaluate the proposed changes including a
cost-benefit analysis that examines, among other aspects of the
move, employee hiring, recruiting, and retention data justifying the
need for the move and the possible success of the proposed new
location. 443 On December 19, 2018, nine House Democrats
introduced a bill aiming to prevent the USDA from reorganizing ERS

P. Roberts, Chairman & D. Stabenow, Ranking Member, Letter to Secretary
Sonny Perdue, HAGSTROM REPORT (Sept. 7, 2018), http://www.hagstromreport.com
/assets/2018/2018_0910_SenateAgLtr-ERS-NIFA.pdf?utm_source=MadMimi&ut
m_medium=email&utm_content=The+Hagstrom+Report+%7C+Monday+09_10_
2018&utm_campaign=20180910_m147086427_The+Hagstrom+Report+%7C+M
onday+09_10_2018&utm_term=Roberts_2Fstabenow+letter+to+Perdue.
441
Jerry Hagstrom, Perdue Responds on ERS, NIFA Moves as Opposition
Continues, AG POLICY BLOG (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.dtnpf.com/agriculture/w
eb/ag/perspectives/blogs/ag-policy-blog/blog-post/2018/09/25/perdue-responds-ers
-nifa-moves; Am. Statistical Assoc. et al., USDA Research Relocation and
Reorganization: Perspectives from Former USDA Chief Scientists and
Administrators, ASSN. PUB. DATA USERS (Sept. 20, 2018), http://apdu.org/2018/09/2
1/usda-research-relocation-and-reorganization-perspectives-from-former-usda-chie
f-scientists-and-administrators/; M. Weaver, Former NIFA Chief Questions USDA
Decision to Relocate Institute, CAPITAL PRESS (Aug. 15, 2018), http://www.capitalp
ress.com/Nation_World/20180815/former-nifa-chief-questions-usda-decision-torelocate-institute; Mary Russell, Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics Letter to USDA
on Proposed Changes to NIFA and ERS, EAT RIGHT PRO (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://www.eatrightpro.org/news-center/member-updates/from-our-leaders/acade
my-letter-to-usda-on-proposed-changes-to-nifa-and-ers; Roger Johnson, Letter to
Secretary Sonny Perdue Regarding the Proposed ERS and NIFA Moves (Sept. 18,
2018), https://1yd7z7koz052nb8r33cfxyw5-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/u
ploads/2018/09/09-18-18-Letter-to-Perdue-re-NIFA-and-ERS-.pdf;
Agric.
&
Applied Econs. Ass’n, Letter to Chairmen, Roberts and Conaway and Ranking
Member Stabenow and Peterson Regarding the Proposed ERS and NIFA Moves
(Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.aaea.org/UserFiles/file/AAEA-USDAERSLetterFinal-AgCommittee.pdf; Christine Aschwanden, Is Trump Trying to Politicize
Agricultural Data? Some Former USDA Officials Suspect Yes, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Jan. 17, 2019), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/is-trump-trying-to-politicizeagricultural-data-some-former-usda-officials-suspect-yes/.
442
Am. Statistical Ass’n et al., supra note 444.
443
Id.
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and NIFA and relocating these two agencies outside of the
Washington, DC area. 444
On December 21, 2018, right before the record-setting
government shutdown started, Secretary Perdue announced the
criteria the Department developed to evaluate the 136 Expressions of
Interest received from parties in thirty-five states in request to the
Department’s public solicitation to become the new home to ERS
and NIFA. 445 With the assistance of Ernst & Young, the Department
aims to apply a “set of guiding principles, including locations
meeting USDA travel requirements, locations with specific labor
force statistics, and locations with work hours most compatible with
all USDA office schedules.” In addition, the Department has further
defined the following criteria to apply to the Expressions of Interests:
quality of life (includes Diversity Index, Residential Housing,
Access to Healthcare, and Home and Community Safety Rankings);
Costs (Capital and Operating includes Cost of Living Adjustment,
Commercial Real Estate Costs, Land Costs, and Wage Growth Rate);
Workforce (includes Labor Force Growth Rate, Unemployment
Rate, and the Labor Force Population); and Logistics/IT
Infrastructure (includes Lodging Availability, Proximity to
Stakeholders, and Travel Time to/from DC).
The Explanatory Statement of the budget agreement that
finalized fiscal year 2019 Agricultural Appropriations called for “an
indefinite delay” in reorganizing ERS and required the USDA to
include cost estimates and research benefits related to the proposed
relocation of ERS and NIFA in the upcoming fiscal year 2020 budget
justification. 446 Subsequently, more than a dozen House Democrats
reintroduced standalone legislation to block the proposed
reorganization and relocations, which stipulates the authority to
administer ERS and NIFA is with the USDA Under Secretary for
Research, Education, and Economics mission area and cannot be
given over to another mission area or office within the

H.R. 7330, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018), https://pingree.house.gov/sites/pingree.h
ouse.gov/files/NIFAERS%20Bill%20.pdf.
445
Perdue Announces ERS, NIFA Site Selection Criteria [Release No. 0282.18],
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/201
8/12/21/perdue-announces-ers-nifa-site-selection-criteria.
446
DIVISION A – AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2019, supra note
136, at 4.
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Department. 447 Secretary Perdue testified before the House
Agriculture Committee on the state of the rural economy on February
27, 2019, during which time Representative Mike Conaway (RTexas) recognized the Secretary’s efforts to take on reorganizing the
Department “head on.” 448 Secretary Perdue responded to questions
from the Committee’s new member, Representative Jahana Hayes
(D-Connecticut) regarding the proposed reorganization and
relocations by emphasizing parts of ERS and NIFA will remain in
the Washington, DC area. 449 Secretary Perdue also explained during
his response to Representative Hayes how he believes aligning ERS
with the Office of the Chief Economist will likely lessen any
potential political interference since the head of both ERS and the
Office of the Chief Economist are civil employees in contrast to ERS
reporting to a politically appointed Under Secretary of Research,
Education, and Economics. 450 A few days later Politico scooped an
internal list of seventy-six staffers from ERS that would remain in
Washington, DC while the rest of the agency staff would be
relocated. 451
While the President’s budget proposals have not reflected
Congressional appropriations, the fiscal year 2020 budget released
on March 11, 2019 asked for relocation funds, significantly reduced
ERS’ budget, and cut staff at ERS by more than fifty percent, noting
research that duplicates land-grant universities will be eliminated.452
On March 27, 2019, the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and
Drug Administration and Related Agencies Appropriations
Subcommittee held a hearing regarding the ERS and NIFA
proposal. 453 During this hearing, the Subcommittee Chairman
Press Release, Congresswoman Chellie Pingree, House Democrats Introduce Bill
to Stop Research Agency Reorganization and Relocation (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://pingree.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=239.
448
State of the Rural Economy, C-SPAN (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.cspan.org/video/?458286-1/state-rural-economy.
449
Id.
450
Id.
451
Ryan McCrimmon, Morning Agriculture: ERS Staff Tapped for Potential
Relocations, POLITICO, (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.politico.com/morningagricultu
re/; see also Charles S. Clark, GovExec: Agriculture Department Staff Given
Marching Orders for Controversial Move, G2XCHANGEETC (Mar. 7, 2019),
https://etc.g2xchange.com/statics/govexec-agriculture-department-staff-given-mar
ching-orders-for-controversial-move/.
452
President’s FY 2020 Budget: Sustainable Agricultural Perspective, NAT’L
SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COAL. (Mar. 19, 2019), http://sustainableagriculture.net/blog
/fy2020-presidents-budget-proposal/.
453
USDA’s Proposed Relocation of the Economic Research Service and the
National Institute of Food and Agriculture, HOUSE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS
(Mar. 27, 2019), https://appropriations.house.gov/legislation/hearings/usda-sproposed-relocation-of-the-economic-research-service-and-the-national.
447
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Representative Sanford Bishop (D-Ga) acknowledged thirty-two
House Republicans wrote him and the Ranking Member a letter
indicating their support of the Secretary’s proposed relocations while
several House Democrats expressed opposition to appropriating
funds to support these relocations. 454 Days later during an
appropriations hearing, Secretary Perdue contended with Chairman
Bishop (who is from the state Perdue was once Governor) that the
proposed reorganization and relocations “maybe one of those areas
where you and I are friends but will have to disagree over the issue
going forward.” 455
On April 25, 2019, the Washington Post reported the Trump
administration plans to move forward with the reorganization and
relocations despite opposition. 456
Secretary Perdue recently
announced a “OneNeighborhood” initiative underway to consolidate
Departmental offices into nearby workspaces. 457 On May 3, 2019,
Secretary Perdue announced a short list of three top locations with
sufficient space to meet ERS and NIFA requirements: Indiana,
Greater Kansas City Region, and North Carolina Research Triangle
Region. 458 During May and June 2019, ERS and NIFA voted to
unionize and is represented by the American Federation of
Government Employees (AFGE). 459 Politico reported on how ERS
employees feel the Trump administration is retaliating against the
agency for publishing reports that did not support the

454

USDA’s Proposed Relocation of the Economic Research Service and the
National Institute of Food and Agriculture, HOUSE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS
(Mar. 27, 2019), https://appropriations.house.gov/legislation/hearings/usda-s-propo
sed-relocation-of-the-economic-research-service-and-the-national.
455
Nicole Ogrysko, Lawmakers, Perdue ‘Agree to Disagree’ Over Proposed USDA
Relocation, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 9, 2019), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/
agency-oversight/2019/04/lawmakers-perdue-agree-to-disagree-over-proposed-usd
a-relocation/.
456
Ben Guarino, Trump Administration Plans to Move USDA Research Divisions
Despite Concerns, WA. POST (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sc
ience/2019/04/25/trump-administration-plans-move-usda-research-divisions-despit
e-concerns/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.dbd4b74de5e0.
457
Nicole Ogrysko, On Heels of Proposed USDA Relocation, Perdue Announces
Plans to Realign Employee Workspaces, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 25, 2019),
https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2019/04/on-heels-of-proposed-usda-rel
ocation-perdue-announces-plans-to-realign-employee-workspaces/.
458
Perdue Announces Top Sites for ERS and NIFA Relocations, U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC. (May 3, 2019), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2019/05/03/per
due-announces-top-sites-ers-and-nifa-relocations.
459
Id.
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administration’s agenda such as trade, farm subsidies, SNAP, and the
environment. 460
On June 13, 2019, Secretary Perdue announced the Kansas
City region as the location for ERS and NIFA and ERS would remain
in the USDA’s Research, Education, and Economics Mission
Area. 461 ERS and NIFA employees who do not move to Kansas City
will be terminated effective September 30, 2019. 462 There continue
to be various legislative actions expressing support for or
alternatively exploring ways to prevent or, at least at this stage,
monitor the relocations. 463 In early August, the White House Chief
of Staff Mick Mulvaney commented at a Republican party gala:
Now, it’s nearly impossible to fire a federal worker
. . . But simply saying to the people, you know what,
we’re going to take you outside the bubble, outside
the Beltway, outside this liberal haven and move you
out into the real part of the country, and they quit.
What a wonderful way to streamline government

Ryan McCrimmon, Economists Flee Agriculture Dept. After Feeling Punished
Under Trump, POLITICO (May 7, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/0
7/agriculture-economists-leave-trump-1307146; Jacqui Fatka, ERS Employees
Overwhelming Vote to Join Union, FEEDSTUFFS (May 9, 2019), https://www.feedstu
ffs.com/news/ers-employees-overwhelming-vote-join-union.
461
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Agric., Secretary Perdue Announces Kansas City
Region as Location for ERS and NIFA (June 13, 2019), https://www.usda.gov/me
dia/press-releases/2019/06/13/secretary-perdue-announces-kansas-city-region-loc
ation-ers-and-nifa.
462
Ben Guarino, Hundreds of USDA Employees to be Removed from their Jobs in
September, WA. POST (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/20
19/08/07/hundreds-usda-employees-be-removed-their-jobs-september/?noredirect=
on.
463
The House Committee on Agriculture Subcommittee on Biotechnology,
Horticulture, and Research, Hearing: Examining the Impacts of Relocating USDA
Research Agencies on Agriculture Research (June 5, 2019), https://www.congress.
gov/event/116th-congress/house-event/109580; Press Release, U.S. House Comm.
on Agric. Republicans, Dunn, Conaway: Relocation Discussion is a Distraction from
Important Ag Issues (June 5, 2019), https://republicans-agriculture.house.gov/news
/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=6565; Daniel J. Sernovitz, Norton Throws Up
Potential Roadblock to USDA Relocations, WA. BUS. J. (June 26, 2019),
https://www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2019/06/26/norton-throws-up-pote
ntial-roadblock-to-usda-moves.html; Press Release, Chris Van Hollen, Van Hollen,
Senators Introduce Bill to Bar USDA Research Agencies From Leaving National
Capital Region (May 23, 2019), https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/news/pressreleases/van-hollen-senators-introduce-bill-to-bar-usda-research-agencies-from-lea
ving-national-capital-region.
460
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and do what we haven’t been able to do for a long
time. 464
But, the USDA Office of Inspector General, among other
federal watchdogs, indicate the relocations may have violated the
2018 appropriations act. 465 Most recently, and after about two-thirds
of affected employees declined relocation, the USDA agreed to key
union demands and will allow employees who agree to relocate to
telework through the end of the year, with an option to extend and
these employees will also be given a bonus equal to one month’s pay
to help compensate for the loss of income incurred by the employees
moving from the higher wage Washington, DC area to Kansas City
region. 466
Thus, it’s unknown at this time how these relocations will
impact the quality and quantity of research used to inform SNAP
policy and programmatic decisions or set precedent for similar
federal agency relocations.
v. Reorganization of the USDA Center for Nutrition Policy
and Promotion
Using the authority of Executive Order 13781, Secretary
Perdue already reorganized the USDA Center for Nutrition Policy
and Promotion (CNPP) by eliminating the former politicallyappointed Executive Director of CNPP position and merging the
White House Chief of Staff Offers New Reasoning for Relocations, FED.
MANAGER (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.fedmanager.com/featured/3405-whitehouse-chief-of-staff-offers-new-reasoning-for-relocations; Editorial Board, The
Administration Said It Was Moving These Agencies For Efficiency. Now the Truth
Comes Out. WA. POST (Aug. 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/the-administration-said-it-was-moving-these-agencies-for-efficiency-now-the-trut
h-comes-out/2019/08/10/854ccd10-b91a-11e9-b3b4-2bb69e8c4e39_story.html?no
redirect=on.
465
The United States Department of Agriculture Office of Inspector General,
USDA’s Proposal to Reorganize and Relocate the Economic Research Service and
National Institute of Food and Agriculture, Inspection Report 918991-0001-223
(Aug. 2019), https://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/91801-0001-23.pdf; see also Ben
Guarino, USDA Science Agencies’ Relocation May Have Violated Law, Inspector
General Report Says, WA. POST (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/s
cience/2019/08/05/usda-science-agencies-relocation-may-have-violated-law-inspe
ctor-general-report-says/?noredirect=on; Eric Katz, USDA Office Relocations Are
Illegal, IG Says, GOV’T EXEC. (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.govexec.com/oversight
/2019/08/usda-relocations-are-illegal-ig-says/158955/.
466
Rebecca Beitsch, USDA Eases Relocation Timeline as Researchers Flee Agency,
THE HILL (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/usda-easesrelocation-timeline-as-researchers-flee-agency/ar-AAFAzHp.
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Center into the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS). 467 The Bipartisan
Policy Center SNAP Task Force urged that this CNPP reorganization
be better leveraged to “consolidate responsibility for overseeing the
Food and Nutrition Service’s nutrition and public health missions
through a new Food and Nutrition Service deputy
administrator/CNPP director position.”468 Only recently was this
new Deputy Administrator, CNPP position announced for hire; there
is no requirement for an advanced nutrition or public health degree
in the position description. 469 CNPP works with the Department of
Health and Human Services Office of Health Promotion and Disease
Prevention to develop the Dietary Guidelines for Americans that
underlay SNAP nutrition policy. 470 This work includes housing the
USDA’s Nutrition Evidence Library (NEL), which “has dedicated
staff that collaborates with leading scientists to objectively review,
evaluate, and synthesize research using state-of-the-art methodology
to answer important food- and nutrition-related public health
questions.”471 NEL was recently renamed to the Nutrition Evidence
Systematic Review (NESR). 472
In the Agricultural Act of 2014, Congress mandated the
Dietary Guidelines for Americans expand to infants and toddlers
from birth to age two and provide additional guidance for pregnant
and lactating women. 473 In addition, as part of fiscal year 2016
appropriations, Congress mandated the review of the guidelines’
developmental process, which resulted in two study reports from the
National Academies of Science recommending significant
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Agric., Secretary Perdue Announces USDA
Improvements for Consumer Service & Efficiency (Sept. 7, 2017),
https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2017/09/07/secretary-perdue-announce
s-usda-improvements-customer-service; see also Improving Customer Service, 82
F.R. 42,781 (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/09/1
2/2017-19337/improving-customer-service.
468
LEADING WITH NUTRITION: LEVERAGING FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR BETTER
HEALTH: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE BPC SNAP TASK FORCE 7, BIPARTISAN
POL’Y CTR. (2018), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/leading-with-nutritionleveraging-federal-programs-for-better-health/.
469
Deputy Administrator, Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion, United States
Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service, FNS-SES-2019-1301,
USAJOBS, https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/531510600 (last visited
Aug. 30, 2019).
470
Dietary Guidelines for Americans, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., FOOD & NUTRITION SERV.
(Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/resource/dietary-guidelines-americans.
471
Julie E. Obbagy, et al., Systematic Review Methods for Pregnancy and Birth to
24 Month Project, 109 J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 698s, 698s (Mar. 2019),
https://academic.oup.com/ajcn/article/109/Supplement_1/698S/5184397.
472
About NESR, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NUTRITION EVIDENCE SYSTEMATIC REV.,
https://nesr.usda.gov/ (last visited May 14, 2019).
473
H.R. 2642, supra note 203.
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opportunities for improving the overall process. 474 In the fiscal year
2019 Agricultural Appropriations package, Congress asked the
USDA to report within six months on how it is modifying its
approach to drafting the Dietary Guidelines for Americans and
appropriated more than twelve million dollars through September
2021 towards this developmental process. 475 The process for
developing the Dietary Guidelines for Americans is behind schedule
and was impacted by the historic shutdown. 476 Recently, the twentymember 2020 Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee was
announced. 477 Known as the DGAC, this Federal advisory
committee kicked off about eighteen months of work at their first
public meeting this past March 2019. 478 While the new Dietary
Guidelines will come out sometime closer to 2020 and CNPP will
subsequently roll out relevant nutrition messages and materials,
Secretary Perdue recently introduced the Start Simple with MyPlate
campaign since most Americans “lack the motivation and skills to
make changes to their eating routines.”479 In May 2019, Secretary
Perdue met with developers of mobile technology and leaders of
rescue missions, among other stakeholders, to discuss how to help
people get access to nutritious food and achieve self-sufficiency. 480
More work is needed to understand the impacts the dietary guidelines
process, messages, and related activities on SNAP and SNAP-Ed
policy and programmatic approaches has on the participation, eating
patterns, and health outcomes of SNAP participants and those
eligible to participate.
Review of the Process to Update the Dietary Guidelines for Americans, NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. ENG’G & MED. (Oct. 8, 2018), http://nationalacademies.org/hmd/Activi
ties/Nutrition/DietaryGuidelinesforAmericans.aspx.
475
DIVISION A – AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, supra note 136.
476
Sarah Reinhardt, What’s for Dinner? A Preview of the People, Process, and
Politics Updating Federal Dietary Guidelines, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
(Sept. 17, 2018), https://blog.ucsusa.org/sarah-reinhardt/whats-for-dinner-a-previe
w-of-the-people-process-and-politics-updating-federal-dietary-guidelines.
477
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Agric. Members of the 2020 Dietary Guidelines
Advisory Committee Announced (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.usda.gov/media/pre
ss-releases/2019/02/21/members-2020-dietary-guidelines-advisory-committee-ann
ounced.
478
2020 Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee, DIETARY GUIDELINES COMM.,
https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/work-under-way/review-science/public-meetin
gs/meeting-1 (last visited May 14, 2019); NAT’L ACAD. SCI. ENG’G & MED. ,
REDESIGNING THE PROCESS FOR ESTABLISHING THE DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR
AMERICANS 26 (2017), https://www.nap.edu/read/24883/chapter/3#26.
479
U.S. Dep’t Agric., Start Simple with MyPlate, YOUTUBE (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W7_i5tY-5BY&feature=youtu.be.
480
Perdue Enlists American Innovators to Advance Self-Sufficiency, U.S. DEP’T
AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV. (May 8, 2019), https://www.fns.usda.gov/pressre
lease/2019/fns-000419.
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vi. Reorganization of the USDA Civil Rights Activities
Consistent with Executive Order 13781 calling for
Executive Branch reorganization, Secretary Perdue is reorganizing
the USDA’s civil rights activities.481 These activities include
managing complaints regarding the fair and equitable treatment of
USDA customers and employees participating in or working on the
suite of fifteen federal food and nutrition assistance programs the
USDA administers. 482
vii. President Trump’s Administrative Actions Summary
Altogether, a variety of administrative proposals and actions
taken by the Trump administration to date have direct and indirect
SNAP implications and should be monitored to ensure the relevant
SNAP personnel and agencies produce the most efficient, effective,
and positive impacts on SNAP participants and SNAP-eligible
individuals and households. In particular, the short-and long-term
implications of the CNPP and Civil Rights activities reorganizations
merit further attention and could provide timely insights on the
Department’s capacity to reorganize and move much larger agencies,
ERS and NIFA.
V. Conclusion
The evolution of the legislative, executive, and judiciary
actions aiming to address food insecurity and improve nutrition
through the Food Stamp Program now known as SNAP provides
fundamental insights. Together, these insights help to analyze the
strengths and limitations of the SNAP provisions of the 2018 Farm
Bill, recent and pending agricultural appropriations, Congressional
oversight (in)activities, along with the actions taken thus far by the
Trump administration. Without question, ensuring SNAP promotes
food security and improves nutrition requires innovative approaches.
Multidisciplinary data from independent, objective sources is a
critical ingredient to help sustain or implement new federal food and
nutrition assistance policy and programmatic approaches at the
federal, tribal, state, and local levels. Evidence demonstrates SNAP
directly and indirectly affects participants, farmers, food retailers,
food and beverage manufacturers, and taxpayers in the short- and
481
Strengthening Civil Rights Management, 83 F.R. 10,825 (Mar. 25, 2018),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/03/13/2018-05051/strengtheningcivil-rights-management.
482
Id.
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long-term across a variety of economic and health outcomes. More
data driven, bipartisan work is needed to positively shape SNAP’s
public health impacts—from participation, product, and retailer
eligibility to infrastructural, technical assistance, and innovative
nutrition education and obesity prevention grant funding. This data
must garner interdepartmental and multi-jurisdictional insights and
ideally factor in participant and retailer perspectives. And gradually,
we will hopefully see an evolution of SNAP and the nation’s social
safety net that better meets participant and stakeholder needs and
adapts, as necessary, to modern technology, up-to-date science, and
ever-changing circumstances.
Table 1: Selected policy and programmatic developments emerging
from the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the United
States Government shaping the United States Department of
Agriculture Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 483
Agricultural Adjustment Act – 1935 (P.L. 74-320)
Provided funding to encourage domestic consumption of
agricultural commodities.
The First Food Stamp Program (FSP) – 1939
Secretary of Agriculture cites problems with the commodity
distribution program and initiates the first, experimental food
stamp program where people on relief were able to buy orange
stamps equal to their normal food expenditures and for every $1
worth of orange stamps purchased that could be used to buy any
food, 50 cents worth of blue stamps were received and could be
used to buy food determined by the Department to be surplus.

483
See A Short History of SNAP, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV. (Sept.
17, 2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/short-history-snap; Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Legislation, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD &
NUTRITION SERV. (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/legislation;
COMMITTEE ON EXAMINATION OF THE ADEQUACY OF FOOD RESOURCES AND SNAP
ALLOTMENTS ET AL., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: EXAMINING
THE EVIDENCE TO DEFINE BENEFIT ADEQUACY (Caswell JA & Yaktine AL eds.,
2013); AUSSENBERG RA & COLELLO KJ, CRS, DOMESTIC FOOD ASSISTANCE:
SUMMARY OF PROGRAMS (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42353.pdf; Rachel
Ehrenberg, The Growth of US farming and the Farm Bill, KNOWABLE MAGAZINE
(Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.knowablemagazine.org/article/society/2018/growthus-farming-and-farm-bill.
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Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act – 1959
(P.L. 86-341)
Authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to distribute surplus food
and issue food stamps redeemable by eligible needy persons
through January 31, 1962. But this authority was not used by the
Eisenhower administration.
President Kennedy’s First Executive Order 10914 – Providing
for an Expanded Program of Food Distribution to Needy
Families - 1961
Authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to expand and improve
the program of food distribution throughout the US and initiated
Food Stamp pilot programs which required participants to
purchase food stamps but eliminated special stamps for surplus
foods and ultimately expanded to forty counties and three cities in
twenty-two states with 380,000 participants.
Food Stamp Act – 1964 (P.L. 88-535)
Authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to administer a permanent
food stamp program that would provide eligible households to
obtain a nutritionally adequate diet through the issuance of a
coupon allotment which shall have a greater monetary value than
their normal expenditures for food; required states to develop
participant eligibility standards; and established eligibility
standards for foods permitted to be purchased with food stamps.
The Food Stamp Act Amendment – 1970 (P.L. 91-671)
Established uniform national standards for eligibility and work
registration requirements; required that allotments be equivalent
to the cost of a nutritionally adequate diet; and instituted an
outreach requirement.
Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cleveland v. United States – 1971
(449 F.2d 255)
Secretary of Agriculture acted within his scope of authority
granted under the Food Stamp Act of 1964 in denying the
applicant fast-food restaurant request to participate as a “retail
food store” in the Food Stamp Program and only approved grocery
establishments which stock a large number of low-cost staples.
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno – 1973
(413 U.S. 528, 93 S. Ct. 2821, 37 L. Ed. 2d 782, 1973)
An amendment to the Food Stamp Act prevented households made
up of unrelated individuals from participating in the federal food
stamp program and a class action suit was brought and the
amendment was found to violate the Due Process clause of the
Fifth Amendment since it is without any rational basis for not
allowing unrelated people to participate in the program.
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Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act – 1973 (P.L. 93-86)
Required states to expand the program to every political
jurisdiction; expanded program to individuals in treatment and
rehabilitation centers for substance abuse; established bi-monthly
issuance; authorized the USDA to establish temporary eligibility
standards for disasters; and added a new category of seeds and
plants as eligible purchases with SNAP benefits.
Agriculture and Consumer Act Amendments – 1974 (P.L. 93347)
Authorized the USDA to pay fifty percent of all states’ costs for
administrating the program and established the requirement for
efficient and effective administration by the states.
The Agricultural Act of 1970 Amendments – 1974 (P.L. 93-86)
Authorized the food stamp program to operate nationwide.
The Food and Agriculture Act – 1977 (P.L. 95-113)
Eliminated the purchase requirement; eliminated categorical
eligibility; established statutory income eligibility guidelines at
the poverty line and a number of other provisions related to
eligibility; established a job search requirement for nonexempt
work registrants; restricted eligibility for students and aliens;
established that authorized stores must sell a substantial amount of
staple foods; introduced demonstration project authority; and
established various access and integrity provisions.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act – 1981 (P.L. 97-35)
Established various income eligibility provisions and prohibited
program funds supporting outreach activities.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act – 1982 (P.L. 97-253)
Established various income eligibility provisions; adjusted the
Thrifty Food Plan; and permits alternative issuance system.
Emergency Food Assistance Act – 1983 (P.L. 93-86)
Grants authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to establish
temporary emergency standards of eligibility for the direction of
an emergency without regard to income and other financial
resources.
The Food Stamp Act – 1985 (P.L. 99-198)
Required states to implement an Employment and Training
program.
The Hunger Prevention Act – 1988 (P.L. 100-435)
Permitted pilot projects to test whether the use of benefit cards or
other automated or electronic benefit delivery systems could
enhance efficiency and effectiveness of operations for both
program administrators and receipts.
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The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act – 1990
(P.L. 101-624)
Established electronic benefit transfers as an issuance alternative
and allowed for electronic benefit transfer demonstration projects;
and authorized food stamp program nutrition education cost
sharing option with states, which only seven states utilized in
fiscal year 1992.
The Mickey Leland Childhood Hunger Relief Act – 1993 (P.L.
103-66)
Encourages state agencies to develop and establish electronic
benefit transfer systems.
Aiman Ghatts, Doing Business as A & M Food Shop v. United
States Department of Agriculture – 1994 (40 F.3d 281, 8th Cir.
1994)
The court reversed the Secretary of Agriculture’s permanent
retailer disqualification of the plaintiff that was imposed by the
Secretary under the authority granted by the Food Stamp Act, as a
result of the plaintiff’s employee’s role in trafficking benefits and
remanded the case for further administrative proceedings
addressing the alternative monetary sanction issue.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act and Other Legislative Actions – 1996 (P.L.
104-193)
Mandated states implement electronic benefit transfer systems;
placed a time limit on able-bodied adults without dependents who
are not working at least twenty hours a week or participating in a
work program; restricted benefits for legal immigrants; and
reduced maximum benefits.
The Balanced Budget Act – 1997 (P.L. 105-33)
Put forth provisions for how to fund state agencies’ nutrition
education plans and employment and training activities.
The Agricultural Research, Education, and Extension Act –
1998 (P.L. 105-185)
Reduces funding of employment and training programs and
payments for administrative costs to State agencies; revises
eligibility for certain disabled aliens, Indians, elderly individuals,
children, and Hmong and Highland Laotians.
The Electronic Benefit Transfer Interoperability and
Portability Act – 2000 (P.L. 106-171)
Puts forth a national standard for electronic benefit transfer
systems.
Agriculture Appropriations – 2001 (P.L. 106-387)
Increased the excess shelter cap and indexed the cap to changes in
the Consumer Price Index for all consumers; and allowed states
flexibility in the vehicle limit.
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The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act – 2002 (P.L. 107171)
Restored eligibility to qualified aliens and immigrants meeting
specified criteria; allowed states options to simplify the program;
reduced employment and training funding; eliminated the cost
neutrality requirement for electronic benefit transfer systems; and
allowed group homes and institutions to redeem electronic benefit
transfer benefits through banks in areas where electronic benefit
transfer systems had not been implemented.
The Food, Conversation, and Energy Act – 2008 (P.L. 110-234)
Changed the name of the Food Stamp Program to the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) to emphasize
the program’s nutrition impacts; institutionalized various policies
to enhance program access, administration, and integrity; provided
mandatory funding for the Healthy Incentives Pilot to test pointof-purchase incentives for healthful foods; and stipulated states
must issue monthly benefit allotments to individuals in one lump
sum unless a benefit correction is necessary.
American Recovery & Reinvestment Act – 2009 (P.L. 111-5)
Increased SNAP benefit levels between April 1, 2009 and October
31, 2013.
Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act – 2010 (P.L. 111-296)
Restructured SNAP-Ed as the Nutrition Education and Obesity
Prevention Grant Program, allowing states to focus on policy,
systems, and environmental change interventions.
Agricultural Act – 2014 (P.L. 113-79)
Required the USDA to update the stocking standards for
authorized SNAP retailers; required retailers pay for electronic
benefit transfer equipment; required states to submit plans and
reports if they elect to operate a restaurant meals program for the
homeless, elderly, and/or disabled; and permitted physical activity
as a nutrition education activity.
Workforce Investment Act – 1998 (P.L. 113-128)
Amended employment and training program provisions of the
Food and Nutrition Act of 2008.
Argus Leader v. United States Department of Agriculture –
2018 (740 F.3d 1172-75 (8th Cir. 2014) and 2018 appeal from
Intervenor Defendant, Food Marketing Institute)
Ruled Exemption 3 and 4 of the Freedom of Information Act does
not apply to data showing how much retailers participating in
SNAP receive each year. The Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch
stayed the lower court’s order requiring the disclosure of how
much money retail food outlets earn from SNAP transactions until
the plaintiff, Argus Leader, responds to the Food Marketing
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Institute’s request to appeal to the US Supreme Court. On June 24,
2019, the Supreme Court held that commercial information
submitted to the federal government qualifies as “confidential”
under the Freedom of Information Act’s Exemption 4 when, at a
minimum, it is “actually” and “customarily” “kept private” and the
federal government provides assurances that the information will
be maintained in confidence.
The Agricultural Improvement Act – 2018 (P.L. 115-334)
Establishes an interstate data system to prevent the simultaneous
issuance of SNAP benefits to an individual by more than one state;
increased mandatory commitments to the Food Insecurity
Nutrition Incentive Program over five years and proposed to
rename the program to Gus Schumacher Food Insecurity Nutrition
Incentive Program in honor of an integral champion of this
program who recently passed away and requires the USDA
Secretary to issue guidance clarifying the process for retailers to
seek waivers to offer SNAP consumers incentives for purchasing
SNAP-eligible staple foods, which were expanded to include
whole grains and dairy; preserves states’ option to eliminate asset
tests; enhances and increases funding for SNAP Employment and
Training operations; requires Secretary of Agriculture to
reevaluate and publish The Thrifty Food Plan every five years;
makes slight modifications to SNAP Nutrition Education (SNAPEd) including directs the Administrator of USDA’s Food and
Nutrition Service to consult with the Director of the National
Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA); eliminates state
performance bonuses; makes slight adjustments to electronic
benefit transfer system rules; and establishes a pilot Produce
Prescription Program.
Table 2: A summation of the emerging legislative branch
developments affecting the United States Department of Agriculture
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
Legislative Development
Block Grants

Status
Initial 2018 Farm Bill discussions
re-explored combining safety net
programs into a meta-block grant to
States where each State would
receive a fixed, annual amount of
funding for several safety net
programs including SNAP, an
entitlement program. The 2018
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Farm Bill did not convert SNAP to
a block grant program.

Broad-Based Categorical
Eligibility

Since 2000, States have been
permitted to use Broad-Based
Categorical Eligibility (BBCE),
which allows States to grant
automatic eligibility for families
that receive TANF assistance and
meet State-determined income
limits. A preliminary House
version of the 2018 Farm Bill
(H.R.2) eliminated BBCE and
proposed changes to countable
resources. On the other hand, the
preliminary Senate version of the
Farm Bill (S.3042) did not propose
significant changes to participant
eligibility. Ultimately, the 2018
Farm Bill did not eliminate BBCE.
However, on July 23, 2019, the
USDA published a proposed rule to
limit SNAP/TANF automatic
eligibility. Any final rule could
potentially
evoke
legislative
response, recognizing BBCE was
not put forth in the 2018 Farm Bill.

Work Requirements

The preliminary House version of
the 2018 Farm Bill (H.R. 2)
proposed
stricter
work
requirements for almost all ablebodied adults without dependents
(ABAWD) unable to find work and
permitted States to target limited
resources to those who they deem
may
benefit
most
from
employment and training programs
but ultimately was not a part of
2018 Farm Bill. Shortly after the
President signed the 2018 Farm
Bill, the USDA Food and Nutrition
Service issued a new proposed rule
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aiming to strengthen the criteria for
mandatory
SNAP
work
requirements and significantly
restrict State waiver allowance.
Legislation has been introduced to
prevent
the
USDA
from
implementing the proposed rule. In
addition, Title 1 of a Rules
Committee package (H.Res. 6)
directs
the
House
of
Representatives’ Office of General
Counsel to explore legal options for
responding to the proposed SNAP
rule, recognizing, in part, Congress
had the opportunity to address
work requirements in the 2018
Farm Bill and did not.
Other

Benefit
Adequacy

Other eligibility related legislative
actions in the 2018 Farm Bill
included simplifying homeless
housing cost provisions, preserving
states’ option to coordinate SNAP
benefits with low-income energy
payments assistance (i.e., helping
households “afford to heat and
eat”), rejecting a lifetime ban on
individuals convicted of certain
felonies, and eliminating state
performance bonuses to recognize
best or most-improved in SNAP
operations
that
have
been
historically
reinvested
in
supporting SNAP integrity and
effectiveness.
The 2018 Farm Bill requires the
USDA Secretary to re-evaluate and
publish the Thrifty Food Plan every
five years based on dietary
guidance, food prices, food
composition data, and consumption
patterns. A legal battle is underway
against the USDA regarding SNAP
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awarding lower benefits to US
citizens who reside in Puerto Rico
than to similarly situated and
equally needy US citizens residing
in any of the fifty states of the US.
The Closing the Map Gap Act
(H.R. 1368) was reintroduced in
the House to amend the Food and
Nutrition Act of 2008 to require
SNAP benefits be based on the
Low Cost Food Plan. In the Senate,
a bill (S.677) proposes to amend
the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008
to provide for participation of
Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and
the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands in SNAP instead
of the Nutrition Assistance
Program (NAP), a block grant
program.
Issuance

The 2008 Farm Bill prohibited
jurisdictions from issuing SNAP
benefits more than once per month
absent special circumstances. The
2018 Farm Bill established an
interstate data system to prevent the
simultaneous issuance of SNAP
benefits to an individual by more
than one state.

Redemption

The 2018 Farm Bill only makes
modest adjustments to electronic
benefit transfer system rules,
including temporarily banning the
switching and routing of fees and
easing of EBT authorization
processes for farmers’ markets
serving multiple locations. The
2018 Farm Bill makes no changes
to the SNAP Restaurant Meal
Program. The 2018 Farm Bill did
not address the use of SNAP to
provide additional benefits during
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the summer but future legislative
action might occur as the Child
Nutrition
Reauthorization
processes get underway. The 2018
Farm Bill requires nationwide
implementation
of
online
acceptance for SNAP benefits after
the pilots required in the 2014 Farm
Bill are implemented. A Supreme
Court decision protected SNAP
redemption data at the retailer level
(online or brick or mortar) as
confidential business information;
maintaining the existing standard
and
protecting
traditional
confidential business information
that could be accessed through
Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests.
Agriculture and related agencies’
appropriations for fiscal year 2017
and fiscal year 2018 provided about
$74 billion to SNAP in required
mandatory spending plus a reserve
fund
for
any
unexpected
participation increases. For fiscal
year 2019, the government was
partially closed for a record-long
thirty-five days due to a conflict
between President Trump and
Congress regarding the lack of
funding of the US-Mexico border
wall. Ultimately, a three week
short-term continuing resolution
was passed to end the shutdown.
The inability to timely finalize
fiscal year 2019 Agricultural
Appropriations
resulted
in
unprecedented SNAP benefit
issuance
logistical,
communication,
and
health
implications. In addition, the
record long shutdown resulted in
unpaid
federal
workers,
contractors, among others, who had
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not been paid for almost two
bimonthly paid dates that could
potentially have been eligible for
SNAP, among other federal food
and nutrition assistance programs.
Moreover,
these
furloughed
workers were tapping into the
charitable food system that many
SNAP participants or SNAP
eligible families depend on
regularly. Near the end of the shortterm resolution, fiscal year 2019
appropriations were finally passed
and provided about $74 million to
SNAP plus a reserve fund, along
with accompanying Congressional
Directives relevant to SNAP. A
two year budget deal was approved
to increase budget caps (P.L. 11637). The House Appropriations
Committee proposed $71.1 billion
in required mandatory spending for
SNAP. The Senate Appropriations
Committee has conducted hearings
regarding fiscal year 2020
appropriations. Another partial
government shutdown is possible
as Congress works to finalize bills
for fifteen agencies after its August
recess.
A record number of hearings
reviewing SNAP were held over
the course of the 114th Congress,
totaling sixty witnesses in sixteen
hearings and a report was published
synthesizing
the
findings.
Congressional letters of inquiry
have been submitted to the USDA
regarding the proposed relocation
of the Economic Research Service
(ERS) and the National Institute of
Food and Agriculture (NIFA) and a
recent hearing regarding the
proposed changes was held by the
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116th Congress. The 116th Congress
has held a few other hearings
relevant to SNAP.
Strengthening SNAP’s
Nutrition Impacts
Restricting Product
Eligibility

The 115th Congress held a hearing
focused on the pros and cons of
restricting SNAP purchases in the
initial weeks of their session but the
2018 Farm Bill did not put forth
any provisions to restrict SNAP
purchases.

Incentivizing Produce
Purchases

The 2018 Farm Bill increased
mandatory commitments up to
$250 million over five years to the
program, made the program
permanent, and renamed the
program to Gus Schumacher Food
Insecurity Nutrition Incentive
Program in honor of an integral
champion of this program who
recently passed away. The
implementation timeline for the
new Gus Schumacher Nutrition
Incentive Program was impacted
by
the
recent
government
shutdown and the uncertainty
regarding the relocation of the
NIFA. The 2018 Farm Bill also
established a pilot Produce
Prescription Program. Specifically,
the Secretary of Agriculture was
granted authority to establish a
grant program, in coordination with
the Department of Health and
Human Services, to award eligible
entities such as federally qualified
health centers to conduct pilot
projects that demonstrate and
evaluate the impacts of a produce
prescription
program.
The
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Secretary of Agriculture was
authorized to use $4,000,000 for
each of fiscal years 2019 through
2023. For retailer funded incentive
programs, the 2018 Farm Bill
requires the USDA Secretary to
issue guidance clarifying the
process for retailers to seek waivers
to
offer SNAP
consumers
incentives for purchasing healthy
SNAP-eligible staple foods.
Enhancing Minimum
Stocking Standards

The Agricultural Act of 2014
required the USDA to update the
stocking standards for authorized
SNAP retailers. The USDA rule
making process involved hosting
listening sessions, calls for public
comments,
and
conducting
regulatory impact analyses, as well
as extensions, delays, and technical
assistance. Implementation of the
final rule that now requires SNAP
authorized stores to meet one of
two staple food requirements was
completed in January 2018. Fiscal
Year
2019
Agricultural
Appropriations prohibited the use
of any funds to be used to
implement, administer, or enforce
the “variety” requirements of this
final rule until the Secretary of
Agriculture amends the definition
of the term to increase the number
of items that qualify as acceptable
varieties in each staple food
category. On April 5, 2019, the
USDA published a proposed rule
that would provide regulatory
flexibility for retailers in SNAP in
meeting the 2016 final rule, by only
modifying the definition of the
term “variety”.
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National Healthy Food
Financing Initiative

In the Agricultural Act of 2014, the
Secretary of Agriculture was given
enhanced
authority
and
appropriated $125,000,000 to
establish HFFI. In fiscal years 2017
and 2018, Congress appropriated
one million to launch HFFI at
USDA. The 2018 Farm Bill made
slight amendments to the HFFI,
including
expanding
eligible
projects beyond retail to include
food hubs, mobile markets, direct
to consumer markets, and food
business incubators. In fiscal year
2019, not less than $22,000,000
was appropriated. In both the
House (H.R. 1717) and Senate
(S.786),
bills
have
been
reintroduced to amend the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 to establish
a new tax credit and grant program
to stimulate investment and healthy
retail options in food deserts.

Nutrition Education and
Promotion

The 2018 Farm Bill only made
modest modifications to SNAP-Ed.
The House proposal to merge
SNAP-Ed and the Expanded Food
and Nutrition Education Program
(EFNEP) was rejected and instead
the 2018 Farm Bill encourages
better coordination across the two
programs, including requiring an
annual report to Congress detailing
the evaluation of the level of
coordination between SNAP-Ed,
EFNEP, and other USDA nutrition
education programs. The 2018
Farm Bill requires SNAP-Ed
programs to use an electronic
reporting system to measure and
evaluate projects and account for
state administrative costs. In
addition, the 2018 Farm Bill
establishes an online information
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clearinghouse to share best
practices
in
planning,
implementing, and evaluating
SNAP-Ed programs. The USDA
Secretary is required to provide
technical assistance to state
agencies in developing and
implementing SNAP-Ed plans and
state agencies are required to
submit an annual SNAP-Ed report
to the USDA Secretary. For fiscal
year 2019, $433,000,000 was
appropriated
for
nutrition
education services.
Table 3: A summation of the emerging executive branch
developments affecting the United States Department of Agriculture
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
Executive Development
America’s Harvest Box

Status
The America’s Harvest Box was
put forth in the President’s fiscal
year 2019 budget and reappeared
again in Secretary Perdue’s fiscal
year 2020 budget discussions.
Under this proposed approach to
support
the
President’s
leadership on Buy American, all
SNAP participating households
receiving $90 per month or more
in SNAP benefits would receive
a package of nutritious, one
hundred percent US grown and
produced food and the remainder
of the benefits would be provided
via electronic benefit transfer
cards. States would be given
flexibility in distributing these
boxes to participants. Recent
stories discuss the new “Meals to
You” program offered through
funding by the USDA FNS,
which offers a box including the
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equivalent of five breakfasts,
lunches, and snacks per student
delivered to each participating
student’s door via UPS during
the summer months.
President Trump’s fiscal years
2018, 2019, and 2020 budgets
consistently proposed massive
cuts to SNAP and included
provisions to reconfigure the
program by establishing a State
match,
limit
categorical
eligibility and the use of waivers
that exempt able-bodied adults
without dependents from work,
and establish application fees for
retailers seeking to participant in
SNAP. The President also
ordered all federal agencies to
cut spending by five percent for
fiscal year 2019 and again for
fiscal year 2020.
The Trump administration has
responded to a variety of
hurricanes, wild fires, floods, and
other natural disasters thus far
using the USDA’s Disaster
Supplemental
Nutrition
Assistance Program (D-SNAP).
Congressional
supplemental
appropriations have also helped
provide relief and on June 6,
2019 a $19.1 billion standalone
disaster supplemental bill was
enacted.
President Trump has taken a
variety of actions ranging from
executive orders, budget cuts,
and
administrative
agency
initiatives that raise concern over
immigrant
participation
in
federal food and nutrition
assistance programs including
SNAP. The most recent explicit
action that involved SNAP was a
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proposed rulemaking notice by
the Department of Homeland
Security
that
indicates
immigrants could potentially be
denied
“lawful
permanent
residency” if they have received
certain government benefits,
including SNAP, or if the
government anticipates they may
seek government benefits in the
future. Known as the “public
charge rule,” the Trump
administration
would
significantly expand the 1999
Interim Field Guidance that
defined
dependence
on
government
assistance
as
participation in cash assistance
or long-term institutionalized
care. The sixty-day public
comment period closed on
December 10, 2018 and more
than 216,000 comments have
been submitted. A final rule was
put forth on August 12, 2019.
In an effort to bail out farmers
affected by the President’s recent
tariffs on Chinese imports and
resulting Chinese tariffs on US
goods, the Trump administration
purchased
$1.2
billion
commodities from farmers and
distributed them through the
child nutrition and emergency
food
assistance
programs.
Another
similar
bailout
followed.
On January 23, 2017, President
Trump signed a Presidential
Memorandum
instituting
a
ninety-day hiring freeze for
United States federal employees.
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There is not much data to
objectively
understand
the
impacts of this hiring freeze or
how severe budget cuts in fiscal
years 2018 and 2019 impacted
agencies’ ability to appropriately
staff SNAP operations.
Nominations

Recently, the 115th Congress
Senate failed to vote on the
USDA nominees that had been
approved
by
the
Senate
Agriculture
Committee;
therefore, the process had to start
over with re-nomination by the
116th Congress Senate. On
January 16, 2019, President
Trump
re-nominated
his
selections for the USDA
Undersecretary for Food Safety;
Undersecretary for Research,
Education, and Economics; and
Assistant Secretary for Civil
Rights. And, Secretary Perdue
appointed each of them to deputy
positions in the interim that does
not hold the same authority but
does not require Senate approval.
The date of a full chamber vote
has not been set at this time. No
one has been nominated at this
point to be the Undersecretary of
Food, Nutrition, and Consumer
Services (the mission area for
SNAP), resulting in a mission
area accounting for seventy
percent of the USDA’s budget
not being overseen by a Senate
confirmed appointee.

Proposed Relocation to New
Department of Health and
Public Welfare

In
Delivering
Government
Solutions in the 21st Century:
Reform Plan and Reorganization
Recommendations put forth by
the Executive Office of President
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Trump, one of the thirty-two
organizational realignments to
enhance mission and service
delivery was to move the noncommodity nutrition assistance
programs (i.e., the “near-cash”
benefit programs such as
electronic benefit transfers or
vouchers) from the USDA to a
newly named Department of
Health and Public Welfare,
which is currently known as the
Department of Health and
Human Services. These noncommodity nutrition assistance
programs include: SNAP, the
Special Supplemental Nutrition
Program for Women, Infants,
and Children (WIC), the Child
and Adult Care Food Program
(CACFP), and the Farmers’
Market Nutrition Programs. In
addition,
the
Trump
Administration’s Reform Plan
proposes the establishment of a
permanent Council on Public
Assistance, housed in the new
Department of Health and Public
Welfare that would be composed
of all intra- and interdepartmental
agencies
that
administer
public
benefit
programs, including within the
new Department (e.g., TANF,
CMS, and now SNAP and WIC),
the USDA (e.g., remaining
commodity-based
programs),
and the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, among
others. The Council would have
statutory authority to establish
certain cross-program policies,
including on uniform work
requirements. The Reform Plan
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acknowledges
a
proposed
reorganization of this nature
requires
Congressional
approvals and the 115th and
initial signs from the 116th
Congress have given these public
assistance reform plans little
attention.
Reorganization of ERS and
Proposed Relocations of ERS
and NIFA

Secretary Perdue proposed ERS
move out of the USDA’s
Research,
Education,
and
Economics (REE) Mission Area
and back into the Office of the
Secretary, Office of the Chief
Economist to enhance the
effectiveness
of
economic
analysis at USDA. In addition,
the Secretary proposed to
relocate ERS and NIFA out of
the Washington, District of
Columbia area to possibly the
Midwest. Congressional letters
of inquiry and a recent hearing
have debated the rationale for
these proposals. On June 13,
2019,
Secretary
Perdue
announced the Kansas City
region as the new location for
ERS and NIFA and that ERS will
remain in the REE Mission Area.

Reorganization of the USDA
Center for Nutrition Policy
and Promotion

Consistent with Executive Order
13781 calling for Executive
Branch reorganization, Secretary
Perdue already reorganized the
USDA Center for Nutrition
Policy and Promotion (CNPP).

Reorganization of the USDA
Civil Rights Activities

Consistent with Executive Order
13781 calling for Executive
Branch reorganization, Secretary
Perdue is reorganizing the
USDA’s civil rights activities,
which would include complaints
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from the suite of federal food and
nutrition assistance programs it
administers.

